Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Robert Neill

2nd reading
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to participate in the debate and to follow the two Front Benchers. I welcome the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State to the Treasury Bench, and thank him for the very generous and accurate tribute he paid to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland), whose conduct in office was of the very highest. I also welcome the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) to the Opposition Front Bench. He is a great loss to the Justice Committee, but very much the Opposition Front Bench’s gain. I look forward to seeing him in his reincarnated capacity. This is proof, I am glad to see, that the Labour party believes in recycling, and doing it in a good way, in this instance. If it is any help, I was recycled by David Cameron once—it happens to all the best, I promise. I am delighted to see the hon. Gentleman there.

This is an important Bill and, in fairness, a measured and tightly focused one. One might not have thought that from some of the things we have heard, but that is the reality. Again, that is in no little measure due to the focus of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon, the principal author of the Bill. I welcome the fact that he did that, and the fact that the Lord Chancellor has adopted the same approach to the Bill.

There were a great deal of noises off around what might or might not happen on judicial review, and I am glad that the course was sensibly adopted of having an independent review panel, chaired by an eminent Queen’s Counsel, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who is a distinguished Member of the other House and who, as I think everyone conceded, had approached his duties as a Justice Minister with exemplary fairness and impartiality, was respected by both sides, and had many years of practice in the field. He led a panel of experts who were also distinguished in the field, and they produced a measured report, for which the whole House should thank them.

That report was a great public service, and it is right that the Government have essentially built on the recommendations that the panel made, and the fact that the panel did not regard the judicial review as a major problem, but suggested sensible ways forward, is not something to be held against them. That seems to me exactly what one can expect if people follow the evidence, which is precisely what the panel did and what the Bill also does.

It is important to recognise that judicial review is an important factor in our constitutional arrangements. When I started as a law student in the mid-’70s, judicial review in its modern concept was in its very early stages of development. The late and lamented Professor de Smith was still alive and had produced the first of his two textbooks, but the subject was still largely taught in terms of the old prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari.

A lot has have moved on from then, and we have developed a much more sophisticated and wide-ranging corpus of administrative law. That is not of itself a bad thing, because it reflects the reality that, as I think the late Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone once observed, in the post-war years we have grown a regulatory state. Therefore, the actions of the state and of public bodies—state agencies, local authorities, hospital boards and a raft of others—impinge on many areas of citizens’ lives. That is not necessarily a criticism, but there are greater interactions between the state and its various agencies and the lives of its citizens.

There will be impacts there, and by the nature of the human condition, errors will be made by decision makers. It is perfectly reasonable that we have seen that, but, as has been observed, there has been an exponential growth—I think that was the phrase used—in judicial review. That is worth bearing in mind, because it has sometimes come at the cost of complexity in administrative law.

Lord Justice Haddon-Cave delivered a very useful lecture, the Gresham lecture, in June this year, which reflects wisely on the balances there: the fact that the growth of judicial review is not of itself a bad thing if it gives remedies to those who are wronged, versus the fact that in some areas of the law—the concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness and lawfulness being one—that has led to a degree of complexity. As Professor Richard Ekins of the University of Oxford has observed, that in turn can, in the fields of lawfulness, voidability of decisions and so on, lead to uncertainty. In so far as, according to the Bingham test of the rule of law, we want to see clarity and accessibility of law, we also want wherever possible to see certainty. Nothing can be an absolute in this world, but that is a reasonable objective, and I think the Bill seeks to strike a balance.

What the Bill is not, in fairness, is an assault on judicial review. It is unfair to characterise it as such in every respect; I would not support the Bill if it were, nor do I think that any Conservative would. The truth is that judicial review—the ability of the individual to seek redress against the actions of the state or its agents—is fundamental to the English concept of liberties. In his role as an author, the Secretary of State wrote about these matters before he came to the House, so he recognises that point, as do I and as does the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy).

Judicial review—I say this to the wider public as well as to colleagues—is in the DNA not just of our British constitutional arrangements, but of the Conservative party. The ability to challenge the actions of the state and its agents when they get it wrong is fundamental to our concept of limited government. Supporting judicial review is an entirely Conservative thing for the Government to do and, dare I say it, an entirely British thing, across all the jurisdictions.

[Joanna Cherry]

As usual, the hon. Member is making a very learned and well-informed speech, but I want to challenge his assertion that the Bill is in line with Bingham rule-of-law principles. The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has produced a detailed briefing on the Bill, which says that clauses 1 and 2 are not in keeping with the Bingham principles on the rule of law and should be removed from the Bill. What is the hon. Member’s comment on that?

