(5 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIt is right that we examine the detail in this place, and the Secretary of State is doing a great job in answering the questions, but may I suggest to him that we, as a collective body, need a slightly more optimistic note? It is my firm belief that now we have got rid of the backstop, we will achieve a fair and good trade deal by December 2020. We should be focused on that, rather than on all the minor detail. It is a bright future, if we decide to take it today.
My hon. Friend is right to talk of the opportunity for trade deals that Brexit unlocks. We start from a position of great understanding of the respective economies—a big part of a trade deal is usually negotiating that understanding at the start—and we can seize the opportunities of those trade deals around the world. That is exactly why we need to move forward.
The problem with the hon. Gentleman’s argument is that it is at odds with the argument put forward by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who says that we need to pass this amendment to have more scrutiny and delay and to take much longer, yet the hon. Gentleman says that we need the amendment to be able to leave on —[Interruption.]
I will come to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I call Mr John Baron.
That is a matter of extraordinary interest in the House and possibly across the nation—I say that to the hon. Gentleman in the friendliest spirit—but it is not a matter for adjudication by the Chair. However, the hon. Gentleman has advertised his non-membership of the ERG, and I hope he feels better for it.
I have given way many, many times. I am going to make some progress, and then I will give way again.
Of the two possible outcomes, one is this deregulated free trade agreement which in the end, whatever people say, will drive us away from the European economic model towards a different economic model. We will look back on this as a turning point in our history of much greater significance than whether this deal technically gets over the line tonight. The other possible outcome, which has been put to me in interventions, is that there is no deal at the end of the transition period, and that has to be significantly addressed. I know that some colleagues are tempted to vote for the deal because they believe that it prevents or removes the possibility of crashing out on World Trade Organisation terms. It does not. Under the previous deal, if the future relationship was not ready by the end of the transition, the backstop kicked in, which prevented WTO terms. That has gone. This is a trapdoor to no deal.
Let me quote the words of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I hope that I do so accurately, but if I do not, he will correct me. What I understood him to say was this:
“The reason I am inclined to vote for this one”
—this deal—
“is very simple… if the trade talks are not successful…then we could leave on no-deal terms.”
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, because I said that I would.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right with the quote, but he has been very selective and taken it out of context, because I continued to make the point that it is a commercial reality that leaving no deal on the table in any negotiations makes a good and fair trade deal more likely. That is something I, and the vast majority of colleagues in this place, actually want. We want a free trade agreement agreed with the EU by December 2020, and my firm belief—I am not alone here—is that by scrapping the previous backstop, we stand more chance of achieving it.
I ask the hon. Gentleman to put his full quote in the Library for the delectation of colleagues.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberOf course, if I was not taking so many interventions, I would conclude my remarks with more alacrity. However, I accept the right hon. Lady’s request.
We were told last time that the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 had to be passed in a day in an unprecedented manner to stop no deal. Yet, Lord Pannick, when debating the measure, said that
“the restrictions on the Prime Minister’s powers...may cause a no-deal exit”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 8 April 2019; Vol. 797, c. 405.]
That was the premise of the amendments tabled by Lord Pannick and others. The ultimate irony is that, first, we had a situation whereby emergency legislation passed in haste had the opposite effect to what was intended, and secondly, we were told that, to stop something unconstitutional, we needed to embrace parliamentary procedure that the constitutional experts said was unconstitutional.
In support of my right hon. Friend’s case, may I return him to the question I posed to the shadow spokesman, to which we did not get an answer? Indeed, the only answer was that if the Government cannot control their business, they should step down. I ask one or two of our Conservative colleagues who are thinking of supporting the motion to reflect on that answer. I will try to get out of my right hon. Friend an answer that we could not get from the Opposition: if we go down this road, does not that set a dangerous precedent? The Government control the business of the House so that they can honour election manifesto promises. If we cannot do that, they turn to dust.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I pray in aid the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I always listen intently to him because he is a very experienced senior Member of the House. When the previous emergency legislation was passed, he said:
“We have been driven to this only in an extreme emergency”.—[Official Report, 27 March 2019; Vol. 657, c. 342.]
That related to timing. Yet is difficult to say that there is “an extreme emergency” if the next Prime Minister is the candidate that my right hon. Friend supports.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Lady is being very generous in giving way, and I appreciate the manner in which she has introduced the debate, but may I gently remind her that predictions about the consequences of voting to leave or no deal have proved very wrong in the past? We heard dire economic predictions in 2016—for instance, it was predicted that by Christmas that year 500,000 more people would be unemployed—but the economic reality has been very different. The predictions were wrong then, and I suggest to her that they are wrong now.
I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about the assessments of the impact on confidence that were made immediately after the referendum. Those were very different from the assessments of the impact of, for instance, World Trade Organisation tariffs, which are very practical, because it is clear what the impact will be on numbers, or on border capacity if customs checks are necessary. Those practical measures have not yet come into being, and I hope that they will not, because frictionless trade is important to our constituencies.
Needless to say, I strongly disagree with my hon. Friend. The people voted to leave the structure of the economic union, and they wanted to slam the door closed. They wanted a clean break. They were not thinking about our future relationship; they said, “We’ve had enough of the existing relationship.”
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I am sure he will agree that in addition to the emotion the people were proved right, because despite the predictions of doom and gloom in 2016, the economic reality since is that we have had a strong period of growth, and those investment decisions have been made in the full knowledge that we could be leaving with no deal on WTO terms.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend.
