Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 25th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The reality is that if the eurozone proceeds, as economic logic demands, towards closer economic and fiscal integration, there will be consequences for the whole EU. As part of that negotiation, we intend to insist that, as a first step, the interests of the 27 are protected over matters such as the single market, and that the particular British interest in financial services is properly safeguarded.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Those of us who opposed the creation of the single currency when John Major’s Government were sitting on the fence view with horror the prospect that its failure may now lead to the economic unification and economic government of Europe. Will the Minister reassure us that Britain would not countenance supporting such a mad and undemocratic idea?

[Mr Lidington]

Part of the critique that both my hon. Friend and I have consistently made of the single currency is that, in the absence of closer fiscal and economic union, a single monetary policy and interest rate would not be sustainable. However, it is the sovereign right of other European countries to choose whether to pursue closer integration now, and it would be disastrous for the UK were the eurozone to suffer a financial collapse or prolonged recession.

Palestine and the United Nations

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 15th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Alistair Burt]

I entirely concur with the hon. Lady.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Am I right in recalling that in 1948 the United Nations voted for a hasty two-state solution before agreement had been reached between the parties and that the result was an immediate outbreak of hostilities between them?

[Alistair Burt]

There are many interpretations of what happened at the UN in 1948, but my hon. Friend is right to suggest that a resolution at the United Nations by itself does not secure the peace between peoples unless it is soundly based on proper recognition, respect and confidence between the two. That is what we earnestly wish to see from the negotiations, which we hope will restart shortly and which we are pressing for as part of our approach to this weekend.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) has been to Afghanistan on 57 occasions, as he told us. That is 56 occasions more than me. Nevertheless, I have a few ideas about campaigning there. When faced with a deadly insurgency, one has three options: to counter it, contain it or quit. We have been trying to counter it and now we are going to quit. It seemed to be the nub of my hon. Friend’s eloquent contribution that those are the only two alternatives.

I believe that NATO’s Afghan strategy has a fatal flaw: the knowledge that however effective our efforts may be, we plan to quit. That signals to the Taliban that they will ultimately win and removes their incentive to negotiate the political deal that we all agree is what must end an insurgency. President Obama and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister have set a time limit for the current surge. British troops, as we have heard many times today, will no longer fight after 2014. By then, the Afghans should be self-sufficient. That is the theory, but as we all know, the key question is, “What if they are not?”

Is there a third way to be found between full-scale counter-insurgency campaigning, which is what the generals have been doing all along, and total withdrawal when the deadlines are reached? In other words, instead of countering or quitting, should we be containing? Some say, and I have heard it said this afternoon, that the long-term use of special forces will be enough by itself to underpin a post-surge Afghan Government. That seems to me inherently improbable. As I have argued before, and as I continue to argue—completely unavailingly in the United Kingdom, but perhaps with a degree more resonance on the other side of the Atlantic—what is required when the surge concludes is a strategic base and bridgehead area, or SBBA, to secure our strategic needs permanently.

There are only two sound reasons for NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan: to prevent the country from being used again as a base, training ground or launch-pad for terrorist attacks, which has been mentioned many times today, and to assist next-door Pakistan in preventing any possibility of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of al-Qaeda or its imitators, which I do not believe has been mentioned today. The following three objectives, though desirable, are not adequate reasons for our presence in Afghanistan: the creation of a tolerant and democratic society, the prevention of drug production, and the advancement of the human rights of women. Full-scale counter-insurgency campaigning, often referred to as war down among the people, involves micro-management of the threatened society. As such, it enables the pursuit of worthy goals such as those. By contrast, a strategic base and bridgehead area cannot secure such goals, but it can achieve both of our genuine strategic interests. During the period of grace provided by the surge deployment, an existing base area should be selected, or a new one constructed, in a remote area out of sight and largely out of mind of the Afghan population.

It is often said—in fact, I have lost count of the number of times it has been said—that there can be no purely military solution in Afghanistan, and that eventually a political deal must be done. Yet there is no basis for such a deal under our existing strategy. The deadlines for scaling down and ending our military presence will certainly put pressure on the Afghan Government to compromise with reconcilable elements of the Taliban, but they will have the opposite effect on the insurgents. The creation of an impregnable, long-term SBBA would enable pressure to be applied equally on both sides, and would confer many benefits, which I will summarise very briefly.

First, any return of international terrorists could be punished without having to re-invade the country. Secondly, any assistance needed by the Pakistan Government to secure its nuclear arsenal could be provided via the long-term strategic base. Thirdly, NATO would be almost completely disengaged from Afghan society, thus removing the constant irritant of a uniformed infidel presence in the towns and countryside.

