National Security and Investment Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 26th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Paul Scully]

We have got to the nub of the matter quickly. I can indeed confirm that. In the letter the Secretary of State sent to the Chair of the BEIS Committee, copying in my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, he spoke about the fact that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs to scrutinise the work of the ISU, including for example details of some of the risks that the ISU has identified under the NSI regime and the measures taken to address them. As part of that, the Secretary of State confirmed that the Department can provide the Chair of the BEIS Committee with confidential briefings on Privy Council terms, and that he would be happy to set those out in more detail in either a memorandum of understanding or further exchange of letters. The Secretary of State went on to say that he would encourage the STC to provide scrutiny of the work of the ISU where the work of the unit falls within the specific remit of that Committee. He also welcomed the Intelligence and Security Committee’s continued scrutiny of the work of the security services, which will include where the security services’ work supports the work of the ISU.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I hate to be slightly disobliging, but it is a fact, is it not, that the staffs of these Select Committees do not have the clearance necessary to see or handle top secret material, and showing a top secret document to the Chair of a Committee on his or her own, briefly in very limited circumstances, does not amount—as I will explain shortly—to effective scrutiny?

[Paul Scully]

I look forward to hearing my right hon. Friend’s explanation.

I believe that the Bill as amended by the other place through amendments 11 and 15 would require the Secretary of State to provide a confidential annexe, to be provided to the ISC. I am advised by my noble Friends Lord Callanan and Lord Grimstone that there is considerable strength of feeling in the other place about ensuring that the operation of the regime receives appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, and I welcome the passionate and expert debate that this question has already received. It has been proposed that the ISC is better placed than the BEIS Committee to scrutinise the Investment and Security Unit, despite the Secretary of State for BEIS having responsibility for the unit. The implication of the amendments is that the Select Committee responsible for holding the Secretary of State to account across their responsibilities is insufficient in that regard. It is also suggested that the ISC would have inadequate access to information to carry out its duties.

In essence, the amendments would require sensitive details to be provided to the ISC regarding the Secretary of State’s decision on final notifications given and final orders made, varied or revoked, but the ISC is already able to request such information as soon as is appropriate from the security services where it forms part of its long-established scrutiny responsibilities under the Justice and Security Act 2013 and, as I hope I have made clear, its accompanying memorandum of understanding. In addition, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State must publish details of each final order made, varied or revoked, and clause 61 already requires the annual report to include the number of final orders made, together with a number of other details. Indeed, that clause was amended in the other place to include further such information in the annual report.

We do not disagree that further information may be required for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Where that is the case, the Government will follow existing procedures for reporting back to Parliament, but that should be done primarily through responding to the BEIS Committee as it goes about its work of ably scrutinising the work of the Department. We will ensure that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs.

It is of course right that the ISC continues its excellent scrutiny of the work of the security services. The work of the security services on investment security in support of the ISU clearly falls within the remit of the ISC. That does not require any statutory change to be made. As I said, the memorandum of understanding pertains to the continuing work of the ISC, and I look forward to working with colleagues on that Committee. As such, and with the BEIS Committee having appropriate assurance that it will be provided with the information necessary, there is no need for these changes made to the Bill by the other place to stand.

In summary, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, I believe that this House is today presented with an improved set of measures to safeguard our national security. The ISC will not have its powers—existing powers —diluted through the discussion of the memorandum of understanding, as we have already said. Therefore, I commend the amendments, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

I reiterate that Labour has consistently welcomed this Bill and we are pleased that certain issues over national security have been addressed. The UK’s takeover regime was not fit for purpose as it was, and the Bill, with today’s amendments, goes some way towards fixing that. It is undoubtedly welcome in protecting our national security, but it is only one element of protecting, nurturing and developing the vital sectors of the future that we know are crucial for our economy. We hope the Government will work with us to ensure the national security of the UK in future.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The Intelligence and Security Committee greatly appreciates the work of the Minister and of his predecessor on this important legislation. I was on the Committee in June 2013 when we identified the risks posed by foreign investment and takeovers to the United Kingdom’s critical national infrastructure, citing Huawei as a case study—and we know what happened after that. We strongly support the Government’s decision to address those risks and we welcome their assurances that national security concerns sit at the very heart of the Bill. That is exactly as it should be.

