Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Fifth sitting)

Jerome Mayhew Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Scully]

Amendments 55 to 57 relate to ensuring that the DMU will be able to use, in its digital markets investigation, evidence that was gathered and consultations that were undertaken before the Bill becomes an Act. I am grateful for the opportunity to explain this really important aspect of the regime.

To provide some context, clause 2 will give the DMU the power to designate undertakings with strategic market status with regard to a specific digital activity. It sets out that, to designate a firm with SMS in respect of a digital activity, the DMU will need to be satisfied that a number of conditions detailed in clauses 3 to 8 are met. SMS designation is the gateway into the digital markets regime. Only the very small number of firms that are designated will be subject to the rules of the regime. The DMU will only be able to designate a firm following an evidence-based SMS investigation, which must include a public consultation that allows the firm itself and wider stakeholders to provide input on the designation decision. I explained earlier that I would use “firm” and “undertaking” interchangeably. Accordingly, when I say a “firm with SMS” or an “SMS firm”, that is the same thing as a “designated undertaking”.

Turning to amendment 55, I strongly support the point that the CMA should not have to repeat work that it has already done. It is for the DMU to decide what is and is not relevant analysis to its investigations, and it should be able to draw on insight from previous analysis or consultations when carrying out an SMS investigation where it is appropriate and lawful to do so. I am happy to confirm that the Bill does not prevent the DMU from doing that, provided that it acts in accordance with general public law principles, which would, for example, require it to ensure that evidence remained relevant. As such, I do not believe this amendment is necessary to ensure the DMU can reflect its existing evidence, understanding and expertise in its designation investigations. Further, the amendment could restrict the DMU’s ability to draw on analysis that had not been the subject of consultation, even if the DMU considered that analysis to be relevant to an investigation.

Amendments 56 and 57 relate specifically to consultations on proposed decisions as part of the DMU’s SMS and pro-competition intervention investigations respectively. The DMU can launch PCI investigations into suspected adverse effects on competition. We will return to PCIs when debating the clauses in chapter 4.

Consultation is a fundamental feature of the regime. It ensures that the decisions are based on the best available evidence and that the regime is transparent. For SMS and PCI investigations, the DMU must consult on the specific decisions that it intends to take at the end of its investigation. That will ensure that all relevant parties have an opportunity to feed in views and perspectives on what the DMU is proposing on the decision at hand, not simply on the general operation of the market.

As I have highlighted, it is absolutely right that the DMU will be able to draw on broader knowledge during the course of its investigations, but it should not be able to do away with the consultations entirely. The consultations are a necessary part of the procedural safeguards that ensure good decision making. I know that the Coalition for App Fairness said that it would raise that in its evidence. I am grateful for its evidence. I totally agree with it that the consumer should not start with a blank piece of paper, but I do not think that it is necessary to amend the Bill in order to be able to be able to use that existing analysis where it is there.

I will now turn to clause 2, which will give the DMU the power to designate undertakings with SMS with regard to a specific digital activity. To do that, the DMU will need to be satisfied that a number of conditions are met. The concept of “digital activities” is detailed in clause 3. To be in scope of the regime, the turnover condition must be met. That is explained in clauses 7 and 8.

The DMU must also consider that the digital activity is linked to the UK, and that the undertakings meet the SMS conditions in respect of the digital activity. That is to say that the firm has, in respect of the digital activity, substantial and entrenched market power, and a position of strategic significance.

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. I will deal first with whether clause 2 should stand part of the Bill. It is of course axiomatic. Right at the heart of the purpose of the Bill is the designation of undertaking. Importantly, it references clause 7, which deals with the turnover of an undertaking. I am looking forward to what the Minister has to say about clause 7, particularly with reference to the levels of revenue or turnover for an undertaking. The Minister has given definitions for “undertaking” and “firm”. I look forward to his further comments about those definitions, particularly when it comes to the classification of worldwide turnover and the revenue being undertaken within the United Kingdom. I am straying slightly into clause 7, but because there is reference to it in clause 2, I hope that is acceptable.