Fourthly, the ending of micro-management would do away with the need to send service personnel out on vulnerable patrols, along predictable routes, which can easily be targeted. Fifthly, the balance of political and military forces in Afghanistan would be allowed to find its own level. If the worst happened and the Taliban took over, we would still have the strategic base and bridgehead area as a safeguard. Sixthly, the prospect of an SBBA would make it more likely that the Taliban would reach a deal with the Government. If the eventual outcome were nevertheless a more radical regime than NATO would like, that would be a matter for the Afghans alone as long as they offered no support to international terrorists. Finally, an SBBA could be garrisoned by as many or as few service personnel as the political and military situation dictated. Too remote to attack, it would be a deterrent to extremism and a bridgehead for easy entry and operations if, regrettably, they become necessary under a policy of containment.

It suits al-Qaeda to embroil us in Muslim states, as it did most calculatedly in Afghanistan in September 2001. That was why, 48 hours before the attacks in America, General Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda. It wanted us to, and knew perfectly well that we would, respond by invading Afghanistan. That was why it removed him.

Costly counter-insurgency cannot be our answer every time our enemies establish a presence in a different country; but there is an alternative to the extremes of micro-management, which is what we have been doing, and total withdrawal, which is what we say we are going to do next. That alternative is containment, and the means of doing it is a strategic base and bridgehead area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Burt]

I wish to make some progress. A lot of colleagues were able to give up two and a half hours to this debate and I would rather concentrate on the issues they raised, rather than on the hon. Gentleman, who came in very late—I hope he will forgive me.

Good progress is also being made on the expansion and improvement of the Afghan national police, and that is also a key part of ensuring security for the future and transition. The UK has funded the construction of 12 new police stations in Helmand province, and since its establishment in December 2009 more than 1,000 patrolmen have graduated from the Helmand police training centre. I have had the good fortune to see for myself the work being done in Lashkar Gah at the police centres and to spend time with Bill Caldwell talking about the training of the national security forces. Progress is being made and there is a growing confidence about this process, but, as with all things relating to Afghanistan, progress is never linear. This is not something that will go smoothly all in one direction; and there will be setbacks and we will take steps backwards before we move forward. However, genuine progress is being made, and the House is entitled to take note of it and feel some pride in it because of the work that has gone into creating that situation.

On security and draw-down, the Government welcome President Obama’s recent announcement on the draw-down of US troops from Afghanistan. We agree that substantial progress has been made towards the international community’s shared objective of preventing international terrorists, including al-Qaeda, from again using Afghanistan as an operating base. This is not simply about whether al-Qaeda is operating there now. The issue is: can the area be made sufficiently secure to ensure that al-Qaeda does not come back in future? That progress has been hard won and the announcement is a sign of success.

As was mentioned by a number of Members, including in interventions that I appreciated from the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) and my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), that draw-down has coincided with the notification of draw-down made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He made a further comment today about reducing our force level by a further 500 to 9,000 by the end of 2012. The decision has been agreed by the National Security Council on the advice of our military commanders, which reflects the progress that has been made in building up the ANSF. For the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border, let me simply say that the Prime Minister said this afternoon:

“This marks the start of a process that will ensure that by the end of 2014 there will be nothing like the number of British troops who are there now, and they will not be serving in a combat role. This is the commitment I have made, and this is the commitment we will stick to.”

This afternoon, there has been discussion about what the draw-down means and about whose incentive is greater. Our assessment is that the incentive for the Taliban to get involved in reconciliation is very clear, as the greatest imminent threat is faced by those who stay outside the process and continue to conduct operations against ISAF forces. The incentive is there for the Afghan security forces to continue the preparation work they are doing. That is the reason for draw-down dates and our sense is that steady progress is being made that vindicates the dates that have been given.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I understand the incentive while drones are still killing Taliban in the run-up to the end of 2014, but what incentive will the Taliban have to stick to any deal that is reached or to go through with a deal after 2014? Are we going to be firing drones from outside the country?

[Alistair Burt]

My hon. Friend is taking far too little notice of the improvement and strength of the Afghan national security forces in their own right. It is they who will carry on the fight on behalf of their people against those who threaten their state. To assume that this is a practice that only we are engaged in and that only we can be engaged in is unfair to the growing success and strength of the ANSF. That is the incentive for the future.

