Battery Energy Storage Sites: Safety Regulations

John Milne Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

This is a subject in which I might have more than a passing interest.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move,

That this House recognises the unique challenges posed by lithium-ion fires in battery energy storage sites; and calls on the Government to bring forward enforceable national regulations for their design and construction.

I have asked for this debate in order to highlight important issues associated with lithium-ion batteries when deployed at grid scale. These installations are known as battery energy storage systems, or BESSs. In particular, I am calling for clear national regulations that could be applied in the same way in every part of the UK. We need legislation, and I hope that this debate will push the Government further along the road to passing it.

The UK has set a target to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. To achieve that, many wind and solar farms have been constructed and permissions are being sought for many more. I fully support the drive towards renewable energy; the enhanced regulation that I am suggesting today is intended to secure the industry’s future, not to create more obstacles. I think it is perfectly possible to draw up regulations that will not stand in the way of BESS roll-out, and which in the long term could actually save the industry from a wholly avoidable setback in the event of an accident.

BESSs solve the classic question of what to do when the sun don’t shine and the wind don’t blow. They provide a number of highly useful functions, including load balancing, peak shaving and energy arbitrage. Above all, they make it practical to meet a much larger percentage of our national energy needs from renewables. However, every energy system carries some kind of risk, and most BESSs currently use lithium-ion battery technology. In the event of an accident—and sooner or later there are always accidents—lithium-ion batteries catch fire in a different way from other materials, in a process known as thermal runaway. It is important to note that most BESSs now rely on lithium iron phosphate or LFP batteries. This chemistry is much more stable than lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide or NMC cells, which are common in consumer uses. That means fewer incidents, but those incidents can still be dangerous. In the future, there will undoubtedly be other chemistries, so we need to leave space for innovation.

Thermal runaway generates very high temperatures and requires different firefighting methods. It is usually best not to try to put out the fire, but rather to control the spread. Firefighters also have to contend with severely toxic gas emissions, the risk of an explosion, soil contamination and damage to watercourses. To repeat, I am in no way suggesting that battery energy storage systems are inherently unsafe. The risks they entail may be different from those of traditional systems, but they are perfectly controllable.

[David Mundell (Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that the location of many of these sites are in rural areas, which are often served primarily by retained firefighters? They are a long way from where specialist firefighting resources would come from, and that does not seem to be taken into account fully in the planning process.

[John Milne]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. I agree that such sites can be in remote locations where there are fewer resources. As I will say later in my remarks, fire officer training is very much part of what I am recommending.

There is a strong case for mandating water-based suppression systems, off-gas detection, ventilation systems and thermal runaway mitigation as design conditions. Unfortunately, that is far from the case today. The guidelines for planning approval are imprecise and vary across the devolved nations. Currently, the burden of responsibility falls on individual local authority planning officers who have no specific training or background in lithium-ion technology—and why on earth would they?

For reasons that are hard to understand—perhaps the Minister can explain—fire and rescue services have not been made statutory consultees for planning applications. The current guidance states that applicants are “encouraged to engage” rather than required to do so, but even compulsory consultation is not enough by itself because the fire services themselves do not always have the expertise. Within the last fortnight, Henry Griffin, Suffolk’s deputy chief fire officer asked for fire services to be given new powers, saying:

“I’d like to see a power that is akin to a regulatory order like those for a commercial property, where we would have the power to enforce safety measures on those sites.”

He explained that the fire service is currently just a “contributing partner”, able to give “direction and professional advice”, but not necessarily to require what it might like.

