Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
National Security and Investment Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJulian Lewis
Main Page: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)Department Debates - View all Julian Lewis's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn Second Reading both of this Bill and of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it was mentioned that in 2013, the Intelligence and Security Committee first recommended measures to prevent high-risk vendors such as Huawei from penetrating our critical national infrastructure in future. It is always the way: you wait seven years for a Bill to protect against infiltration and takeover, then two come along together.
Given that background, the ISC naturally welcomed the introduction of this legislation, and we greatly appreciated the contact that we have had with the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi). Not only did he keep his promise to write to us about the points made by Committee members on Second Reading, during my period of self-isolation, but he dealt with ISC concerns at the Committee stage and reached out before today’s debates as well. That is precisely the type of constructive engagement that we should like to have with the Government. If I do not secure the concessions that I want after all of that, I shall be very disappointed!
The issue on which I shall focus is parliamentary oversight. Normally, that would be straightforward. As the future arrangements laid down by the Bill will depend on the input of the new investment security unit, and as that unit will be housed in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, one would normally expect that general scrutiny could be conducted by Parliament as a whole and specialised scrutiny by the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Unfortunately, that does not work in this case: much of the work of the investment security unit will depend on input from intelligence and security agencies and similar sensitive sources that cannot and must not be made public.
Furthermore, on Second Reading, the then Business Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), made crystal clear how central secret material would be to the practical application of the provisions of this legislation. He stated that
“the whole point of the Bill is for it to be narrow on national security grounds”.
He also said:
“These powers are narrowly defined and will be exclusively used on national security grounds. The Government will not be able to use these powers to intervene in business transactions for broader economic or public interest reasons”.—[Official Report, 1 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 206-210.]
It follows that the very areas in which the BEIS Committee would be perfectly qualified to scrutinise policy are specifically excluded from the application of the powers conferred by the National Security and Investment Bill.
That scrutiny gap was addressed, also on Second Reading, by the shadow Business Secretary, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), who said:
“Given the sensitive nature of the issues involved in this Bill, I do think there needs to be a way…for this House to monitor how this is working in practice.
I do not speak for it, but we have a special Committee of the House—the Intelligence and Security Committee—that can look at these issues. I would like to raise the question with the Secretary of State whether it could play a role in scrutinising the working of the regime and some of the decisions being made, because there are real restrictions on the kind of transparency there can be on these issues…The ISC is in a sense purpose-built for some of these issues.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 214.]
It is hard to disagree with that, although I hasten to add that the Committee has not the slightest wish gratuitously to add to its workload, overburdened as we are due to our delayed reconstitution and the fact that we cannot operate virtually, where sensitive material is concerned, during periods of lockdown. Nevertheless, Parliament should be enabled to scrutinise the implementation of the powers given to Government by this legislation, which explicitly puts national security material at the heart of future decision making. It is obvious that there will be potential conflicts between encouraging business on the one hand and safeguarding national security on the other. In 1994, the ISC was established specifically for circumstances such as these—namely, to examine matters that Parliament could not because they were too sensitive for public disclosure and debate.
It has been suggested that the ISC cannot undertake this role this time because the organisation concerned, the new investment and security unit, is based in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, rather than Departments like the Home Office or the Cabinet Office, which traditionally handle national security matters. Yet this is fundamentally to misunderstand the legal basis under which the ISC functions.
There are two interlinked documents: the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC for which that Act provides. The long title of the JSA makes it quite clear that it provides not only for scrutiny of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, but for
“oversight of…other activities relating to intelligence or security matters…and for connected purposes.”
Section 2(1) of the Act refers to those three intelligence agencies specifically, but section 2(2) spells out our Committee’s wider remit:
“The ISC may examine or otherwise oversee such other activities of Her Majesty’s Government in relation to intelligence or security matters as are set out in a memorandum of understanding.”
Section 2(5) explains that that MOU can be altered by agreement between the ISC and the Prime Minister. All that is required, therefore, for a Government activity in relation to intelligence or security matters to be added to the existing list in the memorandum of understanding is a simple exchange of letters between the ISC and the Prime Minister agreeing to do so.
In other words, the 2013 Act and associated memorandum were designed exactly for circumstances such as these, where evolving intelligence and security arrangements create sensitive new functions and/or new units which need Parliamentary scrutiny to be within the same circle of secrecy as the long-established Agencies. To put the matter beyond all doubt, consider finally this extract from paragraph 8 of the MOU about our remit:
“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
Inserted at the end of this sentence is a notation for the following footnote which explains:
“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments such as the Home Office, FCO and MOD by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.”