It is vital to recognise that the absence of combat troops does not mean a lack of interest from those who have created the conditions for what we hope will be a secure—

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, such matters were included in our talks, but they are also a matter of our public policy position. As we have said, British troops will not be engaged in a combat role after 2015 or in anything like the numbers that are involved today. We have set out our intentions in line with the prospects and aims for transition to Afghan security control throughout Afghanistan by 2014.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Given that it is highly unusual to set a withdrawal date in the middle of a counter-insurgency campaign, has my right hon. Friend received any indication from the Americans that they are considering the retention of a long-term strategic base or bridgehead area in the region so that real pressure can be exerted on both sides to reach an appropriate settlement?

[Mr Hague]

The long-term relationship—after the insurgency and after the transition in 2014—between the United States and Afghanistan is subject to negotiation at the moment between those countries, so it is not possible to give a precise answer to my hon. Friend now, but it is possible to say that such matters are under discussion.

Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend can certainly be assured that we will stay within the scope of the UN resolution, with legal advice, but he must bear it in mind that as the situation changes, what is targeted and the methods necessary to achieve our objectives will sometimes have to change. It would not be effective to say that we are only ever going to target the same things. Many different parts of the apparatus of the regime in Libya that are engaged in prosecuting a war against its own civilians have not actually been targeted yet.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend reassure us that there will be no change in the mission—no mission creep? A no-fly zone can be successful in preventing civilians from being massacred—that is why I voted for it—but what would the Government do if it became clear that the air raids have succeeded in preventing that and that Gaddafi is desisting from threatening to massacre whole swathes of his own people, but that he is staying in place? Would we then call off the campaign because the threat of massacre had been reduced to the point that it did not need to concern us any more, or would we say, “As long as Gaddafi is in place, the campaign goes on”? That is where we might find ourselves in legal difficulties?

[Mr Hague]

Of course it is open to Colonel Gaddafi to comply with resolution 1973, to end violence against civilians and to have a genuine ceasefire. President Obama and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made it clear at the beginning what he would need to do in order to do that; he would need to disengage from battles in places such as Misrata, to cease using his forces against civilians who try to protest in Tripoli, and so on. So it is open to him to do this. It would certainly not bring to an end the enforcement of a no-fly zone, the arms embargo and so many parts of the UN resolution, but in that situation the position—the need to protect civilians from attack—would be different. However, Colonel Gaddafi does not do this, presumably because if he did he would no longer be able to maintain himself in power, as he relies entirely on force to keep himself in power. That is why the question of his being there and remaining in power is, in practical terms, intimately bound up with resolving the conflict.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Spellar]

I say to my hon. Friend and near neighbour that in all the discussions on the middle east, and particularly on Palestine-Israel, there is a danger of what David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist party in Northern Ireland, who went from terrorist activities to a very significant role in the peace process, described as “whataboutery”. I could equally respond to my hon. Friend’s valid points by asking, what about this, that and the other? What about the failure to implement the Camp David accord? What about the terrorist activities?

At the end of the day, the international community and the parties concerned have to get back to the basic fundamental principle of ensuring the establishment of a two-state solution on borders agreed internationally and between the parties, with the states living together in harmony. I cannot put it better than UN Security Council resolution 1850, which said that

“lasting peace can only be based on an enduring commitment to mutual recognition, freedom from violence, incitement, and terror, and the two-State solution”.

I very much hope, as I am sure we all do, that the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington this month will intensify that process and involve a relaunch of the peace initiative by the Obama Administration. I am sure we all look forward to the President’s address on that subject.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The right hon. Gentleman is speaking very sensibly on this subject. I have always supported a two-state solution. Does he agree that Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip, where there were many settlements, shows that if an agreement for withdrawal could be reached, settlements need not stand in the way?

[Mr Spellar]

Yes, and I presume that the hon. Gentleman would also have mentioned the fact that the Israeli army enforced those movements under the direction of Sharon. Pointing such things out is important, but it is equally important to get back to the fundamental need for talks and negotiation on the acceptance of a two-state solution. From many of the discussions that there have been, I do not believe that the sides are too far apart on the detail. We therefore look forward to the initiative that we hope the US Administration will take later this month, which we hope all parties will then pursue.

On Syria, we welcome the Foreign Secretary’s comments about making approaches to the EU and the UN to step up pressure on the regime. At the moment, however, the regime seems well past his “fork in the road”, and I hope that the message is getting through to it clearly.

