(10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI think there is enough resource in policing. As I may have said once or twice before, we have record police officer numbers—a total of 149,500 or so was reached in March last year—so we do have sufficient resources. The police are prioritising this issue, and of course, they can work with the EHRC to take criminal action where the EHRC identifies examples of antisemitism.
Following the battle of Cable Street against Mosley’s blackshirts, the Public Order Act 1936 introduced measures that severely restricted the ability of Nazi-type movements to march in predominantly Jewish areas. Is the Minister satisfied that the police of today are sufficiently aware of the powers they have to stop marches taking routes that go through areas that are predominantly associated with a threatened community?
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI understand that the hon. and learned Lady’s Committee reached that view; clearly the Government, informed by considered legal advice, took a different view. That is why on the front of the Bill when it was published there was a statement made under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that the Government’s view—informed, as I have said, by legal analysis—is that it is compliant with the ECHR. That is particularly because, as the hon. and learned Lady acknowledges, articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights and they are qualified by, among other things, the right of the legislature and the Government to prevent “disorder or crime”. I put it to this House that causing a 10-mile tailback on the M25 does constitute disorder, and I would say we are entirely entitled to protect our fellow citizens from being prevented from getting to hospital or getting their children to school.
The Minister has just uttered the key argument I was hoping to hear from him, which is that even the right to protest is a qualified right, not an absolute right. I quote in support of that something I revere even more than the ECHR, John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty”, which says:
“The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”
That is where the absolute right is restricted to being a qualified right.
My right hon. Friend and John Stuart Mill, the famous libertarian philosopher, are absolutely right. The right to protest, and indeed other rights, should not be enforced or enjoyed at the expense of other people. I know that the protesters think that they have an important and strong case, but that does not confer on them the right to ruin other people’s lives. It is not that they do so incidentally or accidentally as an unintended corollary of their protest; they are deliberately, intentionally and by design setting out to ruin other people’s lives. That is what the Government seek to prevent, and that is what this Act of Parliament seeks to do.
This Act of Parliament received Royal Assent only a short time ago having been through both Houses of Parliament. I think there was about a year between the Bill’s introduction and the completion of its passage through both Houses. The Bill had extensive scrutiny in Committee and was subject to extended ping-pong. No one can say that it did not have extensive scrutiny. That is why it is extraordinary that the nationalists now seek to repeal an Act that received Royal Assent only a few weeks ago.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
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A sentiment I entirely share, Mr Speaker.
I knew nothing about this gentleman until about an hour or an hour and a half ago, when I was briefed by officials, or perhaps earlier this morning when I saw the story in The Times. The Government are committed to making sure that the United Kingdom does not have dirty money. The hon. Lady has referred to the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which is passing through Parliament. It is designed to further strengthen those measures.
The Government are also firmly committed to legislating as soon as parliamentary time allows to combat so-called SLAPPs, whereby extremely rich individuals use, in essence, vexatious or malfeasant lawsuits to shut down proper scrutiny and proper free speech. Clearly, in this case the judge decided that transparency and the public interest were served by disclosure, and I welcome that.
On the other questions about donations, I am afraid that I do not know anything about those, although that is rather dangerous territory for the nationalists just now, is it not?
I had not intended to intervene in this urgent question, but I was delighted to hear my right hon. Friend the Minister say that the Government are proceeding with introducing the anti-SLAPPs legislation, as I had seen a report suggesting that it had somewhat fallen off the agenda. Will he tell us when, given the short time left in the life of this Parliament, the anti-SLAPPs legislation will be brought forward? There is cross-party consensus that it is extremely important and valuable.
I agree with all my right hon. Friend’s sentiments, particularly that about the importance of anti-SLAPP legislation, to which the Government are committed. On the timing, that is out of my hands. I have been informed that it will happen as soon as parliamentary time allows, but I am sure that, if he makes representations to the Security Minister and others, he will receive a fuller answer.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberWill the Minister confirm something for the sake of clarity? In the past, major peaceful demonstrations such as anti-nuclear demonstrations have blocked roads, but it was done with the permission of the police. That would continue, would it not?
Yes, it would. My right hon. Friend pre-empts my next point, which I think an Opposition Member raised earlier. Where a protest has been authorised and licensed in advance by the police, of course these provisions will not be engaged. Protests such as the Iraq war protests aimed at the former Labour Government would, of course, be licensed. Protests against this Government would no doubt be licensed as well and could properly be held.