They made that decision to leave, and they expected us to leave—they certainly expected us to be leaving in a lot less than three years. It has been suggested that if we go back and rerun the referendum, people will change their mind because of the economic arguments and so on. The reality is very different. We should recognise, as I recall the Attorney General saying on one of his outings in the House on this issue, that this has now come down to a political decision, and the political decision should follow the result of the referendum. There would be an enormous backlash against not just the party in power but the political classes if we are not seen to walk through the door before us marked “exit.”
I urge the House to vote against Second Reading and to continue the battle. If we end up with no deal, so be it.
I find it very strange, this condescending view that, “People did not know what they were voting for first time around, so we are going to give them a second vote. If we don’t like that result, we will give them a third and a fourth.” It is complete nonsense.
No. Mr Speaker has told us to be brief, and I will be brief.
I ask the House to reflect for a moment and use moderation when it comes to this issue of so-called crashing out or falling off a cliff by leaving on no-deal WTO terms. I gently remind the House that in 2016 there were lots of dire predictions about what would happen if we voted to leave. We had predictions from the trade bodies, the business organisations and the Government—the Treasury Front Benchers. We had predictions of 500,000 extra unemployed by Christmas 2016, and the CBI came out with a figure of 950,000 extra unemployed within a couple of years. They all proved to be wrong, so much so that the Bank of England had to apologise.
What has happened since? We have had record low unemployment, record inward investment and record manufacturing output. I suggest to the House that the reason for that is that economic reality, trade and comparative advantage trump predictions. When we talk about comparative advantage, factors such as how low our corporation tax rates are compared with those in other countries, how much more flexible our labour markets are, our financial expertise, which is unrivalled—certainly within Europe—our research and development, and our top universities are more important, in aggregate, than WTO tariffs and leaving with no deal. The proof of the pudding is in the economic reality. We would all agree that a low unemployment rate is terribly important, as high unemployment is one of the social evils in our society, and our unemployment rate is nearly half that of the EU average. That is the issue in point. We trade with many countries outside the EU, very profitably, on WTO, no-deal terms, so I suggest to the House that if we want to respect the referendum result, the triggering of article 50 and our election manifestos, we should be leaving the EU on 12 April on no-deal, WTO terms if we cannot agree a deal before then.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe short answer to the right hon. Gentleman is that the House has agreed to the process that has unfolded, and therefore it is entirely procedurally proper for the judgment I have made to be made, and that is the judgment that I have made. The right hon. Gentleman will have noted the view expressed in the debates last week, and let me say in terms that are very clear—he may not approve of them, but they are clear—that the purpose of this discrete exercise, as I think is understood by colleagues across the House, is to try to identify whether there is potential consensus among Members for an approach to the departure from and the future relationship with the European Union. It is in that spirit and in the knowledge that it is wholly impossible, colleagues, to satisfy everybody, that I have sought conscientiously to discharge my obligations to the House by making a judicious selection. That is what I have done, that I readily defend to the House and that I will continue to proclaim to be the right and prudent course in circumstances that were not of my choosing, but with which, as Chair, I am confronted.
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. You know me not to be one to play games in this place. With respect, may I ask you to reconsider when it comes to motions (A) and (B)? The reason why I ask—we live in unusual times, so I do not apologise for making this request—is that motion (A) is new, in the sense that it reflects the withdrawal agreement as amended by the backstop. I suggest to you that it is the one vote we have had in this place, on the back of the Brady amendment, that actually achieved a majority. It is a new motion that has previously achieved a majority, and with respect—and I mean that—I think it worthy for consideration. May I also suggest, if only for future reference, that motion (B) is actually the legal default position from our triggering article 50? I do think it is incumbent on us to consider that in this particular debate, when we are trying to find some sort of consensus.
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point of order and for the very reasonable tones in which, as usual, he expresses it. He and I have known each other for a long time, and I have the highest regard for the integrity of the hon. Gentleman. I am happy, although not obliged, to provide an answer to each of his two points. I say I am not obliged not in my interests, but because the House has long understood and asserted the obligation of the Chair to make these judgments and expected that the Chair would not provide an explanation, but that the House—having vested in the Chair the responsibility—would accept the judgment. However, I am happy in this case to respond to his two points.
First, in relation to the hon. Gentleman’s motion appertaining to the backstop, he makes his own point in his own way. I have to make a judgment about what I think is reasonable going forward. In this debate, colleagues, we are not acting alone; we are acting in a negotiation with the European Union. The point that the hon. Gentleman feels strongly about is expressed in this motion for the first time, but it has been aired repeatedly—I do not say that critically, but as a matter of fact—since the publication in November of the withdrawal agreement. Repeated commitments have been made to seek a re-examination of that point by the Union, and it has become clear over a period of months that that re-examination is not offered by the Union. It may or may not feature in the future, but in terms of trying to broker progress now I did not think it would be the most sensible motion to choose at this time. I put it no more strongly than that.
Secondly, in relation to the so-called no-deal motion, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me—and, frankly, even if he will not—I am going to replay to him his own point in my support rather than his. Somewhat exasperated —well, quizzical—that I had not selected his motion, he said, “But Mr Speaker, leaving without a deal on 12 April is the legal default.” He is right: it is precisely because it is the default position in law that having it on the Order Paper is, in my view, a rhetorical assertion. It is a statement of fact, and it does not in my judgment require debate. The second point on that motion is that in looking at it—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster) can chunter from a sedentary position in evident disapproval of the thrust of the argument that I am developing if he so wishes, but it does not detract from the fact that I am making the point I am making. He does not like it: I do, and we will have to leave it there.
