Trident Alternatives Review

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Danny Alexander)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Trident Alternatives Review.

Thank you, Mr Speaker; I shall certainly do as you say. I will also tailor the number of interventions I take to meet your invocation.

Yesterday, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister published the Trident alternatives review—the most thorough review of nuclear weapon systems and postures that the UK has undertaken for decades, and the most comprehensive analysis ever made public. For the first time in a generation—

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

rose—

[Danny Alexander]

I will make some progress before giving way.

For the first time in a generation, the Trident alternatives review shows that there are credible and viable alternatives to the United Kingdom’s current approach to nuclear deterrence. A different approach would allow the UK to contribute meaningfully to the new multilateral drive for disarmament initiated by President Obama, while maintaining our national security and our ultimate insurance policy against future threats.

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[Danny Alexander]

I will take some interventions later, but in the light of what Mr Speaker has said, I will make some progress.

A different approach could allow long-term savings—about £4 billion over the life of the system—to be made against current plans. Let me be clear: this does not change current Government policy to maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent and prepare for a successor system. It does mean that we can at last have an open and much more informed debate about what our nuclear weapons are for and how they should be deployed—a debate that provides our country with a chance to change course before the main-gate decision for a successor system is taken in 2016.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am grateful to the Chief Secretary for giving way. He says this is the most comprehensive examination for many years—that is open to question—but will he explain why it considered only the four-boat and three-boat options for Trident, not the two-boat options that the Liberal Democrats plan to put to their conference as Liberal Democrat policy?

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[Mr Jones]

I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has had enough time, and the time is limited.

There was another option that was deemed unworthy of examination by what is otherwise a thorough and forensic document: sending two unarmed submarines out on patrol with the intention of stepping up our posture in a time of crisis. That is the policy the Chief Secretary has just proposed.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I read that report in The Times, and it seems to me that what was being said was that the Labour party is committed to continuous-at-sea deterrence and the only question is whether it can do it with three submarines or whether it would have to do it with four. The one thing that is absolutely certain from the report is that it cannot be done with two, yet the Chief Secretary’s position is that if a crisis arose they would step up their performance. How could we build a third or fourth extra submarine in time to step up our performance if a crisis arose?

[Mr Jones]

I know that the hon. Gentleman has studied this subject thoroughly and is an expert. I totally agree with him. As I said, the Chief Secretary clearly has not read his own report because, as the hon. Gentleman rightly says, it outlines the problem with having only two submarines.

The Liberal Democrats briefed the newspapers earlier this week that the two-boat option would be a way forward, and the Chief Secretary has just re-outlined that ludicrous policy. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) hit the nail on the head yesterday when he said that it was a little like installing a very expensive burglar alarm on one’s house with no batteries and putting up a sign saying, “Burglars, come in.” The only difference is that this would be a multi-billion pound deterrent that would not deter.

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[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

I will begin by saying that this is not the most comprehensive review of this subject carried out in recent years: the previous Labour Government carried out a comprehensive review. I can say that with some confidence, because one of the first things I did as Defence Secretary when we came into government was to ask to see that work and check whether its assumptions and costs were still valid. It was my view that they were, and that continuous-at-sea deterrence still represented the best system and best value for our nuclear deterrence.

In our review, we looked at the previous Government’s review and at the systems that have since been rejected again. No Member wants to have an air-launch system or a silo-based system in their constituency. At the time, the Liberal Democrats put forward a proposal on the cruise-based system that they believed to be credible. We, of course, maintained our belief that CASD was the best, along with a replacement for the Trident programme.

There are a number of reasons why I was happy for the review to go ahead. In particular, it would show the Liberal Democrats that the cruise-based system was a non-starter. First, it would be too expensive. It would require research and development for the missile system and for changes to the submarine programme. It would be slower and more easily intercepted. It would require our submarines to be closer to target, and therefore more likely to be detected. It would also—no small point—be illegal under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was a non-starter. I am therefore pleased that the Chief Secretary, who is not in his place at the moment, came to the conclusion, rather belatedly, that it would be good to keep the Trident replacement system. It is a gain for the whole House and the country that the Liberal Democrats have seen sense.

What is deeply depressing, however, is the willingness of the Liberal Democrats to abandon CASD. It has been the position of both major parties—the Labour party and the Conservative party—to have CASD based on four boats, or fewer if technology allowed. Let us be frank: in the foreseeable future, technology will not allow us to go below four boats. We need one going out, one coming in, one in refit and one in training. It is not possible to maintain what we have and what we want at lower levels than that, given present technology. If we go down to three, CASD cannot be guaranteed. If we go to two boats, we cannot have it at all, so that is an unrealistic proposition.