I am mindful of the time, Mr Deputy Speaker, and of the numbers who wish to speak in the debate, so I wish to raise only two other issues—and to do so briefly. First, on protecting our security and national interest, and ensuring stability in the region, the Foreign Secretary will be unsurprised if I once again raise the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The problem now stretches right round the gulf of Aden and out into the Indian ocean, which has a considerable effect on countries in the region. Nearly 800 seafarers are being held hostage, often in appalling conditions. Some have been brutally murdered. More than 30 ships are being held—some are used as mother ships to extend the pirates’ reach far into the Indian ocean. Ransoms totalling well over $100 million were paid last year, and there are credible reports that the pirates have entered a deal with the al-Shabab organisation in Somalia, which is linked to al-Qaeda, for a percentage of the ransom.

Therefore, in effect, the shipping industry is directly funding terrorism. There has been some response, but I feel that it has been inadequate. I had a helpful response from an Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but I was concerned when a Defence Minister told me that there had been no recent change in the rules of engagement. I recognise that there is no easy instant solution, but there is a danger that the crisis will continue to outrun and overwhelm the response. Piracy threatens not only lives but a vital world trade route. Incidentally, the unwillingness of crews and ships to go through the Suez canal and pay dues could have a damaging effect on the income of the emerging Egyptian democracy. Frankly, the Government need to get a grip on that. They must engage with other maritime nations and get commitments for sufficient ships and personnel, but there must also be a step change in the rules of engagement and operational tempo.

To pull those arguments together and put them in a broader context, we do not accept that if we intervene anywhere in the world, we must take action everywhere. Nor do we accept the converse—that if we cannot or will not take action in one country, we should be immobilised elsewhere. That is why the previous Labour Government, when I was a Defence Minister, intervened militarily in Sierra Leone, but were unable to take action against the brutally repressive Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.

I also accept—the Opposition have supported the Government in this respect—that a range of factors must be taken into consideration, and that countries must be considered on a case-by-case basis. However, we would like evidence not only of more coherent planning, but of more rigorous analysis. Around the time of Kosovo both Tony Blair, in his Chicago address, and Kofi Annan, in his Ditchley lecture, extensively developed the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. They might have been controversial, but they helped to create a framework within which policy could be decided, and indeed scrutinised and criticised.

I have not detected the development of such a doctrine in the speeches of the Foreign Secretary, including his speech today. The Opposition support much in his policy, but we require the Government as a whole to get their act together on policy and to be more effective on delivery. In short, we believe that it is time for them to get a grip.

Escape of Taliban Prisoners

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Commons Chamber

[Alistair Burt]

On the right hon. Gentleman’s second point, I do not necessarily make the same link as he does between this incident and the political process. That is continuing. There are further conferences this year on the peace process, which was authorised and supported at the Kabul conference earlier this year. There are processes in place, which are being followed by the international community and led by President Karzai. The UN is closely involved, but I am not certain that a call for a mediator is either enhanced or diminished by the events of the past 36 hours. I recognise what the right hon. Gentleman says, but that process is continuing apace.

As for remarks about optimism or otherwise, it is entirely appropriate that, as they have done in the past, colleagues make statements honestly as they see the circumstances and as they see security situations improving, or not improving. I am here to talk about an incident that has clearly set back the process, but there are other things to talk about in relation to Afghanistan that clearly show the process moving in a different direction. I think that it is right that colleagues should be able both to report honestly the optimistic aspects of what is happening in Afghanistan and, as the right hon. Gentleman suggests, to assess things soberly if they go wrong.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Can the Minister at least confirm the early report that suggests that instead of prisoners tunnelling out, accomplices tunnelled in to reach them? What does it indicate about the internal security of a prison if people are able to tunnel in and it proves possible to go from cell to cell assembling hundreds of prisoners so that they can take advantage of that outside help?

[Alistair Burt]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for such a detailed question. However, I am sure that although he will be disappointed, he will not be surprised to learn that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office does not yet have sufficient detail to confirm the veracity or otherwise of that report. It is such reports that lead, understandably, to our great concern about this case, and the need to find out exactly what has happened—and, of course, how we can ensure that such circumstances do not arise in future.

Bradley Manning

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 4th April 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I, from the Government Benches, urge the Minister to convey to our American friends and allies that those of us who believe that, if Private Manning is guilty of the leakage of which he is charged, he did a very terrible thing indeed, are nevertheless convinced that it is fatal to snatch defeat from the jaws of a sort-of victory by focusing attention on the conditions in which he is being held, rather than on the question of the guilt or innocence of his conduct? The word “counter-productive” should be at the forefront of our American allies’ minds when they consider how to treat him.

