Intelligence and Security Committee

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

For the sake of clarity, before some reporter’s pen runs away with him, will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that there was no suggestion in his remarks that UK intelligence services were responsible for the Stuxnet virus?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Even our worst enemies have not suggested that, as far as I am aware. I of course entirely confirm that.

My final detailed point on the report relates to a part of our intelligence community that is hardly even mentioned in this House or anywhere else: Defence Intelligence. It is part of the Ministry of Defence, but its contribution and role is greatly underestimated, if not entirely unknown, in the wider world, a point we draw attention to on page 51 of the report:

“Defence Intelligence provides the largest single all-source assessment capability within the UK intelligence community.”

As it is part of the MOD, it has perhaps been more subject to resource reductions than the other intelligence agencies. The report states:

“The prospect of further cuts—combined with the impact of cuts to BBC Monitoring, on which DI relies heavily—therefore has potentially very serious long-term consequences for DI’s ability to support military operations”,

which everyone tends to know about,

“and for the UK intelligence community as a whole.”

I hope that the Government can give some careful thought to how Defence Intelligence’s unique contribution to the UK’s overall assessment capability can be properly protected. I suggest that it perhaps needs a higher profile and status in the intelligence community than it has traditionally had so that there can be wider awareness of the benefits it brings to the national interest.

I deal now with the intelligence aspects of the Government’s Green Paper, particularly the control principle and the ISC itself. As far as the control principle is concerned, many Members attending the debate will be aware that what I am referring to, and what the Green Paper refers to, is how we deal with intelligence received from other friendly intelligence services. Anyone who has any awareness of the intelligence situation will know that that is crucial to the UK, particularly our relationship with the United States. If the special relationship means anything, it means a dramatic amount of intelligence, which has continued for around 60 years and benefited the UK enormously. However, it concerns not only the United States; to a lesser degree, we share and receive intelligence from other friendly agencies as well. Fundamental to the system is the deep principle that intelligence shared with another intelligence agency will not be made available to any third party without the consent of the agency that gave it in the first place. That principle has overwhelmingly been respected, but there have been individual exceptions that caused great concern. Following the Binyam Mohamed case, the Court of Appeal decided that such information should be released in a limited set of circumstances, and that caused great concern in the United States and elsewhere. I and the Committee greatly welcome the Government’s determination to deal with the matter in a way that strikes a proper balance between the national security requirement and the interests of justice, because that is the crucial debate in these matters.

Some might imagine that the Binyam Mohamed case was a one-off and that the Green Paper is an overreaction to the problem. With all respect, the Committee’s view is that it is not an overreaction. Although the Court of Appeal’s verdict might have been different in that case, we are today dealing with a situation that is very different from that which existed in the past. Information on this is given in the Green Paper, so I will share briefly with the House what the Government say. The Green Paper refers to judicial review, and not simply with regard to intelligence, but more broadly how it has increased over the years:

“Recourse to judicial review has increased significantly in recent decades, from 160 applications in 1974 to 4,539 in 1998. By 2010 the number of applications had reached 10,548.”

Judicial review and the overruling of the Government’s view—perhaps rightly in many cases—have become a major part of our judicial process, rather than an exception.

The raising of intelligence matters in court has also been transformed dramatically in recent years. The same page of the Green Paper states that

“in the first 90 years of the Security Service’s existence”—

meaning MI5—

“no case impacting directly on that Service’s work reached the House of Lords. In the last 10 years there have been 14 such case in the House of Lords or the Supreme Court.”

That is no longer an exception, but increasingly something we must be aware of and decide whether the previous balance is the appropriate one in the wider national interest.

Another point of interest, and one I was unaware of until recently, is that one of the circumstances in which these matters are being raised is not the release of sensitive documents to help in UK legal cases, as sometimes happens, but often the request for the release of this information to assist legal proceedings in other countries. The Green Paper states on page 7:

“The Government has strained key international relationships and risked compromise of vital sources and techniques in no fewer than seven court cases in which the applicants sought sensitive UK Government-held but very often foreign government-originated information for disclosure into foreign legal proceedings.”

Of course, Binyam Mohamed was such an example, because his appearance before a United States military commission led to the application in the first place.