The result is inconsistency, which is destructive both of public trust and of the success of the industry. In my own constituency of Horsham, the local planning authority has rejected a BESS application, while a similar site, just half a mile away, across the border in Mid Sussex, has won approval. Such inconsistencies show alarming parallels with Grenfell. The Grenfell disaster was the end result of many failings by both individuals and companies, but at heart it was a failure of regulation. The rules left things wide open for exploitation by cost-cutting developers, which is exactly what happened. Just as with lithium-ion batteries, a new technology—in that case cladding—was being used at scale for the first time, without proper understanding of the risks. The time to act is now because the number of BESS applications is expanding exponentially.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I commend the hon. Gentleman for securing the debate. He is right to highlight the issues around lithium-ion batteries and thermal runaway; we are all reminded of explosions and fires in Liverpool in 2019 and in Kilwinning, in Scotland, in 2025. He referred to the need for legislation for the whole of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but that needs to start here. Is it his intention to ask the Minister to confirm in her response that that will happen, so that the legislation can then fan out to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales?

[John Milne]

The hon. Gentleman is better acquainted than I am with the way that devolution works, but yes, I hope that the Minister will be able to set out whatever course of action is required to get to that point.

It is essential that we build battery energy storage sites to proper safety standards so that we do not find ourselves facing the need for a massively more expensive retrofit, with consequences for the entire energy network.

What accidents have there been so far? In September 2020, a fire at a BESS site in Liverpool created a significant blast and took 59 hours to extinguish. Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service said that the blaze on Carnegie Road

“appears to be the first significant fire of its type to occur within the UK”.

However, this was only a small BESS, with just four containers and a modest 20 MWh output in total.

[Samantha Niblett (South Derbyshire) (Lab)]

In common with the hon. Gentleman, I welcome renewable energy. Safety is hugely important. In my constituency there are lots of battery sites that are being placed in pockets around beautiful little villages because there are connections to the national grid. Because of the potential fire hazards and possible toxic run-off into local rivers, does the hon. Gentleman agree that we should prioritise brownfield sites as opposed to such pockets around pretty little villages?

[John Milne]

The issue of site choice is closely associated with grid capacity, so that is a factor. That is why some of these sites are ending up in otherwise somewhat improbable and very un-industrial settings. Rules around the pollution of watercourses are one of the most important measures to be brought in, and a wider discussion of land use is going on that could help with that.

There was another accident in February this year. Essex firefighters dealt with a fire at a BESS project that was still under construction and therefore not even operating at full power. The most serious incident internationally, which caused serious injury, was in McMicken, Arizona in 2019. As a result, America, along with Germany, has some of the most effective BESS protocols in the world, which I think could be copied.

Overall, BESS fires are high risk in their impact but low in incidence. The Faraday Institution estimates that only one in 40 million battery cells will experience failure resulting in fire. That is an exceptionally high standard of safety, but there are millions of batteries, so there will be accidents—and, of course, in a BESS scenario one battery can trigger another. Grenfell was one fire in one building, yet the ramifications continue today. It has left us with the huge cost of retrofitting large numbers of high-rise buildings across the UK built with similar cladding methods. Even a single failure can therefore undermine an entire industry if it turns out to be the result of a systemic mistake in design.

The UK’s regulatory approach to BESS safety relies on performance-based regulations such as the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the Building Regulations 2010. They place the responsibility on the responsible person—the site owner—to ensure that adequate safety measures are in place, but they lack specific provisions tailored to BESSs. Too much reliance is being placed on individual owners to mark their own homework. The National Fire Chiefs Council provides guidance for the fire and rescue services, but that needs to be more comprehensive and updated constantly in line with changes in technology if it is to serve a proper regulatory purpose. On fire response regulation, recent changes to the International Electrotechnical Commission standards suggest a global shift towards mandatory water-based suppression and proactive risk mitigation, but that has not yet been echoed in UK law.

There are also the environmental impacts. The Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Water Resources Act 1991 provide a general framework for managing environmental impacts but, again, they do not specifically address the challenges posed by BESS fires. Existing regulators do not seem to know whose responsibility this should be. In a recent application for a solar park at Cleve Hill in Kent, which includes battery storage, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero stated that the Health and Safety Commission should be consulted on safety advice, but the HSC itself said that commenting on battery safety management plans was not in its remit. That confusion is not exactly reassuring.