I am just flagging that there may be consideration under clause 7 as to the possibility of the manipulation of turnover where there is a global undertaking with global turnover of less than £25 billion, but where the turnover associated with the United Kingdom is approaching the £1 billion mark. It is foreseeable that we could start to have economically significant manipulation associated with the definition of turnover—I flag that because it is referred to in clause 2. Of course, the main body of clause 2 is right at the heart of the Bill. I welcome the constructive opening comments from the hon. Member for Pontypridd, and I look forward to engaging with her and the other Members of the Committee on that basis over the coming days and, I am afraid to say, probably weeks. [Laughter.]

I turn to amendment 55. This Bill is already hundreds of pages long, and it was often noted in my former career at the Bar that legislation gets longer and longer as it seeks to become more and more specific. However, there is a risk with seeking to list all the elements that we wish to cover. By having a list, we encourage exemptions and the seeking out of elements that are not quite on the list. Through that mechanism, undertakings can avoid the intention while complying with the letter. In my submission, the approach taken by the Government in the current drafting of clause 2 is the right one, because, as the Minister has already mentioned, it gives the DMU the wide scope it needs to take account of work that has already been done without constraining it by having a specific list, as amendment 55 would require. Proposed subsection (5), which the amendment would insert, says that an SMS investigation

“may take account of analysis undertaken by the CMA, on similar issues, that has been the subject of public consultation, within the five years prior to Royal Assent of this Act.”

Who could object to that? However, the Minister made the point that it is already encompassed within the powers of the DMU under the current drafting of the Bill. If we say that this is specifically included in the body of text, it prompts the question: what if someone is just outside that but would otherwise properly be within the consideration of the DMU? It raises arguments that will be explored via litigation, particularly by organisations that have substantial turnover and considerable economic interests to defend, as we heard in oral evidence over the past week.

The last thing we want is to have legislation that invites clarification by the courts. Although I and the Minister are very sympathetic to the intentions behind amendment 55, I fear that it might have the unintended consequence of increasing the chances of prolonged litigation as we seek to explore what exactly is and is not within scope of the DMU. For that reason, I do not support the amendment.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the comments from the hon. Gentleman and the Minister, but we would like to press the amendment.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

We do not oppose clauses 3 to 8, on the basis that they set out what constitutes a digital activity for the purpose of part 1 of the Bill. Clause 3 is an important clause with a number of subsections that clarify the exact definitions of digital activities and provision of services. These are all critical to empowering the DMU, which, if properly supported, has the potential to be a world-leading regulator and is ultimately the critical first step in modernising our competition policy.

We can all agree that the UK has the potential to be recognised as a global leader in technology and innovation, and capitalising on that is vital to our economic growth, yet the current situation, which sees a small number of firms dominate digital markets, is reducing competition for other businesses. Ultimately, it is consumers who are paying the price in the products and services we all receive.

This clause is crucial to defining exactly which digital activity will fall under the regulation, and it is welcome. After all, Labour has been clear and has long called for measures to regulate the digital space more widely. We specifically support the clause, as it gives us all clarity on how we can define digital activity.

Subsection (3), which outlines how the regime will give the CMA the power to treat multiple digital activities carried out by a single undertaking as a single digital activity, is particularly welcome. For different activities to be grouped together, they must either have substantially the same or similar purposes—for example, a social media provider offering a number of internet services under different brands with a common function, allowing users, such as advertisers and publishers, to interact and communicate with each other; or can be carried out together to fulfil a specific purpose—for example, services and products that are part of the same supply chain, such as services selling advertisements and the provision of an advertising platform. We all know the rapid rate at which companies can develop and expand, so it is particularly welcome to see this subsection.

Subsection (4), which sets out that where the CMA is required to give or publish a notice or other document under part 1 of the Bill, it may describe the digital activity by reference to the nature of that activity, brand names, or a combination of these, is also vital to the success of the regime. We clearly support the clause, which we regard as crucial to establishing the barometers of the CMA’s regulatory powers, and we have therefore not sought to amend it at this stage.

