Energy Costs in Wales

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Alan Whitehead

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Westminster Hall

[Jonathan Edwards]

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the generosity of the UK Government’s support scheme, but they have to be slightly careful about that, do they not? It is partially a result of electricity prices in the UK being the second highest in Europe—only the Czech Republic has higher. For the last five years, electricity prices in the UK have been far higher. Within the UK, electricity prices in south Wales and north Wales are far higher than the UK average. There is something drastically wrong with the system, is there not?

[Dr Whitehead]

It is uncanny that the hon. Member has anticipated exactly what I was going to say next: one reason it was necessary for the UK Government to be relatively generous in their support is that the price rises in the UK are far higher than those across most of the rest of Europe. I will not go into the support that the French Government have put in place to support price rises, but French price rises are 4% or 5%. The rises are quite a considerable factor of how energy markets work in the UK as opposed to the arrangements elsewhere in Europe.

For a long time we had a Government pretty much asleep at the wheel on governing energy prices, thinking that an energy price cap would deal with the whole thing. But the energy price cap originally was supposed to deal with retail companies price gouging, not price rises coming from the wholesale market into the retail market in the UK as a whole. The fact is that UK energy prices are determined entirely by gas prices. We have done a lot over the years to start bringing renewable energy sources into the mix—indeed, 38% of our power is now supplied by renewable sources; if we take nuclear too, the majority of our energy supply is provided by low-carbon sources—but the UK retail market works as if it were supplied entirely by gas-fired power stations paying the price of gas to make electricity. That is because of the marginal effect of the way the UK energy market works, with auctions and how that all works. I do not think we will go into that this afternoon, but the fact is that the UK energy market is completely broken, in that it allows those really high prices to come through in a situation where we are—or should be—decreasingly reliant on gas.

Let me make a couple of suggestions. It is one thing to introduce price support for the immediate problem of energy price rises. By the way, that problem is not, as the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) said, exclusively about the Ukraine war. Prices were going through the roof well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They started increasing at a high and unsustainable rate from the middle of 2021. The Ukraine war has exacerbated that considerably, but it is by no means the only reason. One reason that prices increased considerably well before the Ukraine war started was the structure of energy markets in the UK, the extent to which they were completely prey to profiteering, and the fact that the UK Government were unable to do anything about the effect of increases in the international price of gas on the UK market.

If we have price support over the next period but we do nothing about that structural position, knowing that sky-high gas prices will be with us for probably—I am speculating—the next decade, or at least five to six years, and that the price will never come down to its level of three or four years ago, we will simply be here in two or three years’ time saying exactly the same thing under exactly the same circumstances. The price cap and the price support will have been and gone and we will be in exactly the same position as before.

Now is the time for the Government to fix the UK energy market rapidly, so that we do not find ourselves here again. That means getting us out of gas and on to renewables as quickly as possible. Without adding to what hon. Members have said, the Labour party’s commitment to a wholly renewable power system by 2030 is absolutely germane to ensuring we have an energy system that delivers us relatively low-priced energy that is not volatile, and is not subject to international power politics, with LPG vessels changing course halfway across the Atlantic because someone has bought their cargo at a higher price than they originally thought they were getting for it when they set out. All those issues would be resolved because the power would be UK-based and essentially free—once the capital cost of the renewables providing it had been taken away—and it would be entirely within the UK’s control to deal with prices in the UK. That is how to fix the particularly difficult energy market conditions.

By the way, a lot can be done in that direction before we get to that position by decoupling energy prices in the UK market from the gas market. That can be done by changing the way people receive their rewards, as far as energy is concerned, and renewable obligations and contracts for difference, as far as renewable energy is concerned. We could perhaps introduce a green power pool arrangement, whereby renewable power is traded in advance of gas, and the gas is placed on the margins without the ability to swamp the whole market. That means that we perhaps have to introduce a strategic reserve for gas-fired power stations outside the market as we move towards a wholly renewable energy market.

None of that will wait for the energy crisis to be over. If we do not do these things very quickly, we will just repeat ourselves. One of the key things—

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Alan Whitehead

Report stage & 3rd reading
Monday 10th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

I welcome these amendments because one of the concerns about RAB is that there are no safeguards, so the developer could run up costs and there would be nothing to stop them doing so. Therefore, if the Government do not accept the amendments, would it not be irresponsible to support the Bill on Third Reading?