[Sir Robert Neill]

I have great respect for the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, but I think that it is wrong—it is as simple as that. I have come to the view, as I think the independent panel did, that the two clauses are not in conflict with the rule of law. That is precisely the sort of area in which there can be legitimate debate. I have worked with the Bingham Centre on many occasions, as the hon. and learned Lady knows, but I do not think that its conclusion is justified on the evidence. I think that that point is borne out by referring to the conclusions of the panel in relation to clauses 1 and 2, which I will come to in just a moment.

We all believe in the importance of judicial review. It is regrettable if any side in political debate sees tension between Parliament and the courts, or between the Executive and the courts, as a bad thing. There is always an element of tension in any constitutional relationship. Sometimes a decision may not go in our favour when we are councillors, members of health authorities or Ministers —it happened to me when I was a Minister. We may not like it, but equally we have to respect the decision. I do not see anything in the Bill that changes that fundamental point at all.

I will address the judicial review aspects of the Bill first, although I do not want to forget the other aspects. What we are dealing with is two very limited and specific proposals; that is a dangerous phrase to use under certain circumstances, but I think it works quite well in this regard. In relation to Cart reviews, I must say—with respect to those who seek to uphold Cart—that I understand the point that in a tiny number of instances there might be success, but overwhelmingly they have not proved successful.

I commend to the House the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), who quoted Lord Hope. Of course there are others who argue to the contrary, but with all respect, I think that the views of a senior Law Lord who sat on the case in the Supreme Court and has said “We got it wrong” might carry just a little more weight than those of some other commentators. Certainly the conclusion of Lord Faulks’s panel was

“that the continued expenditure of judicial resources on considering applications for a Cart JR cannot be defended, and that the practice of making and considering such applications should be discontinued”,

so the Government have acted in line with their independent review and in line with the evidence.

I will make an additional point, which has already been posited, but which is important. Many who practise law would say that in truth there is an inherent illogicality in giving one particular class of appeal, as opposed to others, a third bite of the cherry on the merits, when a decision on the merits both of fact and of law has already been taken by the Upper Tribunal, a tribunal of equivalent status and standards to the High Court. That is not an appeal to a superior tribunal; it undercuts the jurisdiction of an equivalent court. With respect, there is no logic to that at all, so it seems to me that it cannot be said that there is anything objectionable in a modest amendment that relates to removing Cart litigation.

In relation to joint enterprise manslaughter, as hon. Members will recall, the Supreme Court used a phrase about the Court of Appeal taking “a wrong turn”. I think that this is an instance in which we can say—and Parliament is entitled to say, with respect—that the Supreme Court in Cart took a wrong turn, and that we are entitled as a matter of public policy, as is conceded to be Parliament’s prerogative in these matters, to reverse it in this limited measure.

May I also deal with the issue in relation to quashing orders? It does not seem to me that it can be objectionable to increase the suite of remedies available to the courts. There can be difficulty when quashing arises, and I do not say that this is a complete solution to it—I shall return to that in a moment—but I think it is worth quoting, in full, the recommendation of the independent panel:

“Accordingly, we recommend that section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 be amended to make it clear that the courts have the power to make suspended quashing orders in appropriate cases. This could be done through the insertion into section 31 of a new subsection (4A), which would read, ‘On an application for judicial review the High Court may suspend any quashing order that it makes, and provide that the order will not take effect if certain conditions specified by the High Court are satisfied within a certain time period.’”

That, broadly, is the scheme which the relevant provisions in the Act follow. They follow the recommendation of the independent review, and I therefore do not think that there are any significant grounds for criticism in that regard.

The one question that I would raise about this—and I posed it in my intervention earlier—relates to ensuring that when we consider the way in which the statutory presumption which underpins this is set out and is then put into force in practice, we do not allow the individual litigant who has suffered tangible loss as a consequence of an impugned decision to be left without a genuine and meaningful remedy. A future declaration of illegality will not of itself recompense a person who has lost a business, lost an opportunity or lost employment, or something of that kind. Provided that this is applied in a way that ensures that that person does not lose out, I do not think that there is anything objectionable here.

There will be some who are parties to litigation and wish to see a change of policy rather than the question of having suffered individual loss, but I should have thought in those cases, the suspended and future quashing orders are perfectly legitimate and proportionate. It is the need to deal with the individual who has lost out against the state that I think we need to safeguard, and I hope the Minister will confirm that that will be done. I am grateful to the Secretary of State for having done so in response to my intervention. That, I think, is the key test.