Clause 4 sets out the ways in which a digital activity could be linked to the UK for the purposes of designation. We are pleased to see that the clause considers the number of UK users in its criteria, as we have all read the reports of tech firms threatening to leave the UK if other legislation places requirements on them in future. That is why, with regard to pro-competition law, the UK user base must be considered when it comes to implementing this regime.

Once on the statute book, the DMU will be empowered to oversee a new regulatory regime for the most powerful digital firms, promoting greater competition and innovation in these markets and protecting consumers and businesses from unfair practices. It is vital that UK-specific connections are established in the Bill. The clause is also an important opportunity to highlight the significant impact that inaction is having on our digital markets in the UK. As we know, these markets are characterised by having just a few big tech firms with entrenched market power and the ability to shape the market to the detriment of consumers and smaller businesses. The 2020 CMA market study said:

“Both Google and Facebook grew by offering better products than their rivals. However, they are now protected by such strong incumbency advantages—including network effects, economies of scale and unmatchable access to user data—that potential rivals can no longer compete on equal terms.”

The current balance of power means the big tech companies often have an unfair advantage over their competitors and dominate key markets. For example, virtually all UK smartphones run either Apple or Google operating systems. In 2018, Google had a more than 90% share of the UK search advertising market, and Meta owns 50% of the UK’s digital display advertising space. Thanks to their dominance, Apple and Google made in excess of £4 billion of profits from their mobile businesses in 2021. The CMA estimates that Facebook and Google made profits of £2.4 billion above what would be considered a fair return in the digital advertising market in 2018. On Meta’s market dominance, the CMA noted:

“Facebook’s average revenue per user in the UK has increased from less than £5 in 2011 to over £50 in 2019.”

The consequence is worse outcomes for smaller businesses and consumers. That is why we welcome the clarity in the clause and support its inclusion.

Clause 5 requires the CMA to look at the next five years when assessing whether an undertaking has substantial and entrenched market power in respect of a digital activity. Specifically, it must be satisfied that the undertaking’s market power and influence in the digital activity is neither small nor transient. Although we welcome that requirement—ultimately, none of us wants companies to be stifled to their detriment—I hope the Minister will flesh out exactly how he thinks the clause will work in practice. The CMA is clearly well placed to assess digital firms’ plans for progression and development over the next five years, but we are concerned that the clause is broadly asking the impossible, given the rate at which technological developments and expansion can occur in this space. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s assessment.

The clause further outlines that the CMA must take into account expected or foreseeable developments if it does not designate the undertaking as having strategic market status in respect of the digital activity to which the investigation relates. Again, that is the kind of welcome and balanced approach to designation that we would expect of a new regulatory regime, but will the Minister confirm how the Bill will ensure that such decisions and designations are made public so that the transparency of the regime as a whole is enhanced? It would be helpful for all of us—parliamentarians, firms, civil society bodies and stakeholders in the sector—to understand how designations are made, and transparency is central to that. I hope the Minister will address those points. We seek some assurances, but I am sure we will be happy to support the clause as it stands.

Clause 6 sets out the terms by which an undertaking has a position of strategic significance. It sets out a number of conditions, including size, scale and the role the firm plays in terms of digital activity more widely. We support the need for flexibility in the regime, so paragraphs (c) and (d) are particularly welcome. Paragraph (c) is intended to cover circumstances in which the undertaking can use its position in the digital activity to leverage or expand into a range of other activities. That is vital, because companies have to be agile to dominate a variety of markets, and they can abuse that. Paragraph (d), which is intended to cover scenarios where an undertaking’s position enables it to determine or substantially influence how other undertakings operate—in other words, to set the rules of the game—is equally important.

It would, however, be remiss of me not to highlight our slight concerns about subsection (2), which gives the Secretary of State the power to vary the conditions set out in the Bill. The success of the regime relies on scrutiny and direction from the Government, but will the Minister clarify exactly what type of scenario would require the Secretary of State of the day to vary the conditions?