Indeed, having chaired the Commons Defence Committee in the previous two Parliaments, I can confirm there was never the slightest friction, overlap or intrusion from the then ISC into the work of the Defence Committee. The ISC looked at defence intelligence and offensive cyber, as set out in its MOU, and the Defence Committee continued to scrutinise everything else.
It really should not be necessary, every time a new unit is set up inside a Department not normally associated with national security or intelligence issues, to spell out in black and white, as I have done today, how and why the framers of the 2013 Act deliberately created the flexible memorandum of understanding arrangement that incorporated its role on the face of that legislation. It was, of course, to deal with exactly the sort of situation facing us today, where the intelligence and security battle in what is increasingly known as the grey zone of conflict mutates and moves into areas of responsibility far beyond traditional boundaries, as Deborah Haynes’ admirable new podcast illustrates so convincingly. That is why Business Ministers, rather than Defence or Security Ministers, are having to grapple with today’s legislation.
Following a constructive discussion with my hon. Friend the Minister yesterday, I was cautiously optimistic that the Government would recognise that the 2013 arrangements provide the correct basis for scrutiny on which to proceed. Of the 14 amendments tabled for today, there is one—new clause 7—that recognises the scrutiny gap in this legislation and proposes that a special report containing the relevant classified national security material should be prepared for, and provided to, the Intelligence and Security Committee. This Opposition amendment has much to commend it, and, as ISC Chairman, I would be minded to support it if it were the only available option. However, an undertaking by the Minister today that the Government will bring forward their own amendment in the upper House to close the scrutiny gap satisfactorily in a more streamlined way would be even better.
In his appearance before the Public Bill Committee, former chief of MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove had the following exchange with the Minister, who referred to the annual report to be prepared for Parliament as a requirement of this legislation. The Minister asked:
“What is your view on balancing transparency and ensuring Government can take national security decisions sensitively? Where does that balance lie in terms of our ability to be as transparent as we can without harming sensitivities around these decisions?”
Sir Richard replied:
“My view would be that the annual report has as much transparency as possible, but you are probably going to require a secret annexe from time to time.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 21.]
Whether we go down that route of a classified unpublished annexe to send to our Committee or follow the model used in the ISC’s own reports, which are prepared in full with subsequent redactions made and marked in the main body of the text, such an approach would be the least burdensome for the Department to prepare and for the ISC to scrutinise. Either method would effectively close the scrutiny gap and get this valuable and necessary legislation off to the best possible start.
It is a great pleasure, as always, to follow the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), and I support many of his remarks.
Let me start by saying that the Opposition’s approach to this Bill is one of constructive support. That should not surprise the Minister: already at Committee stage we tabled nearly 30 targeted amendments and half a dozen new clauses to strengthen protections of our national security, although, regrettably, the Minister did not choose to accept any of them. As the Minister is also responsible for vaccine roll-out, he may have been distracted. I want to thank everybody—all the members of the Committee and the House staff involved in the Committee stage of the Bill—and confirm that we intend to continue that constructive support.
We support the Bill, because it is a Bill demanded by Labour. The problems it tackles are ones that have been highlighted by Labour, and the Government’s action, only after years of delay, seems to be a result of being constantly reminded by Labour. Reminded this Government have been, not least by their failures again and again. They were reminded in 2012, when they let the Centre for Integrated Photonics, a prize British research and development centre, be taken over by Huawei, an event that our recent head of the National Cyber Security Centre said we would not want to happen with hindsight: national security outsourced and British interests relinquished to the market.
The Government were reminded again in 2014 when they let our foremost artificial intelligence firm, DeepMind, be acquired prematurely by Google: national security interests outsourced again on account of blind market faith. They were reminded twice this time when the Government let our world-leading semiconductor firm Arm be taken over first by SoftBank and now by Nvidia. Again, an intelligence expert told our Committee that the UK had limited freedom of choice in this key strategic technology and that the deal undermined our own ability: our national interest outsourced yet again by Ministers prioritising market zeal over British security.
