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Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will have to respectfully disagree, but I will come to that point.
Let me start with our amendments that deal with trade unions and blacklisting. Amendment 5 and new clause 4 lay out that a criminal conduct authorisation cannot be granted to a covert human intelligence source within a trade union. Similarly, amendment 6 and new clause 5 seek to prevent the powers in the Bill from being used for blacklisting. Although I understand that the Bill is not about the authorisation of surveillance, in both instances I and my hon. Friends believe it is important to explicitly remove trade unions and blacklisting activity from the powers in the Bill. We cannot and will not simply accept the Government’s assurances, because trade unions are absolutely right to be alarmed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Kate Osborne) explained to the House last week, since 1968, over 3,000 trade unionists have been blacklisted, over 1,000 organisations have been spied on by undercover police, and tens of thousands of ordinary citizens have had files held on them by special branch.
Similarly, for the purpose of protecting legitimate political protest, amendments 3 and 4 seek to remove “preventing disorder” and the
“interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”
as legitimate grounds for the authorisation of criminality. These grounds are ill defined and wide-ranging, not to mention open to outright political abuse. Again, I point to where they have already been abused. We know that using undercover police, allegedly posing as protesters, to commit crimes and provoke violence, including a violent response from the authorities, has been reported as an ongoing tactic and been discussed in the public domain in recent years, including more recently in the past few months, with regard to the Black Lives Matter protests and climate change and G20 demonstrations. All of these necessarily constitute an unlawful interference.
That is also why I have tabled amendment 1, which seeks to ensure that discrimination on the grounds of protected characteristics are taken into account before any such allowance for criminal conduct is given. I point to that because we know that, in the spy cops scandal, women were unfortunately discriminated against through the way in which they were coerced into sexual relationships, and as we know, ethnic minorities are disproportionately the victims of state violence. As my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) said last week, it is not hard to see that this Bill is just another iteration of the expansion of state surveillance of marginalised communities.
I should also point out that Members from across the House routinely disagree on what is in the interests of the economic wellbeing of this country. Could my disagreement with capitalism be perceived to fall under the auspices of the Bill? Before anybody says, “That’s absolutely ridiculous,” I would remind the House that Labour Members have been subject to surveillance, and no doubt vague and wide-reaching arguments were used at the time. Where does this end?
To respond to my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), is it not also the case that Ministers cannot assure members of the public by saying that the Human Rights Act guards against abuses, as it cannot be applied to individuals, only to organisations? This Bill would permit crimes to be committed in contravention of the European convention on human rights and the individual perpetrators could not be prosecuted, although the UK itself might subsequently be found in breach of the ECHR—a theme that is becoming all too common in the Government’s approach to legislation.
As the hon. Lady knows, I and my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens) are supporting her amendments, particularly on the trade union angle, but in relation to the Human Rights Act, is it not also true that the Government themselves have argued before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal that the state, in tasking CHIS, is not the instigator of the activity and cannot be treated as responsible for it? There is therefore a real difficulty with the Government trying to give us comfort by reference to the Human Rights Act.
The hon. and learned Member is absolutely right, and that is why we cannot be comforted by those assurances. They would have to be put on the face of the Bill for us to have any assurance that the Government would not move forward in that way.
It is unfortunate that the Government are laying down a Bill like this, at a time like this, without putting in place clear limitations and proper oversight to prevent what are the gravest violations and curbing the use of such powers for political reasons. Our democracy has to be protected and our rights have to be upheld. Our police and security services should exist to uphold the rule of law, not break it. I therefore urge all Members to vote for the amendments and, if they are not passed, to vote against the Bill.
I rise to speak to amendments 25, 23 and 22, and new clause 7 in the name of the Mother of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman). She has asked me to do so because she is operating on a proxy vote at the moment. She has asked me to remind the Committee that these amendments, as well as having her support and cross-party support, also reflect concerns on the part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which she and I are both members. I will run through them quickly and not address them in detail because we have heard a lot of good speeches and I want to make a couple of points that have not been made.