However, what was not as it should be, with the Bill as originally drafted, was the lack of adequate oversight arrangements for those security concerns and for the process when they are weighed against business and other commercial concerns by the new Investment Security Unit. The Government ought to accept amendments 11 and 15 from the other place, introduced on a cross-party basis by former Security Minister and current ISC member Lord West, former Cabinet Secretary and former ISC member Lord Butler, former party leader and former ISC member Lord Campbell, and former Defence Secretary Lord King—who was of course the first Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee when it was established. Their amendments make provision for that previous lack of oversight. They would require the annual report produced by the new Investment Security Unit in BEIS to include, for each final order and notification made, the Secretary of State’s decision, along with the security services’ assessment of the national security risks uncovered. They would allow the Secretary of State to move any classified information into an annex and to provide that classified annex to the ISC. With the amendments in place as they currently are, we could be confident that the Bill will create the robust regime needed to protect the United Kingdom.

Given the powerful speeches from all quarters and the size of the majority in the other place in support of the amendments, it is surprising and disappointing that the Government remain opposed to them and are seeking to overturn what is clearly common sense. The amendments provide for the ISC to scrutinise the highly classified national security elements and the weighing of those classified elements against commercial concerns.

There appear to be three arguments employed by the Government against the amendments. The first claims that because BEIS is not listed in the Justice and Security Act 2013 or in the associated memorandum of understanding on the scope of our work, the ISC cannot look at decisions taken by the new unit in BEIS. That is based on a false premise.

During the passage of the 2013 Act, the Government explicitly and repeatedly told Parliament that the Act and the MOU would provide the ISC with oversight of all security matters across Government. The MOU mechanism, again, in the Government’s own words, was a “flexible” way to ensure that the list of organisations working on security matters and therefore subject to ISC oversight would be kept up to date.

[Sir John Hayes]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Lewis]

I will give way in a moment, because I would like my right hon. Friend to hear this next bit, as I think there was a bit he was missing in his earlier intervention.

These words were used in Committee in my presence by the then Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), when introducing the 2013 Act. He said:

“I want to be clear that the Government intend that, through the provisions of the MOU, substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities will be subject to ISC oversight.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 97.]

As if that were not clear enough, he went on to say, and this is the bit that matters:

“Things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions undertaken by a Department one year may be undertaken by another the following year… An MOU is flexible: it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation. It will enable the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.” ––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]

The setting up of the new Investment Security Unit in BEIS is therefore precisely the situation that the Government assured the House that the MOU was designed to address, and the unit can easily be added to the MOU by a simple exchange of letters. Indeed, if the Government were willing to give an undertaking here and now to add the new unit to those listed in the MOU, the need for these amendments would disappear.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is precisely why I drew the Minister’s attention to the flexibility of the memorandum of understanding and asked him whether the Government stood by the terms of that memorandum. The Minister was as clear as crystal. He said that he believed in that memorandum, and he saw no attempt in what the Government were doing to dilute the powers of the ISC or its ability, of the kind that my right hon. Friend set out, to range across government, if I can put it that way, where security is concerned. I think we have had reassurance from the Minister sufficient to support the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

Unfortunately, and I am afraid unusually for my right hon. Friend, he missed one little part that was missing in turn from the Minister’s answer, because the MOU as it stands does not include the Investment Security Unit. The MOU has a list of seven organisations that we can currently scrutinise. The whole point about flexibility is that, as these units are set up in other Departments, they can be added to the MOU, but the Minister has given no undertaking to add the ISU to the MOU. I am happy to give way to the Minister. If he would like to say that he will add the ISU—the new unit within BEIS—to the organisations listed in the memorandum of understanding, I will stop my speech immediately and say, “Well done, Minister,” but I fear that that is not going to happen, so I will continue with my speech.

