Afghanistan (Troop Levels)

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

We are very clear that United Kingdom forces will not be in a combat role after 2014. We have to bring this engagement to a close. It was a measured decision to fix December 2014 as the end of combat operations. We are highly confident about the level of development of the ANSF.

I say to the hon. Gentleman that there is no example in history of an insurgency being effectively and sustainably defeated by foreign troops. It has to be local forces that sustainably defeat an insurgency. That is the path on which we are embarked in Afghanistan.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I welcome the statement, which stands in marked contrast to the gloom and doom we heard a year or two ago from some elements in the House. I put it to the Secretary of State that for the military success in which our troops have played such an important part to be seen through, a national political settlement is crucial. To that end, the idea that has been floated of bringing the elections forward a year so that the new Government are in place in good time would be a constructive step.

[Mr Hammond]

The timing of the Afghan presidential election is a matter for the Afghans, in accordance with the Afghan constitution. Our concern is to ensure that the constitution is upheld, that a democratic process is followed and that there is an orderly transfer of power from President Karzai at the end of his term.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I welcome the priority given by the Government to this issue when they are under intense financial pressures. May I suggest that the very different accommodation patterns across the services are one of several good reasons why the future new employment model should be devolved to the three services rather than developed centrally?

[Nick Harvey]

It is certainly the case that future employment practices will determine the sort of accommodation we supply to our armed servicemen, and these will vary across the three services, as the hon. Gentleman suggests.

Hostage Rescue Operation (Nigeria)

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Tuesday 13th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I think it fair to say that throughout the long months of captivity there were very good and full discussions and exchanges of views with the Italians, and that they understood very clearly our direction of travel and the way in which we sought to advance our understanding of the situation and then bring it to a close. The circumstances that arose on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning represented an accelerated closing of a time window which simply made it impossible to consult as fully as one might ideally have liked. I am assured that information was continually being transmitted between intelligence agencies, as is the norm between allied agencies, but that there was not enough time for the discussions at Government-to-Government level that we might have had if a further day, or even 12 hours, had been available to us.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

As my right hon. Friend and others have said, this was an extremely difficult operation, and one in which the odds were increasingly stacked against us. Does my right hon. Friend agree that while we commend the courage and professionalism of our special forces, it is extremely important that any examination of the details of what took place does not in any way compromise the necessary secrecy of the methods that they employ?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The operational security of our special forces remains paramount at all times, which is why we never comment on their operations and, indeed, never confirm or deny their involvement in any particular operation.

Afghanistan (Civilian Killings)

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

We are able to say what success would be. Success would be an orderly and successful handover of security to a competent and able Afghan national security force by the end of 2014. Many challenges will face us between now and then if we are to achieve what remains an ambitious target, but that is what success would look like, and that is the strategic goal in security terms towards which we are working. However, I repeat the point made by the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for South Shields (David Miliband): if there is to be a lasting peace in that part of the world, a political process is needed alongside the security strategy. Unless we have both, we will not secure the lasting peace that I think everyone in the House wants to see.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I share the horror felt by Members in all parts of the House at this ghastly incident, and endorse the policy supported by both Government and Opposition. Will my hon. Friend join me in welcoming the show of solidarity by Angela Merkel at a time when her Government are suffering from a number of other pressures?

[Nick Harvey]

It is important for us to retain an international view. The ISAF strategy is one that we have drawn up together, so expressions of support from the German Government are of course very welcome. Essentially, the conclusion that was reached at the Lisbon conference was that we had gone in together and should come out together. That is what I mean when I say that we will agree with our ISAF partners exactly what the strategy and the timelines should be, and that we will act together according to our collective judgment of the progress that we are making.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I will not respond to the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown), because I am confident that one or two of my hon. Friends will do so. Instead, I will talk for a few minutes about defence procurement.

Twenty-five years ago, I was responsible for carrying out a survey with three colleagues as a management consultant to compare the procurement systems in seven western powers. It is depressing, a quarter of a century on, how little things have moved on from the issues at that time. I remain convinced, as I was at the end of that process, that Britain is about average or a little above average, and not as inefficient as it is presented to be by some commentators.

I share the view of the Chairman of the Defence Committee that Bernard Gray is exactly the right man in the right job and that his report is excellent. I am deeply concerned that much of Lord Levene’s report will undermine some of Bernard Gray’s best and most important ideas, much as I respect the noble Lord and the work that he did in procurement at about the time I was a consultant.

