Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend finds the right moment to ask about something not subject to the amendment. It is an important point, however. My right hon. and learned Friend has written to him about onward appeals in immigration cases. The Department will conduct a review of the impacts of withdrawing legal aid in such cases once we have sufficient data and after implementation of the reforms. I envisage allowing about a year for the reforms to take effect before starting such a review.

Lords amendment 2 was passed in the other place yesterday by the extremely narrow margin of three votes. Unusually for this topic, no one spoke other than the mover and my right hon. Friend Lord McNally. That indicates how far we have moved. I remind the House of the main points. First, and crucially, legal aid to obtain the full range of injunctions and orders to protect against domestic violence will remain exactly as at present. There is no evidential gateway for legal aid for these remedies, and those who need legal aid to protect themselves can get it, regardless of their means.

Secondly, although we have removed most of private family law from the scope of legal aid in favour of funding mediation and less adversarial proceedings, we have made an extremely important exception for victims of domestic violence. That is so that they can take or defend proceedings about child contact or maintenance, or about the division of property, without being intimidated by their abuser during the proceedings.

We have made significant changes to the detail of this exception in response to concerns expressed in both Houses. We have accepted in full the Association of Chief Police Officers’ definition of domestic violence. We have also significantly widened the list of evidence that we will accept as demonstrating domestic violence for the purposes of the exception. That list will now include undertakings, police cautions, evidence of admission to a refuge, evidence from social services and evidence from GPs and other medical professionals. That is in addition to the range of evidence that had already been confirmed, including the fact of an injunction or order to protect against domestic violence having been made, a criminal conviction or ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic violence, a referral to a multi-agency risk assessment conference and a finding of fact by the courts that there has been domestic violence. We have also doubled the previously announced time limit for evidence for this exception from 12 months to two years.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

We all noted the Lord Chancellor’s commitment in the Chamber last week to extending the time limit to two years. Will the Minister clarify whether that will also apply in cases of child abuse, which seem to be encompassed by the definition of domestic violence that now applies in the Bill? Clarification would be welcome on that, as there are clearly instances in which proceedings might be brought in relation to child abuse after more than 12 months, including in care proceedings, in which it would be entirely appropriate to grant legal aid.

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, I am pleased to be able to confirm to the hon. Lady that that is the case.

We think that we have struck the right balance, although some will disagree. However, such disagreement misses the fact that there are two important safeguards to our system, which will provide genuine victims with a route into legal aid even if they do not have the headline forms of evidence. First, when a court has to consider whether domestic violence is a factor in a private family case, it may consider any relevant evidence, including police call-outs or evidence from domestic violence support services, or other types of evidence that have not even been suggested by the Opposition. This is also relevant in regard to the time limits. When a case involves older incidents of domestic violence and a court considers that the matter is still relevant and makes a finding of fact, legal aid funding could still be triggered. There is also the more generic safeguard of the exceptional funding regime.

We continue to believe that the evidential requirements should not be in the Bill. The level of detail required means that those requirements will be much better left to regulations, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, rather than to primary legislation. Given how far we have moved on this topic, and the safeguards that I have outlined today, I invite the House to disagree with Lords amendments 2B and 196B.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

As I said, this is a question of what lawyers get paid. I am in no way assessing the vulnerability of the individuals whom the hon. Gentleman mentioned.

I point out to the hon. Gentleman that significant steps have been taken in recent years to lower the barriers to bringing compensation claims for these disastrous diseases. A fast-track procedure for mesothelioma cases has been introduced in the High Court. Over the past few years, various legal changes, including primary legislation such as the Compensation Act 2006 and judgments of the Supreme Court, have removed many of the hurdles for sufferers of respiratory diseases in bringing claims.

The legal climate in which such cases are brought has been transformed in recent years. Judgments of the Supreme Court have removed many hurdles, and a judgment only last month means that victims of this dreadful disease who are able to trace an insurer will now be paid and not miss out on compensation. As I said, a fast-track procedure has been introduced to ensure that claims are dealt with as quickly as possible.

A key outstanding barrier is identifying the employer’s liability insurer when an employer no longer exists, and the Department for Work and Pensions continues to work with stakeholders to see what more can be done to address that. Overall, however, cases are much less difficult to undertake than in the past, and there is no reason to believe that legal firms will stop bringing them, even under the new arrangements, or that they will be particularly expensive.