Another point might be worth bearing in mind. Again, I refer to the helpful paper published by Professor Ekins this morning. This is a path that the Government are not going down, but I should like to know whether there will be some scope for the deferring rather than the suspending of a quashing order. There are circumstances in which that might enable remedies to be applied without some of the difficulties that could arise from uncertainty. I do not say that that is right, but it is worth looking at the paper from Professor Ekins, because it posits some modest amendments that may be worth considering at a later stage in the Bill’s progress. I do no more than float the idea. As it is, however, I see nothing that can be regarded as in any way an assault on judicial review in the first part of the Bill. These are sensible and modest reforms—and reform is not the same as an attack; reform is exactly what we do to keep law up to date.

Let me now turn to the remaining parts of the Bill, starting with criminal procedure. It seems to me that there is nothing wrong with modernising procedure; technology changes, and we all learn. The shadow Secretary of State and I practised in criminal law for much of our careers—as, indeed, did the shadow Minister—and in our time we have all seen procedure change out of all recognition in some respects, often for the better. I think we all agree that serious sexual offences, for example, are handled much better now than they were when we started off in practice at the Bar. In particular, claimants get a far better deal. That is just one example, but I can think of other safeguards that have been built in—the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and a raft of other measures—and have acted to prevent abuses against defendants in the course of investigations.

Procedure can always be improved, and we ought always to be able to take advantage of technology, as we do with video-recorded evidence and so on. Again, there is nothing objectional about that in principle, and I do not think there is any harm in greater flexibility either. Easy movement between the courts can certainly save time. However, I ask the Government to bear in mind that that needs to come with appropriate safeguards.

My concerns about this have been well set out in the Bar Council’s briefing. For example, when moving from in-person proceedings—which at the moment are often remote proceedings—to a written procedure for certain types of offence, safeguards will be needed as to what precisely the specified offence is going to be. An example that the Justice Committee has highlighted in previous reports is that of a young person who has foolishly committed an act and who enters a guilty plea or accepts a caution, which is recordable. That plea is recorded and then, years down the track, because of the way our criminal records system currently works, they find that it is a serious obstacle to employment or educational opportunities that goes way beyond anything they had contemplated when they entered the guilty plea, perhaps to get it out of the way, at the time.

I am concerned that these categorised offences should not involve anything that is imprisonable, and I also suggest that we should not use the provision for anything that is recordable. I can see that in certain types of offence, such as the non-payment of the television licence fee, this could certainly speed things along, but there needs to be a safeguard for anything that is likely to have an effect on someone’s character, reputation or future life chances. The safeguard is surely that we ensure that an informed decision has been made, which must imply access to legal advice before the decision to enter an online guilty plea is made.

We all know that criminal proceedings are often dynamic and that things come to light as we go along. That can happen with the disclosure of material online as much as in person, and there must be a specific provision to withdraw a guilty plea at an appropriate time if it becomes apparent that an arguable defence could be raised. That seems to be a fair balance, and it needs to be specifically written in, either in the legislation or in regulations. I hope that the Ministers will undertake, at the very least, to reflect that in regulations; that is probably the most constructive way, rather than changing the primary legislation.

We also have to look at one or two anomalies. I note, for example, that in relation to the provision for online procedures, the trigger age relates to someone over the age of 18. However, in clause 4, which deals with

“Guilty plea in writing: extension to proceedings following police charge”,

subsection (3)(b) states that the provision shall apply where

“the accused had attained the age of 16 when charged”.

I do not see the logic in that, so perhaps the Minister can help me when he responds to the debate. What is the logic in using the age of 18 in one provision and 16 in a provision that covers broadly similar grounds? We need particular safeguards for dealing with young offenders, to ensure that they do not enter a plea that is not fully informed, either through immaturity or a lack of good advice, as that could have permanent consequences for their future. It is not the principle that I object to; I am just concerned that we get those safeguards in place.

While I am on the subject of criminal procedure, I must point out that modernisation is fine and has its place, but what happens tomorrow in the Budget is as important as anything else. I am all for making the best possible use of scant judicial resources and time, but none of the proposals compensates for the proper funding of the courts system. Sadly, we have a legacy of decades of underfunding—under Governments of all colours, let us be blunt. There is no party point to be made here. Under all Governments, the courts system has not been funded to the level it requires, and I hope that the Secretary of State will use his important position within the Government to take forward the ambitious spending bid that his predecessor talked about. If he does that, he will have my support and that of many others on both sides of the House. Investment in justice is investment in the fabric of society, and that is good for us all in the long term. That is a slight digression, but I hope I will be forgiven for raising it in the circumstances.