There is time to touch briefly on only four points, of which two relate to the procurement function and two to the Ministry of Defence. My first point is that Bernard Gray is absolutely right to point to weaknesses in the contract staff, who are grossly underqualified for the job of stacking up against the highly competent lawyers employed by the other side. In project after project, we have found ourselves badly damaged by the small print.

My second point is about project managers. Gray, Levene and everybody else who has looked at this matter have concluded that we need more continuity in project managers and that they need to be professionally trained. Nevertheless, we are out of line with most other countries in concluding that project managers should be civilians. The most efficient procurers in the world remain, in my view, the Swedes. Their project managers are overwhelmingly military. They are in post typically for four to five years and they are properly trained before they become project managers. The problem, particularly on the army side where there are large numbers of comparatively cheap interlocking projects, is that if civilians are in charge of the projects, as in France, one ends up with lots of detailed user-problems that would have become obvious earlier if they had been before a military project manager. That is why France, despite spending far more on research and development than any other continental country, does not have a particularly good record on land vehicles.

My third point goes more to the heart of the distinction—in my mind, anyway—between Levene and Gray. The heart of Gray’s report—perhaps his single most important recommendation—is at point 4 in his summary, where he says that we must

“Clarify roles and create a real customer-supplier relationship between the capability sponsor (MoD centre)”—

—this is a distinction that we, alone in the whole world, developed before the second world war—

“and project delivery (DE&S)”.

He goes on to stress that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Capability) is the man who has to drive this. In contrast, Peter Levene suggests that DCDS (Capability) should be merged with one, or possibly two, other functions out of a long list—that it should be downgraded—instead of having, as Gray recommends, one board whose secretariat and day-to-day policing should be provided by DCDS (Capability) to oversee the process. In Levene’s structure we would end up with a complete muddle, with, in effect, four different bodies considering these matters—the new Defence Board, which is all-civilian except for the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the three armed forces themselves. That would take us halfway back to pre-1936.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

If the move is to make the CDS the commander-in-chief, and therefore in charge of the Army, with the same going for the other two services, surely it is proper that such people are represented on the Defence Board, if not particularly within the Ministry of Defence?

[Mr Brazier]

I thoroughly agree with my hon. Friend. I was about to come to that as my fourth and final point, but let me first finish my remarks on capabilities.

There is a very important reason, which Bernard Gray fingers exactly in his original report, for having a proper supplier-customer relationship. In the second world war, the Luftwaffe had a much more powerful research and development and industrial base, but the RAF, because it had a separate capabilities group, was able to make sure that all the pieces interacted so that we did not have problems with fighters that could not talk to bombers, and so on.

The A300M is a modern example of where that structure has broken down because—Gray criticises this—the capabilities staff have got weaker, and they will get a lot weaker still if the Levene recommendations are adopted. This aircraft is being bought for the Air Force—I have huge respect for Air Transport Command because of the brilliant work it has done in Afghanistan—but the user is the Army. Bizarrely, we have managed to arrive at a point where we are choosing to buy an aeroplane that is much more expensive than its tried and tested competitor, the Hercules, on the grounds that it can carry one armoured vehicle per aircraft whereas the Hercules cannot. If asked, the Army would say that armoured vehicles usually go by sea—it has C17s if it has to move them by air—and that it could not afford most of the armoured vehicles it wanted anyway. A strong central capabilities directorate would probably have been able to get a grip on that. Furthermore, the problem is as much in the detail as in the big picture.

That brings me to my fourth and last point, which was anticipated by my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). Some countries, particularly on the continent, do not allow executives on to their company boards; we would say that their company boards are all non-executive. Putting those countries to one side, in all my years as a consultant—I worked on all six continents—I never came across a successful company anywhere in which the heads of the main operating divisions were not on the main board. Peter Levene’s recommendation that the individual chiefs of staff should not sit on the Defence Board is bizarre. If one puts that alongside my third point about capabilities, with the greater powers that the individual services are going to take back from the centre to monitor projects, one can see that it is a recipe for increased in-fighting and for a reduction in interoperability. That is a big step away from joined-up defence.