Against that background and as the report states, I and the Committee very much welcome the Government’s proposals to modernise the procedure and their recommendation that the United Kingdom use the closed material procedure and involve special advocates, as already occurs in several areas, to deal with such cases. The only alternative, traditionally, has been the public interest immunity approach, but that is a blockbuster approach, and if one secures such immunity one finds that none of the information can be seen by anyone.

At least under the special advocate procedure, the special advocate—someone who has been vetted to be able to inspect such sensitive material—will have the opportunity to see it on behalf of his or her client, and, although they will not be able to reveal detailed information, they will be able at least to take it into account when advising their client on judicial proceedings.

That is greatly welcome and a step forward, but the Committee wants to make this point. If these proposals are implemented, the situation will improve considerably, but they do not provide an absolute guarantee that no information can ever be released at the insistence of the court, a fact that the Government acknowledge. Page 21 of the Green Paper states that closed material proceedings, involving a special advocate,

“reduce the risk of damaging disclosure of sensitive material.”

Such proceedings do not remove the risk; they reduce it. Likewise, on the following page, the Green Paper states that a decision to allow a special advocate to be available can

“be reviewable by the trial judge on judicial review principles if the other side decides to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision.”

We are therefore dealing with a very curious situation. If the Government’s proposals are accepted, the balance will change, and that is good and healthy, but the significant possibility will remain that in very special circumstances a judge might take a different view on such matters and the information could be released, with all the consequences that might flow from that.

Those who take the interests of national security very seriously indeed, as I certainly do and I am sure everyone here does, accept that, at the end of the day in a country that believes in the rule of law, the courts—in most circumstances, if not all—have to have the final word. I wonder, however, whether the Government ought to consider the argument that the provisions in the Green Paper need to be further strengthened: a belt and braces approach, which would not be inconsistent with the rule of law but would certainly provide added reassurance.

The Government have been good enough to refer in their Green Paper to the way that approach might be taken, and paragraph 2.78 on page 33 states:

“It would be possible for Parliament to provide the courts with clearer guidance in statute”.

The proposal refers to public interest immunity cases, but it could apply to special advocate cases, and the Government go on to state in the next paragraph:

“One such presumption”—

written into statute as a “rebuttable presumption”—

“would be against disclosure of sensitive”—

national security—

“material owned by foreign governments, obtained via intelligence relationships working on the basis of the Control Principle.”

That is exactly what we need seriously to consider. It would not be inconsistent with the rule of law, because at the end of the day it would be a rebuttable presumption, and the court would determine whether the presumption were rebutted.

As we have always known, the courts, when they interpret the legislation of this House, not only look at the words of an Act but try to identify, if they can, Parliament’s intention in passing it. If the statute stated that there were such a presumption against the disclosure of intelligence received from a foreign, friendly Government, the court would be able at least to take that into account before it reached a final decision, so I and the Committee hope that the Government give that proposal serious consideration.

One of the main parts of not only our report but the Government’s Green Paper concerns the future of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and although I note that it is a major issue I will not detain the House for long, as I hope to conclude my remarks in at most another 10 or 15 minutes in order to allow everyone else who wishes to speak the chance to do so. It is, however, a crucial matter.

Over a period of some 17 or 18 years, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 has become outdated: it no longer accurately describes how the Committee operates. That is part of the problem; another part of the problem is that the Committee, if it is to conduct its oversight effectively, needs additional responsibility and power.

It is worth remembering that when the 1994 Act was passed, the intention was not only that oversight would be provided for the first time, but that the public would be reassured that it was independent oversight—and to some degree that reassurance has not yet been achieved. The public, when they look at the Act, see a Committee that is not a Committee of Parliament, although it is a Committee of parliamentarians, because we are all appointed by the Prime Minister, we report to the Prime Minister, and only through the Prime Minister do our reports eventually reach the House. That obviously calls our independence into question.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The House has to give its view, but I say to the right hon. Gentleman, who also serves on the Committee and has done so even longer than I have, that the Prime Minister has the last word. Although Prime Ministers have in practice never overruled the view of the House, they have the statutory power to do so. The House gives its advice, thus illustrating the difficulty in terms of the public’s view. That is the first problem.