The Government’s second argument is that the BEIS Committee is both capable of providing and best placed to provide the necessary oversight. I have the greatest respect for the work and experience of the BEIS Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), from whom we will hear later. He and his Committee are indeed best placed to provide oversight of the business functions of the new Investment Security Unit, and there can be no doubt that that Committee will do an excellent job in that respect, yet it is simply impossible for it to provide substantive scrutiny of the highly classified national security elements or of the overarching decisions taken about how to balance them with the commercial elements.

Select Committees cannot be given proper access to top-secret material in order to scrutinise effectively. Ministers have suggested that the BEIS Committee can substantively scrutinise such material, but that is impossible. While it is true, as we have heard tonight, that the provision of classified information can be negotiated with Select Committees on a case-by-case basis, the laying out of classified material in a secure room in the Department for Members to come in and read for an hour or so—but without allowing them to take any notes, without allowing them to retain it, without allowing them to share it with their staff, without allowing them to discuss it and without allowing them to report on it since any one of those would constitute a very serious security breach—does not amount to effective oversight.

Proper oversight of the national security elements of any decision under this new regime within BEIS must include the ability to access, analyse and discuss top-secret material frequently and fully. The Government already have one body, and only one body, that can do all those things and that they created for that express purpose: the ISC. Members of the ISC are all subject to the Official Secrets Act and have a dedicated office with appropriate security facilities to store and discuss top-secret material freely, and staff who undergo the most stringent Government clearance processes before they are allowed to handle such material—I said in an intervention earlier that the staff of other Select Committees of this House are not so cleared. There is also a lengthy process through which the Committee’s reports must go ahead of publication.

[Greg Clark]

My right hon. Friend will know that the call-in power and the power to refuse permission for mergers to proceed on national security grounds is long standing. It is vested in the Business Secretary and sometimes in the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. During all this time, scrutiny has been available to the ISC on those decisions. Has my right hon. Friend found that deficient in some way?

[Dr Lewis]

I am not sure that without concrete examples of what my right hon. Friend has in mind, I am in a position to give an answer to that question. What I do know is that it is the work of the ISC, on a basis of professional, full-time constant monitoring, to be able to look at the activities of those agencies that cannot be looked at by other Select Committees. He seems to be talking about the power of Secretaries of State to call in decisions, and I am not sure quite how that relates to the work of either Select Committees or the statutory Committee, which is the ISC.

[Greg Clark]

Perhaps I did not explain myself well. What is proposed in the Bill is an amendment of the current powers. There is a long-standing power for mergers to be blocked on national security grounds. It is one of three grounds on which an intervention can take place, so this is not a new power or a novel departure. The ISC is able to scrutinise the security services’ input into that now, as it will be in the future.

[Dr Lewis]

The ISC, on behalf of Parliament, is able to scrutinise the input of the intelligence agencies into these processes. It would not be able to scrutinise how that input is then handled, and the trouble is that because that input is top secret, the BEIS Committee would not be able to scrutinise it either. That means that there would be a scrutiny gap between what was being scrutinised by us as it went into the process of the new unit and what was being scrutinised by BEIS minus that sensitive material, so there would be no effective parliamentary scrutiny of the process whereby, as I said earlier, the highly sensitive security requirements were being balanced and offset against the commercial imperatives. Indeed, that may be the very reason why the Government are so reluctant to let the ISC see what is going on.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I fear that my right hon. Friend may have just answered my question before I ask it, but I am most grateful to him; he is making his speech with tremendous passion and is very persuasive. I just looked up the definition of “top secret” and I am wondering what will be missing from the output of the process that would mean that there are some scrutiny gaps. I think he has just explained that he wants to scrutinise the process and I can see why he would make that case, but will he just give us some indication as to what he expects would be top secret in that analysis, if that is at all possible?

[Dr Lewis]

If I gave an example of something that would be top secret—even if I were in a position to do so because we had started the work that we are not being allowed to start—I would then immediately be breaking the Official Secrets Act so, no, I cannot, and I would not even if I could. However, what is a certainty is that where there are circumstances where the intelligence agencies are advising on the security aspects, for example, of a potentially hostile state buying, overtly or covertly, into a strategically important asset, such as buying up a company engaged in cutting-edge technology. This unit will have to balance that against the possible commercial advantages of major investment from that other country.

