Railways Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJerome Mayhew
Main Page: Jerome Mayhew (Conservative - Broadland and Fakenham)Department Debates - View all Jerome Mayhew's debates with the Department for Transport
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We are now sitting in public, and the proceedings are being broadcast. Does anybody have anything to declare? No. We will now hear oral evidence from First Rail, Rail Freight Group and ALLRAIL. We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
John Thomas: I am John Thomas, policy director of ALLRAIL.
Maggie Simpson: I am Maggie Simpson, director general of Rail Freight Group.
Steve Montgomery: I am Steve Montgomery, managing director of FirstGroup’s rail division.
Q
Maggie Simpson: We are really concerned about the scope and definition of the appeals function as proposed in the Bill. We know that Great British Railways wishes rail freight to succeed. There are positive provisions for rail freight at the beginning of the Bill, but GBR will be a vertically integrated, incredibly powerful monopoly that, quite rightly, will be very focused on its own trains. This legislation will last for a long time, and the behaviours and actions of people today may not be mirrored in future Administrations or at future times.
Our members—businesses across the country that rely on the railways for their supply chains—are really concerned about ensuring that, if things go wrong, they have an effective right of appeal. The provisions in the Bill set an incredibly high threshold—judicial review standards—for bringing an appeal. Even if it is met, the actions that can be taken are such a high bar that it is very unlikely that a decision would ever be overturned, and future Secretaries of State can by regulation, through the negative procedure, set out even more steps and fees. We are really concerned that that is weak. It is a backstop provision; we would only need to use it if things went wrong, but if it is not any use, it will deter people from investing.
Q
Maggie Simpson: On capacity allocation in particular, as well as the points I have just made about the appeals function, we have a conflict between two clauses in the Bill. The capacity duty in clause 63 sets an incredibly powerful requirement in law for GBR to keep capacity for its own trains and any trains it wants to run in the future. We have sought assurance from the Department for Transport on how that duty and clause 60, on the infrastructure capacity plan, work together. The Department has told us that its intention is for the capacity duty to be subservient to the infrastructure capacity plan, where an assessment is made of the best use of the network, but that is not what the law says. We would like to see it clarified that the value-based assessment of what is the right use of capacity on the network is done first, and that GBR is then able to assure the capacity afterwards.
Q
John Thomas: First, I will say that the policy intent is quite clear. One of the DFT’s supporting documents to the Bill is quite clear that one of the definitions of a duty on GBR is for it to be fair and non-discriminatory in its decision making. Network Rail’s recent access and use policy document also made it clear that GBR would have to be fair and non-discriminatory in its decision making. However, there is nothing on the face of the Bill to suggest that.
It is really important that there is something on the face of the Bill to say that GBR needs to be fair, transparent and non-discriminatory in its decision making. I think that would be in the best interests of customers and communities, and it would give our members confidence to continue to invest, rather than just relying on the taxpayer to make investments.
The reason I say no is that there is no such provision on the face of the Bill. Going back to Maggie’s point about appeals, I think it would really help the appeals process if there were provision for GBR to be non-discriminatory in making decisions; otherwise, what are appeals going to be based on? They will be based on GBR’s own policies, and if it can discriminate against other services, what is there to appeal against?
In addition, the ORR will lose its ability to hear appeals on the basis of taking into account the benefits of competition for users. We think that is wrong. We think that an open access appeal could never be successful if that provision were taken away, so we advocate adding it back in. The ORR should have a duty to take account of the benefits of competition. Clearly, it has to take into account other matters, as it does currently, including the funds available to the Secretary of State, but if it does not have the ability to take account of the benefits of competition, how is an open access operator ever going to be successful in any appeal?
Q
Steve Montgomery: I agree with everything John and Maggie said. The challenge we see as a private sector operator is how you get anybody to invest in the industry with the lack of clarity in the Bill. As John alluded to, there is reference by the DFT in the memorandum of understanding on the Bill, but nothing in the Bill itself. That makes it very difficult to go to a board and say, “Look, we want to invest in these things.” What certainty do you have for the future?
An awful lot has been made of open access as we have gone through this process. It would take up 1% of overall capacity, but it is held out there, in the commentary, as one of the major plays in the Bill. We think that open access brings the opportunity for competition, which we seem to have lost with some of the wording in the Bill. How do we make sure that there are better services for customers? That is what we all want and what GBR is setting out to do, but how do we make sure that we all have a fair chance when bidding? We have talked about the access situation. GBR can decide not to give access, and the ORR has very limited powers to hear an appeal, so where is the confidence for the private sector investment that the industry continues to cry out for?
Q
Maggie Simpson: We have been very clear that we welcome those provisions. We are grateful to the Rail Minister and his team at the DFT, and to your own team, for their commitment to freight. That is really good but, with respect, I have been around a long time and I have seen circumstances in which Secretaries of State and Rail Ministers have not been as keen on freight, or perhaps have been more keen on road freight and less keen on rail freight. We have seen situations arise through different political times and economic circumstances.
When I am looking at the Bill, I am looking at whether it works today, with a Government who are supportive of and promoting freight, and at whether it would it work in the future, with a Government, of whatever colour, who have a different view. We have to look at it through that lens because we legislate for the long term. It is really difficult, because you are saying to people who are trying to help you, “Actually, I don’t like this.” That is an emotional tension—of course it is.
The duties and provisions in the Bill are great— I would not want to be going into GBR without them, and I think they will be powerful—but they are doing a lot of heavy lifting. We are going into a very different cultural environment. GBR will think about its own trains first; it has to for it to succeed—that is kind of the core. We are going into a very different access arrangement and a very different set of parameters, and it is entirely possible that they could go wrong and that we would need the recourse of the appeal function. They might not, but we need to know that it will work if they do. Having a strong appeal function will help it to work, because GBR will know that if things do go wrong we have that recourse in law.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Trainline and Independent Rail Retailers. We have until 3.05 pm for this panel. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Catriona Meehan: Good afternoon. My name is Catriona Meehan. I am the director of public affairs at Omio, here today representing Independent Rail Retailers.
John Davies: My name is John Davies, I am vice president of industry relations at Trainline. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today.
Q
“important to give the right signals from the outset that TPRs will be competing on a level playing field with GBR—to encourage that competition and investment which will benefit passengers directly”.