[Kate Green]

Does the Minister not accept, though, that some cases will now simply go unrepresented and unpursued, and that victims will instead have to rely on the Government’s own compensation scheme, in which the average payment is £16,000? This change will be an expensive choice for the Government, because it will lock people out of access through the courts.

[Mr Djanogly]

Decisions are made about such cases now, and even under the existing system, if there are large sums involved, ATE insurance companies want to know the likelihood of losing. A lawyer also has to make such an assessment. As things stand, the balance is not right, and we want to rebalance the situation.

Partly as a consequence of what I have said, I do not believe we should accept the view that critics sometimes advance that our reforms will leave victims of this terrible disease out of pocket. It is true that under our plans individuals will pay legal costs out of their general damages. Crucially, though, damages for future care and losses are protected, and general damages are being increased by 10% to offset a success fee capped at 25%. It is of course entirely up to the lawyer whether any success fee is taken from a claimant’s damages at all.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 13th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

Again, the Government were disappointed by the position taken by the Lords and will return to the matter when the Bill comes back to the Commons. We are very concerned about the victims of domestic violence. Indeed, it was because we are removing legal aid for private family law that we realised there will be certain categories, such as domestic violence, that will not be suitable for mediation, which is why we are concentrating on that area.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

It is widely recognised that specialist domestic violence courts have been very successful, but 23 of them are due to close. Will the Minister assure me that the expertise and multi-agency working that have been a feature of their success will continue in this changed landscape?

[Mr Djanogly]

It is important to point out that those specialist domestic violence courts are closing not because of what they do, but because the courts in which they are based are closing. I am pleased to say that those specialist courts will be moving to other courts, so no specialist domestic violence courts will be lost.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

18. What assessment his Department has made of the potential effects on women of planned changes to legal aid.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

The Government published an equality impact assessment alongside our response to consultation, which laid out the best assessment of the effects on women of planned changes to legal aid. That recognised the potential for the reforms to impact on a greater proportion of women, alongside others featuring protected characteristics.

[Mr Djanogly]

As the hon. Gentleman says, there is to be a consultation on domestic violence, although I believe that it will be undertaken by the Home Office rather than the Deputy Prime Minister. We will look carefully at the results of the consultation, but the definition of abuse in the Bill is broad and comprehensive, and includes mental as well as physical abuse.

[Kate Green]

What steps is the Minister taking to protect women who are victims of domestic violence from the risk of aggressive and unfair questioning in the courts by abusive partners, given the likelihood of an increase in the number of litigants appearing in person as a result of the legal aid cuts?

[Mr Djanogly]

I believe that some 50% of respondents are currently not represented through legal aid. As a consequence, the circumstances that the hon. Lady describes are common in our courts, and our judiciary are expert and accustomed to dealing with them when they arise.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

The reason is that criminalisation would be too blunt an instrument. If we take the example of the straight payment of a fee for a referral, I can see how straight criminalisation would work, but we should appreciate that when that was last banned in 2004 it was a weak provision through which a coach and horses could be driven. What if an insurance company provides insurance to a solicitor in payment for referrals, rather than a straight fee? What if a trade union gives its cheap work to a firm of solicitors in consideration for the solicitors getting its better work? What if a claims management company provides a variety of services to a solicitor in payment for a referral? The point I am making is that the circumstances could be very varied and complex and the straight criminal option would not be appropriate. It would be the principle that counts and it would have to be a regulator that looks to the principle.

We are primarily concerned with removing incentives under the current system with regard to personal injury claims, which is why we are banning referral fees in that area. However, the Lord Chancellor may in future extend by regulation the prohibition on referral fees to other types of claim and legal services and other providers of legal services should the need arise and if the case is made for such an extension.

[Kate Green]

Is the Minister not concerned that that might introduce an element of uncertainty? Although I note what he says about the possibility of extending the provisions to other structures in future, is he not aware that alternative business structures will now be set up by large companies to get around the provisions? How will he address that?

[Mr Djanogly]

Alternative business structures will be set up by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, probably before or just after the end of this year, so the hon. Lady makes an important point. At that stage, claims management companies will be able to purchase solicitors, and vice versa, which means that it would indeed be possible, as we discussed in the Transport Committee, for a claims management company to own a solicitor and effectively act as the advertising arm of a firm of solicitors. However, the important difference is that the claims management companies will then be regulated by the SRA, which will give consumers a significant amount of comfort.