The Committee, in its report, recommends—we are delighted that the Government have accepted it in principle—that the Committee become a Committee of Parliament. It is a joint Committee of the House of Commons and House of Lords, with two distinguished Members of the House of Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Lothian, but we recommend that its appointment procedure be very similar to that used by the Standards and Privileges Committee or by all Joint Committees of Parliament. Names would be presented to Parliament, but Parliament would be able to veto them if it disapproved. If it disapproved, the names would have to disappear, and only when Parliament was satisfied with the recommendations would appointments be made. Parliament would have—in a way that it does not, and has never had—the last word on both the Chairman of the Committee and its members, and it would properly be a Committee of Parliament, albeit obviously required to operate under slightly different procedures because of the secret information that we deal with. That is the first reform of a fundamental kind.

On the second reform, the 1994 Act states that the Committee has responsibility for policy, resources and administration, but it does not mention operations, a subject in which there is overwhelming public interest and in which, on a simple literal reading of the Act, we appear to have no involvement. People who ought to know better have recently asked, “How can the Committee operate effectively if it cannot even look at operations?” In reality, it has been looking at operations over the past few years, whether on the treatment of detainees, the Binyam Mohamed case or the use of intelligence during the Iraq war.

The Committee has been able to look at the raw material and to question agencies about operations, but that role does not appear in the Act. That needs to be revised. We suggest that, instead of listing the issues that the Committee can look at, the Act should be reformed and simply state that “the Committee should have oversight responsibility for all the activities of the intelligence agencies”, thereby including operations.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

On operations, does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that practice in the past has been—and is likely to be in the future—for the examination of particular operations to be retrospective and that there are very good reasons for that?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My hon. Friend raises a very important point. In making our recommendations to the Government—the matter is important to them as well—we acknowledge that we do not seek the level of responsibility that exists in the United States, where certain senior members of Congress have to be consulted in advance of an operation regarding what the intelligence agencies will be doing. They do not have the power to stop an operation, but they are informed about it, as they were, for example—so we understand—of that involving Osama bin Laden.

The ISC can see no public interest in such an approach. Having power without responsibility is bad enough, but to have responsibility without power is even worse. Our responsibility is to provide retrospective oversight, and the Government appear in principle to have accepted that, as long as we are dealing—as we agree we should be—with matters of significant national interest. That is right and proper. Many discussions will be needed about how that will be handled in practice, but the principle is of profound importance.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I begin by reassuring the shadow Home Secretary that, in my limited experience—I have been a member of the ISC for just over a year—such is the sense of cross-party common purpose on the Committee, I would have no difficulty in accepting as Chairman any of the Committee’s three excellent Labour members. However, such a thing is completely unnecessary given the outstanding chairmanship of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind)—[Hon. Members: “Hear hear!”] I am glad to hear Opposition Members’ endorsements.

In his opening remarks, my right hon. and learned Friend mentioned the totally discredited concept that history ended with the end of the cold war. Topics mentioned in the debate include the Olympics, cyber-security, general terrorism and the more traditional threat from more traditional enemies. In my somewhat disparate remarks, I shall try to touch on a few of them.

When dealing with any form of enemy of the democratic system, it is helpful to think in the ways and along the lines that they think—if we have such twisted minds, to which some of us must own up. Our initial reaction in respect of the Olympic games is to think, “There must be a huge extra effort to protect the games,” but what would terrorists planning a series of deadly attacks in the UK think? Would they think, “I must go straight away to the heart of the games, where the maximum security effort is bound to be concentrated,” or would they think, “There will be a huge concentration of effort on the security of the Olympic games in that fortnight, so there will be great opportunities to create mayhem in all sorts of other, less protected parts of the UK”?

Therefore, the problem facing the Security Service is that it cannot say, “With the extra effort we will put into protecting the Olympics, we will ease security measures elsewhere in the country.” The reality is that the holding of the Olympics in the UK is a considerable opportunity—I will not say that it is a heaven-sent opportunity, because it comes from a somewhat different direction—for terrorists to cause mayhem and to maximise the deadly effect of their perverted ideas carried into action. I often wonder whether it was sheer coincidence—it probably was—that the choice of London for the Olympics was announced just 24 hours before the 7/7 atrocities in 2005.