The simple fact of the matter is that that motion, voted on last week, as the beady eye of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) testifies he realises, was rejected by 400 votes to 160. A significant number of Members did not vote, but even if every Member who did not vote on that motion last week were to vote in favour of it this week, it still would not pass. I see my duty as being to try to advance matters. Whatever people think about this issue and whatever side of the argument they sit, they all think, “Can we not make some progress?” It is in pursuit of progress that I have made the disinterested—I use that old-fashioned but valid term—judgment that I have made to try to serve the House.
I totally understand that it will not please everyone, but it happens to be my view, it is an honest one, and it is my best judgment.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move motion (B),
That this House agrees that the UK shall leave the EU on 12 April 2019 without a deal.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following motions:
Motion (D)—Common market 2.0—
That this House—
(1) directs Her Majesty’s Government to— renegotiate the framework for the future relationship laid before the House on Monday 11 March 2019 with the title ‘Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom’ to provide that, on the conclusion of the Implementation Period and no later than 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom shall—
(a) accede to the European Free Trade Association (Efta) having negotiated a derogation from Article 56(3) of the Efta Agreement to allow UK participation in a comprehensive customs arrangement with the European Union,
(b) enter the Efta Pillar of the European Economic Area and thereby render operational the United Kingdom’s continuing status as a party to the European Economic Area Agreement and continuing participation in the Single Market,
(c) enter a comprehensive customs arrangement including a common external tariff at least until alternative arrangements that maintain frictionless trade with the European Union and no hard border on the island of Ireland have been agreed with the European Union,
(d) conclude an agreement with the European Union, which in accordance with Article 2 of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland of the Withdrawal Agreement supersedes the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in full;
(e) develop and bring to this House proposals for full and fair enforcement of the rule that EEA migrants must be “genuinely seeking work” and have “sufficient resources not to become a burden on the UK’s social assistance system”, in accordance with the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006;
(2) resolves to make support for the forthcoming European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill conditional upon the inclusion of provisions for a Political Declaration revised in accordance with the provisions of this motion to be the legally binding negotiating mandate for Her Majesty’s Government in the forthcoming negotiation of the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.
Motion (H)—EFTA and EEA—
That this House recognises the democratic duty of Parliament to respect the result of the 2016 referendum whilst securing an orderly departure from the EU that preserves the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; notes that the UK is a signatory to the treaty establishing the European Economic Area and has not given notice to leave the EEA as is required under Article 127 of that agreement; further notes that the UK was a founding member of the European Free Trade Association in 1960 and therefore call on the Government to (a) assert its existing rights as a signatory to the EEA, (b) take necessary steps to make our rights and obligations as an EEA member operable on an emergency basis through the domestic courts, (c) apply to re-join EFTA at the earliest opportunity to make the EEA agreement operable on a sustainable basis and (d) decline to enter a customs union with the EU but seek agreement on new protocols relating to the Northern Ireland border and agri-food trade.
Motion (J)—Customs union—
That this House instructs the Government to:
(1) ensure that any Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration negotiated with the EU must include, as a minimum, a commitment to negotiate a permanent and comprehensive UK-wide customs union with the EU;
(2) enshrine this objective in primary legislation.
Motion (K)—Labour’s alternative plan—
That this House requires Ministers to:
(a) negotiate changes to the draft Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration so as to secure:
(i) a permanent customs union with the EU;
(ii) close alignment with the single market underpinned by shared institutions and obligations;
(iii) dynamic alignment on rights and protections;
(iv) commitments on participation in EU agencies and funding programmes, including in areas such as the environment, education, and industrial regulation;
(v) agreement on the detail of future security arrangements, including access to the European Arrest Warrant and vital shared databases; and
(b) introduce primary legislation to give statutory status to the objectives set out in paragraph (a).
Motion (L)—Revocation to avoid no deal—
If, on the day before the end of the penultimate House of Commons sitting day before exit day, no Act of Parliament has been passed for the purposes of section 13(1)(d) of the Withdrawal Act, Her Majesty’s Government must immediately put a motion to the House asking it to approve ‘No Deal’ and, if the House does not give its approval, Her Majesty’s Government must ensure that the notice given to the European Council under Article 50, of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union, is revoked in accordance with United Kingdom and European Union law.
Motion (M)—Confirmatory public vote—
That this House will not allow in this Parliament the implementation and ratification of any withdrawal agreement and any framework for the future relationship unless and until they have been approved by the people of the United Kingdom in a confirmatory public vote.
Motion (O)—Contingent preferential arrangements—
That this House directs that in case the UK is unable to implement a Withdrawal Agreement with the EU, Her Majesty’s Government shall seek to agree immediately and preferentially with the EU:
(a) a trade agreement and/or joint notification of trade preference covering 100 per cent of goods traded between the UK and EU under which no tariffs or quantitative restrictions will be applied between the parties and full cumulation of rules of origin which shall apply for a period of up to two years after the UK leaves the EU notwithstanding that these arrangements may be superseded or extended by further mutual agreement;
(b) a standstill period of mutual recognition of standards and conformity assessment for up to two years in which the UK will ensure compliance in the UK with the EU legislative acquis as adopted in Retained EU law under the EU Withdrawal Act on the day the UK leaves the EU notwithstanding that these arrangements may be superseded or extended by further mutual agreement;
(c) a customs arrangement consisting of advanced trade facilitation measures that enables and makes full and widespread use of simplified and subsidised procedures to perform customs and regulatory declarations and associated control processes away from UK/EU borders; and
(d) make provision for the payment of sums to the European Union in amounts equivalent to the UK’s current net annual financial contribution to the EU for up to two years in respect of the above agreements and arrangements.