The hon. Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett), who I see is back in his place, made a point about whether the Bill could be used to disrupt strike action. I draw his attention and that of the House to the Bill’s original clauses 6 and 7, which as a result of the Lords amendments have been renumbered as clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (2)(b) of each clause makes it clear that it will be a defence to offences under the Bill that the act in question was undertaken
“in…furtherance of a trade dispute”,
so trade union protests and anything to do with strikes are exempted from the provisions of the Bill.
I think that the definition we have set out is reasonable. The police have asked for it, the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court supports it, it backs up the case law and I strongly commend it to the House.
Lords amendments 2, 3 and 4 deal with tunnelling. They are clarificatory amendments, making it clear that the offence of causing serious disruption by being present in a tunnel, as defined by clause 4, is committed only if the tunnel has been created for the purposes of a protest. Lords amendments 10 and 16 relate to some clarifications involving the British Transport Police which we think are important. Lords amendments 6,7, 8, 9 and 36 pertain to so-called suspicionless stop and search.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberEveryone’s constituents, including the hon. Lady’s, are entitled to feel safe. As the shadow Minister said, firearms licences are not a right, and it is important that we think very carefully before issuing anyone with such a licence. As I said, we will respond comprehensively to the recommendations in these three reports. I know that that will include consideration of domestic abuse and domestic violence, which are clearly indicators of substantially increased risk, and I would be happy to discuss those recommendations as soon as they come out with the hon. Lady and her constituent if she would like to do so.
Is it correct, as has been reported, that in this tragic case, the murderer’s mother appealed to the police to remove the returned firearm from him and was ignored? If that is true, is it not also the case that no change in any licensing system will be able to compensate for that level of bungling incompetence?
I am afraid to say that very bad decisions—in fact, wrong decisions—were made in this case. As the former policing Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) said, the wrong decisions were taken under the guidance in force both in 2018, when the licence was first granted, and two or three years later, when the gun was confiscated and then returned. The IOPC has said that very clearly, and it has said that two or three officers of Devon and Cornwall police made the wrong decision at the time. My right hon. Friend is right to say that a change of guidance would not have helped, because the wrong decisions were made under the guidance at the time. However, we need to make sure that the guidance is robust and comprehensive and that training is comprehensive. It is with those purposes in mind that we will respond to the three reports in 60 days or so.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) said, I am here deputising for the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), who is awaiting treatment. I am sure the whole House will want to send him their warmest wishes for a speedy recovery to his duties at the Home Office, his duties in the House and his duties at this Dispatch Box, where he would unquestionably do a far better job than me. I wish him a rapid recovery and a rapid return.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on securing this debate on extradition. It is a topic he has consistently raised in this House over a period of time. It has been part of his long-standing record as a champion of civil liberties in a whole range of areas. It is a great privilege to be here this evening responding to his speech.
I would start by saying that extradition arrangements are a vital part of the Government’s toolkit in combating crime. It clearly serves the interests of justice to be able to bring back to the United Kingdom people who have committed offences here, where we want to prosecute them, and similarly, where people in the UK have committed offences elsewhere, it is reasonable for them to face justice in the countries that legitimately want them. So I think the principles of reciprocal extradition treaties are an important part of our justice system.
In recent years, in relation to our extradition arrangements with the US, we have successfully managed to bring back into the UK under that agreement people who have committed very serious offences to stand trial here for those offences, including rape, murder, manslaughter and many child sexual offences. Clearly, it serves the interests of justice and public safety that those people are subject to prosecution.
It is worth mentioning that the Extradition Act 2003, the subject of this evening’s debate, is organised geographically in two parts. Part 1 provides arrangements for European Union countries and part 2 applies to all other countries where we have formal arrangements through the European convention on extradition, the Commonwealth scheme or a bilateral treaty. Requests from any other country where we do not have formal extradition relations are dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and as my right hon. Friend has said, where the UK considers a request by another country to extradite one of our citizens, the standard looked at is reasonable suspicion. That is the threshold applied in deciding whether or not an extradition request is reasonable.
On numbers, it is worth just pausing on this for a moment. On the part 1 extradition figures for the last financial year, 2019-20, EU countries requested 1,168 individuals who were physically present in the UK, of whom 689 were subsequently sent to one of those EU countries. Similarly, we wanted to get hold of 269 individuals who were somewhere in the EU, of whom 231 were brought into the UK.
