Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Jerome Mayhew Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mark Pawsey]

That is a good point, and I hope that the Minister will consider that, because in many cases a contract has been entered into on the basis of a certain volume of business. Many businesses have contracted, so a purchasing company may not be buying the same volume. Does that provide the ability to keep the price at the original position? Price and volume go hand in hand, and there may be additional economies of scale. There are concerns, and I know that the Minister will respond.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) raised the issue of debts accruing because of extended payment terms. Buyers are often more interested in payment terms than the price of the product. A buyer does a great job if he manages to screw 60 or 90-day payment terms out of a supplier, rather than a particularly good deal on the product. If we can move our culture away from extended credit many of the provisions in the Bill would be rather less necessary than they are. The Minister will deal with those issues, and it is entirely right that in the Bill he guarantees that supplies that are made during the moratorium are exempt—the supplier is guaranteed to be paid once the monitor has agreed that they will continue to trade. That goes some way towards providing substantial confidence to the supplier. I am also happy with the exemption from the provisions for small companies. As the Secretary of State has said at the Dispatch Box, the usual criteria on size apply.

I want to conclude with the temporary suspension of the rules on wrongful trading, which I entirely support. Right now, business directors around the country are pretty worried about the financial viability of their businesses and their liabilities if they continue to trade, particularly if the trade position continues to worsen. The current rules are that they could be liable personally if they do not bring their business to a conclusion, even though the challenges facing those businesses are not of their making. Relaxation of those wrongful trading provisions will enable many directors across the country to sleep rather more soundly at night.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland) (Con)]

Could I just come back on that interesting point about the risk of personal liability hanging over directors? I declare an interest, as I am a director of a trading business. It fits very well, does my hon. Friend not agree, with the development of the CBIL scheme? Originally, that scheme was not very popular, because many banks insisted on personal liability for businesses and for the directors of businesses to stand behind the loans that they were giving. The current scheme removes the risk of personal liability for directors via the scheme.

[Mark Pawsey]

My hon. Friend makes a good point, and we must provide every support to business owners and directors at this challenging time, to allow them to make decisions that will enable their businesses to continue to survive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak after my hon. Friend the Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon); we have spoken in many debates on business issues before and he is a huge champion of business. It was also a pleasure to listen to the maiden speech of my new colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton (Chris Clarkson). It is great to have another Conservative northern Member of Parliament to champion the cause of the northern powerhouse. He neglected to mention Yorkshire, and particularly north Yorkshire, in his list of areas in the north that will contribute to the recovery, but I will have a word later. It was a fantastic speech.

I draw the House’s attention—of course, in all these types of debates—to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am still involved in business to this day. I am also the chair of the all-party group on fair business banking, which has talked about many of these issues over the last months and years. In my view, the CBILS and BBLS are a huge success, but there are problems, particularly with the CBILS, in terms of making sure that banks do allow money to go out the door based upon the business being a viable business on 1 March. There are still issues about banks assessing the ability of the business to pay the loan back over a period of time. In particular, there are sector-based issues—football clubs being one and house builders being another. Banks seem to be translating from a standard lending policy into a CBILS lending policy, which cannot be right. That was never the intention of the Government scheme.

On the Bill, I am a strong supporter of the measures being brought forward by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, particularly on the moratorium and the opportunity to restructure. That has been planned for some time to give businesses breathing space. Irrespective of the covid crisis, at any point in time, many businesses can be salvaged through this process. It has happened in the US for many years—it is known as chapter 11—and it is absolutely the right thing to do.

I will not talk in detail about the Bill, because many others have, but I will talk about some of the things that I think we need, as well as this legislation, that would make a significant difference. There are some outstanding issues that the Minister and the Department are aware of and they have consulted on some of them, particularly about moving from a self-regulation basis for insolvency practitioners to a single, truly independent regulator. There are some very important issues that we have seen over recent years in terms of conflicts of interest that will carry on despite the Bill. The moratorium and the opportunity to restructure will help to some extent, but the conflicts of interest will carry on. This is particularly because most insolvency practitioners who are appointed to carry out work on an insolvent business are appointed by the major creditor, which tends to be the bank. It is a panel appointment by the bank and clearly, people rarely bite the hand that feeds. So if most of the work that the insolvency practitioner—who is supposed to work independently of any individual creditor and in the best interests of all creditors—is getting is from the banks, they are more likely, in our experience, to work in the interests of the bank.

It is even worse than simply the facts of what happens in the insolvency. On many occasions, we are talking about large accountancy practices, such as KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst and Young, who are appointed by the banks prior to insolvency, for example, to carry out a supposedly independent business review—paid for by the business but instructed by the bank. They have been brought in to do an independent business review, which is supposed to give a fair representation of the business, and that accountancy practice then becomes the insolvency practitioner and can earn hundreds of thousands of pounds of fees in the insolvency, which is a clear conflict of interest.