Amendment 25 and new clause 7 relate to judicial oversight of the grant of authorisations. They would not be effective until there was judicial authorisation from a judicial commissioner and there would be a test of reasonable grounds. Amendment 23 relates to the grounds for granting authority. As with amendments tabled by other hon. Members, we wish to take out references to preventing disorder and to economic wellbeing. Amendment 22 deals with imposing clear and specific limits on the types of crimes that could be authorised, which is done by other Five Eyes countries. I will come to that in a moment.
I also wish to speak to new clause 6 in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens), which also has cross-party support. It reflects concerns of the National Union of Journalists in relation to matters that we discussed previously when the Investigatory Powers Act was going through the House and there was a successful campaign to require prior judicial authorisation when any application was made to identify confidential journalistic sources. Currently, those applications must be given prior authorisation by a judicial commissioner. Our fear is that this Bill, as currently framed, would give back-door access to identifying sources, so new clause 6 attempts to deal with that.
I wish to give my support and that of the Scottish National party to amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) in relation to trade union protection; I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West has worked hard on those matters. I also support amendments 20 and 16 in the name of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) and new clause 8 in the name of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy).
Like others, I am extremely concerned about the fact that the Bill is being railroaded through. The indication that not even the modest amendment put forward by the Intelligence and Security Committee will be taken on board by the Government suggests that they are not giving the time of day to amendments lodged by others as we hoped for on Second Reading.
I mentioned what other Five Eyes countries do. The approach that the UK Government want to railroad through in the Bill stands in stark contrast with that of two of our closest allies: the United States of America and Canada, which are two of our closest Five Eyes intelligence partners. The Canadian Parliament prohibits serious offences from these sorts of authorisation, including murder, torture and violating the sexual integrity of an individual. Canada’s intelligence service can only use its authorisation process to give agents a defence to prosecution, rather than any blanket immunity. In America, the FBI has for many years run agents using guidelines that expressly ban certain criminal conduct. According to guidelines issued by the US Attorney General, the FBI may never authorise an informant to
“participate in any act of violence except in self-defense”.
The approach of the United Kingdom Government is without precedent. That is why my colleagues and I in the SNP will not be taking any lectures from Government Front Benchers or Back Benchers about our commitment to the security of these nations or the prosecution of serious crime.
The Bill has some implications for devolved powers, because in Scotland the prosecution of serious crime is a devolved matter. I regret to say that, while there has been regular engagement with the Scottish Government and Scotland’s Lord Advocate in relation to aspects that will impinge upon the investigation and prosecution of serious crime in Scotland, the expectations of the Scottish Government and our chief Law Officer have not been met so far by the Government, particularly in respect of independent judicial oversight and prosecutorial independence. As the Bill stands, in so far as it impinges on the prosecution of serious crime in Scotland, the Scottish Government will not be able to recommend a legislative consent motion.
My colleagues in the Scottish Government, like others in this House, recognise that, because of recent litigation, there is a need to provide a statutory footing for the security services and law enforcement agents to sanction some lawbreaking when serious crime is being investigated by covert human intelligence sources. But we think that the Bill goes far too far, and we are frankly exasperated by the lack of time given for scrutiny of the Bill and the Government’s attitude towards the many and varied amendments lodged, which is typified by the fact that they do not even seem prepared to accept the modest amendment tabled by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
I want to say something about the human rights aspect. On Second Reading and during this debate, there have been claims that the Human Rights Act is a sufficient safeguard, so we do not need to delimit the offences that can be authorised. That is wrong, and it is close to a disingenuous claim by the Government. The Government themselves, in the third direction case before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, argued that the Human Rights Act does not apply to crimes committed by CHIS. They said:
“the state, in tasking the CHIS… is not the instigator of that activity and cannot be treated as somehow responsible for it… it would be unreal to hold the state responsible.”