The reason I mention those figures is by way of comparison with the US figures that my right hon. Friend mentioned. First, the numbers in relation to EU countries in both directions are far higher; the numbers I mentioned, which were for just a one-year period, were far higher—by a multiple—than the US figures. There is also the ratio: in relation to EU countries, far more people—about three times more people—were taken from the UK into European countries than the other way around. That ratio is very similar to the ratio in relation to the US. So the ratio is broadly similar, whether it is the US or the EU. Therefore, I would not take that disparity in itself to indicate that there is a fundamental problem, unless we are going to argue there is a similar problem in relation to the EU, which I do not think anyone has so far suggested.
I would like to try to address some of the most fundamental points my right hon. Friend made. Essentially, his central allegation was that there is an imbalance—an asymmetry—in the arrangements, whereby it is easier and it is faster for the United States to extradite UK citizens, or people in the UK, than vice versa. I would like to take each of the points in turn that might be cited in support of the suggestion that there is an imbalance.
One of the first points that often comes up is the evidential threshold: what standard or what threshold do we have to reach in order for an extradition request to be granted? In the United Kingdom, as we have discussed already, broadly speaking, the test is of reasonable suspicion. For a request in the other direction, where the UK is requesting the extradition of somebody in the US, then the standard is what essentially amounts to probable cause. The question is whether those standards are equivalent—is reasonable suspicion equivalent or not to probable cause? That question was considered in 2011 by Sir Scott Baker, a senior retired judge, who concluded that both tests are based on reasonableness, both have to be supported by equivalent documentation and both represent the standard of proof applied by police officers in both jurisdictions, and that in substance the threshold represented by those two tests is broadly the same.
The House of Lords looked at the matter in 2014. The Select Committee on Extradition Law took evidence and concluded that, although the tests are in some elements different,
“whether this difference has any practical effect is debatable.”
The Committee went on to say that the
“experience to date demonstrates that”
the argument that
“they are ‘functionally’ the same is persuasive.”
So, both Sir Scott Baker and the House of Lords Select Committee gave the opinion that in essence the thresholds applied in the two jurisdictions are, broadly speaking, equivalent.
The second area in which one might seek a divergence between the arrangements is on discretion, on which my right hon. Friend touched. He pointed out, quite correctly, that the US Secretary of State has a discretion to refuse an extradition request, whereas the Secretary of State here is under an obligation to grant one after the matter has been considered, if requested, by a court. We have seen a number of cases—including recent cases, one of which Madam Deputy Speaker referred to—in which the courts in the United Kingdom have refused an extradition request, so protection is provided by the courts. Moreover, there is a right of appeal, so if in the first instance the court grants an extradition request, there can be an appeal—in fact, there are probably two levels of appeal above the court of first instance. There is, then, substantial judicial intervention to protect the rights of UK citizens in the way that I have just described.
It is instructive to think about the numbers—how often our courts protect people in the UK who are subject to extradition versus how often the US Secretary of State exercises their unfettered discretion. The answer is starkly in favour of the United Kingdom: I am told that since the treaty was entered into, on 21 separate occasions, a few of which my right hon. Friend referred to—I am not sure if those 21 include the recent Assange case—the UK court has said that extradition may not occur. The courts have stopped extradition 21 times. Conversely, there has been only one occasion on which the US Secretary of State has exercised their discretion and declined one of our requests, and that is in respect of the Anne Sacoolas case, which we should not debate too much. That is the only occasion on which that discretion has been exercised. That gives us some sense that the matter is perhaps not as one-sided as is occasionally suggested.
There is a third argument, which my right hon. Friend advanced with his characteristic eloquence, passion and attention to detail: the question of whether crimes might be committed in the UK that have only a very tangential connection to the US but the US authorities can then reach into the UK and pluck out suspects who really have very little, if anything, to do with the United States. That is the substance of the suggestion.
My right hon. Friend referred to a 2012 Select Committee report that drew attention to such problems. It was partly in response to that Select Committee report, and in response to some of the cases in the first decade of this century to which he referred, that the 2003 Act was amended in October 2013, 10 years after it first came into force, and a new section 83A was introduced that gave the United Kingdom courts the ability to refuse extradition either when a substantial measure of the requested person’s relevant activity was performed in the UK—that is, their offences were mostly UK offences—or when extradition would be contrary to the interests of justice. At the time, the US embassy was not terribly happy about those changes. I think that amendment—new section 83A, introduced in 2013—goes a long way to making sure that people whose offences are only very loosely connected to the US, and the substance of which were allegedly committed in the UK, are afforded quite a good measure of protection from extradition to the United States. That was a very important change that I think goes quite a long way towards protecting UK citizens.