It is important to note that if the batteries themselves are not manufactured in the UK, the Government have limited scope to regulate. However, because batteries are produced under controllable factory conditions, their failure rate is low. The focus of UK regulation should instead be on the processes that can happen in this country, especially the design of the battery containers and the overall site.

I understand from the Electricity Storage Network, which is the industry group for electricity storage in Great Britain, that it is currently talking to officials at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs about a new permitting system. It is also talking to the British Standards Institution about laying down new standards for design and emergency response. However, the Government have responded to all questions from myself and others saying that they consider the present regulatory regime to be “robust”. I am tempted to say that pride comes before a fall.

In the last few weeks, a spokesperson for the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero has stated:

“Battery fires at storage sites are rare in the UK. We already have high safety standards in place that require manufacturers and industry to ensure batteries are safe throughout their lifespan.”

That is just too complacent. Fires as a result of cladding were also incredibly rare, but that did not save 72 lives at Grenfell.

I and others have been asking for action for some time, but so far without success. It feels like the message still is not getting through. It is very concerning that many questions are passed from Department to Department, with no one seeming to be sure exactly whose responsibility it is. Because of inadequate regulation, some BESS units have already been fitted with inappropriate fire suppression techniques, which might actually make the problem worse, but they were installed in good faith by operators looking to do the right thing. Why are the Government so reluctant to act? I hope that the Minister will explain. Perhaps the Government are worried that regulations would slow down the planning process, but I would argue that clearer rules will actually make life easier for planning officers and councillors. Currently, they have to grapple with a complex technical subject for the first time each time—that is too much to ask of non-experts. I further suggest that it would be easier to win public consent if there were more clarity and consistency.

Perhaps the Government fear stifling innovation in a new and rapidly changing industry. I wholly agree that any regulations need to be carefully drafted and have sufficient flexibility. Any guidance needs to cover a number of areas, including the transportation of batteries to the site, design and construction, firefighting, ongoing inspection and decommissioning. In the short term, if the Government are—for any reason—still reluctant to regulate, perhaps they could issue clear national guidelines that are capable of being updated annually. Enforcement might then take place through the insurance industry, which would be likely to insist that any new applications follow such guidelines. As no project can go ahead without insurance, this would be enforcement by the back door.

Grenfell was a wholly predictable tragedy. A similar fire at Lakanal House in Camberwell, which killed six people, should have made us understand the risk, but that warning was not heeded and history took its course. We cannot go back in time to stop Grenfell, but we can act now to avoid making the same mistake again with battery energy storage systems.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for her response and all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions. Wherever we stand on renewable energy, we can all agree that we must have the highest possible safety standards—that is an absolute given.

From the conversations I have had with industry, clear national guidance would be widely welcomed because what we have now is not felt to be sufficient. What industry most wants is clarity, so any rules can be integrated from the start, at the design stage, when the cost impact is minimal. Regulations are clearly a live issue in many constituencies with so many applications across the country, as Members have said. However, everything is progressing in a random and unco-ordinated way. The fact that the Government do not know which Department should answer questions on the subject is revealing.

I am concerned that Parliament does a weaker job of scrutiny on niche subjects like this one because they are so technical. We are currently placing part of that responsibility on the shoulders of local councillors and council officers, who cannot possibly have the relevant expertise. In her remarks, I noticed that the Minister was still using the term “encouraged” in relation to consulting with local fire officers. That is not enough as such consultation should be mandated and I am disappointed not to hear that there will be mandatory consultation, which is what we all want.

I stress again that incidents will be rare, but a single incident can bring down an industry. I hope that the Minister will not make the same mistake that was made over cladding regulations: let us make this a tragedy that never happens.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House recognises the unique challenges posed by lithium-ion fires in battery energy storage sites; and calls on the Government to bring forward enforceable national regulations for their design and construction.