UK Defence Spending

Jim Shannon Excerpts

Thursday 24th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

First, it is a pleasure to speak in this debate, and I thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for calling me. Yesterday we were debating the Armed Forces Bill, and we discussed many things. Today I want to focus specifically on the size of our forces, recruitment and their capability to respond. I make my comments in a constructive fashion, and I look to the Minister for a response to some of the points of view I will put forward on capability to respond. It is important that those are aired and spoken about today.

During the debate yesterday, we sought to firm up our treatment of the armed forces, and I would like to focus on an aspect of that: defence spending on personnel levels. It is my belief that we must address the shrinking numbers of personnel and set aside funding to build them back up. I understand the Government’s aim to build up cyber sectors, and that is right and proper, but we also need feet in boots, on boats and in the air. We need to ensure that we in the United Kingdom and our policy can respond not just here but across the world when we are called and where the demands are many.

Perhaps the largest and most controversial sleight of hand is the definition of trained strength. Up until 2016, Army manpower was judged on the basis of personnel who were trained—that is to say, they had completed phase 1 and phase 2 training. The waters have now been muddied by including phase 1 trained personnel in the total Army trained strength. As one service personnel member has said—and I say it very gently—

“This is a fudge, as it falsely inflates the numbers but hides the fact that phase 1 personnel are trained in only the very basic rudiments of soldiering.”

For example, phase 1 armoured corps and infantry soldiers are unable to deploy on their vehicles; they are not trained to use radios; they have only very basic first aid training; they can only fire a rifle, not other weapons systems; they cannot use drones; they cannot conduct cyber operations; they cannot do public duties; they cannot carry live, armed weapons to guard their own camps, and many of them will not even have driving licences, so they are unable to deploy overseas and certainly cannot deploy on operations.

I say that respectfully, because I hope that, in response, the Minister will be able to say, “Well, here’s what we’re going to do to recruit them, train them and get them to that level of capability.” Again, I ask this with respect: is it not true that those soldiers are not able to do all that many of the duties that are requested because of their capabilities and their training, and that we should not be using them in an attempt to mask—I hope that is not what it is—the scandal of chronic undermanning? Will the Minister clearly outline whether the new figure of 72,500 will be based on trade-trained personnel and confirm that it will not be fudged or adjusted?

Another area of huge concern is the availability of trained military manpower. Is it not true that as much as 15% of the trade-trained strength—that is, those who have completed phase 1 and phase 2—is unable to deploy owing to temporary and permanent medical downgrading, attendance on career courses, maternity and paternity leave, career breaks and so on? I believe that is further exacerbated by large numbers of personnel being unavailable to deploy because they are in training roles already or in full-time reserve service roles, or they are in the MOD office—civil service personnel—on loan service embedded in other countries’ military, seconded to international bodies or serving in embassies around the world. Those are things that they are doing that reduce the number of personnel capable to respond.

[Jack Lopresti]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. When he mentioned the 70,000-odd regular deployable forces, he did not mention the reserve forces, which will be a major element of what we have available. Those will be in excess of 25,000. Will he work into his remarks the availability of reserve forces?

[Jim Shannon]

I thank my hon. Friend—for he is—for his intervention. I am not quite sure that he and I will agree on the figures game. Perhaps it is one of those cases where we agree to differ. If the reserve forces were trained to the high level of capability that I hope they would be, they would be extra forces, but the point I am making about the 72,500 is that we have a level of soldiers who are not trained to the capability that they should be. That is the point that I am trying to make. It is clear to me that there are issues that need to be addressed.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we cannot simply add the reserve numbers in, because in many cases they are not formed units, they are not training with regulars, and in some cases, even among them, there are individuals who are not fit for deployment?

[Jim Shannon]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, which—I say this very nicely—probably encapsulates the issue better. That is further exacerbated by large numbers of personnel being unavailable to deploy because they are in training roles or full-time reserve service roles. Not all those personnel are available; that is the point that I am trying to make.

If we apply the reality of those factors to the Army numbers, taking account of traditional undermanning of 7%—in layman’s terms, failing to recruit to 100% of strength—we are already, to use a snooker pun, behind the eight ball. Take out the staff supporting phase 1 and phase 2 training and any other training organisations that are on the staff assessment; take out the 15% unavailable to deploy, and the British Army regular manpower available to support a brigade-level deployment of just three years—a deployment in intensive operations for six months and every six months—is actually only about 55,000, because they are not trained to the capability that they need to be for so big a response.

I said at the start that I would make these comments in a constructive fashion, because I want the Minister to respond to the queries that we have. Those figures are worrying, and no person here can say that they are not worried by that analysis and those figures.

Given a deployed brigade current manning of about 12,000 people, it does not bode well for us being able to maintain sustained operations for any amount of time. Bear in mind the fact that the Iraq conflict ran for eight years and the Afghanistan one for 12 years, and that between 2003 and 2011 there were simultaneous operations at brigade-plus strength. We have to look at what we had in the past and what we have for the future.

Why focus on numbers? There is an old Stalinist military maxim, “Quantity has a quality of its own.” We should never disregard that thinking. It has been pointed out to me that the residents of eastern Ukraine, watching the build-up of Russian military power on their border, including their motorised nuclear motors, would draw little comfort from the language, and perhaps fanciful notions, expressed in our new integrated operating concept, such as “drive the strategic tempo”, “maximising advantage”, “creating multiple dilemmas”. We are certainly achieving this last one. Here is our multiple dilemma in this United Kingdom: we are likely to know and understand more than we have ever done in terms of intelligence and cyber, and be less able to do anything about it than ever before. That is the point I am making. If we do not have the soldiers, if we do not have feet in boots, on the boats and in the air, we have a serious problem.

In conclusion, I believe we need to spend the money and have a fully able and equipped force, fully trained. I look to our Minister and our Government today to confirm that that is where we are heading, because if we are not, we are in trouble. If we are, I hope the Minister will reassure us.