[Dr Whitehead]

It would not be irresponsible to support the Bill on Third Reading, but it would be responsible of the Government to take a little more notice of these particular problems with the RAB process and possibly, as we move forward with its development, bring in mechanisms that can protect the bill-paying public in a rather better way than is suggested at the moment. That is essentially what the amendments do.

The arrangement for the RAB to be put into place is that a series of considerations are entered into to give an agreed expenditure cap for what is considered to be the proper use of the collection fund that will provide assistance to the company producing the new nuclear power plant. It can properly draw on that, up to a certain ceiling, from the general public. That is if everything goes well with the nuclear power plant, but of course that may not necessarily be the case. Of 176 nuclear power plants across the world, 175 went substantially over time and over budget, so we need to be very clear that we should not commit the general public to fund these proposals completely open-endedly. We are saying in these amendments that should there be a cost overrun or a time overrun, the Secretary of State should seek an increase in the agreed revenue ceiling without further recourse to customer funds. That may be by producing bonds or it may be by further state funding if that is the choice the Government wish to make, but they should not increase the ceiling for customers to pay exponentially at the same time.

These are very simple and straightforward amendments saying that, should there be such cost overruns or time overruns and there is a suggested further call on customer bills through RAB, the Secretary of State will have to think of something else to fund the system. Let us be clear that, with the RAB arrangements at the moment, it is suggested, I think very optimistically, there will be an increase of about £10 to £20 in customer bills. That is a really current topic at the moment, but a cost overrun would substantially increase such a levy on customer bills, and we just think that should not be part of the RAB arrangements for the future.

The third set of changes we wish to put in place are to part 3 of the Bill, which sets out what should happen and what arrangements should be in place if a company, despite all the investment from the public in the construction of a nuclear power plant, essentially goes bust. In this part, the Government have in effect lifted the provision in the Energy Act 2011 for a special administration regime. Again, that is rather current because it is precisely such a special administration regime that was used to rescue Bulb Energy when it went bust a little way ago. It was placed in such a regime under the 2011 Act—the wording is identical to that in this Bill—to allow it to continue trading for the time being, subject to the company being disposed of.

However, I would suggest that a nuclear power plant the size of Sizewell C, for example, is not remotely the same as an energy company the size of Bulb. It would be quite possible to dispose of Bulb or disperse its customers according to the special administration regime, but that would not be the case for a large nuclear power station. We are saying in amendment 5 that there should be an additional backstop so that, in the circumstances of a special administration regime, it would not be possible to pass the company on—to sell it on or to reintroduce it as a going concern through allocation to a subsidiary—and that the Government should have a plan to introduce a public company to take it over, provided it is working as a nuclear power station. That would not be the case—some Members may think the amendment means this—if the power station could not continue because the reactor head had exploded or the power plant was otherwise non-operational. If it is an operational power plant, we think that such a backstop should be available.

Hon. Members have mentioned what I think is the salutary case of the North Carolina energy plant that was conceived under RAB arrangements, or something very similar. Some $9 billion of customer money went into that plant, but the plant went bust, not because it was not operational, but because it was unfinanceable. Customers lost $9 billion of money, and there is no power station at the moment.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Alan Whitehead

2nd reading
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the build cost and financing of a nuclear power station has to include not just the obvious things that we think are associated with a nuclear power station, but all the other infrastructure around that nuclear power station and contributions to decommissioning costs. That is what we are talking about in terms of an overall financing package, and that is why a financing package has to last over the whole life, effectively, of that nuclear power station. I do not intend to move on from the financing of Sizewell C, because that is essentially what this Bill is all about. It is about all those things that the hon. Gentleman mentions, so far as that particular project is concerned.

This plant, if it goes forward—we hope it will go forward with something like this kind of financing—would cover a substantial part of what the Climate Change Committee considers necessary in the mix of low-carbon energy to drive power towards net zero by 2050. I have mentioned that it thinks about 8 GW to 10 GW of new nuclear power would be needed to complement a predominantly renewable power line-up so that firm power considerations are met, without being in such numbers that it puts the development of renewables into jeopardy. That 8 GW to 10 GW includes new nuclear power, but also the one existing power station that will probably last beyond the 2030s in Sizewell B.