What are the Liberal Democrats saying with this policy? They are saying that we would abandon CASD, but deploy at times of increased international tension. What does any Member think would happen to international tension if we deployed a nuclear system that was not otherwise deployed? That would be a crazy foreign policy. I have to say to my Liberal Democrat colleagues that it is all very well to talk about stepping down the ladder, but if the bottom of the ladder is hanging off a cliff, that is not exactly a sensible manoeuvre.

On cost, the Chief Secretary said that they would save £4 billion over the lifetime of the programme—£4 billion over a 34 to 50-year period. That £4 billion is the equivalent to less than two weeks’ spending on the national health service, or six days of what we spend on pensions and welfare. This is supposed to be value for money. For that infinitesimally small saving over a 50-year period, they would abandon a crucial element of our national security—a very interesting definition of value for money.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

For the sake of clarity, it is important to stress that in the report the only options for Trident are a four-boat fleet or a three-boat fleet. That is where the £4 billion would come into it. The report does not even consider or cost a two-boat fleet, because it would be impossible to reinstate to a higher level of readiness.

[Dr Fox]

It is not possible to put in monetary terms the risk that moving to a two-boat fleet would pose to the UK. They are completely different currencies. It is ridiculous to say that there would be a £4 billion saving, given the monumental disruption it would cause to our submarine-building programme and all the jobs likely to be lost, as the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) pointed out many times. The calculations in the report are fraudulent economics.

The crucial question to be asked by anyone who wants to dismantle or diminish the CASD posture is: what will the world look like in 30, 40 or 50 years? It is all very well to say, “The risk assessments says that at the moment it’s okay”, but we do not know what the risk assessments will be in the future, and it is not our job to play roulette with the security of future generations in our country. We are being offered 50 years of protection from nuclear blackmail for the people of our country. There are those who say that £20 billion or more of capital costs is too much for 50 years’ protection from nuclear blackmail, but that it was all right to spend £9.5 billion for six weeks for the Olympics. We need to get our priorities right in this country and recognise what is important in the longer term.

CASD gives us secure insurance that is proven. It is the best deterrent, and to say anything other is political posturing, I am afraid. As has been said, we could drive a nuclear submarine through this report. We all like a good joke in politics, but this is no laughing matter. If it is a joke, however, let us hope it rebounds on the Liberal Democrats, not on the people of this country.

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[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Danny Alexander) on bringing this piece of work to fruition, and I believe it has genuinely taken an open-minded look at the whole issue. The review did not set out at the beginning by offering preconceived conclusions to those carrying out the work, and I believe it has been a worthwhile exercise. I also note that the principal reason why alternative systems were found not to be viable was not—as some have suggested—because they were not technically viable. In contrast, it was because the length of time such alternatives would take, and the amount of money it would involve to equip a warhead to an alternative system, would make such alternatives prohibitive in the medium term. That is the expert view of those tasked with looking at the matter. If that is the conclusion to which they have come, I for one would not seek to question it and we must accept it.

The second part of the study, which looks at alternative postures, concerns the debate that this report can now seek to inform and trigger.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

Not at the moment.

Given that this report was commissioned by a Government who are a coalition of two parties with fundamentally different opinions on the issue, it was never going to come forward with proposals. It was about considering the alternatives and informing the debate that might follow.

I contend that nobody can rationally argue that the nature and scale of the nuclear threat that the United Kingdom faces in 2013 is the same as it was at the height of the cold war. Then we had a known nuclear adversary, the Soviet Union, that had British targets in its sights and we, similarly, had Soviet targets in our sights. We believed that it might strike at a moment’s notice and we therefore thought it was essential that we were ready at a moment’s notice to strike back. But 25 years after the Berlin wall came down, one cannot rationally argue that the threat we face today is the same as it was then. We can debate what threats we might face in the future, but we cannot argue that the threat we face today is the same as it was in 1980.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend that we must consider the threat we might face in 20, 30 or 40 years’ time, so we must therefore ensure that we have a nuclear deterrent in 20, 30 or 40 years’ time that is capable of deterring the threat that we might face at that point. My point is simply that the threat we face today is not the same as it was at the height of the cold war. It therefore cannot make sense to operate it on a 24/7 continuous basis facing a threat that simply does not exist at the moment.