No, no—I have already called the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay and he has started to speak. In any case, I am on my feet, so the hon. Gentleman should not rise to his feet while I am on mine. Somebody as concerned with procedure as the hon. Gentleman might usefully become acquainted with that important procedural fact.
I was just going to appeal to colleagues—and I think the intervention has helped me to do so—to leave the Chamber quickly and quietly so that we can proceed with the debate and each contributor enjoys the respectful attention of the House which he or she deserves.
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
Just so that the House is absolutely clear, my motion (B) reads:
That this House agrees that the UK shall leave the EU on 12 April 2019 without a deal.
May I suggest to the House that, as we stand at this point in time, this is, in law, the default position of triggering article 50? We all knew, those of us who were here and voted for it in February 2017, what we were voting for: the motion simply said that we would leave the EU on 29 March with or without a deal, and we passed it by 384 votes.
I will in a second—I am going to make some progress first.
Although article 50 can be extended—I voted against that—we should still, as a House, reflect on that vote and recognise that, while most of us in this place want a good deal, many of us have taken the view that the deal on offer from the Prime Minister is not a good deal, and therefore the legal default position is that we leave on no deal/World Trade Organisation terms.
May I ask a clarifying question about the meaning of motion (B)? Does my hon. Friend mean to say that, even if a deal is agreed before 12 April, we should still seek to leave without a deal?
My hon. Friend is right to seek clarification. The answer is no—my preference, as I have stated, is that we leave with a deal, with the backstop duly amended, so that we could not as a country be caught in it indefinitely. That would be my preference, and then this motion would no longer apply. The date is set in the motion because, as he will know, that is the date given by the EU if there is no agreement.
I remind Members that, while most of us in this place prefer a good deal to no deal, no deal is still preferable to a bad deal. We are left in a position where it looks as though the Prime Minister’s deal, unless there is a major shift in this place, is not going to pass—I do not think it will come back, but even if it does, I do not think it will pass. The default position is that we are leaving on WTO terms and I remind the House that, despite all the predictions of doom and gloom, we trade profitably on WTO terms, with the majority of the world’s GDP outside the EU. We have been assured on several occasions by Ministers and, indeed, by the Prime Minister that we are prepared for a no-deal exit.
I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to intervene. Let me take a moment to remind the House and in particular the hon. Gentleman that Northern Ireland has not had a Government since January 2017. We have no Ministers in Northern Ireland. The head of the Northern Ireland civil service has warned as recently as the beginning of this month of the “grave” consequences for Northern Ireland if we were to leave without a deal. Does the hon. Gentleman have any respect at all for the head of the civil service in Northern Ireland or indeed for the people of Northern Ireland?
I will respond to the intervention by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), if I may, and then move on. I have great respect for the people of Northern Ireland. Having served there in the 1980s and got the medals to prove it, I take into account what the people of Northern Ireland, as part of our Union, have to say. At the same time, we are part of a United Kingdom, and there are predictions on both sides of this discussion as to possible outcomes. The Taoiseach has just suggested that we do not need a hard border to solve what has become known as the Northern Ireland backstop problem. There are differences of opinion and we need to recognise that in this debate. I will take note of your stricture, Mr Speaker, and make haste in my remaining comments.
We have been assured by Ministers time and again, in Committees and on the Floor of the House, that we are prepared for no deal. We have spent billions on no deal; £4.2 billion seems to be the current figure. When I posed the Prime Minister a very simple question in the Chamber on 12 February—“Are we going to be prepared?”—she answered in three words: “We are indeed.”
I will not.
I have to take at face value those reassurances by Ministers that we are indeed prepared for no deal. There is a prevalent argument that no deal would lead to disaster not only in this place but outside it. I respectfully point out that the people making that argument are often the very same ones who predicted doom and gloom in 2016; they said that would be the result if we voted to leave. Some of the predictions were so dire that they were beyond credibility. We had predictions that 500,000 extra people would be unemployed by December 2016 if we voted to leave; some estimates put it up to 700,000. We had predictions of self-made recessions. We even had predictions of conflict on the continent of Europe. They were all proved wrong. The Bank of England—for the first time in its history, to my knowledge—had to publicly apologise for getting it so badly wrong.
What has happened since then? We have had record low unemployment, record high manufacturing output and record investment, and those decisions in the last two or three years have been made in the full knowledge that we could be leaving the EU with no deal and on WTO terms. I gently remind Members that investment is about comparative advantage. It is about such factors as, what is our corporation tax rate compared with other countries? How flexible is our labour market? What about our top universities? What about our financial expertise? In total, those are of greater influence when it comes to investment than 3% to 7% WTO tariffs. I ask the House to reflect on that, because there are too many wild predictions flying around this place, when the discussion should be based on economic reality.
I would go one stage further. If we introduce a fair and controlled immigration policy, wages will rise faster in this country than if that immigration policy were not in place. That is what Lord Rose, who was leader of the remain campaign leading up to the referendum, said in front of the Treasury Committee. Scare stories that we are all heading for doom and gloom and that goods will no longer traverse customs unions and trading blocs around the world, which they already do, are very wide of the mark. Let us base this discussion and the votes tonight on economic reality. Much as a few Opposition Members—particularly the SNP—do not like to admit it, we are doing rather well economically, and as I said, those decisions have been based on the possibility of us leaving on no-deal terms.