We need extra concentration because of what could be visited upon us during the Olympics, but there are also new technological threats, to which hon. Members have referred. Everybody has welcomed the increase in resources—£600 million net—to ensure greater cyber-security in future. There was concern in the past about a lack of ministerial responsibility for cyber-protection, so it comes as a great relief to the ISC and its members to know that the role will now be undertaken by the Cabinet Office, whose Ministers have a legendary reputation for the protection of sensitive information. Think about it. However, when we are considering—[Laughter.] They got there in the end. As Frankie Howerd used to say, don’t take a vote on it.

The Cabinet Office will be responsible for cyber-security, but that does not mean that it is the most suited Department to be responsible—nor has it been earmarked for the role—for the countering of the propaganda message that is used to generate recruits to the terrorist cause, which is closely related to cyber-warfare. We have heard a considerable amount about the attempts that have been made to decapitate al-Qaeda, which have enjoyed considerable success. However, we also know that attacks are increasingly lone-wolf attacks, when people self-start and trawl the internet, picking up messages and techniques that they turn into action, with deadly effect.

It is of the utmost importance that the Government seek to counter the message put out to mobilise, radicalise and turn into terrorists impressionable and sometimes unbalanced minds already in our society. It is incredibly difficult for a security service to track such people: it is much harder to track a lone-wolf potential attacker than somebody who is engaged with people abroad and part of an al-Qaeda-like organisation planning a much more sophisticated attack. We need to hear more—the Committee will make an effort to ensure that we do—of the efforts that the Government are making to neutralise the radicalising messages on the internet and put forward a counter-narrative so that people can understand the values of the society in which they live.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman is extremely knowledgeable in this field because of his experience before entering Parliament, but does he share my concerns about the work of the Home Office’s research, information and communications unit, which the Committee has decided to consider much more closely? It is essential work but at the moment we have little information about what it is doing and its effectiveness.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted that the right hon. Lady makes that point. It is too early to have concerns about the work of the unit because we have not been able to examine it yet. The work that such a unit is designed to do is, as she said, of the utmost importance, and if it carries it out successfully the public at large might not know how successful it has been in supporting themes and counter-narrative ideologies in the media and internet to the benefit of people in our society who might otherwise become disaffected. However, unless one can examine the organisation’s work—within what is commonly called the ring of secrecy—one cannot be sure whether sufficient work is being done or about its quality.

On page 44, paragraph 156 of our report, the Committee stated:

“The difficulty of measuring the success of PREVENT work is most notable in the work of the Research, Information and Communications Unit…which was established in 2007 with the primary aim of ensuring consistency, across government, on Counter-Terrorism and counter-extremism messages and developing a coherent narrative to challenge extremist ideology. RICU is jointly funded by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. It currently has 22 full-time staff and its budget in 2010/11 was £4.25m (of which £0.3m was spent on research and £2.7m was spent on communication campaigns).”

That does not sound like an effort on the scale needed if we are seriously to counter the radicalising message of the enemies of our way of life.

Democratic societies are inherently resistant to Governments propagandising against organisations involving their own citizens, in an attempt to get a message across to their own people; but sometimes we have to understand that there are forms of warfare besides open warfare—for example, the propaganda and counter-propaganda warfare that went on during the long confrontation with Soviet communism. During that period, in 1948, a Labour Government set up the Foreign Office’s information research department, which remained in existence until 1977 under Governments of both complexions, until unfortunately another Labour Government decided to do away with it. That organisation operated on a considerable scale, and its particular strength was that it made available to opinion-formers the detailed facts that enabled strong cases for what was good about British society to be made on a non-partisan, non-party political basis. I believe—I think that the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) shares my belief—that an effort on a similar scale might be necessary in the future.

On the Committee’s operations, I can reassure the Home Secretary: she said that we need to consider the resource implications of the Committee expanding its work to consider operational matters; but I am not sure that there are many resource implications, because as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington said, we are asking not to change what we do but simply to formalise what we already do. We are not asking to look over the shoulder of the intelligence and security services at what they are doing while they are doing it—in an operational sense—although they sometimes choose to give us glimpses of that, which obviously we treat with appropriate discretion. Instead, we wish to be assured that when something becomes contentious, the ISC can review the matter and decide whether proper procedures were followed, whether mistakes were made or whether we can help the security and intelligence services by giving them a clean bill of health.