For the sake of clarity, the annual report that will be supplied to Parliament will not have any security-sensitive information in it. The Minister says that we could request further information. The only information we want to request is the information of a security-sensitive nature that will routinely have played a part in leading to these decisions. I do not want to tell any tales out of school. All I can say is that the Minister seemed very receptive when I put forward the idea of an annexe to the report, which would come to the Committee, or alternatively there could be an unredacted or redacted version of the report. Is he saying that the Cabinet Office is declining to do that? If so, it would appear that the malign influence of one Mr Cummings is not entirely eliminated from that Department.
I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s intervention. What I was saying is that there are no restrictions. His Committee will be able to invite the Secretary of State to give evidence to it, and it will also be able to ask for further information, which the unit will be able to provide.
Is this what the Minister wants? Every year, the Committee will request to have a comprehensive explanation of the security sensitive information that has underlain the different decisions that the unit has taken. All he is saying is that we can request this ad hoc every year and we will get it—I will believe that when I see it. If that were to be the case, there could be no possible objection to incorporating this in the legislation now so that it is not at the whim of a future Minister to either give us what we need or deny us what we need.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention and his powerful argument, but I just repeat that there are no restrictions on his Committee requesting that information.
Mr Deputy Speaker, may I begin this short contribution by warmly endorsing what you had to say by way of congratulations to the new Secretary of State? He is genuinely one of the most popular Members in any part of the House, and I am sure that his delayed but nevertheless entirely merited accession to the Cabinet was greeted with wide acclamation.
The best must never be allowed to be the enemy of the good. This is a good Bill, but there are, as the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said, opportunities for it to be improved further in another place, which I hope will happen. It is never good form to repeat from the lengthier preliminary stages what one has said in any detail in the final Third Reading debate, so I will just quote one small extract from the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC, which the Secretary of State may not have heard me read earlier. Paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding says:
“only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of Departments”—
meaning other Departments such as his—
“whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
On Report, the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), said that it will be open to the ISC to request the secret information that cannot be published. That is a great step forward, and I thank him for it genuinely, because previously there were remarks to the effect that the ISC’s writ did not run anywhere near the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. That appears to have been dropped, and that is a big step forward.
The reason why it is necessary to recognise this is not that we want to make extra work for ourselves. It is because we entirely agree with the Government that the security threats constantly change, morph and spread themselves out into different areas of activity and, inevitably therefore, into different areas for which different Departments have responsibility. We cannot possibly do our job of inspecting and scrutinising those parts of security issue information that have to be classified if we are not allowed to go into those Departments only in so far as that type of information has spread with a new threat into a different Department. If the Government are saying—and I see some nodding heads on the Front Bench—that it is now accepted that the ISC can ask the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy for this sort of information, that is a huge step forward, and we thank the Government for it. We still believe that it would be better for it to be formalised in the way that Sir Richard Dearlove suggested in Committee.
I will conclude with a message that I would like the Ministers to take to their colleagues in the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office seems to have a strange sort of fear of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because every time we try to do our job, it seems to want to push back. The message I wish to give to them is this: “Friends, colleagues—comrades, even—of the Cabinet Office, the ISC is not your enemy. We are your constructively critical friends. You know what? Sometimes we get it right: we got it right over Huawei. It would have been good if successive Governments had listened a bit earlier over Huawei, but they got there in the end. If you lock us out, you are simply shutting off a safety valve and a mechanism for correcting mistakes that you need not make. Don’t make that mistake again. Apart from that, congratulations on a very good Bill indeed.”
National Security and Investment Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJulian Lewis
Main Page: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)Department Debates - View all Julian Lewis's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe have got to the nub of the matter quickly. I can indeed confirm that. In the letter the Secretary of State sent to the Chair of the BEIS Committee, copying in my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, he spoke about the fact that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs to scrutinise the work of the ISU, including for example details of some of the risks that the ISU has identified under the NSI regime and the measures taken to address them. As part of that, the Secretary of State confirmed that the Department can provide the Chair of the BEIS Committee with confidential briefings on Privy Council terms, and that he would be happy to set those out in more detail in either a memorandum of understanding or further exchange of letters. The Secretary of State went on to say that he would encourage the STC to provide scrutiny of the work of the ISU where the work of the unit falls within the specific remit of that Committee. He also welcomed the Intelligence and Security Committee’s continued scrutiny of the work of the security services, which will include where the security services’ work supports the work of the ISU.
I hate to be slightly disobliging, but it is a fact, is it not, that the staffs of these Select Committees do not have the clearance necessary to see or handle top secret material, and showing a top secret document to the Chair of a Committee on his or her own, briefly in very limited circumstances, does not amount—as I will explain shortly—to effective scrutiny?