Given your guidance on timings, Mr Speaker, I will bring my comments to a close. I appeal to the House for rational consideration with regard to no deal. There are a lot of scare stories out there, but this is a repeat of 2016. Those scare stories were wrong then and they are wrong now. Let us have a note of optimism about the future of this country and the capability of this country, and let us back this country. If we cannot get a good deal, let us get back to economic reality and realise that we already trade profitably with the majority of the world’s GDP outside the EU on WTO terms, and there is no reason why we cannot trade with the EU on such terms. I recommend that the House support motion (B).
As the hon. Gentleman has completed his oration in a timely way, we now proceed to the next contributor to the debate, and I am proposing what might be called an indicative time limit of five minutes.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(Urgent Question): To ask the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on no-deal Brexit preparations.
I thank my hon. Friend for his urgent question and congratulate him on securing your approval for it, Mr Speaker.
The Government have always been clear that leaving the European Union without a deal is not an outcome that we want. Last week, Parliament voted against leaving with no deal, signalling a clear majority against such an outcome. However, the legal default is that the UK will leave the EU without a deal unless an alternative is agreed; any agreed extension would not change that. A longer extension would also entail holding European Parliament elections in the UK. As the Prime Minister stated in her letter to Donald Tusk, we
“do not believe that it would be in either of our interests”—
the UK’s or the EU’s—
“for the UK to hold European Parliament elections.”
Thank you, Mr Speaker; I apologise to my hon. Friend.
The Government have undertaken significant action to prepare for a potential no-deal scenario. We have published 450 pieces of no-deal communications since October 2018, including information on reciprocal healthcare arrangements with the EU, on driving in the EU after exit, and even on how to take a pet abroad. We have contacted 150,000 businesses that trade with the EU to help them to get ready for no-deal customs procedures. We have held meetings, briefings and events with stakeholders across the economy, including around 300 engagements in the past month alone. We have responded to stakeholder feedback to make sure that communications are clear by updating approximately 1,300 pieces of gov.uk content based on their input.
More than 11,000 people are working on EU exit policy and programmes across the Government. We have launched a public information campaign, which includes information on gov.uk, to help citizens and businesses to prepare for leaving the European Union. TV adverts started today and radio, press and outdoor poster advertising are ongoing. Furthermore, the Treasury has provided £4.2 billion for EU exit preparations, including preparations for a no-deal scenario, and £480 million has been allocated to the Home Office to ensure that it is fully prepared.
Getting ready for this scenario depends on action not only from the Government, but from a range of third parties, including businesses, individual citizens and the European Union itself. Despite Government mitigation, the impact of a no-deal scenario is expected to be significant in a number of areas. Leaving the European Union with no deal is the legal default until Parliament passes a deal or agrees on an alternative. We are focused on achieving that, but until it has been achieved, we will continue to prepare for no deal and we advise businesses to do the same.
I thank the Minister for that response. It is important that the Government recognise the current position. Whatever the possibilities for how Members may vote in this place or how the EU may respond to requests for extensions, he is absolutely right to suggest that the current legal default position is that the United Kingdom will be leaving the European Union on 29 March, with or without a deal. It is important in more than one sense that those on the Front Bench recognise that. The narrative that seems to be emerging from No. 10 is that Parliament has not expressed its view as to what should happen. I would suggest to the Minister that it has. In February 2017, by a majority of 384, the House clearly said that with or without a deal we would leave on 29 March 2019. There was no equivocation about; it was black and white.
The Government have said they are making adequate preparations. Many of us on the Government Benches—and, indeed, on the Opposition Benches—have questioned the Government about those preparations. We know that billions of pounds have been spent, and we have had assurances from the Government, including from the Dispatch Box and in Committee. On 12 February, I asked the Prime Minister if she could
“reassure the House that should we leave on 29 March on no-deal WTO terms, we are sufficiently prepared”.
She answered very directly:
“We are indeed. We have ramped up our preparations. We are continuing our preparations for no deal.”—[Official Report, 12 February 2019; Vol. 654, c. 752.]
I applied for this urgent question because media reports, including some emanating from this place, suggesting that a no-deal Brexit would prove a profound economic shock mirror the incorrect warnings before the 2016 referendum and are causing—[Interruption.] This is an important point for Members to appreciate, as we sit in this Westminster bubble. These pronouncements are causing concern across the country. It is easy for Opposition Members to say, “Oh, don’t worry about it”, but for a lot of people sitting in their homes, these dire predictions of economic gloom, which are unfounded, are causing concern.
I remind the Minister that prior to the 2016 EU referendum there were dire predictions of 500,000 extra unemployed people that proved unfounded—so much so that the Bank of England, among others, had to apologise. We have had record low unemployment, record manufacturing output and record inward investment. I suggest that economic reality trumps predictions any time. In order to reassure and better inform the public, will the Minister detail to Parliament the extensive preparations the Government have made for a no-deal exit? Especially given the proximity to 29 March—just a week away—the Government need to reassure people that they are prepared, having spent two years and billions of pounds on no-deal preparation. I look forward to hearing what he has to say.
I found it interesting that my hon. Friend was barracked by Opposition Members for pointing out how strong our country’s economy was. I would have thought they would be proud of that.
I hope that in my opening answer I gave the House a sense of how much preparation the Government have done since August 2016, although preparations have of course been ramped up in the last few months. I will list a handful of points: more than 550 no-deal communications have been sent out since August 2018; we have had 300 stake- holder engagements since February; we have been signing international agreements with our trading partners and rolling over others; 11,000 people are working on EU exit policy and programmes across Government; a number of IT programmes are ready to go should we need to activate them; and we have published the HMRC partnership pack containing more than 100 pages of guidance for businesses on process and procedures at the border in a no-deal scenario. The Government have been preparing assiduously and quietly behind the scenes for no deal, but we want to get a deal over the line; that is the most important thing for us.