I should like to end on a more positive note. With Bernard Gray, who is probably the best informed and best equipped man in the country, being put in charge of procurement, there is a fair chance that he will manage to overcome many of these problems. Certainly, under his leadership the performance of the procurement function itself will move from being a little above average internationally to being among the best. However, if we simply implement at the centre the Levene reforms as they are constituted—I have mentioned two of the weaknesses, and I could go into some of the others in detail—there is a risk that, in this area and in several others, we may undermine long-term defence planning.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Howarth]

I can tell the right hon. Gentleman, who has considerable experience of foreign affairs, that we already co-operate closely with both Turkey and Israel. In this instance, however, I think that Turkey is the important country, and I am delighted that the treaty, which was also signed by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State at the time of President Gül’s visit, will give United Kingdom forces access to training facilities in Turkey.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend join me in commending the very restrained and at the same time statesmanlike way in which the Turks have been handling the hideous problem on their borders that has been created by the barbaric behaviour of the Syrian Government?

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

I have to disappoint the hon. Lady, because decisions about where redundancies fall must be made by defence companies and not by Ministers. I understand her concern about what has happened at Brough, and she will understand what BAE Systems said, in public, about the underlying reasons for the changes. [Interruption.] I can answer the sedentary question from those on the Opposition Front Bench by saying that the White Paper, which will set out our approach in more detail and will help hon. Lady to understand the issues more fully, will be published next month.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I fully understand the difficult balance that my hon. Friend is trying to strike between securing the best value for our forces and protecting key capabilities, but may I urge him to look carefully at French industrial strategy? When we are collaborating with a country that has an activist industrial policy, there is a real danger that our procurement policy will end up following French industrial strategy unless we are fully aware of what is happening on the other side.

[Peter Luff]

Some Members may well find themselves in considerable sympathy with what my hon. Friend has said. Let me simply say that when I engage in discussions with my French opposite numbers, such issues are always at the forefront of my mind, and they will continue to be so—for instance, at the summit that is to be held in December.

Armed Forces Personnel

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Thursday 10th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

I note what my hon. Friend says and I shall draw his remarks to the attention of the RAF, but in respect of this week’s fatal accident, I must stress that the Military Aviation Authority is beginning a full and proper investigation of what happened and what led to the tragedy. It would be quite improper for me, as a Minister of the Crown, to say anything at this stage that would pre-empt that process. In the fullness of time, I have no doubt whatever that he and others will have the opportunity to raise questions about that.

The armed forces of today are different in many ways from those who fought on the Somme or at El Alamein. The conscription that created the massed forces of the world wars was a reflection of the existential threat facing the country at that time. When world war two ended in 1945, there were around 5 million men and women in uniform. Almost every family in the country was connected in some way to the sacrifice that had been made, and service in the armed forces was woven deeply into the fabric of the nation, but for many years now, our armed forces have been a smaller, professional, all-volunteer force, including reserve forces, which have been used widely in recent conflicts.

As the older generations who fought in the world wars or undertook national service dwindle, and as the services have reduced in size since the end of the cold war, public understanding of our armed forces has declined as a result. I am suggesting not that the respect and esteem in which our armed forces are held by the nation has in any way diminished—the way the people of Royal Wootton Bassett chose to mark the return of the fallen is surely testament to that—but that people understand less how members of the armed forces view risk and reward, and what motivates them to do the dangerous job they do.

What a life in today’s armed forces is like and the impact that service life has on modern families is also less widely understood. That is why, as we seek to reinvigorate the armed forces covenant, we must raise people’s understanding of the impact of service life. Fulfilling the armed forces covenant has to be a whole-of-society enterprise: it is not just for the Ministry of Defence but for all Departments; it is not just for legislators here in Westminster but for legislators at all levels; and it is not just for the Government, but for charities, the private sector and private citizens.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a thoughtful speech. Does he agree that that challenge will increase markedly once the Afghanistan operation is over as people see less of the armed forces on their television sets? Does he also agree—he may be about to come to this point—that one key area in which we can build that connection is through the Ministry’s plans for the reserve forces and cadets?

[Nick Harvey]

I had a feeling my hon. Friend would intervene on that matter. It is certainly the case—this has been tangible in the past few years—that the amount of media attention that is quite rightly devoted to the conflict in Afghanistan has had an impact on public recognition and awareness of the work that the armed forces are doing. As we know, their conflict or fighting role in Afghanistan is due to end by 2015. I suppose my hon. Friend is right in saying that there could be a risk that public awareness of the daily and regular actions of the armed forces will diminish, but of course, nobody at this stage can anticipate what demands will be put on our armed forces thereafter. In an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world, I fear it is unlikely that our armed forces will disappear or have a period of inactivity, but he is quite right to suggest that the increasing role that we plan for reserves, and the investment that we intend to make to build up their capacity and professionalism in the next decade or so, will, I sincerely hope, have the effect that more people in society will have some connection and contact with those who serve and awareness of what they do.