I look forward to hearing my right hon. Friend’s explanation.
I believe that the Bill as amended by the other place through amendments 11 and 15 would require the Secretary of State to provide a confidential annexe, to be provided to the ISC. I am advised by my noble Friends Lord Callanan and Lord Grimstone that there is considerable strength of feeling in the other place about ensuring that the operation of the regime receives appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, and I welcome the passionate and expert debate that this question has already received. It has been proposed that the ISC is better placed than the BEIS Committee to scrutinise the Investment and Security Unit, despite the Secretary of State for BEIS having responsibility for the unit. The implication of the amendments is that the Select Committee responsible for holding the Secretary of State to account across their responsibilities is insufficient in that regard. It is also suggested that the ISC would have inadequate access to information to carry out its duties.
In essence, the amendments would require sensitive details to be provided to the ISC regarding the Secretary of State’s decision on final notifications given and final orders made, varied or revoked, but the ISC is already able to request such information as soon as is appropriate from the security services where it forms part of its long-established scrutiny responsibilities under the Justice and Security Act 2013 and, as I hope I have made clear, its accompanying memorandum of understanding. In addition, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State must publish details of each final order made, varied or revoked, and clause 61 already requires the annual report to include the number of final orders made, together with a number of other details. Indeed, that clause was amended in the other place to include further such information in the annual report.
We do not disagree that further information may be required for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Where that is the case, the Government will follow existing procedures for reporting back to Parliament, but that should be done primarily through responding to the BEIS Committee as it goes about its work of ably scrutinising the work of the Department. We will ensure that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs.
It is of course right that the ISC continues its excellent scrutiny of the work of the security services. The work of the security services on investment security in support of the ISU clearly falls within the remit of the ISC. That does not require any statutory change to be made. As I said, the memorandum of understanding pertains to the continuing work of the ISC, and I look forward to working with colleagues on that Committee. As such, and with the BEIS Committee having appropriate assurance that it will be provided with the information necessary, there is no need for these changes made to the Bill by the other place to stand.
In summary, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, I believe that this House is today presented with an improved set of measures to safeguard our national security. The ISC will not have its powers—existing powers —diluted through the discussion of the memorandum of understanding, as we have already said. Therefore, I commend the amendments, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, to the House.
The Intelligence and Security Committee greatly appreciates the work of the Minister and of his predecessor on this important legislation. I was on the Committee in June 2013 when we identified the risks posed by foreign investment and takeovers to the United Kingdom’s critical national infrastructure, citing Huawei as a case study—and we know what happened after that. We strongly support the Government’s decision to address those risks and we welcome their assurances that national security concerns sit at the very heart of the Bill. That is exactly as it should be.
However, what was not as it should be, with the Bill as originally drafted, was the lack of adequate oversight arrangements for those security concerns and for the process when they are weighed against business and other commercial concerns by the new Investment Security Unit. The Government ought to accept amendments 11 and 15 from the other place, introduced on a cross-party basis by former Security Minister and current ISC member Lord West, former Cabinet Secretary and former ISC member Lord Butler, former party leader and former ISC member Lord Campbell, and former Defence Secretary Lord King—who was of course the first Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee when it was established. Their amendments make provision for that previous lack of oversight. They would require the annual report produced by the new Investment Security Unit in BEIS to include, for each final order and notification made, the Secretary of State’s decision, along with the security services’ assessment of the national security risks uncovered. They would allow the Secretary of State to move any classified information into an annex and to provide that classified annex to the ISC. With the amendments in place as they currently are, we could be confident that the Bill will create the robust regime needed to protect the United Kingdom.
Given the powerful speeches from all quarters and the size of the majority in the other place in support of the amendments, it is surprising and disappointing that the Government remain opposed to them and are seeking to overturn what is clearly common sense. The amendments provide for the ISC to scrutinise the highly classified national security elements and the weighing of those classified elements against commercial concerns.
There appear to be three arguments employed by the Government against the amendments. The first claims that because BEIS is not listed in the Justice and Security Act 2013 or in the associated memorandum of understanding on the scope of our work, the ISC cannot look at decisions taken by the new unit in BEIS. That is based on a false premise.