I shall take an example at random. It is known that over the years the approach of Governments towards Libya changed completely. Under the Labour Government, there was a policy—I am sure that its proponents would argue that it was a legitimate line to pursue—of trying to bring Libya back into the fold. For example, when Libya declared its intention to abandon its chemical weapons stocks—we now know that it still had some, although we do not know whether that was because it had not finished getting rid of them or because it was concealing them and cheating on its promises—it was regarded as quite a coup, quite a triumph for the security and intelligence services

It now appears, however, that along the way the degree of co-operation between some of our agencies and some Libyan agencies might have crossed the line. If it did, for example in the rendition of two people, as has been reported, we will need a means of finding out why that line was crossed, which agencies crossed it, who, if anybody, was responsible—was it the Government, was it the agencies?—and whether there are lessons to be learned that we can help to articulate. If the Committee is not given the power to review such operations, many people will rightly ask, “What’s the use of having a Committee of parliamentarians, whose job is supposedly to supervise the security and intelligence services, if when something highly controversial appears to have happened, it cannot, does not or will not look into it?”

I want to refer to one or two of the slightly more traditional threats. It was interesting to hear that the agencies still think that we should not, in our rightful concern about international terrorism, forget that the country remains an intelligence target for countries such as Russia and China. One of the things that worry me the more I focus on it is the possibility that some countries could steal our technology, use it to undercut our competitiveness and then buy their way into our infrastructure in this country. This would be of great strategic value to them in future. I will say no more about that for the moment, but I hope that others might feel it appropriate to do so later in the debate.

Finally, I warmly welcome the proposal in the justice Green Paper to prevent the control order principle being breached. Irrespective of what piece of intelligence was disclosed in court, we must never forget that if we undermine the trust between ourselves and our principal intelligence allies on that issue, we undermine it on every issue. However, it also behoves us to remind our intelligence partners that when they engage in methods and techniques such as Guantanamo Bay and water-boarding, they open up not only themselves but their allies to challenges in court that make such problems much more salient, in respect of the evidence that a judge might feel had to be disclosed. It is a question of exercising two-way restraint: we do not wish to breach the confidence of our allies, but our allies must not breach the standards to which our intelligence services rightly apply themselves.

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[Dr Julian Lewis]

Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on, he might wish to draw the House’s attention to paragraph 33 of the report, which states:

“The Security Service has told the Committee that the numbers of individuals involved with the current republican terrorist groups is around half the number that were active in the Provisional IRA”.

That is a very considerable number, is it not?

[Paul Goggins]

It is, although it is also fair to say that there are degrees of involvement. Although there may be some latent support at a fairly local level for certain individuals, the number of active people who are determined on violence in pursuit of their aims is probably still fairly limited. None the less, they are increasingly dangerous in what they do, and they need to be dealt with. That is why, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree, the 34% increase in investment in the past couple of years in the Security Service’s work on Northern Ireland terrorism is welcome.

There have been some positive developments, and it is important to record them in this debate. The devolution of policing and justice, of course, was a very important step in April last year. The PSNI and the Security Service have worked very well together in a new relationship over the past few years, which has borne great fruit. Only recently—this is outside the period covered by the report, but it is none the less important—Michael Campbell was convicted in Lithuania and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment there. That was the product of some very good work, and those involved should be commended and congratulated.

I warmly welcome the Green Paper, which others have already analysed. Frankly, it takes political courage to come forward with such a Green Paper. The territory is complex and the document is hardly a vote-winner, but it is essential that we grapple with such issues and seek to try to resolve them on a cross-party basis, because they are important. The Binyam Mohamed case was clearly a major breach of the control principle and, as we have reported in our report this year, when we went to the United States and met our colleagues and counterparts there it was clear that they were shaken by this development. Although they reiterated time and again the value that they attach to the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom on intelligence and security, they made it absolutely clear that they must know that their intelligence is safe in our hands. If they cannot trust us, it would be a very negative development.

