Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Joe Robertson and Rebecca Paul

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.

On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

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[Joe Robertson]

Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?

Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

[Rebecca Paul]

As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.

“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.

Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

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[Joe Robertson]

That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost.

The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [Laughter.] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members.

To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences.

The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it.

The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was

“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.”

He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent.

Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?”

Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further.

If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned.

The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says:

“Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal”

amounts to a

“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”

That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with.

Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs

“in proceedings that are intended to be quicker”

and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that

“people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.”

I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of life­changing penalty.

There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases.

JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope.

If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.

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[Joe Robertson]

The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?

[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.

[Joe Robertson]

I am not shocked by anything a Labour Government do.

[Rebecca Paul]

Perhaps I am more optimistic about these things.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Joe Robertson and Rebecca Paul

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I am pleased to speak in support of amendments 25 and 12, and particularly in support of amendment 43, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle.

The amendments all engage with a simple point of fairness. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s wider proposals, it cannot be right to change the rules after a defendant has already elected for a Crown court trial. Such defendants made their choice under the current rules. They did not opt for Crown court for any reason other than the fact they would get a jury trial, so for the court to remove that choice from them without any hearing would frankly be shocking.

Let us keep in mind that some of these people will be innocent, and remember that some may have chosen the magistrates route if they had known that going to the Crown court would not give them the jury trial they seek. The retrospective application of new rules is deeply unfair. Whatever side of the jury trial argument we are on, surely we can all agree that those who have already opted for jury trial should have that decision respected.

The amendments differ slightly in drafting but all try to achieve the same thing: to ensure that where somebody has already elected for jury trial, that choice is respected and the new regime does not operate retrospectively. Amendment 25 would disapply the new allocation rules where a defendant has already elected Crown court trial before commencement. Amendment 12 would strip out the retrospective commencement provisions. Amendment 43 would instead tie the new regime to cases in which the first hearing in the magistrates court takes place after the change in the law. Those are different routes with the same fair and sensible objective.

This should not be controversial. If the state tells a defendant that they have a right to elect for a jury trial and they exercise that right, it is manifestly unfair to turn around later and say that the right has vanished and that their case will now be dealt with under a wholly different system. In fact, to call it unfair fails to make the point seriously enough. It would amount to a violation of one of the most foundational principles of our legal system: that retrospective legislation of this kind runs contrary to basic rule-of-law principles and requires the strongest possible justification.

As JUSTICE, the cross-party law reform and human rights organisation put it in written evidence:

“The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.”

It went on to state:

“It is deeply unfair for defendants who elected Crown Court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not…exist when they made that choice.”

I always endeavour to see all sides of a given issue, but in this case I honestly struggle to see any argument against those statements. I hope the Minister will agree that retrospective application is fundamentally unfair.

If the Government are not moved by appeals to basic fairness, they should at least be moved by their own stated objective of reducing delay. The Bar Council is unmistakeable in warning us:

“The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.”

That is exactly the opposite of what Ministers say they are trying to achieve. If the Government push ahead with retrospective application, they risk drawn-out legal challenge, more hearings and more uncertainty in cases that are already in the system. Measures explicitly brought in to help to reduce the court backlog will, perversely, multiply it. This is exactly the sort of illogical thinking that Committee stage is intended to weed out. I very much hope that the Minister will engage on this point.

Our concern is echoed elsewhere in the written evidence we received. Dr Samantha Fairclough’s detailed submission to the Justice Committee states clearly that the Government’s plan to give the Bill retrospective effect is

“unfair…will create significant additional work in allocating those cases…and likely result in appeals.”

JUSTICE makes a similar point, saying:

“Reallocation of cases already in the Crown Court caseload”

could lead to judicial review challenges, further hearings and additional

“burdens on both defendants and the prosecution”.

Even on a practical level, the amendments are eminently sensible. They seek to diffuse the legal landmine that the Government are in danger of stepping on, and would avoid yet more work for a system that is already under intense strain.

As I have stated, the amendments are nothing other than fair and reasonable—in fact, they are a minimal safeguard. My colleagues and I have been clear that we should not be going ahead with these reforms, but if Ministers insist, the very least they can do is to ensure that they operate prospectively rather than retrospectively. People should be judged and dealt with under the rules in force when they made their election, not have the rug pulled from beneath them halfway through proceedings. That is why I support amendments 25, 12 and 43, and I urge the Government and the Minister to accept at least one of them.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

To the extent that it is necessary, I declare an interest in that I used to be a solicitor regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society. I, too, support amendments 25, 12 and 43. They are not technical or political amendments, but constitutional amendments, and I hope that the Committee will consider them in that spirit.