That position is repeated in the human rights memorandum published with the Bill, which claims that
“there would not be State responsibility under the Convention”—
the European convention on human rights—
“for conduct where the intention is to disrupt and prevent that conduct, or more serious conduct… and/or where the conduct would take place in any event.”
Based on that analysis, an informant could be authorised to actively participate in shooting on grounds that the perpetrator intended to disrupt crime or that the shooting would take place in any event. I just think that is frankly wrong, and I think we are being given false reassurance by reference to the Human Rights Act. I will not push my amendment to a vote, or any of the amendments in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham, but the Scottish National party will support any other amendments that would ameliorate the Bill.
On human rights, there is a very real concern about the practice of blacklisting. Obviously the construction industry found its blacklist, but other sectors of the economy have still to find theirs. Is my hon. and learned Friend concerned, as I am, that in years to come someone will find themselves on a blacklist because of this legislation, and because there is no legal protection in this legislation?
I do share that concern. I really do not understand—others have eloquently made this point—why organisations indulging in lawful activity, such as trade unions and, indeed, other green activists, are required to be infiltrated by these sorts of covert human intelligence sources.
It is all very well to say that there is guidance. I listened carefully and with respect to those who are members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because I know that they have information that the rest of us do not, but guidance is not good enough; it needs to be in the Bill. We are dealing with a Government who recently made commitments in an international agreement that they now evince the intention to break, so I will not apologise for saying that I do not have much trust in them. I want to see proper protections for civil liberties in the Bill. Without them, the Scottish National party will vote against it.
It is a pleasure, as always, to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and to speak with you in the Chair, Dame Rosie. I rise to speak to the amendments in my name and that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the Opposition and other honourable colleagues.
As I said on Second Reading, my right hon. and learned Friend has made it clear that security is a top priority for the Labour party under his leadership. We will be robust in supporting the fight against terrorism and crime in all its forms. We consider it our first responsibility to keep this country, its citizens and our communities safe, and we are grateful to those in the police, the security services, the National Crime Agency and wider law enforcement. They put their own safety and lives at risk to protect us, and we will meet our duty to support them.
It is worth noting that, since 2017, 27 terror plots have been uncovered and attacks foiled, and last year covert human intelligence sources helped to disrupt 30 threats to life. That is the sobering context of the debate, so we acknowledge and understand the Bill’s purpose, and recognise the need to put on a statutory footing the activity of those working to disrupt some of the most vile crimes imaginable, including terrorism, the activities of violent drug gangs, serious and organised crime, and child sexual exploitation.
It cannot be right, for those we ask to undertake that work, for those who might be affected by it or indeed for society as a whole, that that work continues in the shadows, and without boundaries and safeguards. In that vein, our amendment 7 seeks to ensure that the granting of criminal conduct authorisations may not take place until a warrant has been issued by a judge. We believe that it would provide reassurance to have independent judicial oversight of that process.
The language that is used in what would become new subsection 5 of section 29B is reflective of existing provisions within the Investigatory Powers Act. I will go into more detail on the hon. Gentleman’s point about disorder and economic wellbeing.
The point made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) was dealt with very ably earlier in the debate by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) under reference to the letter from the previous DPP, when he said that this was a bit of a Sopranos argument. Our Five Eyes partners manage to delineate the crimes that a CHIS can commit without having these worries, so isn’t this really a false worry?
I reiterate again that a covert human intelligence source is not able to commit any and all criminality. I made that point on Second Reading. There are limits to the activity that can be authorised under the Bill and they are contained within the Human Rights Act 1998. The covert human intelligence sources code of practice also sits under this legislation and provides additional guidance and safeguards that apply to the authorisation of such activity.
I have two minutes left and I still have a few more amendments I would like to discuss.
