(4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2024, (SI, 2024, No. 834), dated 29 July 2024, a copy of which was laid before this House on 30 July, be approved.
The instrument, which amends the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, was laid before Parliament on 30 July using powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, and entered into force on 31 July. For clarity, the instrument was first laid on 24 May under the previous Government. This Government support the aims of the instrument, so we revoked and re-laid it to provide additional time post election for the required parliamentary scrutiny. There are no amendments to the policy in relation to Russia sanctions, and the substance of the instrument remains the same.
The United Kingdom’s commitment to Ukraine is iron-clad. In July, the UK contributed £40 million to NATO’s comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, which ensures that Ukraine will access vital assistance for counter-drone technology, de-mining of reclaimed land, and the medical rehabilitation of injured Ukrainian personnel. Ukraine has placed new orders for ammunition worth £300 million through the international fund for Ukraine, which is administered by the UK.
Sanctions, too, are a crucial tool to weaken Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine. In July, the UK hosted the European Political Community at Blenheim Palace, where more than 40 countries signed a call to action to tackle Russia’s so-called shadow fleet: a fleet of ageing oil tankers, which use deceptive shipping practices and substandard insurance to attempt to undermine sanctions on Russian oil. At the event, the UK spearheaded action against the shadow fleet when we sanctioned 11 oil tankers. Through this action, we continue to demonstrate the UK’s steadfast commitment to Ukraine and underline our leading role in eroding Russian oil revenues.
Targeted sanctions against oil tankers have had a material and immediate impact. UK sanctioned tankers have been left idling, knocked out of the Russian oil trade and for the most part unable to load new cargoes. The instrument provides the basis for those sanctions, and has enhanced the UK’s ability to respond to Russia’s increasingly desperate and reckless attempts to undermine our and our partners’ sanctions.
I thank the Minister, welcome him to his place, and wish him well in his role.
I have been sanctioned by China and Russia, along with many others in this House—it is almost a badge of courage—but that is not the issue. My understanding of today’s sanctions is that businesses and those who have super yachts will be impacted directly, but that is all that the instrument means. If that is the case, will the Minister ensure that our sanctions have enough teeth to bite, and to be painful?
I thank the hon. Member. If he allows me, I will go a little further into the introductory remarks, which I hope will specify why this afternoon’s measures will provide greater teeth. I hope that will answer his concerns, but if it does not, I will return to him.
The instrument, as well as increasing the effect on shipping, also broadens the designation criteria under the Russia regime. It expands our powers to target those who provide financial or material support to Russia’s war machine. That could include, for example, foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions on behalf, or in support, of Russia’s military industrial base. That is in line with steps taken by partners and the G7’s commitment to curtailing Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war in Ukraine.
Let me turn now to the measure about which the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked. The instrument adds new relevant activities to the existing power in the Russia sanctions regime under regulation 57F—“specification of ships”—to provide the criteria to sanction individuals’ ships. The amendment provides that a ship may be specified by the Secretary of State where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it is, has been or is likely to be used for any activity whose object or effect is to destabilise Ukraine, to undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, or to obtain a benefit from, or support, the Government of Russia. That includes where a ship is involved in carrying dual-use or military goods, oil or oil products that originate in Russia, or any other goods or technology that could contribute to destabilising Ukraine or to undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.
Where a ship is specified under regulation 57F, it will be subject to measures in regulations 57A to 57E—the shipping sanctions. Where those sanctions apply, a specified ship is prohibited from entering a port in the UK, may be given a movement or a port entry direction, and can be detained or refused permission to register on the UK ship register—or, indeed, have its existing registration terminated. Additionally, UK persons and persons in the UK cannot provide funds and financial services, including maritime insurance, or brokering services, in relation to specified ships that are transporting certain oil and oil products, and cannot use specified ships to supply or deliver Russian oil and oil products, regardless of the price of the oil on board.
Once again, the UK has already specified ships using that enhanced power. The previous Government specified six vessels on 13 June. In July, this Government specified 11 vessels that were operating as part of Russia’s shadow fleet. That fleet attempts to undercut our sanctions, undermines the maritime rules-based order, and presents an environmental and maritime security threat to coastal states.
