UK Air Defence
Debate between John Cooper and Andrew Murrison(5 days, 8 hours ago)
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Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
I am grateful for this opportunity and declare my interests as a reservist, the father of two servicewomen and the brother of a serving admiral.
Among the many issues that should be keeping Ministers awake at night are two tech-based conundrums that particularly worry me. One is future access to critical minerals and their products, which I have spoken about in the past. The other related issue is the patchy nature of the protection of these islands against missiles and drones. That is what I want to raise this evening.
Everything costs, and it is easy when one is not in government to wish the ends without the means. At the moment, defence is spread too thinly and what I am suggesting would spread it even more thinly. Whether the UK should be globally deployable or focus on the defence of the homeland and its Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood is moot. The likelihood is that we will soldier on, make do and mend—we always have. But the scene is set for the biggest retrenchment since Suez. I wish it were otherwise, but it falls to this Government to make the call. Their attempted unforced surrender of the Chagos islands is perhaps an indication of where their thinking lies.
In 1963, the 35th US President told his National Security Council that European NATO members were not paying their fair share. John F. Kennedy said,
“We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves”.
On Monday, the 45th and 47th President will likely be saying the same thing. Clearly, American frustration with Europe enjoying the insurance policy without paying the premium is nothing new. What is new is the American willingness to strong-arm Europe into changing its ways. Forget 2% or 2.5%—Trump says he wants 5% of GDP spent on defence by all NATO members, and here is the kicker: he wants a 20% tariff on all goods imported to the US. Combine the two and it is not a stretch to imagine him slapping tariffs on European goods unless Europeans step up to the plate.
Ultimately, the single most important reason Trump can do what we fear he is about to do is that America is no longer principally competing with Europe’s proximate threat—Russia. A vast but thinly populated nation of 144 million, a busted economy and a military whose weaknesses have been generously displayed for all to see since February 2022 is not perceived by Washington as a main threat. An America emerging from the 9/11 Bush counter-terrorism era is back to facing off with great powers once again, but the great power is not Russia; it is China.
As the US pivots, European states of all sizes must step up to defend their homeland and safeguard the north Atlantic. There are no free passes. Israel is a small state, but its military capabilities are unmatched in the middle east. Its layered missile defence systems—the famous Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow—and its formidable fleet of aircraft demonstrate how small states, with a little help from their friends, can punch way above their weight. Several of those small states will provide the first line of defence against Putin’s Russia. The bulk of the cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Putin would fire at Britain as a proxy for the US will be intercepted by existing defence systems and fighter aircraft stationed in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.
While our geography, as so often in our history, gives strategic depth and protection from long-range attack, we can have less confidence in dealing with proximate threats from sea and subsea platforms and with threats to deployed and overseas assets, such as Cyprus, that fall well within the scope of short-range missiles and drones from Russia, Iran and their proxies. In any event, some missiles directed at the homeland would get through in the event of a full-on attack right now by the Russian Federation. That has been our blind spot.
The public would expect that missiles evading the first line of integrated missile defence would be destroyed closer to their target. The Type 45-mounted Sea Viper and the ground-based Sky Sabre are exquisite examples of air and missile defence systems, but there are simply not enough of them—not enough missiles ready to go and not enough industrial capacity to enable resilience in anything more than the very short term. Russia’s war on Ukraine has helpfully made us alive to our vulnerability. Russia, as we have seen in Ukraine and throughout its history, is capable of taking long-term pain in a way that it seems unlikely we would. As things stand, the capital is particularly vulnerable to Russian missile attack, unless we park all our Type 45s—those that are operational—on the Thames.
Happily, unlike Israel and Ukraine, we are surrounded by friends. It makes sense to be a full part of, and a contributor to, NATO integrated air and missile defence, but European IAMD, and its suppression and destruction of enemy air defence systems, are currently completely reliant on the US. In any event, the suspicion is that a full-on attack by Russia right now would find too many holes in the patchy architecture that has evolved to protect against missiles.
Germany has recognised that threat; it has owned the consequences of doing nothing. It has established the European Sky Shield initiative, and has begun procuring trusted systems such as Patriot and Arrow 3. The UK has been considering joining ESSI. Where are we with that? What about off-the-shelf systems such as Arrow 3?
John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)
I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for that point. It is interesting that the Arrow 3 project he mentions is a joint project between Boeing in America and the Israeli defence machinery. Is there something in the innovation offered by Patria, a Finnish company, which is offering to help us build armoured vehicles here in Britain but based on its design? Do we need less of a reliance on domestic systems and to consider, as he says, off-the-shelf systems from elsewhere?
Dr Murrison
There is a great deal in what my hon. Friend says. Historically, buying off the shelf has proved to be somewhat more cost-effective than designing exquisite systems of our own. I hope very much that, as we go further into this process, we can partner with others to ensure that what we buy is both integrated and cost-effective. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on ESSI.