That is what the CMA says. Mr Davies, do you agree with the position that the CMA has taken? If you do, do you think the Bill as currently drafted gives a level playing field between GBR and independent retailers? If not, why not, and what would you do to fix it?
John Davies: Yes, we agree with the view that the CMA has expressed on giving the right signals from the outset for how the reformed rail industry should work as far as retail is concerned. They also highlighted the risk of this structure giving rise to the actual or perceived risk that GBR will self-preference its own retail operation. There is relatively little about the structure of the reformed rail industry in the Bill, but I think the relevant point is that the creation of GBR will bring together online retailing in a single website and app. This creates a conflict of interest, because GBR will define and operate the future retail market, it will set its economic terms and it will also compete in it.
It is not just the CMA that has recognised these challenges and risks. The Government’s own Railways Bill impact assessment registered this point in terms of the competitiveness of the ticket retailing market—it could be questioned by potential investors who might be concerned that GBR will use its unique position to take actions that put its retail competitors at a disadvantage. However, I should also note that we are encouraged by some of the words of Lord Peter Hendy, who said in a December interview with Simon Calder that there ought to be a level playing field. We look forward to understanding more about how that will be provided, because we have not seen any of the detail on that just yet.
Q
John Davies: I think it can only be helpful. There is a need to be certain that the retail part of GBR will compete in the market in the same way as everybody else, that it will do so on equality of terms, and that there will be equality of market access on things like fares, features, products, data services and system access, as well as economic parity, so that there is certainty that GBR’s online retail activity will not be loss-making or cross-subsidised, and that there will be transparency of costs and revenues, so that the ORR can hold it to account.
Q
I have in mind, for example, LNER currently being able to offer a full refund with one click on its website, and that service and facility not being made available to independent retailers even under the current system. Can you elaborate on quite how important that is for the independent sector? I would then like Catriona Meehan to come in with her views, too.
John Davies: When we talk about the need for the right kinds of protections for retailers, we are pointing at something that is not theoretical—these are risks that are with us today. You point at the example of delay repay, where independent retailers are prevented from supporting customers who have purchased their tickets through them by submitting their claims directly. It also occurs with things such as loyalty schemes, retailer inability to offer customers pay-as-you-go fares, and our ability to offer assisted travel. Independent retailers are not permitted to have access to a very significant amount of propositions around rail travel that are a very meaningful part of the market.
Catriona Meehan: I completely echo all of John’s points. For us, it is a concern that there would not be proper separation, which could lead to a degree of self-preferencing. You mentioned SNCF and the separation there, which is an example that we think works well. It is not perfect, of course; there are things that could be improved, but a colleague on the previous panel from ALLRAIL mentioned that EU markets are moving the other way: they are liberalising rather than nationalising.
It is interesting to look at why it has happened and why there is a need for it. FRAND principles were mentioned. We are also seeing that in other markets. Omio operates across 46 markets globally, so we have a lot of experience in other markets. Obviously, the UK is very important through our partnership with Uber trains, but we should also talk about the wider sector of independent rail retailers. Unless we have proper safeguards and assurances in place, we are not sure exactly how GBR will not self-preference. That is not exactly clear to us right now.
Q
John Davies: Yes, it would represent a streamlining of the system, but that is only true in so far as the GBR online retail function itself is subject to that code of practice equally. It is not clear to us that that is what is intended yet. That is something that we are working through with the Department and the ORR to set out exactly what that means. To the point that was made earlier about the parts of the customer proposition in the rail market that are not available to independent retailers currently, the surety of a code of practice would provide for what we characterise as parity of market access, which is not just fares— “Can we all sell the same fares?”—but features such as delay repay, services such as passenger assistance, and products such as loyalty. We should be able to have all those things on an equal basis across the industry: if they are good for one retailer to offer in support of rail travel, they should be good for everybody. In the work that we are contemplating on the code of practice, we aim to get to a place where no independent retailer or customer of an independent retailer is ever at a disadvantage in comparison with buying a ticket through what will be the future GBR online retail function.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Transport Scotland and the Welsh Government. We have until 3.30 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Bill Reeve: Good afternoon. I am Bill Reeve, director of rail reform for Transport Scotland and the Scottish Government.
Peter McDonald: Good afternoon. My name is Peter McDonald. I am director of transport for the Welsh Government.
Q
Bill Reeve: There has to be a balance, because we are trying to secure the ability of our Ministers to have a proper accountability mechanism and proper direction for implementation of our strategies and of our very substantial funding of the infrastructure. Equally, our network is not an island; clearly, if a direction in Scotland were to have a material impact on matters south of the border, which would not be the intention, that provision is there; I can understand that. There were constructive discussions between our Ministers and officials about how we strike that balance so, broadly, we are content with the arrangements, noting that an MOU is also required by the Bill to flesh out a little more how that will work in practice.
Q
Bill Reeve: We are working with colleagues in DFT on the heads of terms for that and on what the principles will be. Since the Bill submission last year, that has clearly been a key priority for us. Again, we have had good constructive discussions, working through in detail, as we should. Thus far, we are pleased with those discussions.
Q
Bill Reeve: I do not imagine that the guidance will be used then. Ordinarily, I would imagine that we would start with the use of our strategies, our statement of objectives and our normal means of engagement. It is important to remember that, whereas currently we spend £1 billion a year on Network Rail in Scotland, and it is for the ORR to enforce its delivery obligations under the delivery plan to the current funding arrangement, that role is being removed from the ORR.
What you see reflected in the Bill is something to address what would otherwise be a complete accountability gap. We would welcome the fact that we will have stronger accountability mechanisms under these provisions than we have had hitherto, given the very substantial amount of funding that we fund the railway infrastructure in Scotland with.
Q
Bill Reeve: I think that would be a matter of convention and expectation. It is not the sort of thing you would rush to do when there are other ordinary means of engagement to be used first.
Q
Peter McDonald: Yes I do, in terms of the legislation. However, I do not think we can come to a full judgment on this. This may also pre-judge your second question, because we do not have the full memorandum of understanding in front of us. It is only when we see that full package that we can make a judgment about whether the degree of consultation and partnership is sufficient for Wales.