Hinkley and Sizewell C together therefore would go a long way towards meeting that assessment by the end of the decade, with two 3.2 GW power stations with reactors in each, and the remaining Sizewell B power station continuing in action. It is not surprising then that we are talking about nuclear financing, which is pretty much all the Bill covers. Exam question: how do we finance an unfinanceable nuclear plant when we know we have got to do it because there is no other option? Even if we did decide to repeat the frankly disastrous device of providing a CfD for the plant at Hinkley, which is likely to produce power at twice market cost, it still would not work, because that does not solve the problem of getting investors into the plant for the lengthy period before production starts. There are ways in which nuclear finance can be sorted out.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the very considered manner in which he is presenting his case. Is there anything in his mind that would stop the UK Government using this new financing model for other technologies, such as the tidal lagoon in Swansea, or is it blatantly unfair that one technology has a very favourable financing scheme, while another technology that could provide many of the solutions that he seeks is stuck on contracts for difference?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member mentions tidal power. Of course, a regulated asset base system can be used for any sort of major infrastructure project—and indeed has been already, as I will come to. I do not see the discussion on that system as being about just nuclear power, but a method of funding a large infrastructure project that has certain requirements that must be met by continuous funding throughout its operation. He is right that infrastructure projects other than nuclear in the energy sector could and should be funded by that system.

The National Audit Office discussed those options when it reviewed the decision making and value for money that the CfD process for Hinkley entailed. The route adopted by the Government, after much internal wrangling and delay, is a regulated asset-based model that is essentially constructed along the lines that it has been used for already in capital projects such as Heathrow terminal 5 and the Thames Tideway project. That is, the whole project is part-funded by the proceeds of a levy on bills. The levy varies in size during different phases of the project and, in the latter phases of production, lowers or even goes negative if the project’s income exceeds the ceiling of allowable costs under RAB.

There are substantial advantages to the RAB model for making the project investable. It provides returns for investors as the project proceeds rather than at the end of it, as does the CfD model, which allows investment to be brought into the frame for the project from sources that might otherwise baulk at the timetable between investment and return. It also reduces the hurdle rate for investment in the project, thereby in theory substantially reducing the overall cost of financing the project and likely resulting in cheaper prices for the energy produced by the plant.

There are also substantial risks with RAB that need to be managed. It places the cost and risk of financing the project on the shoulders of customers, in this instance electricity bill payers, which adds to bill costs through a levy on their bills before anything has materialised. In the event of the plant not being completed, it lumbers them with bill costs without the benefit of the plant for which they have paid producing relatively cheaper electricity.

RAB also adds to the burden of bills unpredictably if the project overruns on cost or time—both of which, as we know, nuclear plant development is rather prone to. The extension of the construction period for a project, when the highest effect is felt on bills, lengthens that higher take period. An increase in cost may also cause revisions to be made to allowable costs ceilings, and hence cause heavier costs on bills.

We are in somewhat uncharted waters with a project such as Sizewell C because of its size, complexity, timescale and investment costs compared with the more modest sums and shorter timescales involved in existing RAB projects. Nuclear power stations elsewhere in the world have been funded along RAB lines, but have simply not been completed, which has left consumers with a huge bill and no benefit.

In short, we need to go into this kind of arrangement with a clear eye about the advantages and risks of a RAB model for nuclear. As far as we can, we should attempt to mitigate the risks and play up the advantages. It is workable, but only if the Government have a serious plan.

The Government have sought to alleviate at least some of the disadvantages by introducing to the Bill a special administrative regime for the project in the event of a failure of the company involved during construction. We will look carefully at those provisions, but they seem to be a useful commitment to ensure the robustness of the overall project, even if its prime developer fails to deliver. We also accept that provisions in the Bill on who may be involved in legacy and decommissioning costs will help to clarify the risks for security trustees and secured creditors.