On the issue of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, it is an established statutory purpose for investigatory powers. It recognises that threats to the economic wellbeing of the UK could be immensely damaging. It might include the possibility of a hostile cyber-attack against our critical infrastructure, our financial institutions or the Government. Similarly, preventing disorder is an important and legitimate law enforcement function found in all investigatory powers legislation. Where illegal activity takes place, public authorities listed on the Bill have responsibility to take action that is necessary and proportionate.
Turning to new clause 8, I do not underestimate the concerns expressed about the use of juvenile or vulnerable individuals as covert human intelligence sources. There are provisions contained within the code and the guidance, as the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) knows, and I have sought to discuss those issues with her outside of this place. The provisions also highlight the role of an appropriate adult, but I will continue discussions, because I recognise that there are concerns across the House. In good faith I would be pleased to continue those discussions to see whether there are other issues there.
On the issue of undercover officers and the authorisation of sexual relations, I will reiterate what police leaders have already said publicly: it is never acceptable for an undercover operative to form an intimate sexual relationship with those they are employed to infiltrate and target or may encounter during their deployment. That conduct will never be authorised, nor must it ever be used as a tactic of deployment.
Equally, we discussed trade unions on Second Reading, and I re-emphasise that the Bill does not prevent legitimate and lawful activity, which is precisely what trade unionism is all about. That is why the code of practice is explicit on that. Indeed, section 20 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 in another context also highlights that.
We must not forget the human element of this capability. We are not talking about machines and equipment, which is why the Bill is framed in this way. They are real people who are making significant personal sacrifices, and they must be able to continue living their lives safely and securely. That is what this Bill is about. Through the information they provide, lives are saved, which is why the measures in this Bill matter so much.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Attorney General
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have the advantage of having been present when my right hon. Friend made that very point on Second Reading, and therefore I was entirely prepared for that intervention. I will give a response that is perhaps slightly unorthodox, despite the emphasis put on the Human Rights Act by my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General.
In my previous role as Chair of the Defence Committee, it became more and more obvious that the Human Rights Act, and the European convention on human rights, had had serious, and perhaps largely unanticipated, adverse consequences for the operations of our military. I suspect that if applied too literally, they would have equally adverse effects on the operations of our security and intelligence services. As the years go by, and as experience shows, I fully expect that there will have to be amendments to the Human Rights Act. I believe that although terrorists could indeed read it, they would take rather more seriously a categoric list of forbidden offences in the Bill than they would the rather generalised content of the Human Rights Act. I do not expect my right hon. Friend to be wholly satisfied with that, but it is my honest opinion.
Consequently, terrorist groups whose operations might have been compromised by technical means, rather than by human infiltration, would be likely to ask their genuine members to commit more and more forbidden offences, simply to prove their loyalty. The outcome would inevitably be an increase in murders and other serious offences on their lordships’ list, which would not have happened but for the incorporation in statute of such a collection of prohibited crimes.
As I said earlier, the ISC has had a comprehensive briefing from MI5, explaining how those authorisations are used in practice. We are convinced that the Security Service uses them appropriately and proportionately. We are also reassured that the measures in the Bill legalise only what is specified in each criminal conduct authorisation. That means that any other criminal behaviour not covered by the terms of a CCA may be subject to prosecution—a safeguard that will hopefully encourage the House to reject Lords amendment 2. This is one of those occasions when it is necessary—really necessary—to keep our enemies guessing.
I mean no disrespect to the Solicitor General when I say that, like others, I am sorry not to see the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) on the Government Front Bench today. He is a thoroughly decent man. I wish him all the best, and I have been in touch to tell him that privately.
The Scottish National party will support the Lords amendments, but we do not support the Bill. We voted against it on Third Reading for reasons that I set out in some detail in Committee. We regard it as another milestone in the British Government’s retreat from support for such basic rule-of-law principles as equality before the law, and another milestone in the rolling back of human rights protections. That is not to say that we do not see the necessity for some legislation, given the ongoing court proceedings, but we do not think the balance is right in this legislation at all.