Q
Peter McDonald: In the case of Wales, the heads of terms for the MOU were published in December. We are now working closely with Department for Transport officials on the detail. We are optimistic that we can jointly publish a full draft in early March. It is important for us to do that, because, similar to the Scottish Government, we have a pre-election period ahead of the devolved elections, and we would not want that to lose momentum in this important process.
Q
“the way that the Bill has been discussed with Scottish Government partners is the exemplar that other Government Departments in Whitehall may wish to follow”.—[Official Report, 9 December 2025; Vol. 777, c. 210.]
That is impressive, isn’t it? Do you have any reflections on how this process has been worked out in consultation with yourself and the Scottish Government and whether it might provide instructive lessons for how GBR might seek to engage on a four-nations basis once it is established?
Bill Reeve: It would be churlish of me to disagree with that quote, frankly. In all seriousness, the level of engagement both between officials, and between our Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary of State and the Rail Minister, has been, in my experience, the best I have ever known when it comes to inter-Government exchange. It has been a constructive discussion and a sometimes forthright debate, which is reflected in where we have come to agreement now.
You will be aware that it is the Scottish Government’s position to support the Bill as it goes through the legislative consent motion process in the Scottish Parliament—pending any amendments that might change that; I do not want to fetter the will of our parliamentarians. We have been encouraged by the level of constructive engagement.
The Chair
Q
Malcolm Brown: I am Malcolm Brown, the CEO of Angel Trains.
Rob Morris: Good afternoon. I am Rob Morris, the joint CEO of Siemens Mobility, a manufacturer of trains and the supplier of rail systems here in the UK, for the UK.
Darren Caplan: I am Darren Caplan, chief executive of the Railway Industry Association, a trade association representing rail suppliers throughout the UK.
Q
Malcolm Brown: Yes, by all means. Angel Trains is a ROSCO—a rolling stock operating company. We own circa 4,000 passenger vehicles in the UK, and we provide the bridge between private sector finance and the actual rail industry. In the last 10 years, we have invested about £1.9 billion in new rolling stock in the UK, and we invest about £80 million a year in refurbishing and maintaining trains across the network.
Q
Malcolm Brown: As has been covered in other panel sessions, the Bill as it stands does not provide a long-term view. It relies on the building blocks that it refers to—we talked about this in other panel sessions—where you have a long-term rail strategy and there is also a promise of a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy. It is those documents that we would look to to provide a long-term view on what is coming up in the industry.
Our assets last circa 30 to 35 years, as does the infrastructure, and it is that long-term view that we require, not necessarily to give us certainty, but to give us a clear look-through that allows us to decide whether to invest and the level of investment we will make. In answer to your direct question, we will be looking to the railway strategy, which we presume will come first, and then to the long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy.
Q
Malcolm Brown: As a general rule, a 10-year horizon is something that we can work with. With the nature of infrastructure—not just rail, actually, but other infrastructures too—for this type of asset, that, while it is not whole life, gives a clear look forward. When you extend that, clearly the level of accuracy, if not certainty, gets less. That is perfectly okay; we are used to dealing with that. That is how infrastructure actually works. We do not need to have 100% knowledge of something that is going to happen in 35 or 40 years, but what you want to have for look-through is, “Okay, we know what is going to happen in 10 years, and therefore, on a probability basis, this is what we will assume to do in 30, 35 or 40 years.”
Q
Malcolm Brown: No, I am not. I am suggesting that the strategy should give various date points—10 years, 15 years, 30 years. I do not think we should exclude it saying, “Here is a vision for what we wish our rail industry to look like in 30 years,” while accepting that that will actually change. It has to change; it has to morph and adapt to the market.
Q
Malcolm Brown: I think the references to the building blocks of the long-term rail strategy and the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy are key components that will actually help give greater colour to the Bill. At this point, a number of us are looking at this and trusting in the fact that they will come, and will come in a timely manner, and that that will allow us to get on and invest. This is not just investing for investing’s sake; this is taking Rob’s plant in Goole and actually pouring work in there that will employ people in the local area. It is that type of thing that will break the log jam that we have just now, and let us get on with things.
Q
Rob Morris: Certainty is very important. We have invested something like £340 million, and we are currently investing in a new Goole facility for rail and train manufacture and a train command and control systems R&D and manufacturing facility at Chippenham. To continue with investment not just in facilities, but in skills and rolling stock for the future, we need certainty about the financing or funding over the control periods. It is not just about renewals, which are currently included, and which are there to stop the infrastructure from falling over; it must also be about enhancements and rolling stock and the maintenance of that.
From our perspective, we would echo what Malcolm said about the 30-year long-term strategy. For all those elements I have talked about, we must recognise that strategies have to be reviewed. I would suggest that that be done every five years for all of those and that funding is made available on a five-year basis, so that the supply chain has absolute clarity on where it can invest and how it can support GBR. GBR spend will be 50%-plus, we expect, within the supply chain, so what it does not want is for the supply chain and the investors to fall over.
Q
Rob Morris: Absolutely. Although we are based in the UK, we are a global company. If there is uncertainty here in the UK, we will cut off investments because we are in competition with a global market.
Q
Darren Caplan: We represent rail suppliers in the UK—all around the country, large and small. They can be companies like Siemens and Angel, and they can be SMEs—60% of the supply chain are SMEs and they are our members. There are about 640,000 jobs in the UK rail industry, and about half of those work in the supply chain, so it is quite a lot of jobs.
Around £40 billion of GVA is rail, and half of that is from the supply sector. Around £14 billion of Treasury revenue comes in from our sector, and half of that is from the supply sector, so it is a really important sector, covering building, maintaining, reviewing, infrastructure, rolling stock, signalling and so on—it is the full gamut of the rail industry.
The point you picked up on, Mr Mayhew, is really important, and I am happy to expand on that. I have in front of me the Bill’s clauses and provisions. Schedule 2 is the one we are concerned about, and it is really significant. It says:
“The Secretary of State must provide the ORR and Great British Railways with a statement, in relation to a funding period, indicating the amount of financial assistance that the Secretary of State reasonably considers may be made available to Great British Railways by the Secretary of State…for the purpose of funding the activities of Great British Railways during the funding period.”