[Mr Bellingham]

I thank my hon. Friend for his very wise remarks. He is a candid friend of our American allies, and his points are very well made. All people who are detained in custody deserve to be treated in detention according to the highest international standards, and we certainly expect nothing else—nothing less—from the United States.

To return to the point about Private Manning’s nationality, we must respect his wishes on the matter and recognise the limitations on UK involvement. The right hon. Lady mentions Mr Manning’s family. We have not had a direct request from them, but obviously, if it comes to consular assistance of any kind, we will look at that request as and when one is made.

Private Manning is serving in the US armed forces and has been detained in the US while he is subject to legal proceedings. He has access to legal counsel who, from the reports I have seen, appear to be very active in defending his case. That case is ongoing, and we are confident in this instance that US judicial processes are sound.

In the light of the right hon. Lady’s representations tonight, I will instruct our officials at our embassy in Washington again to report the concerns of this House to officials in the State Department. I will also discuss with the Foreign Secretary and the Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire, who has responsibility for north America, what else we might be able to do, while respecting the views of Private Manning and his legal counsel.

I can assure the right hon. Lady that we are concerned: we have listened very carefully to what she has said before; I have listened to what she has said tonight; and, as I assured her a moment ago, in response to that we will instruct our officials at our embassy in Washington again to report our concerns to officials in the State Department.

Once again, I thank the right hon. Lady for raising the issue. I hope that what I have said is of some help and of some interest to her.

Question put and agreed to.

North Africa and the Middle East

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 24th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

As the right hon. Gentleman will have heard in my statement, I condemn all those attacks and the deaths on both sides—of Palestinians in Gaza and of those who died in the terrible terrorist attacks on Israel in recent days. In the middle of the important developments and dramatic change in the middle east, I have underlined and will continue to underline that those events add to the urgency of the peace process. It is important that both Israeli and Palestinian leaders understand that and that they are prepared to make the necessary compromises to get direct talks towards a two-state solution going again. I have put that in my own way, but what I have said is strongly in accordance with the sentiments the right hon. Gentleman has expressed.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

When the Government decided to withdraw the last of our carriers and the Harrier force with it, they did so at the last minute and for financial reasons. Now that both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor have confirmed what I sought to establish previously—that these operations will receive extra funding from the Treasury reserve—will the Foreign Secretary have urgent discussions with the Secretary of State for Defence on reactivating HMS Ark Royal and some of the Harriers, because, I assure him, people who know about these matters know how versatile and valuable such a capacity would be?

[Mr Hague]

No. I have urgent discussions every hour or so with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, but it is important to implement the strategic defence and security review and to bear in mind that fundamental to our national security is the restoration of our national finances. Yes, we have had to do some things that in an ideal world we would not have done, and the defence budget has had to be controlled, but we have been able to do, and continue to do, what is necessary in Libya without the equipment to which my hon. Friend refers. Our operations are conducted by Typhoon aircraft and, for ground attacks, by Tornado aircraft. These are flying from land bases in the Mediterranean and are able to conduct the operations very easily without, in this case, the need for an aircraft carrier.

North Africa and the Middle East

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 17th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I shall give way only to Members to whom I have not already given way. I really must conclude my speech in a few minutes’ time.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend. Will he confirm whether assessments show that a no-fly zone is likely to be effective against the ground attacks against the Libyan rebels? Will he confirm that in order to mount such a no-fly operation quickly, carrier-borne aircraft—sadly, not ours—will be essential at the beginning? Will he further confirm that if we are involved in such operations, they will be paid for by funds additional to the existing defence budget and not subtracted from it?

[Mr Hague]

Financial arrangements will depend on the circumstances and discussions in government, and are secondary to the urgency of taking these decisions. No, carrier-borne aircraft are not necessary, as none of the contingency planning of any of the nations involves the use of aircraft carriers. I agree with my hon. Friend on one point—that a no-fly zone is not the complete answer, although it might be one element that helps. Having a no-fly zone does not mean that everything would be sorted out and everybody would be fully protected. We should not pretend otherwise. As I say, it is one element and the Arab League has called for it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

We regard the treatment of the lettori as completely unacceptable, and through both our embassy in Rome and ministerial contacts we are pursuing the matter energetically with the Italian authorities.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

If Britain decides to take part in an unanticipated military commitment to engage in a no-fly zone in Libya, will the extra cost be added to or will it be taken from the existing defence budget?

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Chancellor will no doubt make a judgment about that, if it arises.