During the passage of the 2013 Act, the Government explicitly and repeatedly told Parliament that the Act and the MOU would provide the ISC with oversight of all security matters across Government. The MOU mechanism, again, in the Government’s own words, was a “flexible” way to ensure that the list of organisations working on security matters and therefore subject to ISC oversight would be kept up to date.
I will give way in a moment, because I would like my right hon. Friend to hear this next bit, as I think there was a bit he was missing in his earlier intervention.
These words were used in Committee in my presence by the then Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), when introducing the 2013 Act. He said:
“I want to be clear that the Government intend that, through the provisions of the MOU, substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities will be subject to ISC oversight.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 97.]
As if that were not clear enough, he went on to say, and this is the bit that matters:
“Things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions undertaken by a Department one year may be undertaken by another the following year… An MOU is flexible: it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation. It will enable the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.” ––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]
The setting up of the new Investment Security Unit in BEIS is therefore precisely the situation that the Government assured the House that the MOU was designed to address, and the unit can easily be added to the MOU by a simple exchange of letters. Indeed, if the Government were willing to give an undertaking here and now to add the new unit to those listed in the MOU, the need for these amendments would disappear.
That is precisely why I drew the Minister’s attention to the flexibility of the memorandum of understanding and asked him whether the Government stood by the terms of that memorandum. The Minister was as clear as crystal. He said that he believed in that memorandum, and he saw no attempt in what the Government were doing to dilute the powers of the ISC or its ability, of the kind that my right hon. Friend set out, to range across government, if I can put it that way, where security is concerned. I think we have had reassurance from the Minister sufficient to support the Government.
Unfortunately, and I am afraid unusually for my right hon. Friend, he missed one little part that was missing in turn from the Minister’s answer, because the MOU as it stands does not include the Investment Security Unit. The MOU has a list of seven organisations that we can currently scrutinise. The whole point about flexibility is that, as these units are set up in other Departments, they can be added to the MOU, but the Minister has given no undertaking to add the ISU to the MOU. I am happy to give way to the Minister. If he would like to say that he will add the ISU—the new unit within BEIS—to the organisations listed in the memorandum of understanding, I will stop my speech immediately and say, “Well done, Minister,” but I fear that that is not going to happen, so I will continue with my speech.
The Government’s second argument is that the BEIS Committee is both capable of providing and best placed to provide the necessary oversight. I have the greatest respect for the work and experience of the BEIS Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), from whom we will hear later. He and his Committee are indeed best placed to provide oversight of the business functions of the new Investment Security Unit, and there can be no doubt that that Committee will do an excellent job in that respect, yet it is simply impossible for it to provide substantive scrutiny of the highly classified national security elements or of the overarching decisions taken about how to balance them with the commercial elements.
Select Committees cannot be given proper access to top-secret material in order to scrutinise effectively. Ministers have suggested that the BEIS Committee can substantively scrutinise such material, but that is impossible. While it is true, as we have heard tonight, that the provision of classified information can be negotiated with Select Committees on a case-by-case basis, the laying out of classified material in a secure room in the Department for Members to come in and read for an hour or so—but without allowing them to take any notes, without allowing them to retain it, without allowing them to share it with their staff, without allowing them to discuss it and without allowing them to report on it since any one of those would constitute a very serious security breach—does not amount to effective oversight.
Proper oversight of the national security elements of any decision under this new regime within BEIS must include the ability to access, analyse and discuss top-secret material frequently and fully. The Government already have one body, and only one body, that can do all those things and that they created for that express purpose: the ISC. Members of the ISC are all subject to the Official Secrets Act and have a dedicated office with appropriate security facilities to store and discuss top-secret material freely, and staff who undergo the most stringent Government clearance processes before they are allowed to handle such material—I said in an intervention earlier that the staff of other Select Committees of this House are not so cleared. There is also a lengthy process through which the Committee’s reports must go ahead of publication.
My right hon. Friend will know that the call-in power and the power to refuse permission for mergers to proceed on national security grounds is long standing. It is vested in the Business Secretary and sometimes in the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. During all this time, scrutiny has been available to the ISC on those decisions. Has my right hon. Friend found that deficient in some way?
I am not sure that without concrete examples of what my right hon. Friend has in mind, I am in a position to give an answer to that question. What I do know is that it is the work of the ISC, on a basis of professional, full-time constant monitoring, to be able to look at the activities of those agencies that cannot be looked at by other Select Committees. He seems to be talking about the power of Secretaries of State to call in decisions, and I am not sure quite how that relates to the work of either Select Committees or the statutory Committee, which is the ISC.