I recognise the valuable groundwork done by the previous Administration to reinvigorate the armed forces covenant: the 2008 service personnel Command Paper, produced by the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) when he was Minister for the Armed Forces, provides much of the intellectual grounding for the first formal tri-service armed forces covenant published in May. He will find the principles in the covenant familiar, particularly where it states:

“Those who serve in the Armed Forces…should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services. Special consideration is appropriate in some cases, especially for those who have given most such as the injured and the bereaved.”

Now that the Armed Forces Act 2011 has received Royal Assent, these principles have been recognised in statute for the first time. In my view, that is a considerable step forward, and we are already acting to give the covenant life, particularly through encouraging action at a community level. This is about local authorities, devolved Administrations, charities, businesses, communities and individuals coming together to offer their support to the services and the service community in their local area, and to improve understanding and awareness among the public of issues affecting the armed forces community. That is why we call it the armed forces community covenant. It is a voluntary statement of mutual support between the civilian community and its local armed forces community.

In August, the MOD launched the community covenant grant scheme, which aims to support local projects that strengthen the ties on mutual understanding between members of the armed forces community and the wider communities in which they live. Some £30 million has been allocated to the scheme. The covenant has to be seen to be bipartisan, non-political and as an all-society effort, if it is to be meaningful and lasting. The Labour party should take a share of the credit for the progress being made, given that it put in place some of these useful steps.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Harvey]

As my hon. Friend rightly says, I have seen that for myself. I visited that area earlier this year and I know exactly what he is referring to. He makes a good point, and if I were living in those military houses, I would feel just as put out about it as I know the residents do. I take the point entirely. As I have just explained, we are in a tight financial situation. Other Departments have had to set their priorities and also make big cuts in their budgets. Fortunately for those of my hon. Friend’s constituents who happen to live in the other part of the estate, they have had good news sooner than those living in the military housing. However, let me reaffirm the Ministry of Defence’s commitment to return to this issue as soon as funds allow in order to ensure that we continue the programme of improving defence housing.

One of the first actions taken by the new Government was the doubling of the operational allowance paid under the previous Government, taking it to over £5,000 for a typical six-month tour. We have changed the rules on rest and recuperation, so that any days of leave lost due to delays in the air bridge or any other operational requirements will be added to post-tour leave. This year we have doubled council tax relief from 25% to 50% for all personnel on operations, including in Libya. The deployed welfare package is kept under constant review to ensure that it meets the needs of both the service person and their dependants. Free phone calls are available for 30 minutes a week. Wi-fi access has been extended in operational areas, while texting and internet facilities have been improved, even in the forward operating bases. Those measures have been particularly important in ensuring that the home front and the front line can provide mutual support at a time that is difficult for families and dangerous for personnel.

Our focus on operations has meant that we have been unable to go as far or as fast as we want in other areas, as is certainly the case with housing, as my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Bob Russell) has pointed out. However, that means that the initial key pledges in the coalition agreement have already been addressed. They include not only the operational welfare measures that I have mentioned, but providing university and further education scholarships to the children of members of the armed forces who have been killed since 1990. So far, 49 children have received scholarships. We have also included some 45,000 service children in the pupil premium system, recognising the uniqueness of service life and its effect on service children and service communities.

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. Friend is touching on an extremely important point. Will he confirm that we have started to return to what was universally recognised should happen until 12 or 13 years ago—that is, the costs falling where they should fall and not on the defence budget? It is the duty of the nation as a whole, not just the defence budget, to look after the children of the fallen.

[Nick Harvey]

I can assure my hon. Friend that he is quite right about that. The changes made are important, and we have discussed them with colleagues in other Departments. We are pleased that the Government have been able to agree them, but he is absolutely right that the costs will be met where they fall and that the Departments responsible for providing those services will be the ones paying for them.