That period is five years. It says, “must provide”. Then, three pages later, on page 64, it says:
“If the Secretary of State proposes to vary the financial assistance to be provided…the Secretary of State must notify Great British Railways of the proposed variation…The Secretary of State must notify the ORR if…the Secretary of State considers that the proposed postponement, withdrawal or reduction is likely to have a material impact on the ability of Great British Railways to carry on the activities specified”.
That is “provide” versus “notified”. It says they must “provide” the budget for a five-year period, but later it says they just have to “notify” if they want to change what they do. That is hugely significant, because it means that you can set up a five-year budget and decide that you want to change it once in that control period, or every month if you want to. That is highly political, because a future Secretary of State can decide what they want to do coming into a new control period. The future is less certain under the Bill than it is currently. We have had control periods for the last 30 to 35 years— we are now in CP7. Under the Bill, the future version of funding assistance for rail will be less certain than it is now.
The Bill also only talks about postponing, withdrawing or reducing, and not increasing. At no point does it talk about funding going up; it is all about reducing it. For my fellow witnesses, when they are looking at where they are going to invest, they will say that there might be £45 billion invested over five years, but that could come down—if you do not know for certain, why should you do it?
My final point is that rail is a very certain industry: you know what you need to spend in five years—you know the renewals you need to do, and you know the rolling stock you need to get, maintain or refurbish—so why can you not commit to a five-year spending envelope? It is very simple.
Q
Darren Caplan: Yes, absolutely—
Q
Rob Morris: That is absolutely correct.
Malcolm Brown: It is fundamental economics.
Q
Duties for GBR also exist in the Bill. One of those duties is
“to enable persons providing railway services to plan the future of their business with a reasonable degree of assurance”.
In a five-year business plan you may have fluctuations in spending to reflect fiscal reality, but would you say that through those building blocks, long-term certainty is offered to the industry, and GBR has to reflect industry needs and build a railway that is coherent in serving their interests over the long term?
Rob Morris: The short answer to that is yes, absolutely. The other elements that we have just discussed—on enhancements, and on rolling stock and the maintenance and funding thereof—are absolutely fundamental to that. I also think that the ambitions for the railway need to be included in that. Witnesses on previous panels have talked about freight and the target there. What we seem to be missing in the Bill at the moment is the ambition for passenger growth, how that will improve the railway and the levels of investment that need to go with it.
A good example of that is last week’s announcement on Northern Powerhouse Rail, where rail and investment in it will create opportunity for increased productivity— I think £40 billion per annum was mentioned. It seems to me that there needs to be a connection in the Bill between what the Bill seeks to achieve, and generating that ambition, not just for freight growth, but for passenger growth.
The Chair
Order. Sorry, Mr Caplan, but props are not allowed.
Darren Caplan: My apologies. The charts show how uncertain the current situation is, and these measures would make it less certain. If we can have the positives for GBR going forward, and get these issues addressed, that will be better for the supply chain.
Q
Darren Caplan: To 2029.
Q
Darren Caplan: Operations, maintenance and renewals.
I am going to put words into your mouth, but please correct me if I am being unfair. In each control period, you get a bell curve of activity. You start with a low level of activity, because people did not know that there was certainty of funding, and then in years 2 and 3 it gears up and you get peak activity in year 2.5, roughly. Then, as you get towards the end of the control period where the medium term funding dries up or is uncertain, you get a drawdown of activity. That is the point that you were trying to make—is that correct?
Darren Caplan: It can happen between control periods as well, but the basic point is that over those five years, that money is the same. It can vary a bit between years—you can carry some over—but in that time you spend that money. Our concern about schedule 2 is that you can reduce the amount of money in that period.
Q
Darren Caplan: Absolutely. If you do the work that you need to do on rail when you need to do it, it is much cheaper than doing it at a later date. It is 30% cheaper to do a renewal when you are supposed to be doing it than at a later date. That is better for the taxpayer, because you can aggregate it. It is also better in terms of passenger experience, because the asset is being maintained when it needs to be.
Q
Darren Caplan: These guys can talk to that specifically, but I assume so, because you are planning out your workforces, your investment in partner machinery, your overall business plan, the apprentices you are going to take on and innovation—all these things can be planned in advance. If you know, you will get a better cost.
Q
Rob Morris: Yes—electrification and signalling are both part of the renewals process. The five-year cycle that we currently have—which is often referred to as the boom-and-bust cycle, because that is what it is like for us—adds, let us call it, a subjective cost increase of about 30%, as Darren mentioned.
Q
Rob Morris: The overall figure is normally about £40 billion, in terms of renewals and operations maintenance.
Q
Rob Morris: Subjectively, yes. I think there will be more accurate figures around that, but it is an inefficient process.
That is amazing.
Rob Morris: One thing I would say to support the figures that Darren mentioned earlier is that we have had a particularly sluggish start to this control period, which is actually prolonging that and impacting on skills and capabilities in the industry, which might add additional costs to remobilise.
Q
Rob Morris: Your words are correct.
Darren Caplan: Yes.
Malcolm Brown: I am not in that space, so I could not comment.
Q
I am going to move to Siemens now. Historically, during the period of privatisation, rolling stock improvements have been inextricably linked with franchise bids. As franchises have come up for renewal, different operating companies have been in a bidding process, through competition, to make the most attractive proposal to the Department for Transport. Some of that would be in cheques to the Treasury, but a lot of it has been in improving rolling stock infrastructure. My own operating company, Greater Anglia, entirely renewed its rolling stock right across its area as part of its franchise bid.
That impetus for improvement of rolling stock is being removed entirely and replaced by GBR, a nationalised bidder. It has various duties. I look at clause 18(3), which we discussed a little earlier, under which it has a duty to improve “railway service performance”, but that is defined as being, in the main, reliability and passenger overcrowding. There is no reference to improved customer experience, to quality of rolling stock and to improved services that would come with new rolling stock. For Siemens, are you concerned that moving to GBR will lead to a reduction in the pace of improvement in rolling stock?
Rob Morris: Again, it is about understanding what the ambition is specifically with rolling stock and the funding thereof. My belief is that there is a need for a passenger growth target, which would further fuel the need to make sure that there is a clear approach to modern, carbon-neutral, efficient rolling stock to match a similar infrastructure for the betterment of GBR.
Q
Rob Morris: Yes.