Referral fees are one of the symptoms of the compensation culture in this country. The Government are determined to put an end to them while at the same time addressing the underlying cause of recoverability of no win, no fee success fees.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. I can tell him and other hon. Members that it has become clear to me, from my many meetings over the last year and a half with mediators and lobby groups such as those already mentioned, that in the vast majority of cases the parties are better off sorting out their problems together with the help of the mediator. For the most part, mediation is empowering. In most cases, the best way forward is for people to be able to sort out their own futures and those of their children without being told what to do by a judge, and that is what the Government support.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I want to ask the Minister about cases where domestic abuse or violence per se is not present, but where conflict between the parents none the less makes it simply impossible for mediation to work effectively. In the interests of children, will the Minister consider extending legal aid in those circumstances, so that where a mediator knows that mediation simply could not work, the parents will still receive advice?

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government have changed the law through a pre-action protocol. The position from this April has been that where a divorce application is made, the parties have to see whether mediation is appropriate, as has been the case with publicly funded divorce cases. That does not, I hasten to add, mean that the parties have to go to mediation; however, they have to be assessed to see whether mediation is appropriate. I can tell the hon. Lady that the initial findings are very positive indeed. We have adequate mediators, with more than 1,000 mediation units around the country, and all are reporting a significant upturn in business, which is a positive outcome.

[Kate Green]

I agree with the Minister about the desirability of mediation wherever it can work best for all the parties. We would all like appropriate mediation to be used as much as possible in such cases, but will he clarify what he just said? Where a couple is found unsuitable for mediation because of the conflict between them, but where violence or abuse is absent, will they be able to access legal aid?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am afraid that the hon. Lady misunderstands the nature of mediation. In normal circumstances, it is not for the mediator to sit in judgment on the individuals who turn up for mediation. That happens in the assessment. The mediator should explain to the individuals the purpose of mediation and it is for the individuals themselves to decide whether mediation is appropriate. If violence was involved, the mediator might suggest that, in those circumstances, mediation is not appropriate. If domestic violence is involved, the Government believe that legal aid should be provided.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall make a little more progress first.

The forms of evidence that will be accepted for this purpose are not set out in the Bill. Instead, they will be set out in regulations under clause 10. We believe it is appropriate to set out these detailed provisions in secondary, rather than primary, legislation as it can be amended to respond to particular issues that may arise during the operation of the scheme.

In the consultation, we suggested what might be the forms of evidence of domestic violence, and we listened to the views expressed on that in response. As a result, we have widened the range of forms of evidence, and, furthermore, only one of the forms of evidence would be needed. Legal aid will be available for victims of domestic violence in private family law cases where one of the following criteria is met: where a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party is in place or has been made in the last 12 months; there is a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence committed by the other party against the applicant for funding, unless the conviction is spent; there are ongoing criminal proceedings against the other party for a domestic violence offence by that party against the applicant for funding; the applicant for funding has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party; there has been a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party, giving rise to a risk of harm to the victim.

[Kate Green]

Will the fact that there is, for example, a non-molestation order be taken as evidence of suitability for legal aid in family proceedings, and will legal aid be available to enable a victim of domestic violence to get such an order?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, it will be. The hon. Lady makes a very important point, which has come up in consultation and has often been misconstrued. For such individuals, legal aid will be provided for the application for a non-molestation order, for example.

It might be helpful if I give an idea of the prevalence of these forms of evidence. About 24,100 domestic violence orders were made in 2010, about 74,000 domestic violence crimes were prosecuted in 2009-10 and there were 53,000 domestic violence convictions. Further, about 43,000 victims of domestic violence were referred to multi-agency risk assessment conferences in the 12 months to June 2010.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

First, let me confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and other hon. Members that I have listened carefully to the debate, which has been informed and varied. A significant number of general and more specific issues have come up in our deliberations. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) that the debate has, in some ways, become too polarised given the significant agreement and consensus among all hon. Members about the need to counter domestic violence.

Given the number of issues to address, it is hard to know where to start, but I shall begin with the definition of abuse, which was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) and the hon. Members for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). The accusation is that the definition of abuse in the Bill narrows the scope of legal aid in comparison with ACPO’s definition. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Bill weakened the definition of abuse. I can confirm to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion that the definition in the Bill does not require physical abuse. Both the ACPO definition and the Bill definition are very broad and embrace abuse that is not physical, and it is difficult to see what description of behaviour in the ACPO definition would not be covered by the broad description of physical or mental abuse used in the Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman suggested that I said in Committee that to widen the definition of domestic violence would induce self-reporting. As I think my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich was heading towards saying, that confuses the definition of abuse, which determines scope, and the criteria for an individual to qualify. The definition of abuse in the Bill is broad and it is difficult to see how it does not cover that which is covered by the ACPO definition. Neither definition says anything about how abuse is to be evidenced.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon injected a sense of balance into the debate and I noted his condemnation of archaic and unacceptable language. I think we can all agree on that.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the Bill and ACPO definitions of domestic violence. To put an end to this issue, let me say that if any right hon. or hon. Member can write to me with a specific, concrete example of abuse that would be covered by the ACPO definition but not by the definition in the Bill I will give the issue serious consideration.