Perhaps I did not explain myself well. What is proposed in the Bill is an amendment of the current powers. There is a long-standing power for mergers to be blocked on national security grounds. It is one of three grounds on which an intervention can take place, so this is not a new power or a novel departure. The ISC is able to scrutinise the security services’ input into that now, as it will be in the future.
The ISC, on behalf of Parliament, is able to scrutinise the input of the intelligence agencies into these processes. It would not be able to scrutinise how that input is then handled, and the trouble is that because that input is top secret, the BEIS Committee would not be able to scrutinise it either. That means that there would be a scrutiny gap between what was being scrutinised by us as it went into the process of the new unit and what was being scrutinised by BEIS minus that sensitive material, so there would be no effective parliamentary scrutiny of the process whereby, as I said earlier, the highly sensitive security requirements were being balanced and offset against the commercial imperatives. Indeed, that may be the very reason why the Government are so reluctant to let the ISC see what is going on.
I fear that my right hon. Friend may have just answered my question before I ask it, but I am most grateful to him; he is making his speech with tremendous passion and is very persuasive. I just looked up the definition of “top secret” and I am wondering what will be missing from the output of the process that would mean that there are some scrutiny gaps. I think he has just explained that he wants to scrutinise the process and I can see why he would make that case, but will he just give us some indication as to what he expects would be top secret in that analysis, if that is at all possible?
If I gave an example of something that would be top secret—even if I were in a position to do so because we had started the work that we are not being allowed to start—I would then immediately be breaking the Official Secrets Act so, no, I cannot, and I would not even if I could. However, what is a certainty is that where there are circumstances where the intelligence agencies are advising on the security aspects, for example, of a potentially hostile state buying, overtly or covertly, into a strategically important asset, such as buying up a company engaged in cutting-edge technology. This unit will have to balance that against the possible commercial advantages of major investment from that other country.
The fact is that nobody on behalf of Parliament will be able to scrutinise that process unless either these amendments are accepted or the ISU—this new unit—is added to the list of units already on the memorandum of understanding. As I have said before and say again, if at any time the Minister wants to give me the assurance that it will be added, I am happy to let these amendments go from the face of the Bill.
As I explained, this is the reason that the ISC was set up as it is. If any Committee could do what the ISC does, it would not be necessary for the ISC to have all those unique facilities and arrangements. That is why paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding between the Government and the ISC categorically asserts:
“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament”—
I will say that again:
“the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies”—
and please listen to these next few words—
“and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
A footnote to that sentence helpfully explains:
“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments…by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.”
With that machinery already in place, it is all the more baffling that the Government are now refusing to use the very body they created. Without including oversight by a properly structured and fully cleared security body, the Government are not placing security at the heart of the Bill.
The Government’s third and final argument is that if the ISC had a role, it would encroach on the BEIS Select Committee’s remit. This, too, is baffling and not borne out by experience. The Government’s own MOU already expressly states that the ISC scrutinises the classified parts of some Government Departments, leaving the remainder to the corresponding departmental Select Committees. That is what has always happened, perfectly harmoniously, in respect of a number of other Departments, so it is, again, bizarre that the Government now see this as a problem when they themselves have already made express provision for it.
The ISC can work seamlessly with the BEIS Select Committee on oversight of the Investment Security Unit, as it already does with other Select Committees such as the Defence Committee and the Home Affairs Committee, and in respect of the work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Far from being an “overreach” of our remit, in this particular case the ISC is trying to prevent its existing scope from being reduced. The unit that currently carries out investment security work is based in the Cabinet Office. Consequently, it is already overseen by the Intelligence and Security Committee. The ISC already scrutinises these activities in their current form in the Cabinet Office, so it cannot be “overreach” to do in future something that we already do. If the Government do not maintain this existing ISC scrutiny when the new Investment Security Unit takes over, it will be a step backwards from the current position.
If national security really is at the heart of the Bill, the ISC, as the national security oversight body, must be allowed to oversee it. The Government gave assurances to the House in 2013 that the ISC would oversee all security and intelligence matters. It is as simple as that. The sensible solution is that which was proposed and accepted in the other place—namely, the amendments that we are now being asked to reject for, as I have demonstrated, no good reason.