Let me begin with some facts that I think we can all agree on. There are thousands of defendants who are currently part-way through the criminal justice process having made a formal, consequential and, they thought, irreversible election to be tried by jury in the Crown court. They made that election under the law as it existed when they made it—indeed, as it exists today. If the Bill passes unamended, that election, that choice, that right, which they have already exercised, will be taken away from them before they ever reach trial. It is a bitter irony that they have not yet reached trial because of the situation that the country is in. I accept that it is not this Government’s fault that we are where we are, but the state is the state, and the Government are responsible for it. For those people to be awaiting trial because of the state and then have their rights taken away from them by the state because of this Government’s actions goes far beyond disagreement on the Bill and on the principle of jury trial, no matter how important that is.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Joe Robertson and Rebecca Paul

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I completely agree with him, and I remind the Committee that most people in this country are against these changes. Most people who know about the justice system are against the changes—[Interruption.] I know it is really hard for Labour Members to hear that they are not on the side of the people on this one. How has it all gone wrong? They have forgotten who they are and who they represent. It is a sad day.

[Joe Robertson]

This is an extraordinary exchange. I accept that the hon. Member for Amber Valley is not the official voice of the CPS or of the Labour Government, but her sense of “officialdom knows best” will give ordinary men and women in this country great concerns about these changes. Of course, there are some cases in which there is no victim. There are some cases in which the victim is a person who has been falsely accused. That is why we have a legal system in which the ordinary men and women of this country are judged by their peers. That is the principle that is up for debate here—not some wider official view from a prosecuting organisation, rather than the courts.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank my hon. Friend for that point; he makes it eloquently, as always.

I really enjoyed going through the groups that do not support these proposals. Obviously, the Government like to rely heavily on Sir Brian Leveson’s findings and recommendations, but when my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East questioned him in the oral evidence session, he did not blame jury trials.

Fundamentally, jury trials are not the problem. They are not creating the delays, so limiting them will not address the backlog. In fact, their curtailment will likely bring a whole host of other issues to the table that were not there before. The Bar Council believes that the changes

“will produce serious adverse consequences that have not properly been considered by the Government.”

In the light of such uncertain outcomes, I find it difficult to understand why the Government will not perform a pilot first to test the proposal or put in place a time limitation more generally. To plough ahead in this way, with no way back in the event of failure, is reckless by any measure. A more cautious approach might have been more positively received.

As we heard from Kirsty Brimelow KC, the chair of the Bar Council, it is vital that we approach the backlog problem logically, look at where the delays are occurring and target them. For rape cases, the majority of the delay is actually at the investigation and charge point, which takes an average of two years. Although the one-year delay at court stage is too long, the lion’s share of the problem is pre-court—perhaps the CPS can help with that one—so let us deal with that.

The Government should open all the courts so that they can hear cases every day. Yesterday, 11% of Crown courts were not sitting, and I am sure we will find out later what the percentage is today. Revising the contract with Prisoner Escort and Custody Services to ensure that defendants are delivered to the dock on time would also help. Giving proper consideration to specialist rape and serious sexual offences courts to deal with sexual offence cases and addressing the many inefficiencies and delays in the system through a better use of technology would no doubt greatly reduce the backlog.

It is also important that we give the steps that the Government have already taken to address the backlog an adequate chance to filter through. One example is increased sitting days: in February 2026, the Justice Secretary announced that there would be no cap on sitting days for ’26-27, which will undoubtedly help.

In addition, last month, powers were granted to suspend custodial sentences of up to three years, a change from the previous two years. Putting aside whether that is a sensible measure, it will undoubtedly increase the number of guilty pleas. That means fewer trials and a decrease in the backlog. The Government should properly model the impact of those significant changes on the backlog before imposing such a draconian limitation on jury trials. I would be grateful if the Minister could share any projections of the impact of those two changes on the backlog and clarify whether they have been factored into the “do nothing” option of the impact assessment. It looks as though they might not have been included, because they are not referenced.

If clause 1 is accepted, there are several types of serious cases where the defendant might now lose their right to elect for trial by jury. It has been suggested by the Justice Secretary that only cases involving minor offences, such as stealing a bottle of whisky, will be impacted, but that is not the case. Let us start with causing death by careless driving. That is a serious offence—rightly so, given that a life has been lost—and it carries a maximum five-year sentence and driving disqualification. Currently, the defendant has the right to elect for trial by jury. That is especially important in such cases, where the difference between careless and unfortunate is not entirely clear.

It is exactly that type of case where we see the benefit of 12 individuals, all with different experiences, using their judgment to decide whether the defendant crossed the line into “careless”. Under clause 1, that right is no longer available; the judge will decide on their own. Imagine a defendant who is innocent. Their whole life, and that of their family, is to be decided by one person—their bad day can destroy the defendant’s entire life. Their case might not even make it to a judge; it could remain in the magistrates court. Surely the intention was never for our magistrates courts to hear cases involving the loss of a life.

Sexual assault is another serious offence. It carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and inclusion on the sex offenders register. It is also completely life-changing for everyone involved. Under clause 1, the defendant’s right to choose a jury trial will be removed. Many of those cases could end up in the magistrates courts, but they are nothing like the normal cases seen in magistrates courts day to day: they are highly sensitive and complex, involving third-party disclosure, and video recorded and forensic evidence. They are not simple add-ons to what those courts already do. With the best will in the world, they do not currently have the capability or skillset to handle such specialist cases involving traumatised victims.