We all agree that we want a system of open justice. Article 6, on the right to a fair trial, is a vital part of our system. As far as possible, of course, defendants and suspects should have the gist of the case against them outlined and given to them, but the problem is that the “gist” is starting to become virtually the whole case, which makes things very difficult. When evidence includes highly sensitive information, there must be a way of protecting it. Ministers have an obligation to ensure that they uphold article 6, but they also have article 2 obligations to the people who are the source of the intelligence that enables Ministers to act. Those people must be protected, too, because if Ministers were to reveal such information and thereby the identity of the sources, who might then be imperilled, it would be a terrible development. It is vital that both sources and the wider public are protected.

I welcome the proposals in the Green Paper on the closed material procedures, but, as others have said, they must be made as tight as possible. In the end, the court will always have the last word and make the ultimate decision, but it is for Parliament now to make its views absolutely clear, through statutory guidance and through the consideration, as others have said, of the statutory presumption against disclosure of foreign intelligence material. All those safeguards should be considered, but, having had the courage to introduce this Green Paper and grapple with these issues, it is vital that we get it right. We will not get an early or easy second chance to do so, so it is essential that we make the best effort that we can now.

Let me make a final point on closed material procedures. We are familiar with the arguments about the control principle and more familiar with its application to immigration cases in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and to control orders—and TPIMs, when they are introduced. I caution the Minister, as we will increasingly need clarity on the recall of convicted terrorists who are out of prison on licence. I want to emphasise the importance of that. It is already an issue in Northern Ireland, and it will become increasingly important across the rest of the UK. When intelligence raises concerns about the continued involvement in terrorism of someone who has served their sentence and is now out in the community on licence, although that intelligence might not be able to be used further to convict that individual, it must be possible to use it to ensure that they go back into prison and continue their sentence so that the public are protected. That is another important test that the Minister will need to set himself when he comes up with the ultimate solution to the issues raised in the Green Paper.

Finally, I warmly welcome what the Green Paper has to say about the future role and remit of the Committee. I am not personally persuaded by the argument put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) that the Chair of the Committee should always be from the Opposition party, and there was a good exchange involving my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen in which the arguments were advanced. It is important that the individual who is in the Chair of the Committee should be respected by not only its members but more widely across Parliament and the agencies. The Chair should have the expertise and leadership to create consensus, which is at the core of all this work. We have that in our current Chair, and whether or not a future Chair is from the Opposition or Government party, those are the key credentials that that individual must have.

I welcome the proposal that the Committee should be a Committee of Parliament, with all the safeguards that have been discussed. There should be a limited number of public sessions, which would help to explain more about the importance of the work of the intelligence and security agencies as well as that of the Committee. The remit of the Committee should run across not only policy, resources and administration, but all the work of the agencies. That already happens, and we need to ensure that it is formalised for the future.

It is also important that the Committee can not only request information but require it. As we make that move, it will place greater obligations on the Committee to ensure that it gets the information and that it knows that it has it, as well as that there is nothing missing. That means that we will need a deeper investigative capacity in the Committee. The agencies should ensure in every case that we get all the information that has been requested the first time rather than the second or third time.

Speaking personally, my first year as a member of the Committee has been fascinating and very enjoyable. I certainly look forward to the year ahead and the many challenges that lie in it. There will certainly be no let-up in those challenges, particularly with TPIMs coming into operation and the Olympic games coming to our capital city.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I apologise to the House for my late arrival and for missing the opening speeches, but the Foreign Affairs Committee has been sitting tonight. The President of Turkey is in town on a state visit and the Turkish Foreign Minister and Baroness Cathy Ashton, the High Representative of the EU, have given evidence to us.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), who is one of the new members of the Committee. I had the privilege of serving on the Committee from 2005 to 2010 and I found it to be one of the most rewarding experiences of my parliamentary life. He is quite right that Northern Ireland has moved up the agenda in recent years and I agree with virtually every point he made in his speech.

As this is the first debate on such matters in this Parliament, may I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the staff of the ISC, who are of the highest possible calibre? There are not enough of them, but that is not their fault. I also pay tribute to the agencies for their hard work and the way in which they protect the freedoms that we all value. The Foreign Secretary rightly praised them in his speech last Wednesday and we can all join him in his praise.