I now turn to the remaining provisions. Moving tribunals across makes sense. Many people who practise in the tribunals would say that it is about time that tribunals were not regarded as slightly out on a limb and as a bit of a poor relation. A closer alignment will be beneficial for their interoperability. For example I noted during the pandemic that some tribunals’ rule systems, not being the normal Supreme Court rules, lagged behind the courts in adapting to online hearings, so the change can only be beneficial.

I wish the Government had gone further and adopted the recommendations of the Justice Committee’s report on coroners. As far as it goes, the change is well and good but there is a missed opportunity to which we can perhaps return in due course. There is nothing in the Bill to which I object, and I see the good sense in greater flexibility on certain types of hearing, but that is no reason for not being more ambitious in relation to coroners either in this Bill or in future legislation. As the Bill proceeds, I hope we will be able to look at that again, because the coronial system is important to the country and particularly to victims and bereaved families, and it operates with variability, if I might put it that way, across the country. The Select Committee’s well-reasoned proposals deserve more consideration than they have perhaps had so far.

There is an argument to be made about equality of arms, which is again about funding. Massive sums are not required to give the families of victims in complex inquests equality of arms with state agencies that do not appear on the other side in technical terms, because of the nature of a coroner’s inquiry, but in reality are making assertions that the families would rightly wish to challenge and explore. I hope the Government will reflect on that as a measure of fairness and equity.

This Bill has proved to be less controversial than it was flagged up to be, and it is the better for that. It is a sensible, conservative set of incremental improvements and proposals that are welcome and should be supported. Parliament, the judiciary and the Executive have important and equal functions in our system. The rule of law does not mean that every public action has to be subject to judicial review, but it does mean that judicial review should be sufficient, strong and robust enough to ensure that victims of injustice are recompensed.

It is also important that we who sit in this House and who operate in the political sphere recognise the integrity of the judiciary in their sphere. As Lord Faulks’s review concluded, we can trust that the judiciary will act properly, accordingly and fully within the limits of their powers, and we should respect that, as we can also be confident that they will respect us.

Lord Chancellor’s Oath and the Rule of Law

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Robert Neill

Wednesday 14th October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Mr Twigg, and to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). I have great respect for her as a lawyer; we do not always agree in our political views, but I take seriously what she says on legal matters. I ought to mention my interests as a non-practising member of the English Bar, as a consultant to a law firm and as a bencher of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple. I will start with the topic of the debate: the Lord Chancellor’s oath. The hon. and learned Lady ranged widely in her speech, and I am sure she will forgive me if I do not follow some particular matters that she understandably raised relating to the constitutional settlement and devolution.

The irony of this debate is that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 does indeed place the Lord Chancellor in a different position from that of other Ministers, both because of the oath and because of their obligation under section 17(1) of the 2005 Act to respect the rule of law and defend the independence of the judiciary. Ironically, the Blair Government in 2005 never actually defined the rule of law in the Act. The late Lord Bingham, who has been much quoted already in this debate and probably will be again, noted that that was interesting and rather unusual, as it placed great reliance on a concept that was set out in statute but never defined. That, he concluded, clearly was not an accident; it was clearly because it was probably impossible, if not unhelpful, to find a pithy statutory definition that could be put in an Act of Parliament of something that has evolved over time. His conclusion in his admirable book, which I brought along this morning, is that it was desirable to leave the matter to be decided—as courts might need to, from time to time—in the practical, rather than purely in the abstract, as issues arose. That, perhaps, is wise.

That means that it was wrong for some in recent weeks, since the arrival of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, to make rather unjustified ad hominem attacks on the current Lord Chancellor—first, on his conduct throughout, and secondly, in making an assertion that the rule of law is potentially breached. An assertion is, of course, no more than that, and a legal argument, however distinguished, be it made by academic or legal commentators, is no more than that either. I have known the Lord Chancellor for his whole professional career, and the reality is that he is absolutely rooted in his commitment to the rule of law and to the profession, as he made clear when he took his oath and repeatedly since. I will come to part 5 of the Bill in a moment, about which my views are well known. However, I believe and am satisfied that the Lord Chancellor has acted diligently throughout all this to ensure that we deal with a potentially difficult situation proportionately and consistent with our obligations.

Since taking, the Lord Chancellor has also been clear in his support for the independence and integrity of the judiciary. Not all his predecessors in recent years have been; I say that frankly. There are people in all jurisdictions that we might wish to brush over, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West put it. For every Lord Rich there is a Lord Braxfield, perhaps, and others who we might not wish to dwell upon. The reality is that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland), has been meticulous in this. I welcome his clear commitment in his letter to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to the Government’s continuing support for the provisions of the European convention on human rights. He has been willing to be outspoken on that.