This statutory instrument also amends regulation 6 of the Russia sanctions regime. That regulation provides the criteria for the designation of individuals or entities for the purpose of an asset freeze and other relevant measures. Specifically, the instrument adds additional activities for which a person may be designated, including where individuals or entities provide financial services or make available funds, economic resources, goods or technology to persons involved in obtaining a benefit from, or supporting, the Government of Russia. In practice, that widens the set of actors and enablers that can be targeted for providing financial and material support to Russia and its war machine as Putin continues to prosecute his illegal war in Ukraine.
The instrument also consolidates powers under the Russia regulations to designate individuals or entities involved in the destabilisation of Ukraine. Specifically, the additional activities that the instrument adds to the designation criteria make possible the designation of persons who have owned or controlled entities involved in destabilising Ukraine, as well as individuals who work as directors or managers of such entities.
In the plainest language—because that was the language that the hon. Member for Strangford used—the instrument enables us to target the ship, as well as the individuals or entities involved with the ship. We found, through the previous regime, that the ship itself is the sharpest area of vulnerability, so the International Maritime Organisation number of the ship itself is where sanctions have greatest effect, and that is the effect that we are using today.
I understand; the Minister has laid out the system very simply. It applies to the EU, but we all know that those who seem to break most of the rules are India and other countries across the world that are out to buy Russian oil. If that is the case, what discussions have been had to ensure that India does not contravene what we are trying to do through these sanctions?
I say gently to the Minister that we have only an hour and a half for this debate. I know Members want to speak and I do not want to take any of that precious time away.
(4 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend raises a very important issue. My right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds) and I made statements in our first weeks in office on supporting UK-Med and restoring the funding to UNRWA, to ensure that those children get the medical aid they need at this time. I am afraid my assessment is that, across Gaza, it is not sufficient, for the reasons that I have discussed, but it was important that we put all the aid and money we could into that endeavour, particularly on behalf of those young children. Another issue that I am tremendously concerned about is the amount of young people who are not in school. This has gone on for months, and young people must be in school.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for his answers. I defend the right of Israel to protect all its people, as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland did for its own citizens against IRA terrorism, and as Ukraine has done against Russian aggression. I am ever mindful of that. Our hearts ache for those hostage families who have received the news that they feared and dreaded for almost a year. That even more forcibly underlines the need to ensure that either the hostages or their remains are brought home, and that steps be taken for peace in the middle east, which is the goal of the Foreign Secretary and everyone in this House. Will he outline what further steps can be taken along with our allies to bring about this much-needed peace?
Today’s decision relates to an independent process concerning our strategic export licensing criteria. It comes on yet another day of tremendous pain for those hostage families—I am acutely aware of that. It is why I have sought to speak to those families—those who have a relationship with our own country, and those beyond as well—and to meet them when I have been in Israel. My heart bleeds for them. The pain and suffering that they are going through is torturous. That there are so many left is unbelievable. To have gone so many months not knowing whether their loved one is alive or dead is horrific. Anyone who looks at the front pages of the international news can see those beautiful young people who have been taken from us in the most horrific of ways; frankly, it brings tears to the eyes. I offer my deepest condolences—all of us do—to those families who have learned that they have lost their loved ones over the last few days.
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I always have a question. [Laughter.] Sorry, humour is not what this is about. I apologise for that—I should not have said that.
I thank the Secretary of State very much for his calm and measured statement, which encapsulated the temperament and concern of all of us in this Chamber, on both sides. The attack at the football pitch in Majdal Shams was deadly and full of complete evil: 12 children and young adults were slaughtered. Will he outline what steps are being taken to find the perpetrators and hold them accountable, and to ensure the message is sent that these attacks will not bring peace, but instead further division? What steps will be taken to assist Israel, whose very existence is under threat from Hezbollah? Hezbollah are terrorist murderers of innocents, and must be neutralised.
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Member for his question. The Foreign Secretary has been crystal clear that he will be as transparent as he possibly can. He will ensure that Parliament is fully updated on these matters.
I thank the Minister for that response. If we want to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza, it is quite clear what the free world has to do: get rid of Hamas, who are murderers and terrorists. They hide in schools and hospitals, and they hide among civilians. They are the people who are bringing death to Palestine. If we want to give Palestinians the humanitarian aid that we should give them, we have to get rid of Hamas.