I also want to thank the three Chairmen I served under during those five years. Although it is regrettable that there were three, they all discharged their responsibilities with diligence and enthusiasm and were all of a very high calibre. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) is the only Chairman we have in this Parliament, as a degree of continuity is essential.

This is the first time we have looked at the report from the outside, so to speak, and one change I have noted—I do not know whether it is my imagination—is that there seem to be fewer redactions than in the past, which we recommended in the previous Parliament. We wanted reports to flow better, and I think that has been achieved.

I share the concern about the drop in funding—a 10% cut would concern anybody. The agencies do not seem to be alarmed, but a 10% cut in staff at the Secret Intelligence Service would certainly alarm me.

We host the Olympic games next year and I see that the agencies feel they are well placed to manage risks. However, that sits a bit awkwardly with the revelations in the past couple of weeks, after the report was published, that a review of security is under way.

I agree with the Committee’s conclusions about cyber-security. The national security strategy puts cyber-security as a tier 1 risk, but under the present strategy an uprising in north Africa is a tier 3 risk, so I do not know how much weight one can put on these things. At the moment, we just take the world as we find it and try to address things.

The Committee has noted that the Foreign Affairs Committee managed to get some of the World Service cuts reversed and would like to see the same happen with BBC Monitoring. I completely agree with that but I point out to members of the Intelligence and Security Committee who are present that the Foreign Affairs Committee’s recommendation was initially rejected and that it took a debate under the Backbench Business Committee procedure to raise it again before the Government took that on board. We have seen the growing influence of the Backbench Business Committee, and I do not know whether the ISC wants to get down to that level—get deep down and dirty, as it were—but it may be something it has to do.

I also welcome the conclusions of the coroner who said, in relation to the report arising out of 7/7, that the ISC’s conclusions were “detailed and thorough”. The coroner also made some interesting recommendations about the use of photographs. I note that the Committee found that any discrepancies would not have changed its conclusions. That shows the calibre of the work being carried out by the ISC—if the coroner can describe the work as “detailed and thorough” and it can be said that conclusions would not have been affected. That is an important point to make in relation to those who were so critical of the reports when they came out.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am listening to my hon. Friend’s speech with great attention and I think that another word of praise could be said for the services themselves in that context. In the past, when they have found that they have inadvertently overlooked some piece of information, in providing that information to the ISC, they have not hesitated to own up to that fact even if it opened them up to criticism. It is incumbent on us to encourage them to do that and not to be deterred from doing it because it is a slight blot on their record when they do not get things right first time.

[Richard Ottaway]

I completely agree, and I have always been hugely impressed by the vast quantity of information. When there was just one needle in the haystack, they might not have found it the first time around but they did find it the second time around and quite rightly, as my hon. Friend says, produced it for the Committee.

On the Green Paper, may I support the point that was made about the handling of sensitive material, which I gather was mentioned by the Chairman of the ISC in his opening speech? The recommendations in the Green Paper are sensible and offer the best way of dealing with sensitive material, but I do not think it has to be instead of using a special advocate. It could well be in addition to using a special advocate and using the presumptions set out in the Green Paper.

Let me address the role of the Committee and the way it operates. Parliamentary oversight of a secret service is always going to have limitations. I do not think there is a silver bullet, regardless of whether the Committee is a Committee of the House. Let me give an illustration. The major foreign policy objective of our engagement in Afghanistan is to deny al-Qaeda and international terrorists a base from which to carry out their operations. During the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on Afghanistan, a number of witnesses told us that that is no longer a problem in Afghanistan, so at the Liaison Committee I asked the Prime Minister whether he was still receiving intelligence to that effect and he said he was. So, we are stuck with the same old problem that a major overseas deployment of the British Army and other armed services is based on intelligence that has not been subject to the scrutiny of the House. Those of us who were here at the time of the Iraq war know the problems that that can generate. This is an echo of the past. I have come up with a least-bad option and have written to the Chairman of the ISC to ask him to put it to the appropriate quarters when a suitable opportunity arrives and then to report to the House on the veracity of that information. I hope that, in the short term, that can be a way of dealing with the matter.