As I have said, we support an agile approach to regulation. After all, even across other jurisdictions, the idea of regulation and encouraging pro-competition across our digital markets is a complex process for legislation. We wholeheartedly support the need to get this Bill on the statute book—it is something Labour has long called for—but none of us wants the regulator to be undermined or constrained by the opinions of the Secretary of State of the day, so I would appreciate some reassurance from the Minister on that point before proceeding.

Clause 7 outlines the turnover conditions that must be met for the CMA to designate an undertaking as having strategic market status in respect of a digital activity. Subsection (2) sets out that the turnover condition is met if the CMA reasonably estimates that the undertaking’s UK turnover in the relevant period exceeds £1 billion or that its global turnover in the relevant period exceeds £25 billion. We welcome the clarity that only one of these thresholds needs to be met for the turnover condition to be met and, if the undertaking is part of a group, the turnover of that pooled group should be considered, which is a matter we will come to when we debate clause 114.

I will take this opportunity to highlight the fact that while the £1 billion and £25 billion turnover figures may seem high, they show the sheer market dominance that certain firms have over our digital markets. Setting the conditions at the current rate will not act as a deterrent for growth, which, of course, none of us want to see. We particularly welcome subsection (5), which requires the CMA to keep the thresholds under review and, from time to time, to advise the Secretary of State as to whether they are still appropriate and proportionate.

It would be helpful for all of us in the room and those listening elsewhere to understand how the Minister envisions that this will work in practice. Will it be on an annual review basis, and when will we have clarity on that? Will the reviews be made public to ensure proper and appropriate scrutiny? These are small points, but given the lack of transparency around the regime as it stands, I would be grateful for the Minister’s assurances. Despite that, again, we support the clause as it stands and do not seek to amend it at this stage.

Finally—thank you for your indulgence, Dame Maria—clause 8 makes provision about the value of an undertaking’s or a group’s UK or global turnover in the relevant period for the purposes of the turnover condition. We see this as a fairly procedural clause, which outlines the definition of global turnover by which the CMA will make its decisions on designation. We note that subsection (4) gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations providing further detail about how the total value of an undertaking’s or a group’s UK turnover or global turnover is to be estimated for the purposes of the turnover condition. Again, we feel that this could be problematic, and I would welcome the Minister’s reasoning as to why and in what instance the Secretary of State would need to make regulations to provide that further detail.

If the CMA is to be trusted to make reasonable decisions on a group’s turnover for the purposes of the turnover condition, it seems odd to give the Secretary of State the power to provide further detail when the merits or even the content of such further detail is so ambiguous. I hope the Minister can provide clarity and expand on that point. That aside, we support the clause because the turnover point is crucial for designation. The clause should remain and it should stand part of the Bill.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I briefly made mention of clause 7 in my earlier remarks. I am interested in the Minister’s view, particularly on clause 7(2)(b) and the definition of UK-related turnover being £1 billion or more. There is a legitimate question to be asked, because while that is a substantial amount of money, it is not that great in terms of global business. As I mentioned, I could foresee a situation whereby when a global undertaking’s global turnover is substantially less than £25 billion and its UK-related turnover is approaching the billion-pound mark, there might be a perverse incentive to direct investment and activity away from the United Kingdom because of that cliff-edge definition. I would love to propose a better alternative—it is above my pay grade—but I highlight that as being an issue we might need to take into account.

[Paul Scully]

I will cover most of the points in my main speech, but the reasons for designation of SMS status will be published, so that will be public. I will cover the points on the Secretary of State and on turnover. Clause 3 sets out what constitutes a digital activity for the purposes of the digital markets regime. Digital activities are defined as the provision of digital content, such as software, operating systems or applications; services provided by means of the internet, such as an e-commerce platform; and any other activity carried out for the purposes of providing digital content or internet services, such as background processes.