Of course, this Government recognise that Hamas have used civilians as human shields. We are deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation, and I set out our response to that a few moments ago. We need to ensure that civilians are protected, and we will continue to press for that as a matter of absolute urgency.
(5 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI will continue, if the right hon. Gentleman allows.
The signing of the convention on the establishment of the GCAP international government organisation, commonly known as the GIGO, by the parties of the UK, Japan and Italy took place in December 2023 and was conducted by the Defence Secretaries of those three nations. The GIGO will function as the executive body, with the legal capacity to place contracts with industrial partners engaged in GCAP. Through the GIGO, the UK will lead on the development of an innovative stealth fighter jet with supersonic capability and equipped with cutting-edge technology, and will facilitate collaboration with key international partners that raise the profile of the UK’s combat air industrial capacity.
The GIGO headquarters will be based in the UK, employing personnel from the UK, Italy and Japan. The chief executive and director posts shall be filled by nationals of different parties according to a mechanism that shall preserve a balance between the parties. Given the nature of the GIGO as an international defence organisation, the Ministry of Defence, with support from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, has been leading on trilateral engagement and negotiations on its establishment. The convention, once in effect, will enable closer collaboration between the parties—the Governments of Japan, Italy and the UK—and support the development of His Majesty’s Government’s defence capabilities, stimulated by development of the UK-based headquarters. That will enable further collaboration with key industry partners, with the headquarters supporting hundreds of jobs, and working in close partnership with Rolls-Royce, Leonardo UK, MBDA UK, and hundreds of other companies across the UK in the supply chain, to deliver GCAP.
I am coming to an end, and then there are 90 minutes for debate.
This Order in Council is a statutory instrument and forms part of the secondary legislation needed to confer legal capacity and privileges and immunities on the GCAP international government organisation and accords certain privileges and immunities to the organisation’s personnel and the representatives of the parties to the convention. The order was laid in draft before Parliament on 23 May 2024—
There is much to be welcomed in the Minister’s speech. At the very beginning, she referred to a number of aircraft companies that will be involved across the whole of the United Kingdom. My understanding—maybe she can confirm this—is that Spirit AeroSystems will also be involved. If that is the case, it means that everybody in this great United Kingdom of Great and Britain and Northern Ireland will benefit from the jobs and opportunities.
Obviously the specifics of the supply chain and so on are not really part of the order, but we are aware that that is an important part of our industrial puzzle, and I am sure that there will be some knock-on benefits for Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman is a fierce defender of jobs and opportunities in that wonderful place.
The first duty of Government is to keep the country safe. Under this Government, defence will be central both to the UK’s security and to our economic prosperity and growth, including by harnessing the strength of our well-established defence industry. The GIGO is key to GCAP, and the UK Government continues to make positive progress with our partners Japan and Italy. I commend the order to the House.
My right hon. Friend’s question is an interesting one. Whenever I was in front of the Select Committee—it was always a great joy and privilege to be cross-examined, particularly by my colleagues on the Conservative Benches—there was always a debate about when we withdraw platforms and when we bring in their replacements. That will never go away, and I wish the Armed Forces Minister well when he has the unique privilege and experience of going in front of the Committee. What I would say to my right hon. Friend is that we have to accept that, as a matter of avionic reality, the Typhoon will reach the end of its service life, and we as a country have to replace it. GCAP is key to that, with the construction of the new core platform.
While investing in the best combat air capability does not guarantee air superiority in the future, it offers us the chance to deny adversaries such potentially deadly freedom of operation by maintaining technological competitiveness. However, there are those who ask, “Why don’t we simply go off-the-shelf and buy more F-35s?” I noticed similar views being expressed in The Daily Telegraph this very day, and there is even a rumour that some Government Departments, such as those I mentioned earlier, may take a view along those lines. We must be clear that the F-35, while a brilliant and highly capable aircraft, is a fifth-generation platform, not a sixth-generation one. It is not optimised for the battle space that is likely to pertain by the late 2030s, and the United States—which, after all, possesses and manufactures the F-35—is itself investing in a sixth-generation programme, as are our adversaries.
I commend the shadow Minister for what he is saying: his great focus on the issues of modern technology, our companies and what they are involved with. I know that he has a tremendous interest in Northern Ireland—he visited there regularly in his former role in government. Can he give us some suggestions about the role that aerospace in Northern Ireland could, and will, play in finding a way forward?