Order. I think that the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman) is concerned, but the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) is back in the Chamber. I do not think that I need to dwell on the matter. Suffice it to say that there can, in extremis, be a reason why someone has—very, very, very briefly—to leave the Chamber. When the call of nature sounds, that person cannot pretend to be deaf. I do not say that in a pejorative spirit; I simply mean that one cannot pretend not to be aware of the immediate requirement.
I was trying to signal as much in a somewhat more tactful and seemly manner, but the hon. Gentleman has now blurted out the truth, and the nation is aware of what was his requirement. As he has now returned to the Chamber, he can beetle back to his seat and listen to the remainder of the exchanges.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe short answer is that the House has said two different things. It passed by a big majority legislation on article 50, which many Members on both sides of the House voted for. It passed by a large margin legislation to say we are leaving the EU on 29 March, and put that date on the face of the withdrawal Bill. The House also voted by a large margin to give the people the decision through the referendum. Frankly, the legislation takes precedence over the motion to which the right hon. Gentleman refers. In essence, this issue was raised earlier in a point of order. I appreciate that he is making this point as an intervention, but it is the same point.
I encourage the Government to keep their nerve during these negotiations. I accept that the vast majority in this place would favour a good deal over no deal, but will the Government confirm for absolute clarity that if we are not able to secure a good deal—probably courtesy of intransigence by the EU—we will not only leave on 29 March, but will leave on no-deal/World Trade Organisation terms?
My hon. Friend, as a former member of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, knows all about holding his nerve. He is correct that Parliament needs to hold its nerve. We need to send a clear signal to those in the European Union with whom we are discussing these issues, who share our desire to have a deal and to deliver on our shared values, and who respect the fact that we are trading partners, and wish to get on with the future economic partnership and work together.
I think we all agree about the importance of keeping our nerve, and keeping no deal on the table actually makes a good deal more likely, but will the Secretary of State answer my specific question and confirm that if we do not achieve a good deal on 29 March, we will not just leave the EU, but will leave on no-deal terms?
For the avoidance of doubt, I am happy to confirm that, because that is what the legislation says. The only way to avoid no deal—as the Prime Minister has repeatedly said, and as is backed up in legislation—is either to secure a deal on the terms that the Prime Minister has set out, with the mandate that the House gave her in response to the earlier motion, or to revoke article 50. The court case says that the only alternative would be to revoke, and revoking would be unconditional and unequivocal.
I rise to support amendment (a) in my name and that of the Leader of the Opposition. The Secretary of State ended by saying that we have to “hold our nerve”, but he was all over the place this afternoon on all the important issues.
It is obvious—obvious—what the Prime Minister is up to. She is pretending to make progress while running down the clock: a non-update every other week to buy another two weeks of process, and inching ever closer to the 29 March deadline in 43 days’ time. We should not be fooled. Let us look at the history of recent months and set it against the exchanges today. The Prime Minister pulled the meaningful vote on 10 December, promising to seek further reassurances on the backstop. She feared a significant defeat, and it was obvious that the backstop was the problem way back then, as it had been through the autumn. That was 66 days ago, and there were then 109 days until 29 March.
I will in a minute.
And the Prime Minister returned with nothing—warm words in the margins of the EU summit in December, and a letter, coupled with a statement about Northern Ireland, that simply repeated already existing commitments. That is what she came back with. The meaningful vote was then put on 15 January, and it was lost heavily. That evening, the Prime Minister stood at the Dispatch Box and promised to explore ideas with the European Union, following cross-party talks on how to proceed. That was 30 days ago, and there were then 75 days until 29 March.
I have sympathy with the point that we will need an extension to article 50 sooner or later, whether a deal goes through or not, and that the question is what is the right binding mechanism for doing that. We will support measures proposed by others on that issue in due course, and I will return to that point.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is being generous with his time. In contrast to what he just claimed, the Secretary of State’s point was admirably clear. A good deal is preferable to no deal, but if there is no deal we will leave the EU on 29 March on those terms. Labour Members have an unfortunate habit of taking everything that the EU says as gospel, which is clearly not the case, and they ignore the fact that the EU could write the textbook on 11th-hour deals. Have some optimism in the ability to achieve a deal.
As for the Prime Minister taking us out of the EU on 29 March this year without a deal—we’ll see about that. I do not think that the majority in this House will countenance that; I think the majority in this House will do everything they can to prevent it. Having worked with the Prime Minister when she was Home Secretary and I was Director of Public Prosecutions, I know that she has a deep sense of duty. Deep down, I do not think that this Prime Minister will take us out of the EU without a deal on 29 March, and that is the basis on which we should be having this discussion.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI wish the Secretary of State a productive summer—it could be a very interesting one. The EU has a poor track record when it comes to trade deals generally, which is why we trade with the majority of the rest of the world on World Trade Organisation terms. What assurances can he give us that, in the run-up to the publication of the White Paper, we will be meaningfully preparing to leave on no trade terms and that the White Paper’s proposals will have the dexterity to ensure that the preparation is in place in time?
My hon. Friend is right to raise that aspect of the arrangements. We are working closely with all the other arms of Whitehall, including the Department for International Trade, and we are ensuring that we have the right flexibility. The advantage of the implementation period in the White Paper is that it is finite, so that those who want to see an end to the eternal haggling with the EU and want some clarity about the end-state relationship will have that provided. During the implementation period, we will be free to negotiate and to conclude free trade deals with other countries beyond the continent.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI want to address my remarks to the two core tenets of the EU: the customs union and the single market. I think there is a danger in this place, and perhaps in certain sections of the community outside, of taking the view that people did not know what they voted for when they voted to leave. Not only is that incorrect, but it can come across as very patronising and condescending.