The fact is that nobody on behalf of Parliament will be able to scrutinise that process unless either these amendments are accepted or the ISU—this new unit—is added to the list of units already on the memorandum of understanding. As I have said before and say again, if at any time the Minister wants to give me the assurance that it will be added, I am happy to let these amendments go from the face of the Bill.

As I explained, this is the reason that the ISC was set up as it is. If any Committee could do what the ISC does, it would not be necessary for the ISC to have all those unique facilities and arrangements. That is why paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding between the Government and the ISC categorically asserts:

“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament”—

I will say that again:

“the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies”—

and please listen to these next few words—

“and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”

A footnote to that sentence helpfully explains:

“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments…by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.”

With that machinery already in place, it is all the more baffling that the Government are now refusing to use the very body they created. Without including oversight by a properly structured and fully cleared security body, the Government are not placing security at the heart of the Bill.

The Government’s third and final argument is that if the ISC had a role, it would encroach on the BEIS Select Committee’s remit. This, too, is baffling and not borne out by experience. The Government’s own MOU already expressly states that the ISC scrutinises the classified parts of some Government Departments, leaving the remainder to the corresponding departmental Select Committees. That is what has always happened, perfectly harmoniously, in respect of a number of other Departments, so it is, again, bizarre that the Government now see this as a problem when they themselves have already made express provision for it.

The ISC can work seamlessly with the BEIS Select Committee on oversight of the Investment Security Unit, as it already does with other Select Committees such as the Defence Committee and the Home Affairs Committee, and in respect of the work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Far from being an “overreach” of our remit, in this particular case the ISC is trying to prevent its existing scope from being reduced. The unit that currently carries out investment security work is based in the Cabinet Office. Consequently, it is already overseen by the Intelligence and Security Committee. The ISC already scrutinises these activities in their current form in the Cabinet Office, so it cannot be “overreach” to do in future something that we already do. If the Government do not maintain this existing ISC scrutiny when the new Investment Security Unit takes over, it will be a step backwards from the current position.

If national security really is at the heart of the Bill, the ISC, as the national security oversight body, must be allowed to oversee it. The Government gave assurances to the House in 2013 that the ISC would oversee all security and intelligence matters. It is as simple as that. The sensible solution is that which was proposed and accepted in the other place—namely, the amendments that we are now being asked to reject for, as I have demonstrated, no good reason.

If, for some reason we have not been told, the Government cannot accept provision for oversight on the face of the Bill, there is the other solution that I have previously indicated. The Justice and Security Act and the memorandum of understanding linked to it set out the ISC’s role and remit, which the Government expressly told Parliament was the oversight of all intelligence and security matters across Government, now and in the future. The memorandum of understanding mechanism was rightly described by the security Minister at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), as “flexible” because

“it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]

The matter before us today is exactly as described in 2013: an area of Government in respect of which the ISC has oversight responsibility has been moved to a different Department. The memorandum of understanding could therefore be updated to reflect this, by way of a simple exchange of letters, to add the Investment Security Unit to the list of bodies covered by the MOU. The ISC would happily accept a commitment from the Minister to this effect tonight, in lieu of the amendment. Either method will ensure what is needed: real oversight of the national security elements of this legislation by the only body constituted and equipped to carry it out, rather than what might be described as “scrutiny in name only”.

[Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)]

I am very much of the view that, as Shakespeare said, “brevity is the soul of wit”. Notwithstanding that, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), made an incredibly professional and profound set of points that I hope the Minister listened to closely.

As the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), did, I welcome the Minister to his place, notwithstanding the fact that the previous Minister, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), is off doing a fantastic job—I think it is fair to say—getting the entirety of the UK vaccinated, of course in partnership with our colleague in Scotland. I am sure that he regards it as a step up in terms of ministerial oversight of the Bill.