This issue has been brought up for decades in this House. I found two debates in 1999 when this conflict of interest was mentioned. It is something we need to deal with. This has featured in many of the issues we have seen over the last decade or so, particularly around the last crisis, where we had tens of thousands of businesses that were put into administration by the banks—this is a matter of public record—particularly by RBS and Lloyds Banking Group. Tens of thousands of businesses were put into insolvency inappropriately. A fair percentage —around 20%—of those businesses were viable, but there is not one instance of an insolvency practitioner deciding to sue the bank and saying, “Your business has gone into receivership as a result of creditor misconduct.” In other words, the bank is forcing the business into administration. Never has there been a case in which an insolvency practitioner who is supposedly independent and working for all the creditors has said, “There is something wrong. We need to take the bank to task.” There has not been one instance. We have pushed for information, and we have received emails from accountancy practices saying, “We would never sue a bank—we would never litigate—because of the conflict of interest.” There is a huge conflict of interest, and huge sums lie at the heart of this.

We are talking about thousands of businesses in this situation. This is systemic for every bank and almost every insolvency practitioner, but I should like to discuss a particular case, because it reveals the nature of the issue. We are talking about tens of thousands of businesses, and we have to understand that there are tens of thousands of people—individuals—whose life’s work has been taken from them, along with hundreds of thousands of jobs. These are very serious issues.

The case I wish to raise is that of Arthur Holgate and Son. This is not a sub judice issue, and I have obtained consent from the business to discuss it. It is a tangible example of the problems that arise. It was a family-owned business that ran caravan parks and turned over about £2 million. It was a significant business that, like a lot of other businesses, sold a swap that put it in danger, which increased the cost of loan servicing a great deal. That became the matter of a redress scheme, because of the inappropriate sale of complex financial instruments to businesses that were not sophisticated.

When that came to light, with a route for redress, the business approached the scheme and was offered £300,000 in compensation, despite the fact that its losses totalled £1.4 million. Ultimately the business failed and went into administration. It was taken off the owners—it had been in the family for generations—but it was one of the few businesses that we have come across that had the financial wherewithal and tenacity to get this thing through to court. On the courtroom steps, compensation was settled at about £10 million by Barclays bank.

We need to look at the actions of the insolvency practitioner as well as the actions of Barclays bank. Despite the fact that the insolvency practitioner is supposed to work independently, it did not do so. It colluded in bringing about the failure of the business and as a result the distribution of assets from the business effectively went to them and to the banks. Deloitte was the insolvency practitioner. This is not an isolated case: Deloitte was fined this year for its administration of Comet—many Members will remember that—and it was given a £1 million fine for failing to manage a conflict of interest in that case. We need to deal with this, as we are not dealing with it in the legislation.

Deloitte was brought in to undertake an independent business review for the bank to see whether the business was viable and able to get through its financial difficulties. It charged the business £50,000 for that work, which was paid after the business was declared insolvent on a preferred creditor basis, which is against the law.

There are many concerns, but the most disgraceful part of this case was the correspondence between Barclays and Deloitte. Barclays effectively told Deloitte to ignore the directors, although they were running the business and knew it best. In fact, I can quote from one of the emails sent internally in Deloitte, which said: “Be careful of swallowing the Paul Holgate line”—Paul Holgate being one of the directors of the business—“that it’s somebody else’s fault”. He kept saying to them, “It’s not our fault that we are in this position. This is because the bank sold us a swap.” He was right, but Deloitte deliberately did not put that information in the business review and did not even mention the swap at that point in time or when the insolvency happened. Another email sent internally in Deloitte said, “We do not want to appear critical of the bank.” That is because of the conflict of interest, and it cannot be right.

We must put a Chinese wall between consultancy work that a bank requires an accountant to do and that very accountant then being able to do the insolvency work, because there is a clear conflict of interest. In this case, there were fees of £400,000 for Deloitte to carry out the insolvency work. Had it just done the £50,000 report and said, “This business is fine. It’s actually your fault because of the swap. If you settle that problem, the business will carry on trading fine,” Deloitte would have got £50,000, and that would have been it.

[Jerome Mayhew]

My hon. Friend talks very persuasively about this, and I have found myself nodding along to everything he has been saying for the last several minutes, but he keeps on referring to a conflict of interest, when surely what he is talking about is better named corruption.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. Before the hon. Gentleman answers the intervention, although he has not spoken for an inordinately long time—indeed, other Members have spoken for much longer—he has spoken for well over 10 minutes, and I have to ask him to conclude pretty quickly, because it is in the interests of everyone that the Minister is able to answer the debate. Members have asked questions, and we must have time for that.