I understand the view of those who say that we must retain enough capability to ensure that, in the future when we face threats we cannot anticipate today but know intuitively could come, there is enough of a deterrent to repel them. That is perfectly logical, but it does not make sense for the nuclear deterrent—uniquely among our military capability—to be on patrol the whole time when even our national security strategy has stressed that it is for a second-tier threat and when we do not use our military capability to deter the primary threats on that continuous patrolling basis.

To answer the points made by my right hon. Friend the former Defence Secretary, I am not saying that it might not be necessary in the future to crank up to a more rigorous posture—it might well be—but I do not see how anyone can rationally argue that we have to do that at the moment. The idea that the nuclear capability has a deterrent effect at all only by being patrolled 24/7 is clearly absurd. All the rest of our capability has a deterrent effect against a variety of aggressors in a variety of scenarios and we do not see the need to exercise any of it on a 24/7 basis.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I could just about stay with the hon. Gentleman’s argument if he was saying that we ought to build four submarines but not send them all to sea until the situation became worse, but he is not saying that. He is saying that we should build only two or three such submarines, which would mean if the situation got worse, we would not be able to reinstate continuous-at-sea deterrence because we would not have the submarines. Without the submarines, we cannot have the posture, much as he might like to reinstate it when the situation gets worse.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I can agree to the extent that we must ensure that we build enough capability that we can mount the deterrent we will need at the point that we need it. What that will comprise is a matter for further debate and further study and I note with interest that even those on the Labour Front Bench and the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), acknowledge that it remains to be seen whether we need four or three to do that.

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[John Woodcock]

I would describe it as a complete collapse in the Liberal Democrats’ position. Two years on, we have a taxpayer-funded document—how much did this process cost the taxpayer, by the way? The document basically confirms what we duped fools have been arguing for years—that unless people show their true colours and come out as unilateral disarmers, and in doing so advocate a path that we strongly believe would make the horror of a nuclear war more likely, there is no credible, cost-effective alternative to the fundamentals of the existing plan to replace our fleet of deterrent submarines.

The alternative review rejects as unworkable and even more expensive what had long been the Liberal Democrats’ preferred option—some sort of mini-deterrent. Then the fall-back plan of halving the number of replacement Vanguard submarines to two, fervently briefed to the newspapers over the weekend, turns out not to have been considered by the review at all. Would anyone like to explain this? Have Liberal Democrats realised that every idea they have put forward so far has collapsed under scrutiny? Did they come to a view that it was best not to test this one in the official review, lest those pesky facts and figures ruin it like all the others?

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman may be aware that all the talk about the Liberal Democrat conference considering a two-boat option comes from a Liberal Democrat document that has been drawn up by a Liberal Democrat group. When I asked the Chief Secretary earlier today at a briefing whether any copy of the review was going to be taken to the Liberal Democrat conference for consideration, he said, “Well, I might take a copy, but it will just be in my briefcase.” In other words, the review is not the document that the Liberal Democrats are going to consider. They are going to consider a completely different document making completely different recommendations, which the review did not even bother to consider.

[John Woodcock]

The hon. Gentleman is right. If we were living through a Monty Python sketch, this would be the point when the army major intervenes and says that this is all getting too silly and we have to stop it at once. But of course the consequences for the nation’s security, and the 13,000 people directly employed in Barrow and across the UK, would be bitterly serious if the Liberal Democrats had their way on their part-time deterrent idea. That is why it would be a very good thing if this shambolic process now sunk without trace. Even their own document makes it clear just how hopeless an alternative a part-time deterrent would be. It states that

“a 3-boat fleet would risk multiple unplanned breaks in continuous covert patrolling as well as requiring regular planned breaks for maintenance and/or training.”

They are effectively suggesting that we pay billions for something that we cannot be sure will be available to do the deterring when needed.

Proper analysis of the figures makes clear the economic folly of the argument. The Chief Secretary told me that he had considered the cost of maintaining Britain’s submarine-building capacity at Barrow and elsewhere, but his own document makes no suggestion, as far as I can see, that the savings take account of that. It suggests that the extra costs from 2025 of bringing forward the next submarine programme—the successors to the Astute—to avoid a crippling gap in the order book of the shipyard are simply not considered in the £4 billion saving. When he sums up, will the Minister finally confirm what the Chief Secretary has so far avoided admitting—that these relatively modest savings would be completely wiped out by the extra cost?