We have endorsed all the proposals made by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) in his report on improving mental health care, in particular: a structured mental health component in existing medical examinations performed while serving; an uplift in the number of mental health professionals conducting veterans outreach work from mental health trusts; the trial of an online early intervention service for serving personnel and veterans; and the means to allow the newly formed veterans information service to contact service leavers after they have left the armed forces. The new round-the-clock veterans mental health helpline is funded by the NHS and run by Rethink Mental Illness on behalf of Combat Stress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

That question is a bit rich—although the hon. Gentleman is a Liberal, and we know we have to accept such things from them. I visited Colchester garrison with him, where we saw the investment that had been made not only in recreation and training facilities, but in housing. He knows as well as I do the problem we all grappled with and that the current Government are still grappling with. I understand, of course, that the hon. Gentleman is hinting at the Annington Homes issue, but to get to the bottom of that, we have to go all the way back to a decision made under the previous Conservative Government. The Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), is present, and his fingerprints are on that decision, which was not a good decision for the taxpayer and limited what we could do to improve armed forces housing. None the less, we made great strides in both married quarters and single-living accommodation in the Navy, the RAF and the Army, and it is now some of the best accommodation of its kind to be found.

Although the Minister hinted at possible future provisions, there is a question whether we should provide housing at all, or whether we should instead move to an allowance system, so that individuals have options in housing, rather than being wedded to a contract, which was also very bad news for the taxpayer.

[Mr Brazier]

Will the hon. Gentleman expand on how that proposal would work in places such as Catterick? It is the largest forces base and there is a huge concentration of soldiers out in the countryside with almost no civilian housing anywhere nearby.

[Mr Jones]

What has happened at Catterick and in other places is very interesting. People are speaking with their feet, as it were, by commuting large distances. At Catterick, many people stay in single-living accommodation during the week or commute to Tyneside or even further afield. We have to recognise that the way people organise their lives is changing. The hon. Gentleman talks about examining how we provide housing and allowances, and we need to do that. The piece of work that I kicked off—I do not know whether it is still going on—looks at the options, including paying allowances or working with, for example, housing associations to provide accommodation where people want it. In all three services, many people are choosing to buy or rent accommodation far from their workplace and travel at the weekend. That creates new challenges for the armed forces in providing single-living accommodation, and these are things that we need to examine.

We ask our armed forces to risk all on our behalf. In return, we must make sure that we give them the proper equipment, training and financial support that they deserve. The sacrifices that service personnel make for the country are such that they should not be treated as other public sector workers. They deserve special recognition. In that spirit of recognising the unique nature of military service, I look forward to hearing the contributions to today’s debate. The debate about our armed forces mainly concentrates on equipment, and that is important, but this is an opportunity to recognise the work that our armed forces do. We should not forget that without the input of the men and women of our armed forces, some of the fantastic, dangerous and, in some cases, unique things we ask them to do would not be possible.

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

I have listened with interest, amusement and, often, respect to the words of the shadow Minister. I hope that he will have a stiff word with the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), who interrupted him, in the middle of a perfectly good argument, to talk about something that has absolutely nothing to do with this debate. He was a troublesome member of the Select Committee on Defence, but an extremely effective one, just as he was an effective Minister. So, too, is my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, whose words I also listened to with interest and respect.

I wish to thank the Government for holding this debate on armed forces personnel and for its timing. I have been looking through my records and it seems that this is the first debate on personnel since January 2009. Can that really be the case? I say that because it is our armed forces personnel and the training that they receive which make our armed forces the envy of the world. I have to say that the arrangements for having these debates on armed forces matters or on defence equipment are simply not working. I am relieved and pleased that the Leader of the House is having discussions on how to change things. One matter that I would point out to the Backbench Business Committee—I cannot immediately see any of its members in the Chamber—is that the pressure of time in this debate is such that there is a 10-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches, on a day when there is no vote at the end. There is no shortage of interest in this matter and I hope that the Committee’s members will take that point away with them if ever we go back to ask for further time.

It is not surprising that there is no shortage of interest in this issue, given what the armed forces are going through. There is turmoil in the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces because of the degree of change that is having to be forced through. There are redundancies, restrictions on money for exercising and training, and changes to the allowances, not to mention the fighting that they are doing at the same time. The Defence Committee has been doing work on all those things, as the House would expect.