The courts have used that power, and they have also used human rights law, as my right hon. Friend has said, in cases such as those of Gary McKinnon and Lauri Love. The courts have used it more recently as well, as Madam Deputy Speaker said, where the prospective defendant has successfully argued before our courts that their human rights would be infringed in some way if the extradition proceeded, and our courts here in the United Kingdom have afforded that protection. I think that is a very significant point in our debate.
How does the Minister respond to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) that an innocent person finding themselves on trial in the United States—our closest ally, as we all agree—would nevertheless be put under intolerable pressure to plead guilty, because if he gambles on proving his innocence and fails, he faces an enormous sentence, whereas if he confesses to a crime that he did not commit, he can get off with a few months in jail?
The argument that my right hon. Friend advances is essentially that the US justice system is inherently not fit for purpose. Of course, the rules that he describes apply as much to US citizens as they do to anyone else. Although the practice of plea bargaining in the United States is not one that we have in this jurisdiction, I do not think I would agree with the general proposition that the US justice system is inherently unjust, and that it is so bad that we cannot allow anyone to be taken there from this jurisdiction because the system is so terrible that justice will not be done. I do not accept that characterisation.
Of course there are points of difference, as has been pointed out, but I do not think those points of difference are such that we should simply turn around and say, “We will have nothing to do with the United States at all.” That is not a conclusion that I share or concur with, and therefore I do not think it is a basis on which we would want to discontinue all extradition relations.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Government have spent a quarter of a billion pounds this year on making our court estate covid-safe. Public Health England and Public Health Wales find it to be safe. I hope that it reassures the hon. Gentleman’s constituents to know that the number of positive cases in the court system detected among court staff is no different from what we find in the general population. The measures that have been taken are working, and people who need to use the justice system do not need to be afraid in the way he describes.
We are not complacent. We aim to do more, particularly in the area of testing. I urge people using the court system to take a lateral flow test, administered by a local authority testing centre, before going into court where they can, and if they see anything that concerns them, they should report it quickly, because there are reporting processes available. We are committed to making sure that courts are safe, and that work will continue.
Given that the Minister has previously expressed sympathy for the idea of raising the mandatory retirement age for magistrates in particular, may I appeal to him to ensure that when he does so, there is provision to reinstate those magistrates who have retired in the meantime, so that the valuable services of people like my constituent Peter Power JP are not lost to the bench?
As my right hon. Friend knows, we ran a consultation in the autumn on this topic, and I hope we will be able to respond formally to that and move forward in the near future. His suggestion that recently retired magistrates who are under the new retirement age can return is a very good point well made, and I can assure him that it will definitely feature in our thinking when we respond to the consultation.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs the Lord Chancellor said, we will not comment on individual cases. As the right hon. Lady knows, the number of TPIMs in force is very low—it is only five currently. We are not just talking about what may have happened historically; we are looking prospectively at what measures we may need to take to protect our fellow citizens.
Members have asked what the safeguards are. The first safeguard is that the Home Secretary—who I see is now in the Chamber, and who is a doughty defender of public safety and public protection—does not act without fetter, because when a TPIM order is made by the Home Secretary, it is reviewed by the High Court under section 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. The High Court has to give permission before that TPIM can come into force, and if the High Court finds that it is “obviously flawed”, permission is not granted, so there is a judicial safeguard inherent in the structure of TPIMs. If the subject of the TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, they may go to the Court for a judicial review. There are significant safeguards inherent in the structure of TPIMs.
As I said a moment ago, the Government use these measures extremely sparingly. Our preference, of course, is prosecution, as it should be. We only use TPIMs where absolutely necessary to protect the public, and we make no apology for doing so. Only five are in force at the moment, which is evidence of how carefully the Government apply these measures. Since 2011, despite the judicial mechanisms I have described, not a single TPIM has been overturned. I hope that that gives Members confidence that there are safeguards and that these measures are being used in a thoughtful way.
Reference has been made to the opinion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Of course, we listen carefully to what Jonathan Hall QC has to say. We study his advice carefully, and we often follow his advice. It is for this House and for us as Members of Parliament to reach our own decision, which may in many cases accord with the independent reviewer, but in some cases it may not. Where our judgment differs, we should exercise our independent judgment, as we are doing in this case.
In the Minister’s references to TPIMs, he may have answered a question that I was hoping to ask him a little later: what do we do about that category of people who have gone abroad to fight for terrorist-backing organisations and return to this country, where there is not enough evidence to prosecute? I think that the Bill does not say a lot about that. If I am wrong, will he correct me? If I am right, surely that is an area where TPIMs might be relevant.
