Jeremy Corbyn
Main Page: Jeremy Corbyn (Independent - Islington North)Department Debates - View all Jeremy Corbyn's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 9 months ago)
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Danny Alexander
I entirely agree. I applaud President Obama’s leadership of the disarmament debate. I think that the review gives the United Kingdom an opportunity to contribute further both to disarmament and to the global movement towards the de-alerting of our nuclear weapons.
Danny Alexander
No, I will not. I will give way later, but I want to make some progress first.
The review presents a much greater opportunity for change and the consideration of alternative postures, and that in turn presents the possibility of maintaining our nuclear deterrent capability with fewer submarines. This is where the real opportunity resides for making long-term savings, for recalibrating our policy to the requirements of our ages, and—as we just heard from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell)—for contributing to nuclear disarmament.
Analysis of the national security strategy confirms the position adopted by successive Governments that
“no state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge.”
With no hostile backdrop and a surprise attack against the UK highly unlikely, the United Kingdom could adopt a number of viable and credible alternative postures while maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability that meets the needs of national security.
The review demonstrates that our current nuclear posture of continuous-at-sea deterrence is not the only one available. Let me briefly describe four of the alternative postures that were considered in the review, from highest to lowest readiness. Each of them represents a different rung on the nuclear ladder, with CASD at the top.
A posture of focused deterrence would maintain a continuous nuclear deterrent for a specific period in response to a specific threat. At all other times, the system could adopt a reduced readiness level. We considered three options for reduced readiness. A so-called sustained-deterrence posture would mean regular patrols that maintained deterrence capability, but the number of platforms could be reduced. A responsive posture would allow gaps of irregular frequency and length between deployment, so that a potential adversary could not predict when and for how long a gap in deployment might occur. A posture of preserved deterrence would hold forces at low readiness. Under preserved deterrence, no platforms would be regularly deployed, but the UK would maintain the ability to deploy if the context changed.
The review clearly demonstrates that the concept of a ladder of nuclear capability and readiness is viable and credible, and that there are a number of options for taking steps down the rungs without getting off altogether.
Danny Alexander
As my right hon. Friend will know, the first question is a matter of political judgment for the Government of the day. As for the second, it would depend on which of the alternative postures was adopted. They would all be designed to allow us to surge back to the so-called focused deterrence, which would sustain a continuous posture in response to our needs.
The reality is that in the current circumstances, and for the foreseeable future, the ultimate guarantee does not need to sit on a hair trigger. We can afford to go much further in de-alerting our nuclear deterrent. The option of non-continuous deterrence does not threaten current security, and by changing postures we can reduce cost at the same time. For example, ending CASD and procuring one fewer successor submarine would make a saving of about £4 billion over the life of the system.
Jeremy Corbyn
May I put a simple question to the right hon. Gentleman? In what circumstances would he envisage the use of nuclear weapons, and the problems that would follow as a result of their use?
Danny Alexander
The whole purpose of nuclear deterrents is to deter their use.
The judgment must be made about where on the ladder we believe that it is credible to stand, provided that the ability to scale up or down as threats change and the momentum of proliferation on the one hand and disarmament on the other shift. As a recognised nuclear weapon state under the non-proliferation treaty, we have an obligation to move towards a world in which nuclear weapons are no longer part of state security and defence postures. It is true that Britain has made significant steps since the cold war in disarmament terms. Some would argue that Britain has done its bit for disarmament and we have reached the minimum level possible. That argument has been deployed at every point at which we have scaled down over the past 20 years, but each time it has proven not to be true. The next step down the ladder is to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in our defence policy itself, which means accepting that a cold-war-style continuous deterrent has become unnecessary.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)
I am pleased we are having this debate and that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has spoken, because he sincerely believes in nuclear weapons as much as I sincerely disbelieve in them. Interestingly, he quoted Tizard as one of the main scientists involved in the Manhattan project and the development of nuclear weapons, but we should also recall that many of the others involved, including Joseph Rotblat and Einstein himself, were later appalled at what they had discovered, at how it had been used and at the consequences for humanity of possessing nuclear weapons at all.
I hope that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), I and one or two others might manage to bring to the Floor of the House a sense that there are alternatives to Trident. The review that the Liberal Democrats have asked for and that was no doubt produced at enormous expense is not a discussion of the alternatives. It is a discussion of weaponry and, in part, of perceptions of security and risk, but it is not a discussion of the alternative to Trident and nuclear weapons, which is not to have them at all and instead to aspire to a nuclear-free world. Interestingly, when those who support nuclear weapons are challenged, they all say they want to live in a nuclear-free world—
Jeremy Corbyn
Not all of them. I beg the hon. Gentleman’s pardon. I exempt him from my last remark. He wants to live in a nuclear world, but many who agree with him about the decision on Trident want to live in a nuclear-free world, yet they go on to say that they cannot do anything about it, because now is not the time to do it, and then they head off rapidly down the road of weaponry and cold war attitudes towards deterrence and defence.
One or two fundamental questions need to be asked. A nuclear weapon is not a targeted weapon. Let us imagine we set off a nuclear weapon against, say, France. Let us suppose a Conservative Government got very angry with President Hollande. They are frequently angry with the French on most matters. They have never quite forgiven them for the 100 years war or the French revolution—[Interruption.] See, they are cheering up now. They are licking their lips at the prospect of war with France. Indeed, this whole building is festooned with memorabilia about the French revolution and the defeat of Napoleon. If they wanted to teach the French a lesson by sending a nuclear weapon against them, it would not take out a military establishment or an airport; it would take out millions of people in the civilian population, just as it would if used against Moscow, Pyongyang, Tehran or anywhere else. A nuclear weapon is a weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction against a civilian population. Small nuclear weapons were used in 1945 over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were tiny in comparison with one warhead on one part of a Trident submarine now, and the cancers from those weapons have existed and lasted for 60 years. The use of a nuclear weapon sets off a nuclear winter and an environmental disaster for those affected.
To those who want us to spend, in reality, £100 billion on Trident, I say that by 2020—if the main-gate decision is taken in 2016—a large proportion of the defence budget will be taken up in building new submarines and the warheads to accommodate them. Will defence chiefs at that time accept cuts in every other area of defence expenditure to accommodate the construction of those new submarines and new missile systems? I seriously doubt it. Those in the House who talk so glibly about nuclear weapons know full well that there is a serious debate in the Royal United Services Institute and the defence establishment about targeting defence expenditure on nuclear weapons when so many other demands are apparently being put forward by different service chiefs.
To my colleagues in the Labour party, who have been through this debate on nuclear weapons many times, I say that if we win an election in 2015—obviously, I hope we do—the demands on that incoming Government about apprenticeships, student fees, benefits, hospitals, schools, council housing, railways, roads, and a whole range of things, will be massive. Will we say to our supporters, “Sorry, the priority is weapons of mass destruction. The priority is nuclear weapons”? I like to think we would not.
Yes, we face threats in this world, including from terrorists, but holding nuclear weapons did not do the USA much good on 9/11, or us much good on 7/7, and it has not done anybody else much good. We must look to the causes and the humanitarian effects of war. A 1996 International Court of Justice ruling stated that
“the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”
Let us look for alternatives such as nuclear weapon-free zones, supporting a non-proliferation treaty, or a conference of middle eastern states to bring about a nuclear weapon-free middle east. The review is not an alternative document but one that leads us down the road of nuclear proliferation and danger. The real alternative, produced by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, sets out an agenda for peace and investment in people, jobs and a good future for this country, not investing in weapons of mass destruction.
I hope I have managed at least to bring an alternative view to this debate.