Reference was made to the risk to the rule of law being undermined by the Government’s proposals to examine the scope of judicial review. When I started my law degree at the London School of Economics—which was, I hate to say, in the early 1970s—judicial review was a very new and evolving legal concept. There was little of it in those days. It grew, as many of us will remember, through the Gouriet judgment, the Grunwick case and so on, and perhaps rightly so. There has never been a fixed corpus of law in this area, as there is in others, such as jury trial. There is nothing wrong in that; the advantage of the common-law system is that it can evolve.

No one would seriously say that, prior to the development of the current system of judicial review in, let us say, the 1970s through to the beginning of this century, Britain was not a country that was subject to the rule of law. A willingness to review the way in which judicial review as a concept operates, and what are or are not the proper limits, cannot be regarded as an assault on the rule of law per se, on any objective basis.

[Joanna Cherry]

I take that on board, but the difficulty is that the individual who has been put in charge of the review has evinced very strong criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision in the prorogation cases and has also evinced hostility to the European convention on human rights, notwithstanding what the hon. Gentleman has already said. There is a widespread perception in the legal profession that what is intended here is to circumscribe the rule of law, not just because Lord Faulks is the chair but because of the Government’s rhetoric. Surely the hon. Gentleman must see that.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Lord Faulks is a fellow bencher of the Middle Temple and a distinguished lawyer. That does not mean that one always has to agree with everything that he says. It would not be fair or reasonable to judge somebody by past comments until we have seen the results of the panel as a whole. Lord Faulks is the chair of the panel, but there are other very distinguished people on it as well. I respect what the hon. and learned Lady says, but this is a classic case of not prejudging the issue until we have seen the outcome of the deliberations.

I am a great believer in judicial review, in appropriate cases. Has it sometimes been abused? Many people would say that perhaps that can be the case. When I was the junior Minister at the Department for Communities and Local Government, I was critical of the attitude adopted to some decisions by the then Secretary of State, the noble Lord Pickles, is he is now, in relation to the removal of regional spatial strategies. We were judicially reviewed by large commercial housebuilders, undoubtedly in pursuit of their own vested commercial interests. They sought to prevent our removing the comparatively easy route, so they could impose large housing developments on communities that did not want them. I was critical of those house builders for doing that and for undermining in law the wishes of local residents. The courts found that they were entitled to do it, but that does not mean that we were assaulting judicial review as a concept, simply by criticising the motive behind some of the people who bring it.

There is an important distinction, which I recognise. We criticised the clients—the people who brought the judicial review—but I did not criticise the lawyers who were instructed on their behalf. I would not seek to do so. It is important to say that we should not, whatever our views in politics, use political arguments to attack lawyers generally or by taking broadbrush approaches. The attacks upon the judges, which were not perhaps called out as much as they should have been at the time of the early Miller litigation, were wholly disgraceful and unacceptable. The current Lord Chancellor has made it clear that he would not countenance such attacks and such language without speaking out. That is very much to his credit and entirely consistent with his own personal integrity. I do not care for the use of language such as “lefty lawyers” or the broadbrush approach of saying that systems are being hijacked. That is not language that I would use. However, I am a Member of Parliament; I am not a speech writer.

I gently observe that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West referred to the taxi rank principle at the Bar. That is something that I have always worked under as well. To be fair, there have always been sets of chambers that would not prosecute, or would not act for landlords, for example. Some might ask whether that is in theory inconsistent with the taxi rank rule. It probably is, yet it is not something that warrants a great deal of personal attack. I just make the observation that those matters cannot be seen in a purely academic sense. I would not make too much of that, but that is where I stand as far as that is concerned. It is pretty clear where the Lord Chancellor stands, and where I suspect my hon. Friend the Minister stands as well, as far as those matters are concerned.

The other issue raised is part 5 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, about which I was not a little critical when it was first introduced. I believe we have sought to improve that Bill. Is it perfect? As yet, that I do not know. Would the use of the powers in part 5 be wise politics? That is a very big question mark. However, that is not the same as, say, that it is per se constitutionally improper to put those clauses in the Bill, provided there are appropriate safeguards. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West might disagree upon that, but I think it is a legitimate area of legal dispute and the Lord Chancellor is entitled to have a different view from her and, indeed, perhaps from me in that regard, without it being suggested that he has failed to uphold his oath of office or his constitutional obligations.