Malcolm Brown: If I may, there is a natural life cycle. There is a beat rate to replacing, renewing and then retiring rolling stock. It is lumpy, because you do not replace trains one at a time; it tends to be in fleets. There is not a great deal we can do about that. What would concern me is if we reverted to everything being planned and done by a central organisation. We have tried that before. I refer the Committee to the 2014 National Audit Office report on the DFT procuring IEP. It did not go well, the National Audit Office says. There is a natural tension there just now—the commercial tension of trying to improve rolling stock and always trying to have the next best thing.
You talk about Greater Anglia. Apologies, but it is Alstom’s trains that we bought in there. They are a step change that was there before, but we cannot keep replacing every single train every time. We need to refurbish trains. We invested £125 million in the Pendolino fleet on the west coast. That created 100 jobs at Widnes and its own infrastructure there. That was completed on time and on budget. Nobody ever really talks about that, but we can do it. We have given the passenger an environment that is as new. That is a lot more cost-effective than simply going, “We must buy a new train every time we feel like it.”
Q
Malcolm Brown: I cannot comment. I presume it is going to be in one of the building blocks. My concern is that we have a group of people who are trying to design trains for a hobby, when we have manufacturers such as Siemens in the UK, which have global platforms for trains. Yes, we adapt and customise them for the UK, but we get all the benefits of the manufacturing experience of a global manufacturer with the economies of scale that that provides as well. We do not need bespoke custom-built trains in the UK.
Q
Malcolm Brown: To my mind, there is the potential there—there is no question of it—but without having visibility, at the risk of repeating my previous answers. You talk about consulting with the industry; there is a vast amount of experience in the UK rail industry. I am totally agnostic about whether that is in the private or public sector. I would compel GBR to use that experience to inform the decisions and the forward planning.
I have an organisation that is not as large as Siemens. It is about 170 people and I think about 60% of them are qualified engineers. We have more than 30 years’ experience of acquiring rolling stock and structuring it. I think we are reasonably good at it. I would say utilise the experience and expertise that is there. I am not saying private or public; I am saying use the experience that is there to, frankly, avoid reinventing the wheel.
The Chair
Q
Andy Burnham: Good afternoon, everybody. I am Andy Burnham. I have been the Mayor of Greater Manchester for coming up on nine years. I was previously the Member of Parliament for Leigh for 16 years.
Jason Prince: Good afternoon. My name is Jason Prince, and I am the director of the Urban Transport Group, which represents transport authorities and mayoral strategic authorities across the UK.
Q
I will start with the Bee Network up in Greater Manchester, which you have organised on the basis of concessions let by you, the mayoralty. The benefit of that is that the fare box is kept locally and it is operated privately. It does not have to be; you could run those concessions through a wholly owned subsidiary. I accept that. That approach of keeping the fare box local does not work with GBR because the fare box stays with GBR. Even if you have a greater level of devolvement, it feels a bit like it is going to be GBR in Greater Manchester, just painted yellow. Is that what you wanted from the Bill, or did you have aspirations for a bit more control?
Andy Burnham: Thank you very much for the question. I agree with the way that you have presented it. There is a tension to be resolved, but I believe it can be resolved. It is really important that you have mentioned the Bee Network, because I am responsible for running the tram and bus systems, so the backbone of the public transport system is under our control. We have to move to a world where the railway emerges from its railway silo and sees the bigger picture—the integration of public transport across all modes. I would encourage the Committee to think about that, because that change is coming. You will know, Ms Barker, that Liverpool city region will also soon embark on putting buses under public control, and I think the model we are creating will become something of a norm around the country.
I think it is possible to go further, as you say, and my evidence for that is TfL Overground: an arrangement was reached between the Government, the railways and TfL on an integrated, fair offer. I believe that is entirely achievable in Greater Manchester, where the railways come into the capped system. Actually, the rest of the Bee Network adds value to the railway, because no longer will it be the case that you buy a ticket in somewhere like Buxton or Glossop and your travel runs out at Manchester Piccadilly; in a capped system, people can have their onward travel all included under that daily cap. That is what operates in London, and I see no reason why it cannot operate in Greater Manchester—indeed, we will insist that we get the same.
Isn’t it all about revenue sharing, hopefully in relation to passenger growth? We have a plan to bring eight rail lines into the Bee Network, starting with two this year, and it is a plan that has been agreed with the rail industry. This is potentially a win-win for everybody, because the arrival of the capped Bee Network system gives people more reason to use the railways, so we think that we can increase patronage on those rail lines.
It has to be a real partnership with the railway, which is why we are encouraging the Committee to go beyond the idea that we are just consultees who can be listened to or not. Meaningful partnership is what will build the right railway and the right public transport solution in our city. It is much more than painting the trains yellow, although I do want to see yellow trains all over Greater Manchester with bees on them.
Welcome to the Committee, Ms Brabin; I am sorry that we started before you managed to get in.
Tracy Brabin: My apologies for being late.
Q
Andy Burnham: I do not think it can be justified any more that there is one transport arrangement for London, but that arrangement is not available to everywhere else—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Before I bring the shadow Minister back in, I make colleagues aware that the session will run until 5.15 pm.
Q
It was rather frustrating, Mr Burnham —the Division bell went when you were about to deliver a hammer blow against the Government on your disappointment about what is not in the Bill and what should be in it. You used to say that you wanted more autonomy for the Bee Network. I have heard your answers—it is clear that your position on that has not changed. You want to have more autonomy, but the Bill does not provide it at the moment. You have a duty to consult, which is okay so far as it goes, from GBR, and then thereafter, once it has consulted with the mayoralties, it only has a duty to have regard to what it is that you have said or requested. In your combined evidence, what would be a better form of words more accurately to reflect the relationship that you think should exist between the national and the regional? Mr Burnham, because we were halfway through a conversation, perhaps we could start with you, then move on to Tracy.
Andy Burnham: Thank you. I do not know about coming back, but what I do know is that in my 16 years here, there were enough Tory MPs around that there was no double-jobbing, I do not think, from my memory. We will move on.
I think that it is about a meaningful role. I do not think autonomy is actually what we are asking for here today, any of us.
Tracy Brabin: No.
