Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between James Wild and Chi Onwurah

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Hollobone, and to see the Bill Committee present. I thank all its members for taking part, and I observe that the room is a lot warmer than it was in December, when the National Security and Investment Bill was in Committee. I hope that we will continue like that. I also thank the Clerks and all the members of House staff who have supported us with the amendments and on the Bill more generally.

I crave your indulgence, Mr Hollobone, to start with a few opening remarks that will be helpful in understanding the Opposition’s approach to this amendment and to the Bill as a whole. To give the context, I worked as an electrical engineer for 20 years before entering Parliament. I am still a chartered engineer and proud of that. As an engineer, I worked all over the world helping to build out the networks—fixed, wireless and mobile—that became the internet and on which this Bill is intimately focused.

I should also declare an interest. Many of the provisions of the Bill deal with the regulator, Ofcom, and I joined Ofcom in 2004, just a few weeks after it was born, when it was to be a light-touch regulator, small and nimble. Over the years, it has acquired responsibility for critical national infrastructure, the BBC, the Post Office, soon the entirety of online harms and now, it would appear, national security as well. I have been calling for greater security, in particular for our mobile networks, for many years now, so I and the Opposition welcome the aims of the Bill, and the Bill itself. However, many areas within it need to be addressed.

As I have declared my personal and professional interest in the telecoms network, Mr Hollobone, you will not be surprised to hear that I am thrilled that we will spend so many hours of our parliamentary democracy time here in this room, dedicated to debating our telecommunications infrastructure. But, to my regret, the Committee is not taking advantage of the very telecoms infrastructure with which it is dealing. I would like to place on the record that we believe holding this Bill Committee physically rather than virtually is putting Members of the House, Clerks and House staff at risk from the coronavirus pandemic, and we feel that it is our duty, as a reasonable and responsible Opposition, to ensure that that risk lasts for as short a time as possible. Therefore, we are going to crack on as quickly as possible through as many clauses as possible, while maintaining appropriate levels of scrutiny. I want to put the Government on notice that we expect as a consequence to have more time on the Floor of the House on Report to consider the Bill, because we do not feel that it would be wise to dwell on many of its important themes when we are meeting physically in one room at a time of national pandemic and lockdown.

To keep all Members and staff as safe as possible, we will have a laser-like focus on three primary areas. The first is national security. Labour prioritises national security, but failings in the Bill show the Government are taking risks with our security-critical national infrastructure and economic security, and we will highlight those failings constructively whenever we can. Secondly, the security of our networks depends on an effective plan to diversify the supply chain, which should include support for UK capability, and we are very concerned that the Bill short-changes both our national security and our telecoms infrastructure by not including more references to the Government’s diversification strategy; it is a weak strategy and we will try to overcome that. Thirdly, the Bill also gives sweeping powers to the Secretary of State and Ofcom, including sweeping powers over security. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) said on Second Reading, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is not known for its understanding of or expertise on national security, and we want to take measures to address that.

Security is the primary concern of amendment 7, which was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. It seeks to add the presence of supply chain components that represent a security threat to the list of security compromises that network and service providers must take security measures against. Supply chain components are defined in amendment 8, for the purposes of amendment 7.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

Amendment 7 refers to national security. I note that the Opposition have not tabled a definition of national security, which is an issue we have considered in other debates. Is there a reason why the hon. Lady now accepts that we should not define national security?

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, which raises a really important point that I will say something about. As I am sure you are aware, Mr Hollobone, yesterday was the Third Reading of the National Security and Investment Bill. I refer Members to the report by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, published on Tuesday, on the critical issue of national security and its definition. In fact, the Opposition sought to put into the National Security and Investment Bill not a definition of national security but a minimum standard of what national security should refer to. We wanted to include elements such as critical national infrastructure—of course, telecoms infrastructure is a part of that—and supply chains, which the amendment deals with, and also human rights. I do not want to anticipate what we might table in future, but one reason we have not so far tabled a framework for guidance in national security is that we had hoped that the Minister responsible would recognise both the advice of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee in giving greater guidance on what national security was, and that that was a better place for it.

National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between James Wild and Chi Onwurah

Committee stage
Thursday 10th December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Graham. I am also pleased that the Committee is now moving to the new expanses of new clauses. I see that Committee members have come fully prepared to deal with the environment in which we find ourselves. I should say, Sir Graham, that the previous Chair said that we should be able to put on as many coats as we liked. I think that that is much to be desired. Unfortunately, I left my office in a rush and forgot to bring my coat, as well as the Houses of Parliament Christmas jumper in which I invested only yesterday, in anticipation that it might be needed today. We shall have to take the temperature as an encouragement to press on.

Had we known that, regardless of the title of the Bill, it was actually the National and Security and Investment, and any improvements to the Enterprise Act 2002 we feel it is necessary to make, Bill, we might have ranged somewhat broader in our new clauses. We chose instead to focus on what we felt was absolutely critical to the good functioning of our national security framework. New clause 1 seeks to set out some of the factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to when making assessments under the provisions of the Bill. We recognise some of the implications of including a definition of national security. The Bill is called the National Security and Investment Bill, even if it does go somewhat beyond that title.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

I note that the hon. Lady uses the word “may” not “shall” in the new clause. Can she explain why she opted for “may” in this instance?