I note the views, which have been referred to, of Professor Catherine Barnard. She is a distinguished academic and her views are worthy of respect. By their nature, however, she not being a judge or legislator, and valuable and worthy of respect though they are, they cannot be determinative of the point. It is one side of an argument that can properly be hooked. If, on those matters, there were no scope for difference of opinion, no scope for difference of legal interpretation, no scope for legal argument, there would scarcely be any scope for litigation and scarcely any scope for lawyers at the end of the day. It is perfectly possible for respectable lawyers to hold different opinions around matters of this kind, particularly in emerging areas of law or new legislation as it comes forward, without it being appropriate for us to say that either side is seeking to undermine constitutional principles or their professional or governmental responsibilities. That is the proper way to look at the position, as far as that is concerned here.

I am glad to say, in response to some of the endeavours, which I may have had a small hand in, the Government have made it clear that, effectively, they will only be using those powers should they ever be needed. I hope to heavens that they are never needed because we will get a deal, but should that be the case, there will be certain triggers that would have to be met, both in procedural terms but also in terms of substance. In particular, we would only do so had the European Union, in our judgment, demonstrated bad faith. Bad faith is recognised in international treaty law and in the Vienna convention as being a ground under which it is possible to derogate from an otherwise binding commitment.

The fact that we will be using this as a shield rather than a sword is important—it is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in some respects. The Minister may well have more to say about that, but that is an important shift and one that I welcome. Therefore, the suggestion that the mere putting of those clauses on the face of the legislation is itself a breach of law is not one that is universally accepted, and I do not think therefore that it can be regarded as an act of impropriety on the part of the Government or of any Minister. As I say, there is a proper political debate as to the wisdom of using them, if we ever come to that, but that is not for today.

I want to say one final thing in relation to this. Lord Bingham was very clear that the rule of law itself is something that can evolve and must be flexible, but there are certain fundamentals. I do not think anyone would suggest that anything we are doing here alters the basic fundamentals. I am conscious of his eighth principle, but I do not think we are at that stage, and I hope we will not be. Moreover, he accepted that parliamentary sovereignty was a fundamental part of the rule of law too. There is always a set of checks and balances in that regard.

I have no problem with certain circumstances where the actions of Ministers properly should be reviewed by the courts, but I do not think this is really going to change that. Lord Bingham made it quite clear, though, that he did not accept the view advanced by, for example, Lord Steyn or Baroness Hale of Richmond that there are some concepts so fundamental that even Parliament cannot legislate to change them. He did not take that view. Again, there is a perfectly respectable dispute there and disagreement between highly distinguished former jurists, which makes the point that none of the arguments powerfully advanced by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West are determinative of any failing by either the Lord Chancellor or any other Minister in respect of their constitutional obligations.

This is a worthwhile debate to have. In a sense, an hour and a half is not enough to do it justice, because as we go forward, we are going to have to think about our constitutional and legal settlements in a broader sense, how we will operate the separation of powers in a post-Brexit world and how, continuing, as I hope, as a unified state with devolution within it, we can perhaps refine the arrangements that are required to make that work in practice too. Those are all proper matters for further consideration, but do not, I think, impinge upon any proper allegation of any failure by the current Lord Chancellor or his Ministers to act in accordance with their constitutional duties.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Robert Neill

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 29th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

I am not sure whether or not that is an argument for Brexit; on that basis, the Don Pacifico affair was a great statement of national sovereignty, but I do not think it was a great triumph of intellect, integrity or national interest. Leaving that to one side, I accept that there will be a number of occasions when Governments may have departed from their international obligations, but that does not make any of them desirable and it does not mean that we should not seek to limit the circumstances in which that might occur to the barest necessities. So I think we have some common ground there, or at least I hope that we have. That is why I welcome the statements the Government have made to flesh out their intentions on the way in which part 5 would be used.

I say to Opposition Members that I accept that there are certain circumstances in which we might find ourselves in difficulty because of the attitude of our counterparties in the EU. I hope that that will not come to pass and that we are seeing just a matter of the rhetoric of negotiation. There is, however, a respectable legal argument, which has not been ventilated before, although it is held by a number of senior lawyers I have spoken to, to say that, as we all know, the withdrawal agreement is binding on the UK as a matter of international law—that must be right—but that that is based upon the true construction of the withdrawal agreement.

The withdrawal agreement is clearly subject to the provisions that stipulate that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. There is an obligation on the parties in good faith to negotiate a free trade arrangement between the UK and the EU such as would render the need for checks on goods passing between the UK and Northern Ireland largely, if not completely, unnecessary. Provided that is done, I do not think any of us get into any difficulties. I accept that in negotiations there has been some language—I hope it is no more than the language of negotiation at this stage, a posture—that might suggest that the EU could argue for a substantial array of checks that might go beyond that which is compatible with the true construction of the agreement in so far as it must respect the role of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.