Andy Burnham: What we are saying is that we want a meaningful partnership, which is about more than just being consulted and then ignored—which, if we are honest, does happen to us as mayors with the rail industry. Even though I am chair of the Rail North Committee, we sometimes have to work very hard to make the railways listen to what democratically elected mayors and leaders say. It is a different relationship, and I would say that I strongly feel the railways need culture change. We need to get back to a railway that serves people and places, not a quite adversarial section of transactional arrangements that can be very complex. It feels to us sometimes that the railways have lost sight of that.
Q
Andy Burnham: Yes, I think if you end up with a very top-down railway, it is a bit like the phrase I used to hear in the Department of Health: “You can hit the target and miss the point.” Is that not that the risk with the railways, if they become too much like monolithic structures? It has to be a bit of both. If you go back to the old British Rail days, I remember a thing called Regional Railways, which was very separate to InterCity, so that split has always been there in the railways.
What we are arguing for in front of the Committee today is to think of the railways in a more place-based context. Railways serve growth in local areas, and there are things that we can bring to the table to support the health and growth of the railways in the future. It points to a different partnership, but it is a partnership. We want the right to specify timetables, as it is legitimate for us to make those requests, and we want a stronger role over station access. Actually, we think there should be a presumption in favour of devolution. Rather than a right to request, the onus should be the other way around; there should be the right to refuse, which presumes that it should be devolved, if that is possible, but there is still a callback if it cannot be devolved.
There is a relevant recent example: the Access for All funding. The Rail North Committee has asked the Department to devolve the Access for All funding, so we do not get the situation that Tracy described a moment ago. Currently, that is not being supported by the Department. We submit lists of stations to the Department as part of our Access for All bid on a regular basis, but we have often had the experience that it comes back with a different prioritisation to the one we sent in. This is really granular, local stuff, and it is mind-boggling to us that you have an infrastructure programme for the railways, and then an Access for All programme at the highest level that is dealing with very local schemes at stations. It is a meaningful partnership, and we are calling for a devolved role, where there can be one.
Tracy Brabin: I totally agree with what Andy has said; it is about accountability. I do not think you could expect the Secretary of State to be accountable for the whole of the network. How on earth would they understand the challenges? At Denby Dale, all they need is a ramp, and those sorts of decisions should be made locally.
We are building three stations in the next year. Why are they so expensive? In Germany, I think it is £5 million a station, but here they are £50 million. In the ’80s, it was £500,000 a station in today’s money. Surely, if we are working together as a collective for the good of the nation, we could find a way that makes it easier—one where we are more agile in building stations, and where we are part of that conversation around services. Also, it is about where we get then get the revenue from, so that we have a circular pound—the one that goes into the washing machine and comes back out again on the other side—and can build more accessibility on more stations.
Q
No, mine did not either—it is important that we also get to hear your perspective, Jason. One of the things I want to hit on is accountability. One of the benefits of the Bill that Lord Hendy stressed in his evidence to the Transport Committee is that by having a unified, guiding mind for the railway, you will have hard-working people at GBR who will wake up every day and know that they are responsible for making sure that the railway runs in the interests of the British public, in partnership with people like yourselves. Could you take us through the current challenges in engaging with an array of different private sector operators and DFTO-managed train companies? What does it look like for the people you represent who are trying to navigate this bewildering system, and for you guys who are trying to drive high standards, passenger satisfaction and, ultimately, better economic opportunity for your local areas?
Tracy Brabin: It has been very difficult to navigate who is responsible for what. There is a lot of finger pointing with, “It’s them,” or “It’s them,” and trying to get a decision about who actually owns a project has been difficult. That is why I really welcome the leadership that Lord Hendy has shown in bringing together track and train and having that simplicity.
In West Yorkshire, the partnership piece of work was published last week. We have been seen as an exemplar in our strategic place partnership, where we brought together Network Rail, DFT, the TOCs, the shadow GBR, ourselves and all the partners to identify how we can cut through roadblocks. It has been incredibly effective. When the Mayor of South Yorkshire, the Mayor of York and North Yorkshire and I were working with David Blunkett on the White Rose rail plan, it was helpful to look together at how we could phase the delivery of the plan, how we could make it affordable and what was the structure of delivery. You can do that only when you are all in the room and all have skin in the game, and you are not blaming each other. I want to reflect on the relationship held locally by our organisations and myself. I think that is the way forward.
We also need resources, and I speak for other mayoral strategic authorities as well. I am blessed to have some very talented people—some of them are sat behind me—who help me with our rail plan, but not every MSA has that talent. Although people might be waking up to deliver better outcomes, they are not all sat in the regions. Having people with timetabling and infrastructure experience actually in the regions would also be a huge benefit.
Andy Burnham: The job of getting the railway to be more accountable has been the devil’s own job in my time as mayor. I am not talking so much about recent times, but certainly in the early days when we had the 2018 timetable collapse. It was only Transport for the North and the Rail North Committee that got underneath what was going on inside Northern and TransPennine. If we had not been there, I do not think the travelling public would have seen the change.
We were the ones who challenged Northern, when it was run by Arriva, to keep guards on the trains. We were the ones who fought to keep ticket offices open—the railway would have closed them if it had not heard our voice. We had to challenge Avanti West Coast when it was collapsing and cutting the timetable between Manchester and London—two major cities in this country—damaging our growth. It just took that decision without any reference to us. Recently, the Office of Rail and Road has done something relating to a ghost train. We constantly have to challenge these things. Without us, I do not think we would have a railway that has moved towards more public ownership and more accountability.
I think major culture change is needed. I come back to this point. My observation is that it is still not responsive enough to what local areas need. As people may know, I support Everton. I go to Everton’s new ground on a regular basis. So many more people are travelling there by train, but to the railways, it is like it has not happened. It is as though they are oblivious to it. They are not in the place with us, managing it and putting extra people on. The railway seems to be too dislocated from what happens on the ground. For example, Sunday services are not put on during the Manchester Christmas markets. That is the thing: you need a railway that is knitted in to supporting growth.
Finally, look at the evidence where we have more locally accountable railways. Transport for Wales is a strong operator, in my experience—it serves Greater Manchester as well. Merseyrail is accountable to the Mayor of Liverpool. It has higher levels of performance, I believe, although all railways have their issues. That is evidence that if you have more local accountability, you generally have a higher performing railway that is more responsive to what people are saying.