There is much to agree with in the Bill, given the evident need to secure a mechanism that enables Sizewell C to be developed and come into production at a reasonably early date. There are measures to lower the overall cost of the project so it is investable and less price inefficient than its immediate predecessor, and to ensure that the project stays on track and delivers at the end of it. However, there are still many questions to be answered, particularly on the robustness of the RAB model under circumstances where the inevitable “optimism bias” of project costings—that candid acknowledgement comes from the Bill’s impact assessment—proves to be disadvantageous and costly to consumers who, after all, are supposed to be paying up for a benefit later on. It is important that we look at such matters carefully, with a clear eye on consumer protection, and do not just assume that the mechanism will milk customers for whatever it takes to produce an outcome in the end.

We need much greater clarity about the Government’s intentions on the difficult situation concerning Chinese investment in Sizewell. That may not be central to the Bill and the RAB model, but it is indirectly affected. The project’s overall shape will be affected by whether the Government take over the Chinese share, offer it to other investors or even calculate that RAB is a sufficiently powerful tool to enable investors easily to come in and scoop it up once the Secretary of State’s investment agreement provisions are untangled. We need to know in the Bill’s early stages what the Government will do about that and through what mechanisms.

As the Bill progresses, the Government can expect Labour’s overall support but also a proper, critical eye on aspects of the mechanisms they are adopting and a particular emphasis on protecting the people, who will either stand to benefit from a reliable power station producing needed energy at reasonable cost if it goes right or suffer grievously if it goes wrong. In other words, the customer must be first in our minds in taking such decisions, and we will stand up for them as the Bill progresses.

Energy Bill [Lords]

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Alan Whitehead

Monday 14th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Dr Whitehead]

Again, the right hon. Gentleman misses the point I am making. This is not about the Opposition attempting to delay the imposition of the law. It is about the rush to close the renewables obligation on the part of the Government, not the Opposition, and the subsequent, rather dilatory way in which the Energy Bill was placed before this House—and, indeed, the way in which it has been scheduled in this House and the distinct possibility that further stages of the Bill may be scheduled. The net result of that dilatoriness in the legislative process is that the Government, not the Opposition, may put us in a position where retrospective legislation is apparently the case and the possibility of legal action is also apparently the case. It is important that we remember that today. One reason I am suggesting that the closure of the RO ought to be much later, albeit still early, is that it would avoid that potential legal action.

In reality, we know that the proposed closure of the renewables obligation a year early is not about implementing a manifesto pledge. The RO is not a new subsidy—that is what was in the Conservative manifesto. Indeed, we had discussions about that in Committee. The proposals before us are not only about putting an end to something that has been in place for a considerable period, that has worked well and that was about to change, in good time, to a new system that allows for degression in underwriting and a path towards effectively dissolving subsidies for a technology that has achieved close to market parity; they are about putting an end to something that industry investors were clear and confident about. Investors were confident not just because the renewables obligation had worked for a while; there was also a clear process whereby it would come to an end and a clear line of progression to contracts for difference—the new system, which we discussed at some length during the passage of the Energy Act 2013—and an orderly roll-out of renewable energy as something progressively more effective and cheaper.

[Jonathan Edwards]

In formulating his amendments, has the hon. Gentleman had time to consider the recent excellent report by the Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change, which said that the Government’s current policy would lead to bills increasing due to uncertainty?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to draw attention to that report and, indeed, to the issue that has arisen not just from these changes, but from a series of other abrupt lurches in policy from the Government in the field of renewable energy. The net result has been a dramatic drop in investor confidence and a dramatic fall from our advanced position as a country that was regarded as a safe, good place to invest in renewable energy. This policy lurch has led to a feeling among many investors that they are now living in a world of confusion, in which it may be recommended in the boardroom that—perhaps in light of the competitiveness of many other countries—they should invest elsewhere when it comes to renewables. It has thrown a great many programmes into confusion and affected a great deal of potential investment in this country, not just in onshore wind but in many other renewables. Policy lurches of this sort tend to creep and spread across confidence in other areas of investment. If things had been left well alone, it would have been possible to envisage the continued progression of a secure investment circumstance, along with a clear understanding of what investors were doing and of how investments would change over a period.