I think we know what people voted for. The twin tenets of the EU are the single market and the customs union. If that point needs to be reinforced, we have only to look at the two manifestos of the two main political parties at the last general election. They confirmed that we would be leaving the customs union and the single market, and 80% of the electorate voted knowing that to be the case. I take exception to the view that somehow the British electorate did not know what they were voting for. It is particularly important to say that, because I believe that if this Parliament does not accept the will of the British people, we risk pushing the mainstream to the edges of the political spectrum. That would not be a healthy development for democracy in this country.
Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the information that the Government sent out before the referendum was that even in the event of a leave vote, their intention was to remain in the single market? Is it not also the case that the Government won a majority on a manifesto that said they would stay in the single market, and then lost that majority on a manifesto that said they would leave it?
I think it is quite straightforward. We had a referendum on the question of whether people wanted to stay or leave. The decision was to leave, and the political parties woke up to that fact and put that decision at the heart of their manifestos, on which we then went to the country. I remind the House that it is there in black and white in both manifestos: we will leave the customs union, and we will leave the single market. My concern about the Chequers agreement is that having gone to the country on that basis, there seems to be a bit of a fudge that needs explaining by the Government.
Let us take the common rulebook and the customs union. It is no accident that the EU has had a problem negotiating free trade deals with countries outside the EU. It does not have a free trade deal with the US, with Australia or with New Zealand. It struggles on emerging markets—big economies like Brazil, India and China. The reason for that, in large part, is that it has protectionist non-tariff barriers that a lot of countries cannot abide. If we incorporate those protectionist non-tariff barriers into our own regulations, that will make our task of negotiating trade deals that much more difficult. It will therefore take away from us one of the key upsides of Brexit, which is to negotiate our own trade deals.
We all have our own views of President Trump, but one thing that he was very direct about, stating the blindingly obvious, was that if one incorporates protectionist non-tariff barriers as part of one’s own regulations, it will—surprise, surprise—be more difficult to negotiate trade deals. That is why there is concern among Conservative Members about the common rulebook. If we incorporate those rules, it makes trade deals more difficult.
Is that not exactly what President Trump is currently doing—building trade barriers, because he is putting up tariffs?
There are pluses and minuses with President Trump, perhaps, but I think he is trying to be a very good friend of the UK. Unlike President Obama, who said that the UK would be at the back of the queue, it is quite clear that President Trump does want to do some form of trade deal with the UK. He is stating the obvious when he says that incorporating protectionist non-tariff barriers is going to make trade deals much more difficult.
Let me move on to freedom of movement. The SNP spokesman said that racism is on the rise in this country. There is a sort of implication that if somebody voted to leave, they were somehow anti-immigration. That is completely wrong. Under the current immigration policy, because we are members of the EU we discriminate against people wishing to come to this country from outside the EU. We cannot say no to immigrants from Europe or from the EU, but we have to say no to immigrants coming in from outside the EU. That, in any language, is discriminatory. One of the main benefits of Brexit will be that we will be able to forge an immigration policy that will be not only controlled but fair—it will not discriminate on the basis of nationality as the current policy does.
On the second big idea, we are being told that with a mobility framework, freedom of movement will end. However, I worry slightly that it is not being clearly explained how a mobility framework will be any different from freedom of movement. That needs fleshing out by the Government. If I know anything about my constituents and constituents across the country who voted for Brexit, we want a controlled but fair immigration system, and the Government need to better explain how the mobility framework is going to deliver that. Without that explanation, I think they are going to struggle in selling this package to the country, because we no longer want an immigration system that discriminates against the rest of the world.
I want to make a final point about leaving on WTO terms. There has been a little bit of nonsense spoken about this issue. There have been too many lawyers in this debate and not enough businesspeople. Whoever has been exposed to business will know that one can have frictionless supply chains crossing customs arrangements. It happens right across the globe, particularly in the far east.
No, I have taken one intervention from the hon. Lady and I am not going to take another. I have taken my two.
There are these arrangements right across the globe, and they are not a hindrance to trade. We trade profitably with many countries outside the EU on such terms, and that trade is prospering. Those countries are often faster growing than the EU.
The idea that we must protect the supply chains and that leaving on WTO terms would disrupt them is utter nonsense. Look around the world and at the far east in particular, where a number of complex supply chains cross customs arrangements without any friction. A particular example of that is Japan, which has outsourced much of its manufacturing capability to countries such as China because of the strength of its yen. The bottom line is that that has made for good trade and actually it has helped to lower costs.
If we ignore the wishes of the British electorate as expressed at the referendum, I really do worry that we will push the mainstream in this country towards the extremes of the political spectrum, because people will have lost faith in this place to deliver what they clearly believe they voted for, which is to leave the EU, and that meant leaving the customs union and the single market. Anything less than that will be seen as a betrayal by the British electorate.
I welcome the Secretary of State to his new role—we wish him the best of British. He will know that my views and his diverge as much as is possible on this subject. Although I could point out that my views are closer to those of his constituents than his are, perhaps he can point out that his views are slightly closer to those of my constituents than mine are—such is the way things are working on Brexit.