On the Bill itself, my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) spoke on Second Reading and on Report with passion and knowledge of the subject in respect of the scrutiny that should be provided by all of us when looking at such serious matters. We have tried to be constructive with the Government and to make helpful suggestions. I am pleased with many of the amendments moved by those in the other place that the Government are agreeing to—on beefing up scrutiny and perhaps offsetting some of the concerns that some of us might have had about the danger of investment chill, which was certainly real given the original nature of the Bill.

Improvements have been made, therefore, but there is still scope for further improvement. In that regard—as I said, I will be brief, Madam Deputy Speaker—I again urge the Minister to give cognisance to the wise words of the Chair of the ISC.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention, and I will come back to that. Let me first develop the point about scrutiny. Clearly, the BEIS Committee has business expertise and is able to determine whether the regime is effective in scrutinising relevant acquisitions of control. I do question some of the narrative that I have heard that suggests that the BEIS Committee is not well placed to scrutinise the NSI regime. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the ISC requesting further information from the unit or the Secretary of State where it falls under the remit of that Committee. There is no barrier to the BEIS Committee handling top secret material or other sensitive material subject to the agreement between the Department and the Chair of the Committee on appropriate handling.

As part of its role, the BEIS Committee can request information that may include sensitive material from the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, including on the Investment Security Unit’s use of information provided by the intelligence and security agencies. The Select Committee already provides scrutiny over a number of sensitive areas, and there are mechanisms in place for it to scrutinise top secret information of this kind on a case-by-case basis.

As the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy explained in front of the BEIS Committee last week, and indeed in his letter to the Chairman of the BEIS Committee, which was copied to my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, there are three Committees that should act in collaboration. The BEIS Committee provides the primary work of scrutinising matters within BEIS competence, but two important additional Committees—the Science and Technology Committee and, indeed, the ISC—were acting in an auxiliary capacity, making sure that the essential cross-cutting nature of the Investment Security Unit benefits from the rigour of those Committees, with expertise in each area that the unit covers.

The Government therefore do not believe that we need to update the existing memorandum of understanding, because it is flexible and it does still pertain. As I have said, there is no dilution of the ISC’s work in this. The current arrangements are sufficient to ensure that we can have the correct scrutiny of this.

[Dr Lewis]

I appreciate that I have tried the patience of the House, but on that one point let me say that the MOU is flexible in the sense that we can add new organisations to it. The flexibility is not being used by the Government because they are refusing to add this new unit to the MOU, so the flexibility is rendered nugatory.

[Paul Scully]

As I say, the direction from the Secretary of State in his letter to the Chairs of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and the Science and Technology Committee was clear in terms of his expectations of how this should work. The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee should be the prime Committee to scrutinise BEIS competence, but similarly the Science and Technology Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee should absolutely be there to look at places within their competence to ensure wider scrutiny.

As I said, we have listened to Parliament. We have tabled a number of amendments to increase the amount of information included in the annual report and the various threshold. We have responded.

Lords amendment 1 agreed to.

Lords amendments 2 to 10 agreed to.

Clause 61

Annual Report

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 11.—(Paul Scully.)

Hospitality Industry: Government Support

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 11th January 2021 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) complained that it is rather cold in Westminster Hall today. I can recommend the House of Commons Library to him. It is an absolute furnace there, where I prepared the great oration that I was going to make, 90% of which is now going to be chucked because of the time limit. However, that is a measure of the importance of the debate, because so many people want to contribute to it. That is why our time is so limited.

When I last looked, more than 206,000 people had signed the petition, and the group with the highest number was people from the New Forest. In New Forest East alone almost 300 businesses are in the food and accommodation sectors, employing 4,000 people and constituting 10.8% of the working population. The hospitality industry is the UK’s largest employer of under 25-year-olds and, as the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) said in her able introduction, the importance, post Brexit, of our having an appealing environment for people to come and invest in cannot be overstated.

As the vaccine programme is implemented, one might reasonably expect the reintroduction of tiered restrictions on a gradually reducing basis. That is where the significance of adequate ministerial representation for the hospitality industry comes into play. For a sector of this size—the third largest in the UK—ranging from pubs through to restaurants and hotels, tourism and travel, not having a separate specialist and dedicated voice at the core of Government has led to a justified sense of disregard and discrimination.