Ukraine has shown the limitations of the “just in time, not just in case” policy that has driven our failure to stockpile the materiel of war in recent decades. In the 1930s, the shadow factories initiative fitted commercial premises that typically produced cars for reconfiguration as armament factories, in case the need should arise, which it did. Car workers would switch to become the basis of the skilled workforce necessary to create materiel for prosecuting the war effort. That then happened, to the point that in 1940, this country was outstripping Germany in the production of fighter aircraft. With every respect due to the Few, the Battle of Britain was won in Britain’s factories and on its production lines as much as in the skies. Victory hinges just as much on logistics now, except the timelines are far shorter. The defence ecosystem in the US 2022 national defence strategy had more than a whiff of the 1930s in advancing an intertwined commercial-military co-operative.
In a good light, we can see shadow factories in the thematic approach to missile defence taken by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory missile defence centre. Crucially, it is industry partner-based, with a heavy focus on growing suitably qualified and experienced people, of whom we are desperately short. The MDC is now 20 years old. What assessment has the Minister made of it, and what changes does he propose to its structure and remit to help plug holes in our missile defence architecture? In the light of prevailing circumstances, will he consider upgrading the MDC so that it has the salience and clout approaching that of the pre-war directorate of aeronautical production? Then, it was Spitfires and Hurricanes; today it is missile defence, SDEAD—suppression and destruction of enemy air defences—and drones. Then, it was preparation for the total war to come; now—God willing—it is deterrence.
There are those who say that the solution to our vulnerability to missile attack from the east is simple: it is Israel’s Iron Dome—the close-in element of the layered missile defence system used successfully to thwart Iran in April. However, Israel is a small country with a small population concentrated in a small number of cities with limited critical national infrastructure. It is surrounded by hostiles. Happily, none of that applies here.
Our missile defence must be fully integrated with NATO partners. NATO needs European leadership as the US pivots, and we must not encourage those whose primary interest in defence lies in extending the remit of the institutions of the European Union, rather than the defence and security of Europeans. We do not need the distraction of a separate, competing EU defence architecture; NATO is our strength and our stay, and we must use our status as the continent’s leading military power to ensure it remains so. In particular, we must articulate clearly the case for layered missile defence and SDEAD within a NATO construct, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific. The UK and Europe need NATO integrated air and missile defence that incorporates close-in systems to guarantee major centres of population, defence assets and critical national infrastructure. Crucially, member states must not give an aggressor capable of waging an attritional war grounds for believing that the west will exhaust its ordnance in the first few hours or days.
Where are we with the versatile and scalable very short to medium-range modular ground-based air defence system envisaged by NATO Defence Ministers at their meeting in October 2020? What application might that system have to provide the last arrow in our quiver—one that will destroy missiles that have evaded intermediate layers and are about to land on critical sites in the UK? For a country with no money, directed energy weapons offer a potential solution for dealing with drones and missiles, albeit in line of sight and in good weather. Is DSTL’s DragonFire weapon still on course for service with the Royal Navy in 2027, and what export opportunities are Ministers exploring? Do they expect that Type 26s, Type 31s, and any Type 32s will carry DragonFire or successor directed energy weapons? Will they be fitted as standard, or as expensive retrofits?
Do we really need a sixth-generation manned—or even hybrid—fast jet to replace Typhoon? Would it not be better to rely on the F-35 airframe with mid-life upgrades in a future that is surely progressively unmanned? The lineal, if less romantic, descendants of the Few will be tech geeks, gamers, coders and those who provide a human interface with artificial intelligence. What are we doing to grow them, and will the Minister visit the #TechTrowbridge initiative that I started in Wiltshire’s county town, which was once a centre for Spitfire manufacture? He would be warmly welcomed on his way to his constituency.
The reason that a grisly artillery war has played out in Ukraine is because nobody has been able to command the airspace. Happily and to our surprise, Russia has been unable to suppress or destroy Ukraine’s air defences. In the future, unmanned combat aerial vehicles configured to shoot the archer, not the arrow, will do that. I would be very surprised if Lord Robertson were not casting a critical eye over the global combat air programme, and comparing and contrasting its cost and effectiveness with those of unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
I appreciate the deep cultural difficulty of envisaging an unmanned future battlespace. It is deeply unsettling for those of us steeped in the traditions of the armed forces, but while there will always be a need for sufficient booted and spurred combat troops ready to close with and kill the enemy and hold the ground—as the Member of Parliament for a garrison town, I am not for one moment suggesting a further reduction in headcount—this country will never again be able to expose itself to attritional warfare of the sort we are seeing being played out in Ukraine. Politically and societally, that would be impossible and unconscionable. That means integrated missile defence, SDEAD, drones, and command of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Once again at a dreadnought crossroads, Britain must configure the forces at its disposal for the long term in all domains and take a lead as what is still the principal military power in its Euro-Atlantic voisinage. Early pointers suggesting that this Government are taking the right fork in the road would include difficult and unpopular decisions such as standing firm on the deep space advanced radar capability envisaged for Cawdor barracks on the St David’s peninsula, which was bottled by previous Governments. As we chop to an unmanned future, those pointers would—for example, and very painfully—include consignment of the RAF Red Arrows aero-acrobatics team to the historic flight.
This Government have four years left to run—the time the directorate of aeronautical production had to fit out this country with what it needed to prevail. Recent events have revealed the fundamental truth that we are vulnerable now, as we were then, and the shifting geopolitical plates will likely make us more so. The public will never forgive an Administration of whatever colour who muddle through, leaving them open to the predations of Putin’s advancing missile programme.