I am confused by the contribution of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). There are clearly constituencies where every single person who spoke to him was raising the single market and customs union in the run-up to the EU referendum, whereas in my constituency every single person talking to me was speaking about immigration. I cannot recall someone saying during the referendum campaign, “I want to be out of the single market and customs union.” May I point out that if the European Union does not currently have a trade deal with India, that is because of our then Home Secretary—now our Prime Minister—rejecting the trade deal because it would have required issuing visas to Indians? He needs to look more carefully at some of the reasons why such things have not happened.
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the number of migrants to the UK went up in 2017 compared with 2016 because there was growth in non-EU migration, which is something he omitted to point out in his comments.
I agree that there is clearly a difference between the treatment of EU citizens and migrants from outside the European Union, but the number of non-EU migrants has gone up, which has more than compensated for the numbers of EU citizens coming to the United Kingdom. I assume he welcomes that.
I see the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) is back in his place. The Conservative party was a pragmatic party, but I am afraid to say it is clearly no longer such. It is now very much a party driven by ideology. I suspect that is why he is as uncomfortable with it as he is.
After the last couple of days, today’s debate has something of the feel of the morning after the night before. Indeed, it has been a sobering debate, reflecting the depth of the crisis that we are in. Two years on from the referendum, the Government are still unable to speak on behalf of the British people. The most important negotiations the country has faced since the second world war are being led by the most dysfunctional Government in living memory.
It does not have to be like this. The Prime Minister was right at Mansion House to say we had to face up to hard facts, but that meant facing down those in her party who put their ideological hostility to the EU before the interests of the country. If she had faced up to the facts two years ago—if she had said then that the country had voted to leave the EU but by a painfully close margin, and that it was a decision to depart but not to destroy our economy, and if she had said that we would leave the EU but remain in a customs union and close to the single market and the members of the agencies and partnerships we had built together—she could have secured a clear majority in this House and built a consensus in the country, which had been so bitterly divided by the referendum.
But she did not. Instead, she handed a veto to the European Research Group—the people who have sought to undermine not just herself at every step but every one of her predecessors. They are, as John Major commented recently, even more hard-line than those he faced. They are less than 10% of this House but are calling the shots. The tail is wagging the dog. They are demanding the red lines that have held us back—no single market, no customs union, no European Court of Justice, no agencies. To be fair to the Prime Minister, she put that proposition to the British people in last June’s general election. She sought a mandate for an extreme Brexit, but she did not get it. She went into that election with a majority and came out without one.
I remind the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who sought to misquote our manifesto, as others have done, that at that election we said:
“We will scrap the Conservatives’ Brexit White Paper”—
as we would this one—
“and replace it with fresh negotiating priorities that have a strong emphasis on retaining the benefits of the Single Market and the Customs Union – which are essential for maintaining industries, jobs and businesses”.
I will not, because I have answered the hon. Gentleman’s points and we cannot get into a detailed exchange.
The result of the Prime Minister’s approach has been paralysis, not simply on Brexit but on the other crises facing our country. The Government have neither the authority to deal with Brexit nor the ability to tackle the issues that led to it. There has been a dawning realisation from the Prime Minister that those early red lines were a mistake, but each time she tries to step over them, she has been hauled back by the extremists within her party.
At Chequers, it did seem that the Prime Minister was beginning to face up to the hard facts—to break free from the icy grip of the European Research Group. Not far enough, not soon enough, but tentative steps towards reality, towards a customs settlement and a regulatory alignment demanded by business—a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Richard Burden)—and also necessary to resolve the issue of the Northern Ireland border.
Of course, the former Brexit Secretary was right when he endorsed Donald Trump's view that the plan would “kill” the prospect of a US-UK deal; and of course, it was just a starting point, not the end point of negotiations. It would inevitably involve further movement by the Government. Knowing that, the ERG tore it to shreds, and Monday night’s debacle was the last nail in the coffin. Rather than defeat the amendments—as they could have, overwhelmingly—the Government rolled over and accepted wrecking amendments that left their White Paper dead in the water. The Minister shakes his head, but if there was any doubt about its death, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) laid it to rest today in what was, frankly, a chilling contribution.
While the Prime Minister turns on those in her own party who would welcome the Chequers plan, threatening them, she embraces those who would destroy her, and she continues to bring them into the Government. Having resigned, the hon. Member for Wycombe was succeeded as a Brexit Minister by his predecessor as chair of the ERG, the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) —who, of course, joins another former chair, the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman). It is beginning to look as if there is a secondment scheme going on between the ERG and the Brexit ministerial team.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe entire approach of the White Paper is to ensure frictionless trade between the UK and the EU, and to minimise the risks that the right hon. Gentleman is concerned about. On referendums and second referendums, if the right hon. Gentleman had read the whole article, rather than a selective snippet, my point was that under the European Union Act 2011, which was passed by this House, there would always be ongoing and further opportunities for a referendum. What I did not do, which the right hon. Gentleman did, is stand up during debates on the European Union Referendum Act 2015, and say that we would all respect the outcome of a referendum, and then renege on that. That shows bad faith to the electorate.
I welcome my right hon. Friend to his post. I know he will be well aware of the deep concern on both sides of the House about the extent to which the UK will become a rule taker under the so-called common rulebook. Has he had time to make an early assessment about the percentage of our goods that will be subject to that common rulebook? By way of illustration, can he answer a question that I have been asking but for which I have so far received no answer: under this common rulebook, will we be able to ban the export of live animals to the EU? That is something that we as a country wish to do, but we are unable to do that if we remain members of the EU.
I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and in my earlier remarks I addressed points about how in practice this House will retain scrutiny. Under the facilitated customs arrangement, up to 96% of UK goods trade is likely to pay the correct or no tariff at the border. I hope that that gives him a sense of the minimisation of disruption that we will achieve.