The choice that the next Government but one would face would be either to leave a gap in construction so large that it could end the country’s capacity to build submarines for ever, sacrificing all those 13,000 jobs, or to end up saving no money at all by embarking on a whole new submarine-building enterprise before it is needed by the Royal Navy.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In the past few months we have had several opportunities to debate nuclear deterrence. The hon. Members for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and I, from our respectively opposite sides of the argument, successfully procured a debate on 17 January. Strangely enough, I did not hear many of these Liberal Democrat midway positions articulated on that occasion. The hon. Member for Islington North then secured a debate in Westminster Hall on nuclear deterrence and the non-proliferation treaty on 22 June, and I seem to remember that there were no Liberal Democrat contributions to that debate at all.

I think that it is possible to make a principled and coherent case either that we should have an effective and continuous nuclear deterrent or that we should not, but one cannot make a sensible case for having a part-time deterrent. I have looked at the report in some detail and will pick out a couple of elements that I regard as particularly significant. The very first sentence of the executive summary states:

“Deterrence rests on the notion of ‘unacceptable loss’—the ability to inflict a level of damage that a potential aggressor would judge outweighed any benefit they might gain by a particular course of action.”

Well, yes and no. It does not just rest on the notion of unacceptable loss; it rests on the twin notions of unacceptable loss and unavoidable loss. That is where the whole concept of continuous-at-sea deterrence is central, because if one thinks one has a chance of avoiding an unacceptable level of retaliation, one might well take that chance in the hope that one will not have to face up to it.

I have quoted before, and I will quote it again tonight, what was stated the first time a senior British defence specialist considered the concept of what in those days would have been called atomic deterrence. That was in June 1945 in a top secret report drawn up by a committee of defence scientists headed by Professor Sir Henry Tizard. He made a comparison between the atomic bomb, which at the time had not yet been tested or used against Japan, and the concept and practice of duelling:

“Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood twenty paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each other’s hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling affairs of honour.”

However, if the duellists do not know whether the pistol is loaded, then even if they are standing only a yard apart they might just be reckless enough—“reckless” is the word that we hear time and again in the context of this Lib Dem policy—to take a chance. The whole point about nuclear deterrence is that it is unacceptable and unavoidable that a country will suffer nuclear destruction if it uses its nuclear weapons against a similarly armed country.

In the document, which was prepared by two civil servants in the Cabinet Office specially seconded from the Ministry of Defence, a number of strange concepts are articulated. One of them is familiar—continuous deterrence, which is referred to without quotation marks. Then the document refers to things called “focused deterrence”, “sustained deterrence”, “responsive deterrence” and “preserved deterrence”. I have studied this subject for at least 31 years and I have never come across those terms before. At a briefing earlier today, the two civil servants were good enough to admit that in fact they had made them up. That is perfectly okay, except for one thing—the use of the word “deterrence”. They could just as easily have referred to something like “intermittent deterrence”, “semi-deterrence”, microscopic deterrence” or “virtually zero deterrence”. It is not really deterrence unless it is certain; that is why it used to be called “mutually assured destruction”. It is not enough to be able to threaten destruction; it has to be assured because otherwise the person may not be deterred.

It may seem as though the Liberals’ policy is in disarray, but they could still emerge, at the end of this process, as the winners. I will explain why. At the next general election, we could have another hung Parliament, as my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) suggested. The Liberal Democrats could then say to the Leader of the Opposition, “All that stands between you and entering No. 10 Downing street is to get rid of this weapons system.” They would not say, “Go down to two boats”; they would say, “Get rid of it completely”, because that is what they have wanted all along.

[Hugh Bayley (York Central) (Lab)]

In the unlikely scenario that the hon. Gentleman paints of our having another hung Parliament, the Liberal Democrats would presumably negotiate both with his party and with mine. I think he is going to give me a firm view of what the answer would be from his party, and our Front Benchers have already given a firm view of what the answer would be from our party.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted by that intervention, because it not only gives me an extra minute but anticipates the next part of my argument.

If the Leader of the Opposition accepted that deal, then knowing the Liberal Democrats, they would start making the same offer to the current Prime Minister, who would have to think to himself, “Well, if I say no and the leader of the Labour party has said yes, Trident is doomed anyway, so I may as well say yes as well.” Who knows how these things might work out?

However, a solution is at hand: we could sign the main-gate contracts for some or all of the submarines in advance of the next general election. The only reason we put that off was to enable the Liberal Democrats to have their alternative study. They have had their alternative study, and it did not even consider a two-boat solution; it considered only a three-boat or four-boat solution. It could hardly be a breach of the coalition agreement if we were to challenge the Liberal Democrats to accept signing the contracts on the first two boats, if not the first three. That would at least prevent them from blackmailing either party, in the event of a hung Parliament, to get rid of the deterrent entirely.