Indeed. In relation to people who go overseas to assist terrorist organisations, we deprive them of their citizenship where we can, if it is lawful— if they are, for example, dual nationals—to prevent their return here in the first place. It is right that we do that. Secondly, on their return, it is our strong preference, if there is sufficient evidence, to prosecute them under the criminal law, as we very often do. However, if there are evidential difficulties and we cannot meet the burden of proof required by a criminal court—beyond reasonable doubt—but we do have a reasonable suspicion, we can use TPIMs to protect the public, should the Bill be passed in this form. The excellent example from my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) illustrates exactly why TPIMs could help us in those cases where we cannot achieve prosecution. Evidence from Syria, for example, is very hard to gather, but in cases where we have a reasonable suspicion, we must act to protect the public.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am very glad that this question has arisen. We should be absolutely clear that these crossings of the English channel are extremely dangerous. They are crossing the busiest shipping lines in the world. They are facilitated by criminal gangs who are ruthlessly exploiting vulnerable people. The crossings are also entirely unnecessary because France is a safe country and it has a very well-established and functioning asylum system. We are therefore working with our French counterparts around the clock, sharing intelligence between our National Crime Agency and the French authorities, to stop illegally facilitated crossings and to prevent on-the-beach embarkations.
That is a very clear answer as far as it goes, but it appears that French patrol boats are escorting these dangerously overloaded inflatables across the channel until they reach English waters—I should say UK waters—whereupon our patrol boats pick up the occupants and ferry them to our shores. I understand that this is because we have to save people who put themselves, and sometimes their families, at serious risk at sea, but how can we remove perverse incentives to behave in such a dangerous fashion?
It is worth emphasising that where boats get into difficulties in French waters—for example, if their engine breaks down—the French will pick them up and take them back to France. We must, as my right hon. Friend says, be mindful of safety of life, but we are reviewing our operational practices in these areas, for the reasons he mentions. Half the attempted crossings are intercepted by the French on the beach. We have so far, since last January, returned 155 people who have crossed and we seek to return many more.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberVictims who feel that a sentence is unduly lenient currently have a 28-day period following sentencing to apply under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme to the Attorney General, who can then make a reference to the Court of Appeal. On a review of sentencing more generally, which may well include the tragic case to which my hon. Friend referred, the sentencing White Paper that will come forward a little later this year, followed by a sentencing Bill, will provide my hon. Friend and other colleagues with an opportunity to raise issues that go beyond the matters we are considering today. I will of course listen carefully to this debate, in which colleagues from all parties may raise issues that can feed into the sentencing White Paper.
One topic that the sentencing White Paper will certainly deal with, although we are not dealing with it today, is short custodial sentences, which are not particularly effective at stopping reoffending. The White Paper will address that, and in particular it will make proposals to do more to treat the causes of offending behaviour, particularly drug and alcohol addiction and mental health problems, which are often the cause of high-volume repeat offending. Short custodial sentences do not deal effectively with that cohort of offenders, but that is not the topic of the regulations; it is a matter we will come to in the forthcoming White Paper and sentencing Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. May I offer a refinement on the suggestion made by my constituency neighbour, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne)? We understand why one wants to give prisoners who are serving a sentence an incentive to behave well in jail, but that could be achieved without this upset of the public perception that someone is getting a longer sentence than they are really getting. Prisoners could be given the sentence that they are going to serve, with the expectation that if they misbehave, it can be extended by a certain amount, rather than their being given a sentence that they can reduce by a certain amount if they behave themselves in prison. That would avoid the perception among the public that the Government are trying to con them into believing that the sentences being imposed are more severe than we all know them to be in reality.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. I should make it clear—I will explain this in a bit more detail in a moment—that the standard determinate sentences under discussion today have an automatic release point. The current release point, at 50% of the sentence, is not contingent on good behaviour; it is automatic. We are proposing to remove that automatic release point to two thirds as a first step, but, of course, there are other things that we could do in the area that he has just mentioned. Examining and investigating the clarity of sentencing decisions and how the public understand them are certainly matters that the sentencing White Paper and sentencing Bill can properly look at, and I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that.
What today’s regulations do is to take a very specific area where we can act quickly and immediately, rather than waiting for the larger and wider piece of work to be done later in the year. Of course, as part of that piece of work, we might well choose to go further than is the case today, but here is an area where we can act quickly and decisively and deliver on a critical manifesto commitment just 47 days after the general election.