Robin Hutson, who was mentioned earlier and who is my constituent, said, “It is our belief that we do not have a respected, truly invested senior Minister with deep sector knowledge, but who also has the power and the ear of the PM to effectively defend our corner.” It took more than four months for the Treasury to respond to one letter that I sent from a concerned constituent. Having a separate dedicated Minister would prevent that sort of delay. It would matter less that responsibilities are spread over more than one Department if only it were the same Minister who held the post in each Department. It is not uncommon to have a specialist Minister with a focused role in more than one Department. Initially, that could be on a temporary, emergency basis, as a hospitality industry recovery Minister. If it is found to work well during that phase, making it permanent might well be the logical next step.

CCRC Decision on 44 Post Office Prosecutions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 5th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Paul Scully]

I thank my hon. Friend—I did not ask him to say what he did, but it is gratefully received and he can come again.

All of us as constituency MPs hear from people like Nirmala Fatania. We are determined to get the answers through the independent inquiry, so that this can never happen again.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

Does my hon. Friend accept that those present or former Post Office officials who perpetrated this disaster and perpetuated the agony of the victims must be punished, not promoted, and shamed, rather than rewarded with honours, as I believe happened in at least one prominent instance?

[Paul Scully]

Yes, the Honours Committee and any future employers need to look at the background of any person involved in this. However, as I said, the inquiry is independent, and I do not want to stamp my authority on it. It is now for Sir Wyn Williams to question people and get answers. I want everyone, including people at the Post Office who were involved and are now no longer employed there, to engage in the process.

Regulatory Impact Assessments (Legislative Scrutiny)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Paul Scully]

I am glad that my hon. Friend made that point. He has been working tirelessly with his local wedding venues in Eddisbury to try to get a road map. We continue to work and engage on that issue to make sure that the sector, which is a really important contributor to the UK economy, can reopen, and that people whose special day is being put off, and in some cases ruined, can come together.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

I fully accept that in certain Departments, including the Minister’s own, Ministers are trying conscientiously to weigh up the different factors, come to sensible decisions and stick to them, but will he take the message back to the Government that the inability of Government at a very high level to choose policies that seem capable of withstanding gusts of public opinion or media opinion, which is something else, is undermining confidence in the process, at least in part of Government, because if a decision has to be changed in the way that my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) described in his rather splendid opening speech, that suggests that a certain degree of rigour is absent.

[Paul Scully]

I think that rather than gusts of public pressure, the Government have been working in what is, in effect, as close to real-time decision making as we are ever going to get, and it is based on health advice and the business response. My right hon. Friend talked about the press and the media; I direct him to the example with which my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch started—male eyebrow trimming and beard trimming—because that was never actually in the guidance. The guidance, which I worked on, was such that male beard trimming could work out, apart from detailing at the front if there was close, face-to-face, near contact. That was exactly the same as female eyebrow trimming, so there was no sense that men could go and get their eyebrows trimmed and women could not. The rhetoric in the media that men were getting a better deal than females, which understandably upset beauticians, just was not the actuality—it was not what was happening—but unfortunately, as we know, it is sometimes difficult to work with the media to stop a good story.

We must continue to engage. We do want to get back to the formality of regulatory impact assessments but, as I say, we need to engage at pace, so we will continue to listen to businesses. Sometimes, the consultations on the guidance we have been working on have lasted literally 12 hours on a Sunday. That guidance has come to me, to the unions and to businesses and we have all been acting within the same time constraints. We have not been hiding things away from businesses and those people who are most affected by this situation.