[Joanna Cherry]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Robert Neill]

Can I just finish my point, and I will happily give way to the hon. and learned Lady?

Were it to get to the stage that the level of checks being insisted on were to threaten the integrity of the UK, it would, arguably—perfectly respectably arguably—be threatening the integrity of the agreement itself upon its true construction. That, I think, would be an arguable point for saying in international law that the UK would have a case for saying it was entitled to take measures to protect the underlying purpose of the agreement.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I think that he is describing a situation in which the European Union might be in bad faith, but last week when Professor Catherine Barnard, the very well-respected professor of European law at Cambridge University, gave evidence to the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union, she said that there is no evidence whatever at present that the EU is negotiating in bad faith but that there is a strong argument that the existence of the Bill and clause 45 breaches the United Kingdom’s duty of good faith in article 5 of the withdrawal agreement. As Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Gentleman will be aware that that is a widely held view by lawyers. Does he recognise, as she said, that there is a strong argument that, merely by bringing the Bill to the Floor of the House, the United Kingdom is already in breach of its article 5 duty of good faith under the withdrawal agreement?

[Sir Robert Neill]

I recognise that that is a widely held argument.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill]

I am sure that it is a matter of privilege for the House, but I just come back to the point: I do not think that that engages with the issue we are concerned with here. Of course, it is perfectly within the rights of the House to bring forward any legislation it likes. I know my hon. Friend played a role in having section 38 inserted into the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, but, with respect, that simply restates that which we already knew and probably picked up in the first week of the law course; that, essentially, Parliament is sovereign and of course it can legislate in the way that it wishes. It can legislate in a way that is incompatible with international law. That does not make it a desirable course to go down. I think that is the point that needs to be said. Of course, it may be possible and I do not think privilege is engaged. The point I am seeking to make is that the UK should be very wary about doing anything that breaches its international obligations. I do not think it has yet and there are reasons why we may be able to avoid that, but that is why I think we need to keep the debate a little more calm in terms of what the rights are.

[Joanna Cherry]

Is not the problem that some Government Back Benchers are falling into the distinction between domestic law and international law? It is true as a matter of domestic law that this House can pass any Bill it likes, but as a matter of international law, as stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 55 of its judgment in Miller 1, it does not impinge on international law. If we sign treaties, we are bound in the eyes of international law. There is a distinction here between domestic law, which means that this House can do what it wants—God forbid—and international law, which means that sometimes when this House does what it wants, it could be in breach of international law.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I think that is clearly established law. It is perfectly possible to act within one’s domestic law and still breach one’s international obligations; however, I do not think that that means that the Bill itself, at this stage, is a breach of our international obligations, particularly now that it has been reinforced by comments made by Ministers on the Floor of the House, which I am sure the Government therefore regard as binding as a matter of good faith in itself, that the provisions would be used only in circumstances where the EU had behaved in such a way that it had breached its duty of good faith under the agreement.

The Government have also importantly committed not to use the provisions of part 5 to undermine the pre-existing provisions in relation to both article 16— the safeguarding arrangements of the protocol—and articles 167 onwards, on the arbitral arrangements. Given those circumstances, I reach a different conclusion from that of the hon. and learned Lady and the professor. I do not dismiss the arguments, but I make the case for why I think, as a matter of law and fact, it is possible to distinguish them.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Robert Neill

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

That is a very helpful reassurance for today’s purposes, and I am grateful for the spirit in which the Minister said that. It is an important point, and I am glad that he takes this on board. Sometimes, for the best of reasons, there can be a mission creep with these measures, which could lead to a broader spread of their use in the criminal justice system, and that would be a matter of concern. If he says that the use is very specific, I accept his word on that, but it is important that we continue to keep this under review and do not have unintended mission creep. As we all know, it is often easy to present perfectly benign and reasonable reasons for doing something that departs from the normal checks and balances, but it then becomes entrenched and permanent and spreads.

In that spirit, I take the Minister’s assurance, but he will understand why it is important that that issue is debated and that reassurances are given that the overall integrity of the justice system will not be affected by these changes. That has dealt quickly with the issues that I sought to raise. It was perhaps a record brevity, but I hope that brevity does not reduce the import of the issues raised.