Sometimes people believe that it is the job and the role of the Defence Committee to speak for the armed forces, but strictly speaking that is not true. We are not a lobbying organisation for the armed forces or for the defence industry. Our role is to ensure that the MOD does its work as well as it can in the circumstances. Our lobbying role is to lobby for the country; we are not lobbyists for the armed forces. Lobbying for the country, we realise, as people and as a Committee interested in defence, that the country wants certain things. It wants its armed forces to be treated fairly and properly. It also wants its armed forces treated with respect and honour, and the Royal Wootton Bassett phenomenon is a demonstration of that.

There has been a discussion in the newspapers over the past few days about the issue of wearing a poppy and about the question of whether people feel compelled to wear one. There was even an article in The Independent by Robert Fisk entitled, “Do those who flaunt the poppy on their lapels know that they mock the war dead?” I read that article not with anger, but actually with a degree of sympathy. However, I concluded that it had got entirely the wrong end of the stick. He talked about his father, who had fought in the first world war, stopping wearing his poppy because he did not want to see so many damn fools wearing it. His father felt that those who wore the poppy had no idea what the trenches of France were like, and what it felt like to have your friends die beside you and then to confront their brothers, wives, lovers or parents. Of course, to a large extent that is true; those of us who have not been in the armed forces cannot imagine quite the horror that is involved. We may think we can but we cannot. Few of us in this House—there are honourable exceptions, and I am pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) in his place—have had that experience.

As Wilfred Owen pointed out,

“Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori”—

it is a sweet and fitting thing to die for one’s country—is actually a lie. Horace, who wrote those words, did not follow his own advice. Interestingly, he did fight at the battle of Philippi, but he later claimed that he survived that battle only by running away, having thrown his shield away. I do not blame him for that. But we who have not fought do not wear the poppy because we claim to understand what war is truly like—as I say, we cannot do that. We wear a poppy for other reasons.

Robert Fisk’s article says that he declined to lay a wreath at the Menin gate because it was something of which he was not worthy. I think that that is a shame because, in those terms, which of us is worthy? I do lay a wreath on Remembrance Sunday, and I do not do so because I am worthy—I am not. I do so for many of the constituents I represent: the incredibly brave Chinook pilots who rescue our wounded under fire; the former Gurkhas who have done so much for our country; the families who bear so much of the brunt of death and injury; and the pensioners who survived the second world war and who fought in the Korean war. Those are the people who are worthy and I do it for them.

I also wear a poppy. That is partly because of my grandfather, who, like Robert Fisk’s father, fought in the first world war but who died at the second battle of Ypres. But wearing a poppy is also a public acknowledgement of debt, a public reminder of continuing need in the armed forces community, a public display of respect and a public expression of thanks. It is really not a public announcement, “Look I’ve given the Royal British Legion a bit of money.” Although it is true that sometimes politicians and others may feel obliged to wear a poppy because if they fail to do so they will be subject to public disapproval, one really should not get hung up on that sort of thing. The vast majority of people wear a poppy out of pleasure, and they wear it because they want to, rather than because they must—at least, that is my reading of the situation.

[Mr Brazier]

Like my right hon. Friend, I have never fought, but is there not one further argument, in addition to the powerful ones that he puts forward for wearing a poppy? The men and women who went off to fight in the two world wars were a huge cross-section of ordinary people, many of whom had no military experience at the time, yet on the eve of the battle of the Somme, not one single man was reported absent without leave.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

My hon. Friend has got military experience, even if he has not fought. He highlights a point that my hon. Friend the Minister made about the current shortage of experience—within a cross-section of the country, as my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) said—in what the armed forces do. I think that is, as my hon. Friend says, a reason for wearing the poppy.

Our constituents also wear a poppy with pride, and it is not pride in themselves. It is pride in their country and pride in what our young men and women, who are prepared to sacrifice everything they have and all that they are, do. In the end there are times when it is right to go to war. If diplomacy fails and if people are determined to behave as Hitler and Gaddafi did, they must be stopped, and we should give respect, honour and thanks to those who are prepared to do it for us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow my friend and Select Committee colleague, the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), and indeed our excellent Committee Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot).

As we remember those who gave their lives in earlier generations, we honour those who serve today. To visit them, whether on operations or on exercise, is to be humbled by the sheer quality of the men and women who serve in our forces, but over the generations since the cold war the structures that planned and organised them lost direction.