If, for some reason we have not been told, the Government cannot accept provision for oversight on the face of the Bill, there is the other solution that I have previously indicated. The Justice and Security Act and the memorandum of understanding linked to it set out the ISC’s role and remit, which the Government expressly told Parliament was the oversight of all intelligence and security matters across Government, now and in the future. The memorandum of understanding mechanism was rightly described by the security Minister at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), as “flexible” because
“it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]
The matter before us today is exactly as described in 2013: an area of Government in respect of which the ISC has oversight responsibility has been moved to a different Department. The memorandum of understanding could therefore be updated to reflect this, by way of a simple exchange of letters, to add the Investment Security Unit to the list of bodies covered by the MOU. The ISC would happily accept a commitment from the Minister to this effect tonight, in lieu of the amendment. Either method will ensure what is needed: real oversight of the national security elements of this legislation by the only body constituted and equipped to carry it out, rather than what might be described as “scrutiny in name only”.
I am very much of the view that, as Shakespeare said, “brevity is the soul of wit”. Notwithstanding that, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), made an incredibly professional and profound set of points that I hope the Minister listened to closely.
As the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), did, I welcome the Minister to his place, notwithstanding the fact that the previous Minister, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), is off doing a fantastic job—I think it is fair to say—getting the entirety of the UK vaccinated, of course in partnership with our colleague in Scotland. I am sure that he regards it as a step up in terms of ministerial oversight of the Bill.
On the Bill itself, my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) spoke on Second Reading and on Report with passion and knowledge of the subject in respect of the scrutiny that should be provided by all of us when looking at such serious matters. We have tried to be constructive with the Government and to make helpful suggestions. I am pleased with many of the amendments moved by those in the other place that the Government are agreeing to—on beefing up scrutiny and perhaps offsetting some of the concerns that some of us might have had about the danger of investment chill, which was certainly real given the original nature of the Bill.
Improvements have been made, therefore, but there is still scope for further improvement. In that regard—as I said, I will be brief, Madam Deputy Speaker—I again urge the Minister to give cognisance to the wise words of the Chair of the ISC.
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention, and I will come back to that. Let me first develop the point about scrutiny. Clearly, the BEIS Committee has business expertise and is able to determine whether the regime is effective in scrutinising relevant acquisitions of control. I do question some of the narrative that I have heard that suggests that the BEIS Committee is not well placed to scrutinise the NSI regime. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the ISC requesting further information from the unit or the Secretary of State where it falls under the remit of that Committee. There is no barrier to the BEIS Committee handling top secret material or other sensitive material subject to the agreement between the Department and the Chair of the Committee on appropriate handling.
As part of its role, the BEIS Committee can request information that may include sensitive material from the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, including on the Investment Security Unit’s use of information provided by the intelligence and security agencies. The Select Committee already provides scrutiny over a number of sensitive areas, and there are mechanisms in place for it to scrutinise top secret information of this kind on a case-by-case basis.
As the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy explained in front of the BEIS Committee last week, and indeed in his letter to the Chairman of the BEIS Committee, which was copied to my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, there are three Committees that should act in collaboration. The BEIS Committee provides the primary work of scrutinising matters within BEIS competence, but two important additional Committees—the Science and Technology Committee and, indeed, the ISC—were acting in an auxiliary capacity, making sure that the essential cross-cutting nature of the Investment Security Unit benefits from the rigour of those Committees, with expertise in each area that the unit covers.
The Government therefore do not believe that we need to update the existing memorandum of understanding, because it is flexible and it does still pertain. As I have said, there is no dilution of the ISC’s work in this. The current arrangements are sufficient to ensure that we can have the correct scrutiny of this.
I appreciate that I have tried the patience of the House, but on that one point let me say that the MOU is flexible in the sense that we can add new organisations to it. The flexibility is not being used by the Government because they are refusing to add this new unit to the MOU, so the flexibility is rendered nugatory.
As I say, the direction from the Secretary of State in his letter to the Chairs of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and the Science and Technology Committee was clear in terms of his expectations of how this should work. The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee should be the prime Committee to scrutinise BEIS competence, but similarly the Science and Technology Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee should absolutely be there to look at places within their competence to ensure wider scrutiny.
As I said, we have listened to Parliament. We have tabled a number of amendments to increase the amount of information included in the annual report and the various threshold. We have responded.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to.
Lords amendments 2 to 10 agreed to.
Clause 61
Annual Report
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 11.—(Paul Scully.)