[Joanna Cherry]

It is a real pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and I endorse his concerns about the provisions in relation to TPIMs. My hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) and I have tabled amendments 39 to 41 in relation to the proposed changes to the TPIMs regime. I am also speaking in support of amendments 46 to 51 and 59 to 61, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and signed by me. I will try to keep my comments brief, because I went into these issues in some detail on the Bill Committee and I want to allow others who were not on that Committee to speak.

First, I want to say something about the Prevent strategy review. I endorse what the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) said about that. It is important to remember that it was a recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and a successful amendment to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, which imposed a requirement on the Government to initiate an independent review of Prevent. It has been delayed for reasons that we have heard a lot about, and I think the delay is most regrettable. Clause 47 of this Bill removes the time limit for conducting the review. We in the Joint Committee on Human Rights have concerns about that and we would like there to be a time limit, hence the amendments we have tabled. I am happy to associate myself with the date suggested by the official Opposition.

I note in passing that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland is devolved, and that although national security is a reserved matter, the Scottish Government’s delivery of the Prevent strategy reflects a rather different procedure. I will not take up too much time with that.

Leaving the EU: Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Robert Neill

Wednesday 18th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Robert Neill]

It is certainly clear from the available evidence that the Government will need to take that necessity on board. We will have adhere to European standards of data protection for other member states to be able to share the information with us, according to their law. We may also want to share information with other third-party countries, so both we and they will have to be prepared to adhere to international standards. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) rightly said, that might involve some form of international adjudicative process to deal with disputes between member states. I am not going to tie anyone down on how best to solve that, but there are serious issues that we will have to bear in mind from day one of our negotiations.

Equally, when we talk about involvement with some of the other agencies—we referred to ECRIS, the European criminal records information system, to Prüm and to a number of other valuable tools—we need to recognise that there is a financial cost to the development of the databases. I would certainly encourage the Government not to be afraid to continue to make a financial contribution to the development and maintenance of them. That would be a small price to pay in view of the advantage of protection for the British public. I think there is common ground on the objective of the European arrest warrant. I just wanted to raise some of the practical issues that we will have to grasp if we are to succeed in achieving our continued full access to it as a non-EU member state.

I want to refer to other matters of concern—co-operation between the courts, which involves our continued membership or association with Eurojust. There is a precedent for non-member states continuing to co-operate with Eurojust. Norway has a co-operation agreement and has liaison prosecutors based at Eurojust. If we leave the EU as it stands, we would have to move from being national college members, but we could have a Norwegian-style status. Perhaps we should be bold and try to argue that we should remain as national college members on some sort of basis if the constitution permits it. That would be preferable.

[Joanna Cherry]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says about Norway, but is he aware that the Prime Minister, in her former role as Home Secretary, was very disparaging about the abilities of Norway and Switzerland, outside the EU bloc, because they do not have access to all the tools and have to come under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, without having the same input into the law-making process?

[Robert Neill]

Prior to the referendum, neither the hon. and learned Lady, the Prime Minister nor I would have wished to be in the conundrum in which we now find ourselves. However, I accept the verdict of the British people, so we must find a practical means of achieving the objective that we want. It would be better to find something that is beyond Norway. That is why I have suggested starting as a negotiating point with the idea that we should be national college members rather than associates of Eurojust. If we are ambitious, we lose nothing from pressing for that from the beginning.

In April last year, the Prime Minister as Home Secretary referred to the whole of the European criminal record system—financial intelligence units, the prisoner transfer unit, Schengen Information System II, joint investigation teams and Prüm—in the context of seeing them as practical measures that promote effective co-operation between different European law enforcement organisations. If we are not part of them, Britain will be less safe. As Francis FitzGibbon, the chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, told the Select Committee, that would be a pretty good starting point for bringing this whole area to greater prominence, and a pretty good starting point, I would suggest to the Minister, for our negotiation objectives. Witnesses to the Justice Committee repeatedly said that this is part of a mutually reinforcing system of justice co-operation.

We may concentrate on the arrest warrant, but the information exchanges, the ability to enforce court judgments and the ability, for example, to seek a European information order to obtain evidence from abroad are all part of the same process. That is why it is critical for us to set our objectives at the highest possible level when it comes to seeking our continued engagement with these matters.

This is an important debate because it concerns an immensely important topic. Those of us who now want to move on constructively from what, according to any view, has been a bruising experience for this country will want to do so on the basis of an ambition to protect the country, while also recognising that both our judicial system and our police force are immensely highly regarded, not just in Europe but internationally. We have something to bring to the table as well. I hope that the Minister will take those points on board in a bold and ambitious negotiation, and I wish him and his colleagues well.