Horizon: Sub-Postmaster Convictions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Paul Scully]

In terms of the finances, the Government continue to work with the Post Office on its needs and to ensure that, although it is an independent company, it can work within its service obligations. In terms of the review, we recognise the hugely negative impact that the Horizon dispute had on postmasters. The financial settlement was a major step towards resolving some of those grievances, but there is more to be done. That is why we have launched the independent review, to ensure that the lessons are learned and that they can never be repeated.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

This is one of the worst disasters in public life since the contaminated blood scandal. Does the Minister agree that, if it is proven that Post Office executives were aware of the software faults but allowed innocent people to rot in jail, they were guilty of criminal negligence and possibly criminal conspiracy and therefore ought to be brought to justice? Will the proposed inquiry allow that to be done?

[Paul Scully]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his question. The Horizon IT system was put in place in 1999, with the first issues being raised in the early 2000s, so this was over a long period. Mr Justice Fraser considered what happened over that period and set out his findings in considerable detail and, as I said, he has referred some individuals to the Crown Prosecution Service. Post Office is now working to implement all the vital changes to which it has committed under the leadership of its new CEO, to reset the relationship with its postmasters.

Horizon Settlement: Future Governance of Post Office Ltd

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

The Post Office Horizon scandal must rank as one of the most shocking and badly handled ever. Its impact on honest, hard-working sub-postmasters has been truly devastating and life changing. Even the compensation won by the sub-postmasters in their class action against the Post Office will do very little to replace the lost years of pain, suffering and social stigma due to being classed as criminals, when all these people set out to do was to earn an honest living.

One of those affected is my constituent Kamran Ashraf, whose wife was a sub-postmaster, and together they ran the business. Right from the beginning, using the Horizon software provided by the Post Office, there were shortfalls. In September 2003, the Post Office carried out an audit of their branch and found a shortfall of £25,000. Following investigation, the Post Office prosecuted Kamran and his wife, but because they had two small children, even though they had done nothing wrong, Kamran decided to plead guilty so that their children would not risk both their parents being incarcerated. In February 2004, he was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment at Kingston crown court and, to add insult to injury, was fined £25,000.

Kamran and his wife lost their business and their home and had to enter into an individual voluntary arrangement to pay off creditors. Because of his conviction Kamran struggled to find work, and although his conviction is now spent and he has found employment, he still has that stain on his reputation because his conviction has not been overturned.

In August 2015 Kamran happened to chance on the BBC “Panorama” TV programme, which highlighted other cases identical to his, where sub-postmasters were prosecuted and convicted due to shortfalls in their takings following an audit. Dozens of sub-postmasters were affected and came forward and formed an action group called the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance, or JFSA for short. The JFSA, led by Alan Bates, brought a class action with a total of 557 sub-postmasters which was vigorously fought by the Post Office, and on 11 December 2019 the sub-postmasters were awarded £57.75 million in damages.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) is right when he says that the biggest scandal of all was the fact that the Post Office denied that there was any flaw in the system but knew all along there was a problem, while innocent people were sent to prison.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

One other thing the Post Office must have known all along was that there was this huge spike in postmasters and postmistresses being reported and prosecuted, so they did not know that they were not alone in the matter, but the Post Office presumably knew that all this was going on at scale.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and makes an excellent point. Evidence about the infallibility of the system would have led to the conviction of these sub-postmasters, and that is why we need to look at how to progress this further. While after the trial the Post Office chairman conceded that it had got things wrong in the past, the fact was that the Post Office fought the action until the bitter end, and that speaks volumes.

Criminal Law

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp]

Victims who feel that a sentence is unduly lenient currently have a 28-day period following sentencing to apply under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme to the Attorney General, who can then make a reference to the Court of Appeal. On a review of sentencing more generally, which may well include the tragic case to which my hon. Friend referred, the sentencing White Paper that will come forward a little later this year, followed by a sentencing Bill, will provide my hon. Friend and other colleagues with an opportunity to raise issues that go beyond the matters we are considering today. I will of course listen carefully to this debate, in which colleagues from all parties may raise issues that can feed into the sentencing White Paper.