[Kate Green]

I am not going to give the Minister an example of that. If he is so sure that there is such an overlap, why not use the ACPO definition?

[Mr Djanogly]

I look forward to the hon. Lady providing her reasons why that should be the case.

The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made a significant number of points for his significant number of amendments, most of which I covered in my preliminary remarks, and I do not intend to go over them all again. However, he mentioned two particular points that I did not cover, so if he does not mind I will concentrate on those.

It is not clear that amendments 92 or 93 would widen the category of services described in paragraph 10 significantly or at all. The definition of abuse used in the Bill is intentionally broad and not limited to physical violence, but it embraces physical or mental abuse. Abuse is stated to include sexual abuse and abuse in the form of violence, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation, but it is not limited to those examples. Therefore, we believe that it is sufficiently flexible to cover cases of genuine abuse, as is the intention. Both amendments refer to physical and mental abuse, which are already explicitly referred to in the Bill’s definition. Additionally, they refer to threatening behaviour, violence and emotional abuse, which are clearly within the scope of physical and mental abuse and so are unnecessary and add nothing to the breadth of the category.

Further reference is made to financial abuse. It is not entirely clear what that would cover outside the context of serious cases where the treatment of one party by the other in relation to the family finances amounts to physical or, in particular, mental abuse, which would include neglect, maltreatment and exploitation in the Bill’s definition, where it is clearly within the definition of abuse in the Bill. Where the financial abuse does not amount to or form part of physical or mental abuse, it could be argued that the amendment would widen the gateway beyond what might be ordinarily understood as abusive behaviour, but in a way where the effect is unclear. For instance, there is no special reference to financial abuse in the provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 to protect against domestic violence or in case law, in contrast to emotional or psychological abuse, so it is questionable what it would add in this regard.

However, the amendment also stipulates that any incident of abuse would suffice to come within the category. On one construction, that would make no difference since the existing definition does not require a course of conduct, but on another construction it might be argued that the explicit reference to any incident could be read as a fetter on the power to define what would be accepted as sufficient evidence of abuse through secondary legislation. That is because the type of evidence acceptable will reflect a certain degree of seriousness. For instance, a family court will not generally make orders relating to minor, one-off incidents, although it will do so in appropriate circumstances, such as a course of conduct of trivial incidents adding up to something more serious.

It is not clear that any challenge to secondary legislation requiring forms of evidence that in themselves are unlikely to arise from minor, single incidents would have any prospect of success, but the risk cannot be entirely ruled out. Were it impossible to prescribe the forms of evidence proposed to date, we estimate that the consequent opening up of eligibility would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The part of amendment 23 that refers to violence or abuse

“between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality”

is superfluous, since it duplicates the effect of paragraph 10(7), which sets out that for the purposes of the paragraph there is a family relationship between two people if they are associated with each other. That “associated” has the same meaning as set out in part 4 of the 1996 Act, where it is defined very widely and covers a range of relationships no less wide, and in some instances wider, than the ACPO definition.

Amendment 93 would widen the domestic violence gateway so that legal aid would be available for the potential victim in private family law cases where there has been an as yet unproven allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse. It would make the gateway extremely wide and, in effect, would mean that self-reporting would have to be accepted as sufficient evidence of domestic violence, making any other evidentiary requirements redundant. It would be difficult to limit very far the forms of evidence of an allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse, that would be accepted. We estimate that that would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The amendment refers to allegations that person B has been abused by person A. In paragraph 10 of schedule 1, it is person A who is the victim, and person B who is the abuser—the other way around. However, the amendment does not change the opening proposition, which is that the services are provided to person A. This appears to have the perverse consequence that if the proven abuser, person B, alleges that the proven victim, person A, was the abuser, person A would qualify more easily for legal aid as they would then have to give as evidence only an allegation by person B of abuse or the risk of abuse. That is almost certainly a drafting error, but if it is not, and the intention is instead to ensure that legal aid would be available where either party might be the victim of abuse, that would be unnecessary.

