Arch Cru Compensation Scheme

Jim Shannon Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Westminster Hall

[Tom Greatrex]

I thank my hon. Friend, who makes an important point, which goes to the heart of this issue—the role of the FSA as the regulator and, it seems, the broker of a deal that might help to get something off its back.

It seems the FSA cannot work out what happened. It wants a line to be drawn under this issue, but thousands of unhappy people expected the regulator to prevent this abuse from happening. The FSA has said that the deal will return to investors approximately or up to 70% of their investment, and the words “up to” are quite significant. That 70% is based on the £54 million that has been returned already, £149 million from the sale of other assets, which were valued at that level at 31 March 2011, and an additional £54 million, which Capita, HSBC and BNY Mellon agreed to without accepting liability in a deal brokered by the FSA. However, that £149 million might well not be realised, especially when we consider that the asset base included Greek shipping and what have been described to me as rust-bucket ferries, as well as middle eastern property, the value of which—if there is any left at all—could have fallen, even in the short time since March, given the current economic conditions.

The question I put to the FSA—it was entirely reasonable, but the FSA was unable to answer it—was why it did not add up the asset sales and projected asset sales and subtract them from the investors’ losses to give a figure that would make the compensation up to 100% of what people invested. In that way, people could get their money back; they would not make a profit, but simply get back what they invested, based on the assurances they were given by an organisation that was regulated by the FSA when they took out their investment.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

One thing that has come to my attention through my constituents is that the FSA has given advice to investors pushing them towards independent legal advice. Some of that legal advice has led to further complications and added to the money they had already lost. Does the hon. Gentleman feel the direction the FSA pushed investors in should be addressed, given the extra heartache and money losses they have experienced as a result of seeking legal advice that has turned out to be wrong?

[Tom Greatrex]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I do not wish to get drawn into the background dispute between people who have paid into a class action legal fund and people involved in a different action group on behalf of investors. To be frank, I have spoken for far longer than I intended, and I want to give others the chance to get in. There are lots of complicated issues, and I want to focus on the compensation scheme before I draw my remarks to a conclusion. I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.

The approach I have suggested would simply enable people to get their money back—to get up to 100%. This case has been described as one of the worst investment scandals of recent years. There was a similar scandal under the FSA’s predecessor, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, and the name Peter Young will mean something to many people here. The relationships and problems involved were broadly similar, but following the suspension of the fund in question in 1996, IMRO achieved a settlement whereby people got their money back. The deal was funded by Morgan Grenfell, which was broadly in the same position as Capita.

That settlement was agreed three months after suspension. Although IMRO took action against the chief executive of the fund manager, the offer was not paid until January 1999—two years and four months after suspension. In the case of Arch Cru, however, it is now two years and eight months since suspension, and only now are letters starting to go out to people with the payment offer—I understand that they are going out now or will be going out in the next couple of weeks. Why was the FSA unable to get close to the resolution achieved by its predecessor as regulator in a similar time frame? Why is up to 70% acceptable to the FSA, when IMRO managed to get 100%?

Fourthly, there is the issue of ensuring that these events do not happen again. Something needs to change if these things are not to happen again, and people who invest their retirement nest eggs or lump sums on the basis of being told that a fund invests cautiously are not to lose their money, not to have to battle through the press to get a hearing, not to have to get a debate in Parliament so that issues can be aired and not to experience the stress, anxiety and rank unfairness of losing their money in a high-risk gamble they were told was a cautious investment.

In this regard, the FSA is about to be replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority, and the relevant proposals are beginning their pre-legislative scrutiny. What will be put in place to enable the FCA to prevent something similar from happening again? All of us, including the Government, have an opportunity to get the proposals right, and that is why these issues are a matter for the Minister and the Government. The Minister and the Treasury correspondence unit have been clear that this affair is a matter for the regulator, not them, but when the ACD fails, the regulator admits it did not know what was happening because of the structure of an investment vehicle, and the basis of a payment offer is so woefully inadequate, these things become a matter for the Minister; it becomes the Government’s responsibility to prevent or minimise the risk of such things ever happening again.

It also becomes a matter of my constituents and those of other Members present being entitled to information, but the FSA and others are not releasing much information. That is why I am putting the questions to the Minister today. Does he believe that Capita fulfilled its role effectively? Does he accept that the FSA has been hampered in fulfilling its role as regulator by its structure? Does he understand that in not providing information, there is suspicion among the investors? Does he realise that on that basis, up to 70% is just not good enough? Does he now know that the FCA needs to be bolstered for the future? Given all the above, will he now ensure that there is a section 14 investigation into what went on with Arch Cru?

I have spoken for far longer than I had intended, so I will conclude. It is easy, when looking into the matter, as I have done over the past few weeks, to get into the details and get lost in the technicalities and minutiae of the regulatory regime, and in the reputations of blue-chip companies, the statements of their chief executives and other individuals, and even the reputations of some of those in high-profile positions in the investment fund. Ultimately, the matter is about people—people such as my constituent Mr Pringle of Cambuslang, whom I have been in correspondence with. He e-mailed me yesterday and asked me to include a final point in the debate, which I will conclude on. He said that

“my wife…and I invested all our pension money with the Cru in this ‘Low Risk’ venture. Being pension money we obviously did not want any high risk ventures that would put our money at risk…We are extremely disappointed in the FSA’s attitude towards this case, by saying that they think Capita’s offer is ‘Fair and Reasonable’. Not in any way is their offer ‘Fair and Reasonable’. Investing in Greek Shipping is not ‘Low Risk’!”

That is the crux of the issue. That is why it is a matter for the Government as well as the regulator, and that is why the Minister needs to respond to the debate this morning.