Tracy Brabin: Andy and the Rail North Committee have been holding operators’ feet to the fire not just for northern transport but also for the east coast main line where it goes through other mayoralties. So on accountability, I think coming from a mayoral strategic authority or a mayoral combined authority where all mayors across the country can hold rail to account—you are doing a brilliant job, Andy, but currently where else in the country is there that group that will hold operators to account? At the moment, it is only the Rail North Committee, but surely that has to be across the whole country.
The Chair
Q
Richard Bowker: I am Richard Bowker. I am the former chair of the Strategic Rail Authority. I now co-present a podcast about the railways called “Green Signals”.
Q
I am going to focus on a couple of things. On access and capacity, we have heard a lot of evidence today; I do not know how much you have heard, but it has replicated, in essence, what was put before the Transport Committee a few weeks ago. There is a huge amount of concern in the sector about whether the Bill provides a level playing field between GBR and open access, freight and the like, coupled with a very weak—those are my words—appeals process, which is so narrowly constrained that it only deals with errors of law as opposed to disagreements on the merits. Is it right that there is a real problem with the future of competition in our railways? If you agree with that broad statement, perhaps you could expand on your reasons why.
Richard Bowker: I will probably say more about certainty and confidence for investors than competition per se. If I think about my experience at the Strategic Rail Authority, it was a significant frustration that elements of planning in terms of timetable and service were split apart in the way that they were. I think the Government are right to want to create a directing mind—I say directing mind rather than guiding mind. We have a capacity-constrained railway. In places, that is very severe, and someone needs to say, “Right. This is how we think we should allocate capacity.”
Having said that, there is a possibility that the pendulum has swung a little far. Probably the biggest issue with that would be rail freight. If you are a rail freight operator, at the moment you have certainty; if you are unhappy with the way that you are treated, you can go to the ORR. As an independent regulator, the ORR can make the final access decision.
What is contemplated is a perfectly logical process, starting with an access and use policy, capacity plans and capacity decisions. The problem is that railway timetables are not really like that; they are more dynamic. These things change. We looked at doing exactly this at the SRA, and it is very difficult to do. It changes constantly, so it has to be very agile. Under the Bill as drafted, while the process could work perfectly adequately, the capacity duty in clause 63—and potentially clause 18(4)—seems to say, to me at least, “Yes, GBR has all these duties, but they are subject to the capacity duty.” I can see why that causes tension and concern among freight operators, for example. I am not saying that it cannot work, but until we actually see it work, there is a risk that third-party operators will be concerned.
Q
Richard Bowker: The ’93 Act was not set up that way; it was set up so that the Strategic Rail Authority was responsible for setting an overall strategic plan for the railways and for managing the award and management of franchises, but Railtrack plc, and then Network Rail, was under the regulation of an independent economic regulator. The two worlds were apart. Whereas the regulator had to have regard to our strategies, it did not have to comply with them, so we always had that tension. It was not really for me to change it. That is why I think that, overall, this is a good approach.
Q
Richard Bowker: It is not for me to say whether she is overreacting, but I absolutely understand the concern, because rail freight in particular involves a lot of private capital. You have to have a degree of confidence and assurance that if you have access rights, you will be able to maintain them, so I understand that. I think the Government are right to create a directing mind. We have seen too many examples of timetabling processes that have gone wrong for precisely that reason—it is about balance.
Q
Richard Bowker: On the first point, yes, I recognise the concern. Secondly, personally I would look at clause 18(4) and ask whether we really need to have the capacity duty able to override other duties. As far as the appeals process is concerned, I can see why being able to look at a case on the merits rather than on a strictly legal basis would help enormously. If GBR believes that its access and use policy, its capacity planning and its final decisions constitute a good process, it should not fear that.
Q
I was pleased to hear that you agree with the concept of a guiding mind for the railway—a unified body able to direct services in the interests of passengers. I want to point to the specific provisions in the Bill that relate specifically to passenger experience. One of GBR’s duties is to promote the interests of users and potential users of the railway, including those with disabilities, and clause 18(3) talks about having reliable services, and the avoidance and mitigation of passenger overcrowding. Does what is contained within the legally binding duties on GBR reflect the overall aspiration to have a unified railway with the passenger at its heart?
Richard Bowker: Yes, I think it does. There is a danger in being overly prescriptive about how you do those things, but the duties are fairly widely drafted, and they probably do do that. Much of this will depend not so much on what the Bill says GBR’s duties are; they are pretty clear and comprehensive. It is about how it is then structured to go on and do these things. Previous panel members talked about culture and behaviour, and those are really important. So, yes, I think the duties are broadly fine.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Department for Transport. We have until 5.55 pm for this panel. Ministers, you have both participated in today’s sitting, but could you please briefly introduce yourselves for the record?
Keir Mather: My name is Keir Mather. I am the Minister for Maritime, Aviation and Decarbonisation at the Department for Transport and the lead Minister for the Bill.
Lilian Greenwood: My name is Lillian Greenwood. I am the Minister for Local Transport, and I am assisting as a Minister on the Bill.
Q
We have heard lots of evidence, and some clear, consistent themes have risen out of it. If you have read the Transport Committee’s report on this issue from a few weeks ago, as I am sure you have, you will know that the sector is giving the Government a few messages very loud and clear. We will discuss those a little bit, but the secret question is: So what? What are you going to do about it? That is what I hope you will come back to.
A level playing field is fair and without discrimination. There is a structural conflict of interest between GBR as the holder of the ring and GBR as an operator—for example, in the relationship with open access, with freight and with independent retailers. Each one of those—they are sectors, not individual organisations—has profound concerns about a structural conflict of interest that has been deliberately built into the Bill.
Combined with that, there is an appeals process that is not worthy of the name. We can say that it is robust, but we all know that it is not. It is very, very tightly defined. It relates only to areas of law; there is no appeal on the merits at all. GBR is judge, jury and gamekeeper, as well as participant—that is a slightly mixed metaphor, but you get the point.
With the defenestration of the Office of Rail and Road as an economic regulator, the independent arbiter of the relationship with GBR is now gone. You have heard the evidence. What are you going to do about it?