On the day after another young Territorial has died in Afghanistan, I want to talk about reserve personnel, but first I shall give the House some context—when tension between operational pressures and funding is especially tight. The Ministry of Defence has become distorted by the shape of most conflicts during the 20 years between the Gulf war and the Libyan operation. For most of that period, the main effort has been a single, medium-scale expeditionary force, led by the Army with air support. Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan mostly followed that pattern.

The intensity of the conflicts varied enormously, but each saw a brigade-sized expeditionary force supporting air elements in six-monthly rotations and in line with defence-planning assumptions, hence a strong temptation for the planners to configure our forces around that model. Resurgent problems in Northern Ireland and the 7/7 bombings figured very little in pre-strategic defence and security review planning, and two important overseas outliers were widely overlooked.

First, there was the planned invasion of Kosovo in 1999, when 1 million desperate refugees fled the Serb army. Almost all our allies demurred from sending ground forces and the MOD initiated a confused blizzard of call-out notices, summoning many reservists at a few days’ notice, even from units that it was in the process of disbanding. Britain was spared humiliation, of course, when the Serbs backed down under Russian pressure at the very last moment.

Secondly, in 2003-04 we were stretched well beyond expectations, as the continuing operation in Iraq overlapped with the incursion in Afghanistan.

The national security strategy rightly dismisses the assumption that our forces should be optimised almost entirely for medium-scale, Army-led expeditionary operations. It includes other roles, including, crucially, homeland security and upstream intervention, and there is even a faint hint of the scenario that dare not speak its name—general mobilisation for an unexpected crisis. Libya was Royal Air Force and Royal Navy-led—and led brilliantly, a point that I note in the week when we mourn the loss of Flight Lieutenant Cunningham of the Red Arrows.

How can we address so many scenarios, therefore, when the money available is so tight? The key surely is to reverse the slide towards an impossibly expensive manning model in which most units are full time, with costly payrolls, pensions, housing and so on. Of course they are worth it, but we cannot afford enough of them. Between two fifths and half the armies of our English-speaking sister countries are made up of volunteer reserves. On paper, ours make up less than one fifth, and in reality estimates suggest that the true figure is nearer 10%.

The US deploys National Guard armoured infantry brigades and fast-jet fighter squadrons to Afghanistan; Canada had a reservist company with every infantry rotation; and Australia has deployed formed companies and handed over its main commitments in Timor and Bougainville to reserve-led forces.

[Bob Stewart]

When we talk about National Guard pilots, I worry, because I wonder how much training they have to do, and whether it is different from what a regular has to do to be up to speed and to fly in combat.

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Three quarters of the US National Guard’s fast-jet pilots are ex-regulars, so they are not wasting several million dollars in training when they leave, and the remaining quarter have to be very experienced pilots to be allowed to join.

As we stand in silence at war memorials up and down the country, let us remember that the vast majority of those who served and fell were not professionals, and that the volunteer reserves were the key link between our brave but small professional forces and the wider community. They also provided back-up that was immediately available and, crucially, a framework for expansion into a national effort.

In the great war, the Territorial Army provided almost half the combat units, winning 71 Victoria Crosses. The Royal Naval Reserve won 12. In the battle of Britain, the Auxiliary Air Force squadrons comfortably out-shot their regular RAF counterparts. Although those forces were trained in peacetime at a fraction of the cost of their regular counterparts, they were available when they were needed to fight—and fight they did.

When overstretch peaked in 2004, our small volunteer reserves provided a fifth of our forces in Iraq and one-eighth of the number in Afghanistan. Yet over the next two years, they were rewarded with a cack-handed reorganisation, recruitment ceilings and a demoralising freeze on collective training. Despite all that, they continued to achieve some remarkable successes. In 2007, when commenting on a company from the London Regiment, its commander Brigadier Lorimer—now General Lorimer —said:

“Somme Company was an outstanding body of men: well trained, highly motivated and exceptionally well led.”

More than 25,000 reservists have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and 28 have given their lives, including the young man yesterday. Yet, in 2009, all formed deployments to Afghanistan apart from field hospitals were stopped, and the use of reservists has degenerated into the backfilling of regular units, unlike what happens in the countries of our English-speaking counterparts.

Not surprisingly, the strength of the reserves rapidly dwindled, with the greatest deficiency among young officers. As the House knows, I was recently privileged to serve under General Sir Nicholas Houghton on his review of reserves. Two or three units I visited had no young officers left at all. While we were carrying out our study, the unhappiness among TA officers was compounded by the truly disgraceful announcement by the Military Secretary’s branch in July that an unprecedented four-fifths of TA commands were to go to regular officers, despite there being 25 Territorials in the frame who had all the necessary qualifications.