This is not about putting an end to new subsidies; it is about the removal of a well-understood, long-lived subsidy before the point at which investors, the market and everyone else had expected it to be replaced by another system. As late as the spring of last year—after, I imagine, the Conservative manifesto had been written—the Secretary of State announced that the renewables obligation would close in March 2017, and the changeover would then be undertaken. I think that that came as a particular surprise to investors and the market because the Government had previously seemed to be so confident that the procedure would be as it had been originally set out.

It has been claimed that the removal of the renewables obligation at an early date is okay because we are reaching one of our European targets relating to the proportion of renewable energy that should make up our overall energy mix by 2020. The claim is that because the component that is represented by wind, and particularly by onshore wind, is reaching its target, it is okay to throw the market into its current confusion. We must, however, bear it in mind that we are failing substantially on the two other components of our European 15% target, heat and transport. Incidentally, the United Kingdom can be fined for missing that target.

The target can be achieved through overachievement in some areas, even if there is underachievement in others. The 12% renewable heat target, on which we are failing fairly miserably at the moment, and the 10% renewable fuel target, on which we are also failing, could be supported by our continuing to deploy onshore wind in particular. It might be suggested that to cut onshore wind at this time, given the extent of the failure to keep up with the overall energy target, is irresponsible to say the least.

A further claim that we have heard during the Bill’s passage is that all this is being done to help the customers who will have to pay for the underwriting of onshore wind. Of course it is important for us to consider the bills that customers are paying when deciding how best to establish our energy mix for the future.

We will have to establish an energy mix that is the most affordable, the most secure and the least carbonising over the next period, but the claim that this change is being introduced to help customers is in reality paper thin.

If the Government were serious about renewables in general, as they claim, the hole left by onshore wind over the next period as a result of the early closure of the RO—estimates suggest that a loss of investment of £1 billion is on the cards, as the Select Committee has noted—would have to be filled by other renewable sources that are currently more expensive to underwrite than the onshore wind they would replace. The net outcome of this measure could well be that the cost to customers is considerably more than it would have been if the present arrangements had been allowed to continue to their conclusion.

Onshore wind is at the leading edge of market parity. As the Government will be aware, it was on a sustained glide path down to parity, with investor confidence high and costs coming down. I emphasise that the damage to investor confidence as a result of this essentially retroactive Bill will be enormous. If it goes through, it will effectively replace a steady path down to market parity in which competitive deployment could progress—a cliff over which investment will fall.

A further claim that the proposed change is necessary is connected to the levy control framework, the éminence grise in many of our discussions on energy, particularly renewable energy. It is a control framework formed in obscurity by the Government and continuing in background gloom as people attempt fruitlessly to find out about its calculations, its variations and its consequent prescriptions. The levy control framework was devised in 2011 by the Government to get us into a position where about £7.6 billion at 2012 prices of levy payers’ money—money derived not from Government sources but from levies on energy companies, which would pass those costs on to their customers—would provide a framework within which renewables could develop.

However, the levy control framework is based on a static endpoint—2020 in this instance—even though prices will be variable over the period. It is based on the idea of a strike price that renewable energy will receive and that has been agreed, certainly for onshore wind, at an auction process, set against a reference price, which is the median price for energy at a particular time. The strike price is considered in relation to what rewards will be undertaken for that renewable energy. When and if energy prices go down, the difference between the strike price and the reference price widens. Although a renewable energy developer will receive the same amount of money for their energy, the make-up of the amount paid to the developer will be different. The more prices go down, the less the developer will get in relation to the reference price and the more they will get in relation to the difference between the reference price and the strike price, which will come from the levy control framework. Therefore, over a period of time the levy control framework, as designed, increases the reward to those inside the system, even though they do not get a total additional reward. New entrants are squeezed out, because the money goes to rewarding those who are already in the system and less money is provided to new entrants outside the system. Indeed, many commentators consider the present form of the levy control framework to be, in essence, bust as far as new entrants are concerned. The relatively small amount of change that the levy control framework will undergo through the ending of the renewables obligation period a year early is all about how the framework balances itself, which is a pretty thin claim bearing in mind the range of theoretical headroom in the framework and the difficulties it has experienced.