John Baron
Main Page: John Baron (Conservative - Basildon and Billericay)Department Debates - View all John Baron's debates with the Cabinet Office
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberAs my right hon. Friend knows, we have supported the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army with advice, training, mentoring and non-lethal equipment, and I am not proposing a change to that today.
Let me address directly the issue of ISIL in Syria. I am very clear that ISIL needs to be destroyed in Syria as well as in Iraq. We support the action that the United States and five Arab states have taken in Syria, and I believe that there is a strong case for us to do more in Syria, but I did not want to bring a motion to the House today on which there was not consensus. I think it is better if our country can proceed on the basis of consensus. In this House, as I am sure we will hear in the debate today, there are many concerns about doing more in Syria, and I understand that. I do not believe that there is a legal barrier, because I think that the legal advice is clear that were we or others to act, there is a legal basis, but it is true to say that the Syrian situation is more complicated than the Iraqi situation. It is more complicated because of the presence of the brutal dictator Assad. It is more complicated because of the state of the civil war. We should be clear that we have a clear strategy for dealing with Syria, backing the official opposition, building it up as a counterpoint to Assad and working for a transition. As I have said, in the end, what Syria needs is what Iraq needs: a Government who can represent all of their people.
Does the Prime Minister accept that without the Iraqi army being able to take and hold ground, there is a real risk that air strikes alone will not only prove ineffective but could become counter-productive, especially if civilian casualties mount and ISIL spins the story that it has withstood the might of the west and held its ground, which it has so far managed to do?
I would disagree with my hon. Friend on the basis that the air action that has already been taken by the Americans and, to a degree, by the French has already made a difference. Lives have been saved. Christians, Yazidis and other minorities, who otherwise would be butchered, have been saved by that action. If my hon. Friend is asking me, “Do we need a better Iraqi army that is more capable on the ground?” Yes, of course we do, but the truth is that, because we, rightly, are not prepared to put our own combat troops on the ground, we should be working with the Iraqis and the Kurds so that they become more effective. However, we cannot wait for that and allow minorities and others to be butchered and the risk to our own country to increase, without taking action.
I rise to support the Government motion concerning military action against ISIL in Iraq. It is right that the Prime Minister has brought this issue to the House and committed to bringing future decisions to the House too. Let me start by saying that all of us, whatever side of the debate we are on, will be conducting it with huge admiration for the bravery, spirit and duty displayed by our armed forces, who act on the decisions that this House makes.
Let us be clear at the outset what the proposition is today. It is about air strikes against ISIL in Iraq. It is not about ground troops from the United Kingdom, or about UK military action elsewhere. It is a mission specifically aimed at ISIL. As we debate this issue today, I understand the qualms and, for some, deep unease that there will be about that undertaking, both in the House and in the country. Those who advocate military action today have to persuade Members of the House not just that ISIL is an evil organisation but that it is we, Britain, who should take military action in Iraq. I want to do so by first setting out the particular nature of the ISIL threat, by secondly talking about the criteria that we should apply to judging the case for military action, and by thirdly saying something about the role of our country in the world, which for me is directly relevant to this decision.
Will the right hon. Gentleman also clarify Labour’s position with regard to the politics? Many of us are concerned that there is no clear exit strategy militarily, but what about the politics? There is no point in military intervention if the politics are not right—and they are not. Many of those who served under al-Maliki are still in place, and many Sunnis still feel alienated. Without the hearts and minds policy being right, military intervention will not be enduring.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s long-held caution on these issues, but the point I will make is that there needs to be a comprehensive strategy. We are not talking about a military-only solution. It is about political action, humanitarian action and wider strategic action, and I will come to that later in my remarks.
First I want to say something about the nature of ISIL. As the Prime Minister said, ISIL is not simply another terrorist organisation. We have seen, of course, its hostage-taking of innocent British citizens, and it is not just British citizens whom ISIL is threatening but Christians, Yazidis and fellow Muslims, Sunni and Shi’a, from many different countries and backgrounds—anyone who does not subscribe to its deeply perverted ideology.
If the House will allow me, I want to give one hideous example recently gathered by Amnesty International, because it is directly relevant to the decisions that we make today. On the morning of Friday 15 August, ISIL fighters assembled the residents of Kocho village in northern Iraq at the secondary school, where they separated men and boys from women and younger children. The men were then driven away to different nearby locations, where they were shot and killed. The women and children of the village were abducted and continue to be held by ISIL.
Let us be clear about what this is: ISIL is murdering Muslims. So to those who say that military action against ISIL is somehow an attack on Islam, let me just say this: I understand the anxiety, including in communities in Britain, but the truth is entirely different. It is Muslims themselves who are saying it—leading British Muslim scholars and imams recently wrote of ISIL:
“They are perpetrating the worst crimes against humanity…it is a war against all humanity.”
ISIL’s ideology has nothing to do with the peaceful religion practised by billions of people across the world and by millions of our fellow citizens, who are appalled by their actions.
There can be and is no greater responsibility for Parliament than when committing combat troops—armed forces—to battle. As such, we are absolutely right to scrutinise and examine the evidence and to ask the questions. I am afraid that there are certain questions that remain unanswered, and I hope that the Deputy Prime Minister will address them when he winds up the debate.
A key concern is that there seems to be a lack of a co-ordinated plan, particularly when it comes to the military and political aspects. As a soldier, clarity of mission and a clear exit strategy are absolutely essential, and yet that is not what we seem to have here. We all accept that military intervention—air strikes—alone will not defeat IS, but what is not clear is what plan B is if there are no ground forces to follow through and take and hold ground. I am talking about local and regional ground forces. Because there is a real danger that if the Iraqi army is not fit for purpose and cannot take and hold ground, the air strikes themselves become not only ineffective but actually counter-productive, especially if civilian casualties mount, and especially if IS will be able to spin that they have withstood the might of the west and held ground. There is a real danger, without a co-ordinated military plan, that we will go up a cul-de-sac with no successful exit strategy.
I also suggest that the politics is not right. It is very clear that one of the major reasons for IS’s success in the north of the country is that the Sunni minorities feel alienated. We have had a change in leadership—the sectarian al-Maliki has gone—but the next tier of politicians, who were responsible for implementing that sectarian politics, have largely remained in place. There has been no clear-out, and without a political solution, without the hearts and minds accompanying a military campaign, any military successes on the ground could be very short-lived.
We must learn from the errors in the past with regard to just knocking the door down and in effect walking away, because if we do not, we shall yet again make fundamental errors.