One topic that the sentencing White Paper will certainly deal with, although we are not dealing with it today, is short custodial sentences, which are not particularly effective at stopping reoffending. The White Paper will address that, and in particular it will make proposals to do more to treat the causes of offending behaviour, particularly drug and alcohol addiction and mental health problems, which are often the cause of high-volume repeat offending. Short custodial sentences do not deal effectively with that cohort of offenders, but that is not the topic of the regulations; it is a matter we will come to in the forthcoming White Paper and sentencing Bill.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. May I offer a refinement on the suggestion made by my constituency neighbour, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne)? We understand why one wants to give prisoners who are serving a sentence an incentive to behave well in jail, but that could be achieved without this upset of the public perception that someone is getting a longer sentence than they are really getting. Prisoners could be given the sentence that they are going to serve, with the expectation that if they misbehave, it can be extended by a certain amount, rather than their being given a sentence that they can reduce by a certain amount if they behave themselves in prison. That would avoid the perception among the public that the Government are trying to con them into believing that the sentences being imposed are more severe than we all know them to be in reality.

[Chris Philp]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. I should make it clear—I will explain this in a bit more detail in a moment—that the standard determinate sentences under discussion today have an automatic release point. The current release point, at 50% of the sentence, is not contingent on good behaviour; it is automatic. We are proposing to remove that automatic release point to two thirds as a first step, but, of course, there are other things that we could do in the area that he has just mentioned. Examining and investigating the clarity of sentencing decisions and how the public understand them are certainly matters that the sentencing White Paper and sentencing Bill can properly look at, and I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that.

What today’s regulations do is to take a very specific area where we can act quickly and immediately, rather than waiting for the larger and wider piece of work to be done later in the year. Of course, as part of that piece of work, we might well choose to go further than is the case today, but here is an area where we can act quickly and decisively and deliver on a critical manifesto commitment just 47 days after the general election.

Buildings with ACM Cladding

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 9th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments and for his campaigning on these issues of fire safety, as well as on leasehold, over many months. Regardless of whether I look forward to coverage in Inside Housing, I recognise the work it has done in assisting and helping to shine a light on a number of these factors. As the hon. Gentleman knows, there are programmes of work by the Law Society and other agencies, and the Law Commission’s overarching work on leasehold is a separate programme that we intend to continue. We will continue to engage with the hon. Gentleman and others in relation to progress on that.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the Secretary of State explain how this welcome scheme will work in a couple of respects? Is the list of 433 vulnerable buildings going to be published? How will those who might be living in a building where no work has been done be able to access the scheme, and will any of the money be recoverable from the freeholders who refuse to do the work of their own volition?

[James Brokenshire]

We are aware of all the survey work and other steps that local government has been involved in, and I pay tribute to local councillors for their active engagement, alongside fire authorities, in enabling us to arrive at this position. As I have said, we want claims to continue to be made against those with responsibility and liability, whether through warranty claims or insurance, and to see that moneys are repaid. There are 175 private residential buildings and 159 social residential buildings where ACM cladding has been identified, and steps and interim measures will be in place to give assurance now. We will continue to engage with the authorities and building owners as we make progress in this regard.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 30th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Ah, yes—the good doctor. I call Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

May I welcome the substantial central Government grants that have been made to enable Jewish buildings to be better protected? But given that three quarters of all anti-Semitic incidents happen in Greater London and Greater Manchester, will the new Secretary of State seek out the Mayors of those two cities to see what more can be done to protect their Jewish communities?

[James Brokenshire]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising this significant and important issue. I pay tribute to the Community Security Trust for its work in providing safety and security in this area. I will certainly engage further not just with my right hon. Friend but with local government to ensure that we continue to make progress.

Windrush

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 30th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sajid Javid]

No, I do not wish to comment on that question, because it was just political point scoring and not serious in any way.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

From his earliest days as a Member of this House, my right hon. Friend has spoken out uncompromisingly against all forms of anti-Semitism. What will he do to encourage some other people in some other parts of this House to follow the fine example he has set?

[Sajid Javid]

In my previous role as Communities Secretary, I obviously had a big role to play—I was privileged to do so—in fighting race and hate crime of all types. In my new role as Home Secretary, I will work very closely with my successor to make sure that we are fully co-ordinated in fighting hate crime and that we look carefully, particularly with regard to anti-Semitism, at what more we can do.