Keir Mather: It is a very good question, Mr Mayhew. It goes to the core of the differing ideological perspectives that underlie the debate we have had today on the Bill. Although you see the state seeking to take too much control and giving itself an unfair advantage, our perspective on why this legislation is so important is that passengers—who are ultimately both people who pay for services on the railway and taxpayers who end up funding those services more often than not under this broken rail system, and will do once GBR is established—deserve a good service. We believe that having a unified service with a single guiding mind to bring track and train, passenger services and infrastructure together under one roof, with one point of accountability, is the best way to achieve those aims.
You asked me what we are going to do about the concerns raised today. It is my obligation as a Government Minister to address them, to explore ways in which we can allay them further and to progress the work the Department is already taking on through its stakeholder engagement, whether that be on the freight target or the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, to make sure that stakeholder concerns are heard.
On the principle of fairness and transparency as it relates to ticketing and third-party access, it is worth making the point that GBR is, by public law principles, obligated to have regard to fair and transparent processes as part of how the system works. On access and appeals, that is a real point of contention, which we will explore throughout Committee, but I heard the concerns raised by freight stakeholders and others.
I want to take this opportunity to be really clear that the Department’s very firm view is that clauses 60 and 63 are not in contention with each other and that Great British Rail has the ability to decide what constitutes best use of the railway, in a way that not only meets its duties, but balances opportunities for GBR services, rail freight and open access alongside one another. The clauses provide an opportunity to appeal on the basis of whether that has been followed, through the ORR, but also a robust process, once that allocation has been determined, to figure out whether GBR has been compliant with the law, as of course we always expect it will be.
Overall, this is a point of ideological difference that exists between our two parties. Labour believes fundamentally that you need one point of accountability and that the Government need to take a more proactive role in fixing this broken rail system. I am really pleased that this piece of legislation seeks to achieve what I think are very noble aspirations.
Q
The Bill has designed in a structural conflict of interest, as we have heard many times from all sorts of different people. Given that the Government have taken that decision, my question has nothing to do with ideology—it is practicality. What are the Government planning to do to reassure that 60% that they will not be steamrollered by a GBR that says, “We are the masters now. We can do what we like and there’s no effective right of appeal, so suck it up.”?
Keir Mather: I would point to the extremely robust suite of accountability measures that sit within the Bill as it stands. If you look at the legally binding duties GBR has in how it undertakes its work, one of those, which came out in our discussion with the ROSCOs, is to ensure that those who provide railway services can plan the future of their business with a reasonable degree of assurance. GBR is bound to meet a freight target set by the Secretary of State; it is legally bound to meet its duty to promote the interests of freight and, in clause 60, through the design of the best use of the railway as GBR sees it, it must give equal regard to users of the railway. Open access operators and freight are included as part of that mix.
However, we also need to think about what this legislation does in the future and how that contrasts with the situation now. The ORR had to turn down a number of open access applications on the west coast because we had insufficient capacity in our rail network. I do not understand how that constitutes fairness or competitive advantage for open access operators—it means that they are locked out of providing services and turning a profit by a rail system that is failing.
GBR having the capacity to manage, within one centralised function, capacity on the railway overall allows us to unlock those benefits, in partnership with mayoral combined authorities, but with a robust set of accountability measures to ensure that it is compliant with the law, compliant with its duties, and compliant with the aspirations of the Secretary of State, irrespective of their ideological predilections. Hopefully, that is an adequate answer to your question.
Q
Keir Mather: Absolutely. It is fundamental that that investment continues, both on the—[Interruption.] Sorry— I will just say this very briefly and then let you come back. On the rail freight point, where we have a target in place allowing us to boost the amount of goods moved by train, it might create more capacity for open access to work on the network, but the infrastructure delivery and the long-term rolling stock strategy that accompany this legislative piece of work also offer the private sector a real opportunity to play in the future of our railway, as I see it.
Q
Whether it is the access in use concerns, the failure of the appeals process to be anything worthy of the name, or the fact that the proposed powers for the Secretary of State to change without notice access in use, taken in combination, the evidence from multiple witnesses today was that the Bill does not make it easier. Are you going to listen to them, or are the Government going to pursue their dogged insistence that everyone else is wrong and they are right?
Keir Mather: If you take something like the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, the consultations are undertaken in close partnership with the private sector. If you are asking me whether it is going to be easier in the long term, with GBR created, for private sector operators to engage with a level playing field, I think that it will be. I think that it creates a very clear structure of accountability measures, clear metrics by which decisions are taken and robust accountability, if GBR does not meet its obligations under the access regime, to make sure that it does things correctly, especially on the matter of access.
I think it is important that we dig into this further, because it came out consistently with the freight operators. GBR has to decide how it meets its capacity duty once it has decided what best use of the railway constitutes. That is a really important safeguard that is built into the Bill. The Secretary of State gives GBR its funding envelope through the business plan, and needs to ensure that GBR will deliver the services that it has said it will. It is therefore very important to have that capacity duty in place, but that is after GBR has made a determination, while balancing its existing duties and its need to promote freight and service providers on the railway, on whether or not those services stack up.
I think that the accountability process and appeals process are very clear, and give private operators multiple points to raise concerns, and robust enforcement measures for the ORR to substitute decisions and ask GBR to think again. The point about thinking again is very important, because we want GBR to improve as an organisation, and to become more agile and more responsive to the needs of the private sector, and the appeals process facilitates that.
Olly Glover
Q
Keir Mather: That is a really important point. I hope that you feel that the human side of the equation, in terms of furthering the interests of passengers through the duties, is embedded in clause 18, but I take your point about the funding envelope, and the way that passenger services are funded via the spending review period set by the Secretary of State, as opposed to infrastructure more broadly. The reason for that in the immediate term is that the procurement and delivery of passenger services is a far more complex and changeable process to work through than the delivery of long-term infrastructure, or other functions that sit under GBR.
In the future, we can certainly get into a debate about whether passenger services should be funded in a similar way to other aspects of GBR’s operation, but for the moment, and after GBR is stood up, which let us remember is in quite short order after the passage of the Bill, in around 12 months’ time, the Secretary of State needs to be able to determine that passenger services offer value for money. It is therefore right that she retains more control over the funding envelope for those services at that stage. We can certainly take the debate on how that should change in the future forward as part of this Committee. I would be very keen to explore it further.