A firm can only be designated with SMS in respect of a digital activity. The restriction to digital activities is appropriate for the new regime, which responds to the specific characteristics of digital markets, such as network effects and data consolidation, which makes them extremely fast-changing as well as prone to tip in favour of a few firms. With all of this, the definition of digital activities has been designed so that our regime will be able to handle the complexities of different and fast-evolving digital business models, and that is reflected in the powers given to the Secretary of State.

Clause 4 sets out when the DMU will be able to consider a digital activity as being linked to the UK for the purposes of designation. As we have heard, the global nature of digital markets means that business actions in other countries can impact on consumers and businesses in the UK, so it is important to allow the DMU to address harm to competition in the UK, even when all or part of a firm’s physical operations are located elsewhere.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

I have talked about the fact that the CMA will publish on a regular basis—on an annual basis—its report about what it is doing and how it is working. The Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton, has regular meetings with the CMA and with the Competition Appeal Tribunal as well. We will meet regularly the digital markets unit to talk through the issues of capacity and its decision making, but it is not just for us to be talking to it “behind closed doors”, within the Department. The regular reports from the CMA and the decision-making reports, which will be published as well, will absolutely highlight why the decisions have been taken and how they have been taken, and therefore we can take a judgment on what resources it needs and whether it is under-resourced.

Over the three years of my ministerial career, I seem to have been giving the CMA jobs to do. I say that having done the Bills that became the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 and the Subsidy Control Act 2022 and now this. The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark is right to say that the CMA has expanded. But it has expanded in accordance with the expertise that it has.

[Jerome Mayhew]

We had three days of oral evidence last week and were lucky enough to have the chief executive of the CMA come and give evidence to us. I do not have a copy of Hansard with me, so I stand to be corrected, but I believe that I am right in saying that Ms Cardell, when she gave her evidence, was directly questioned about the level of resource that the CMA had and her degree of confidence as to whether it would be sufficient to carry out the tasks anticipated in the Bill. The words that stick in my mind and that I ascribe to Ms Cardell—again, I stand to be corrected—were that the CMA is well resourced and more than capable of undertaking these activities.

[Paul Scully]

I thank my hon. Friend.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jerome Mayhew Excerpts

Thursday 27th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Selaine Saxby (North Devon) (Con)]

5. How the Church of England plans to spend grant funding from local authorities.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland) (Con)]

9. How the Church of England plans to spend grant funding from local authorities.

[The Second Church Estates Commissioner (Andrew Selous)]

Grants that would cover kitchens, loos or disability access, basic repairs to rooves and windows and so on are in many cases unavailable to Church of England parish churches because of an inconsistency in the way in which local authorities are applying the law, and the Bishop of Bristol has tabled an amendment to the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill to resolve this so that parish churches can apply for such grants, and I hope the Department will be supportive of it.

[Andrew Selous]

Yes, of course I will meet with my hon. Friend. I have also heard of the good work of St John the Baptist, Meshaw. The Church Commissioners have given £11 million over the next three years to fund specialist support officers to advise on community projects of this nature and to help with fundraising. Small grants are available to help with repairs and towards buildings becoming net zero. Parishresources.org.uk may also provide helpful information. The Exeter diocese recently held a “meet the funders” day, to which more than 100 people turned up, to learn how churches such as St John the Baptist can approach funders such as the Benefact Trust. I encourage Meshaw to follow that up.

[Jerome Mayhew]

My hon. Friend has made reference to the speech of the Bishop of Bristol in the other place highlighting an apparent inconsistency between the Local Government Act 1972 and the 1894 Act, which gives cause for concern as to whether local government funding for Church buildings is legal. Does my hon. Friend recognise that as a serious concern, and if so how does he propose to clarify the issue?

[Andrew Selous]

My hon. Friend is right about the Bishop of Bristol, whose amendments in the other place have the support of heritage bodies and the National Association of Local Councils, whom I have also met on the issue. All we are asking is for Church of England parish churches to be treated the same as other faith and community buildings, which does not seem a lot to ask for, and I would hope that both my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch (Rachel Maclean), and the Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South (Mike Wood), are listening hard to what I have said and representations will be made to Ministers about these issues.