Our study recommended that we should move towards a better balance between regulars and volunteer reservists in the Army, with 30,000 trained reservists by 2015, and that they should

“no longer simply be used as individual specialists and augmentees, but as formed units and sub-units”.

The Royal Naval Reserve has plans to expand several areas, including its highly cost-effective air branch, which took over the training pipeline for some months in the overstretch crisis of 2004. It also has imaginative plans for the Royal Marines Reserve. The commission was disappointed with progress on the RAF, which has a pool of flying volunteer reservists that is only about a quarter of the size of that of the Royal Navy. Although there were some more imaginative ideas in the background, the recommendations it actually put forward were all rather expensive and seemed to be very modest in their actual value. That is why we recommended an independently led follow-up study on the RAF.

There are three keys to rebuilding our reserves: first, we must get out and recruit officers from the thousands of young men and women passing through our university officer training corps and restore the proposition. If we reintroduce demanding collective training for units and sub-units, it will restore the capability of the TA to deploy formed bodies and provide those leadership opportunities that are so vital for the commitment of young officers.

On a recent visit to 7 Rifles, I was told that four regular officers had just applied to join. I was astonished to hear, however, that some of them were stuck waiting to receive security clearance. Why on earth do we have security clearance for regular officers transferring to the TA?

That brings me to my second point. We need fit-for-purpose administrative systems, so that people can enlist, have their medicals and be fed into training without the endless delays that characterise the current dysfunctional system. My local unit, 3 PWRR, has had more than 100 recruits in a few months. Yet, the sheer incompetence of the MOD personnel administrative systems has already put off a large number of them.

Some regular officers are claiming that the TA cannot reach a trained strength of 30,000 by 2015. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, who made an excellent speech earlier, not to listen to them. It is the dysfunctional system and the blockages in the regular-dominated training pipeline that is holding our reserve numbers back.

Hence, my third and final item on the shopping list is this. Let us reintroduce regionally based phase 1 training, so that Territorials are not scrabbling for a place at the back of the queue in the regular establishments. In July, the former Secretary of State announced a £1.5 billion investment in the reserves over a decade. I am certain that my right hon. Friend the new Secretary of State is still committed to that. May I advise that it must be spent on rebuilding viable and usable structures to meet the 2015 deadline, not siphoned off to meet shortfalls elsewhere while that crucial date is allowed to slip?

Rebalancing our armed forces will enable Britain to afford more capacity within tight budgets—to expand the pool of talent available for defence, to increase the footprint for national resilience and, above all, to reconnect our excellent but increasingly remote regular forces with the nation they serve so well.

Afghanistan

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I have been saying for many years, long before I came anywhere near having a responsibility at the Dispatch Box for this issue, that it is not moral to ask troops to go into mortal danger without the best equipment that we can provide them for personal protection, and that remains my view.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

May I congratulate my right hon. Friend both on his appointment and on the remarkable speed with which he is mastering the brief? He mentioned the importance of developing the local police force. One of the key factors for success in Helmand province and elsewhere in southern Afghanistan will be recruiting southern Pashtuns into the Afghan national army, so that it is no longer seen as an army of northern foreigners.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. At the moment the ethnic balance in the ANA does not reflect the ethnic mix of the population, as it is heavily Tajik dominated. In the longer run, it will be necessary to achieve a better representation of the ethnic mix of Afghanistan in the forces, but that process will take time and inevitably will be a consequence of the reconciliation and reintegration process that will take place over the coming years.

Defence Responsibilities

Julian Brazier Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

As I have made clear, I am not aware of any specific interests in that sense at all, but if the hon. Gentleman thinks there was any particular pecuniary interest, I am sure the Cabinet Secretary would love to hear from him, as would I.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

Is it not the case that taking a close interest in a dangerous and divided country with a civil war going on does, indeed, amount to an interest, but is it not also the case that the framers of the ministerial code took it for granted that people reading it would understand the difference between a public and a private interest?

[Dr Fox]

I am sure that is correct, but although we may understand that, it does not allow any of us to absolve ourselves of our responsibility to ensure that it is fully transparent and understandable. As I said in a previous answer, although the code is clearly set out, we must now ensure that we put in place processes that make it properly waterproof.