At the most recent Defence questions I think I heard from the Opposition a commitment to try to bring forward the main-gate decision to this side of the election. I urge Opposition Members who believe in deterrence to join Conservative Members and put relentless pressure on our leaders for a grand coalition to bring forward the main-gate decision and secure the future of the nuclear deterrent—

[Mr Speaker]

Order.

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[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am pleased we are having this debate and that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has spoken, because he sincerely believes in nuclear weapons as much as I sincerely disbelieve in them. Interestingly, he quoted Tizard as one of the main scientists involved in the Manhattan project and the development of nuclear weapons, but we should also recall that many of the others involved, including Joseph Rotblat and Einstein himself, were later appalled at what they had discovered, at how it had been used and at the consequences for humanity of possessing nuclear weapons at all.

I hope that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), I and one or two others might manage to bring to the Floor of the House a sense that there are alternatives to Trident. The review that the Liberal Democrats have asked for and that was no doubt produced at enormous expense is not a discussion of the alternatives. It is a discussion of weaponry and, in part, of perceptions of security and risk, but it is not a discussion of the alternative to Trident and nuclear weapons, which is not to have them at all and instead to aspire to a nuclear-free world. Interestingly, when those who support nuclear weapons are challenged, they all say they want to live in a nuclear-free world—

[Dr Julian Lewis]

indicated dissent.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Not all of them. I beg the hon. Gentleman’s pardon. I exempt him from my last remark. He wants to live in a nuclear world, but many who agree with him about the decision on Trident want to live in a nuclear-free world, yet they go on to say that they cannot do anything about it, because now is not the time to do it, and then they head off rapidly down the road of weaponry and cold war attitudes towards deterrence and defence.

One or two fundamental questions need to be asked. A nuclear weapon is not a targeted weapon. Let us imagine we set off a nuclear weapon against, say, France. Let us suppose a Conservative Government got very angry with President Hollande. They are frequently angry with the French on most matters. They have never quite forgiven them for the 100 years war or the French revolution—[Interruption.] See, they are cheering up now. They are licking their lips at the prospect of war with France. Indeed, this whole building is festooned with memorabilia about the French revolution and the defeat of Napoleon. If they wanted to teach the French a lesson by sending a nuclear weapon against them, it would not take out a military establishment or an airport; it would take out millions of people in the civilian population, just as it would if used against Moscow, Pyongyang, Tehran or anywhere else. A nuclear weapon is a weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction against a civilian population. Small nuclear weapons were used in 1945 over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were tiny in comparison with one warhead on one part of a Trident submarine now, and the cancers from those weapons have existed and lasted for 60 years. The use of a nuclear weapon sets off a nuclear winter and an environmental disaster for those affected.

To those who want us to spend, in reality, £100 billion on Trident, I say that by 2020—if the main-gate decision is taken in 2016—a large proportion of the defence budget will be taken up in building new submarines and the warheads to accommodate them. Will defence chiefs at that time accept cuts in every other area of defence expenditure to accommodate the construction of those new submarines and new missile systems? I seriously doubt it. Those in the House who talk so glibly about nuclear weapons know full well that there is a serious debate in the Royal United Services Institute and the defence establishment about targeting defence expenditure on nuclear weapons when so many other demands are apparently being put forward by different service chiefs.

To my colleagues in the Labour party, who have been through this debate on nuclear weapons many times, I say that if we win an election in 2015—obviously, I hope we do—the demands on that incoming Government about apprenticeships, student fees, benefits, hospitals, schools, council housing, railways, roads, and a whole range of things, will be massive. Will we say to our supporters, “Sorry, the priority is weapons of mass destruction. The priority is nuclear weapons”? I like to think we would not.

Yes, we face threats in this world, including from terrorists, but holding nuclear weapons did not do the USA much good on 9/11, or us much good on 7/7, and it has not done anybody else much good. We must look to the causes and the humanitarian effects of war. A 1996 International Court of Justice ruling stated that

“the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”

Let us look for alternatives such as nuclear weapon-free zones, supporting a non-proliferation treaty, or a conference of middle eastern states to bring about a nuclear weapon-free middle east. The review is not an alternative document but one that leads us down the road of nuclear proliferation and danger. The real alternative, produced by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, sets out an agenda for peace and investment in people, jobs and a good future for this country, not investing in weapons of mass destruction.

I hope I have managed at least to bring an alternative view to this debate.