In relation to amendment 97, the intended effect is unnecessary because section 37 proceedings are public law matters and it would be possible, in private law proceedings, for a court that is considering a section 37 order to adjourn so that the parents, if they are not already represented, may have access to legal aid and representation under the public law heading. The actual effect is rather wider. However, the amendment would bring the whole of family proceedings, such as proceedings for residence and contact with children, into scope where the court considers making a section 37 direction, rather than simply consideration of that point. Again, this may be a matter of defective drafting, but if so the entire amendment would be superfluous.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether an adjournment would introduce a delay in protecting a child. We would expect a court to adjourn a hearing only if it considered it safe to do so. The only way to avoid the potential of being a section 37 direction being made at a hearing involving unrepresented parents would be by providing legal aid for all private law children cases, which we believe would be a disproportionate response. There is already the potential for section 37 directions to be made in cases involving litigants in person under the present system, but as I have said, legal aid is available and will be in future to challenge such a direction.

A significant number of comments were made in relation to amendment 74. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) indicated that he will want to press it to a Division, so I will spend some time on it. I agree that it is an important matter. He said that he understands our intent. Does he understand that we need to have savings in legal aid? I am not sure what he meant when he said that he understands our intent—[Interruption.] He says that he will address that in a later debate, but I think that it is quite an important issue. In contrast to what he said, his right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State recognised in an article published only this morning that

“cuts need to be made”.

Looking at the amendments tabled by Opposition Members, I cannot see where those cuts will be made. We have had a little look at what they are proposing. The estimated costs of the Opposition amendments are: £20 million in debt matters, £5 million in employment matters, £15 million in housing matters, £25 million in welfare benefits matters, £10 million in clinical negligence matters and £170 million in family law matters. The total is £245 million. The taxpayer deserves to know where the money for that will come from.

Let me address the actual effect of amendment 74. To set out in the Bill the circumstances as specified in the amendment that should be accepted as evidence of domestic violence for the purposes of legal aid for the victim in a private family law case would mean that those circumstances, but not those that the Government intend to accept as evidence of domestic violence, would be set out in primary legislation. The Government would therefore have no power at all to amend those circumstances through secondary legislation. They would be in addition to any circumstances set out in secondary legislation for providing appropriate evidence of abuse. We expect that significantly more cases would receive funding if the circumstances set out in either amendment were accepted as evidence. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) and others mentioned their concern about the issue of incentives for false allegations of domestic violence, but we received a significant number of responses to the consultation that expressed concern that there might be a rise in unfounded allegations of domestic violence, and the respondents expressing such concerns included the Law Society and the Bar Council.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 17th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

Legal aid to take family cases to court will in future be available only when domestic violence is an issue. Otherwise, couples will be expected to go to mediation. However, mediation may not be appropriate where there is a high degree of conflict, even when domestic violence is absent. What consideration is the Minister giving to how such cases will work after legal aid is removed?

[Mr Djanogly]

We are studying that issue very carefully through the consultation. We believe that mediation, as a cheaper, quicker and less stressful alternative, is normally the best way to go, but there will be circumstances in which it is not appropriate, domestic violence being one of them. We are considering the definition of domestic violence carefully.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Kate Green

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

15. What progress he has made on his proposed reform of legal aid.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

The consultation for the reform of legal aid closed on 14 February and we have received some 5,000 responses from members of the public, lawyers and their representative bodies, advice providers, charities and many others. We are continuing to review all the representations received and we hope to publish our finalised proposals, which will include plans for implementation, after the Easter recess.

[Mr Djanogly]

We do not accept the figures provided by Citizens Advice, but we do recognise that early advice can certainly be helpful in a range of contexts. Often, people need general advice on welfare benefits or debt rather than legal advice.

[Kate Green]

The Government are announcing a huge programme of welfare reform, which means that, at least for a time, there will inevitably be confusion and uncertainty about entitlement. Will the Minister explain how it can be right to consider removing funding for legal aid for welfare benefits and social law matters right now? What guarantees will he give about continued funding for such advice?

[Mr Djanogly]

There is never a right time to do these things, but we feel that legal aid needs to play its part in reducing the deficit and that is what we propose to do. In terms of benefits, there could be an issue with more benefit claims coming through from the Department for Work and Pensions and we are working closely with that Department to ensure that we maintain a smooth service.