Preparedness for National Emergencies

Jim Shannon Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd June 2026 Westminster Hall

[Graeme Downie]

I absolutely agree; that is a point I will come to later. We must engage with the public if we want their permission to plan for resilience.

Article 3 tells us that preparedness must be constant and not confined to defence Departments. It must be collective, but it requires active participation across the system. I would be grateful if the Minister picked up on how resilience is being embedded across Departments in the areas of threat highlighted by the national security strategy.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I commend the hon. Gentleman for bringing this issue forward; I spoke to him beforehand. Does he agree that if groups tasked with preparedness training, such as the building resilience in communities project in Northern Ireland, are to be effective, they must be well funded? The work carried out with local groups to build grassroots disaster resilience can bring about results only if there is the scope to invest in reaching out and if groups are not hampered by tiny budgets. This is not just about England but Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland collectively.

[Graeme Downie]

As ever, I agree with the hon. Gentleman—I always agree with his interventions, particularly when they are made so well. There is a need to make sure that we break outside of the M25, frankly, when we talk about resilience. We also need to look seriously at the resilience of our critical national infrastructure. What is striking about many of the risks we now face is that they do not require a full-scale conflict. They can arise from hybrid threats, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South (Gordon McKee) mentioned: those are much below the threshold of war but are capable of causing real and widespread disruption.

In a recent discussion with senior officials about the threat of Chinese-manufactured cellular internet of things modules, in my role as chair of the Coalition on Secure Technology, it was suggested to me that because the threat from such modules was theoretical—even though it was acknowledged that it was clearly feasible and would have a significant impact—there might be no need to prepare for it. Most risks are theoretical until they are very real, and the public then wonder why we were not prepared. I ask the Minister to specifically say what conversations he is having about the threat of cellular modules to the UK. Which Departments have been involved in those discussions?

I move on to our energy system—a key and particularly sensitive part of our infrastructure. We have seen how Vladimir Putin has used energy as a weapon against ordinary Ukrainian people, and he would be more than willing to do the same to British people as well. Without reliable energy, hospitals cannot function, communication systems begin to fail and supply chains break down. The Energy Security and Net Zero Committee, which I am a member of, will hold an evidence session on this very topic tomorrow. I have raised the issue with Defence Ministers before, but I believe that there are areas where we lack clarity on the legal position when it comes to hybrid attacks on our offshore infrastructure. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on what role the Cabinet Office can play in resolving that, as there seems to be an unclear boundary between the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Ministry of Defence in particular.

I turn to the point made by the hon. Member for Strangford about the importance of the devolved Administrations. Emergencies are experienced locally, as I highlighted at the beginning—they are managed locally, and resilience must be built locally. Too often, the UK’s national security infrastructure can feel as though it is concentrated within the M25 and shaped in central Government rather than fully embedded across all parts of the United Kingdom. I do not believe that that is intended, but it does create a risk: if preparedness is genuinely to be a whole-of-society effort, it must extend beyond Whitehall.

In those areas, security, advice and expertise do not always flow consistently to devolved Administrations and local partners. At the same time, those Administrations do not deal with national security issues with the same regularity as central Government. That creates a potential blind spot—due not to a lack of commitment, but the structure of the system. It is exactly the kind of gap that hostile actors could seek to exploit. I hope the Minister will address what more can be done to ensure that security advice and capability are fully embedded across the devolved Administrations and local authorities, and how we can ensure resilience is genuinely UK-wide, rather than only inside central Government.

Finally, I turn to a topic that is becoming a bit of a hobby horse of mine: the requirement to trust the public when we are developing our national security and resilience. Preparedness cannot be delivered by the Government alone; it must involve the public.