[Chi Onwurah]

I am grateful for that intervention. First, it shows that the hon. Gentleman is paying attention, which in itself is something to be welcomed. If I may say so, it also shows that he is taking lessons from my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. We have considered the matter and this is the correct use of the term “may”. I shall go into more detail later, but this is not about prescribing what the Secretary of State must look at; it is about giving greater clarity, particularly to those who will come under the Bill’s remit. One of the expert witnesses put it very well. Those who will come under the Bill’s remit need to get a sense of what the Government mean by national security, not in a specific and detailed definition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I will not take up the opportunity of a test. We have all learned a lot about air flows—in this room, at any rate—as we seek to maintain some heat. What we have not learned, though, is how the Minister believes the Bill can be improved. All our line-by-line scrutiny has yielded many assurances, compliments on our intention and, indeed, some letters, for which I am grateful, but no acceptance and not even the commitment to go and think about some of our constructive proposals, amendments and new clauses. I urge him to consider this new clause as an opportunity to show that he truly believes, as he said earlier, in the skills, experience and expertise of the Committee by reflecting on the potential for improvement.

The new clause returns to an earlier theme and would require—the Minister will be pleased to note that that is a “must”, not a “may”—an annual report to be prepared by the Secretary of State

“in accordance with this section”

and a copy of it to be provided

“to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.”

It sets out what should be in that report, such as the events, the number of entities, the nature of the risks and

“details of particular technological or sectoral expertise”

and so on. It would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about the powers exercised under the Bill and allow closer scrutiny and monitoring.

The new clause reflects how we have consistently supported the need for the Bill. Our approach to the security threats we face is to push for change specifically to allow broad powers of intervention, but for those using those broad powers to be held to account by Parliament and through transparency. Our international allies do exactly that. The US requires CFIUS to produce a non-classified annual report for the public, alongside a classified report for certain members of Congress, to provide security detail to them, allowing congressional scrutiny while retaining sensitivity of information.

As I think the Minister acknowledges, the Government have been late in following where international allies and the Opposition have led with calls to better protect our national security, so he must not fall behind in following our calls for accountability and transparency. That is critical not just to ensure our security and wider parliamentary understanding of the nature of the threats we face but for accountability.

The Secretary of State is to be given sweeping powers. For the last time, I should say that we will go from 12 reviews in 18 years—less than one a year—to 1,830 notifications a year, which is more than five every single day. The Secretary of State will be able to intervene in every single such private transaction. It will be hard to bring claims against national security concerns in court, where the judiciary will understandably find it difficult to define national security against the Government’s definition. In that context, it is important to bring expert parliamentary scrutiny to the Government’s decisions. I do hope the Minister will reflect on that. Alongside a public report, the new clause would require the Government to publish an annual security report to the Intelligence and Security Committee so that we have greater accountability without compromising security.

I will say a few words about the evidence base and the reason for tabling the amendment. Professor Ciaran Martin said:

“I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]

My understanding is that the only accountability and transparency mechanism is the public report, which may be published, and the prospect of judicial review, neither of which provide for expert scrutiny on the security issues.

I also ask the Minister to reflect on Second Reading, where member after member of the Intelligence and Security Committee stood up to say that they felt that their expertise would be useful and helpful in the working of the Bill.

[James Wild]

The hon. Lady said that the annual report “may” be published, but in clause 61 it “must” be laid before the House, so there is no question that the annual report will be published.

[Chi Onwurah]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It must be published, but the details that it sets out are limited. The reporting on other information, as I think the Minister has said, is something that is intended but is not required. We have requested that several other pieces of information be published, but the Minister has said that they may be.

The hon. Member for North West Norfolk is absolutely right that there will be an annual report, but that is a public report that will provide only the limited information set out in clause 61(2). Obviously, it will not provide anything that might have an impact on national security. With regard to what is published in the final notifications, for example, that can be redacted to take out anything of commercial interest as well as of national security interest. There is no requirement to report on any aspect to do with national security. Given that the only report is a public report, that is understandable. That is why we are proposing that a secure sensitive report should also be published and shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee.

The hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said that

“there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and…the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.]

A member of the Intelligence and Security Committee also said that

“we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.]

As I have already noted, CFIUS has an annual reporting requirement.

National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between James Wild and Chi Onwurah

Committee Debate: 12th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 10th December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

[Chi Onwurah]

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

[James Wild]

[Chi Onwurah]

National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between James Wild and Chi Onwurah

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah]

May I begin by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and what a pleasure and, indeed, honour it is to discuss this important Bill with the rest of the Committee?

This issue is important to Members on both sides of the Committee, and as we scrutinise the Bill line by line over the next two weeks I am sure we will get closer—or as close as social distancing allows. Labour Members look forward to a constructive and collegiate debate and recognise that Members on both sides of the Committee share the objective of making well-informed contributions. It was clear from speeches made last night on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, the interests and ambitions of which overlap those of this Bill, that all Members share a belief in the critical importance of national security, and I am sure that will be reflected in our deliberations.

We agree on the importance of securing our national security, for which line-by-line scrutiny is vital. The Government’s impact assessment notes the need for change and says that national security is an area of “market failure” requiring some Government action. I found that statement somewhat shocking, and a marked difference between the views of Labour and Conservative Members. It is an astonishing claim, because national security is not a private concern first, and a Government after-thought second. There is no market in national security, which is the first duty of a Government and not a failed responsibility of the private sector. It ought to be the first priority of any Government to address it. It is not under-supplied by the market; it is outside the market altogether.

Although that claim is astonishing, it is unsurprising from this Government and the party that leads them. The impact assessment is a marker of a Government who have outsourced significant responsibility for national security; a Government who let Kraft take over Cadbury in 2012 because the market promised good behaviour by the acquirer, only for them to be embarrassed when the acquirer broke all its promises—national responsibility outsourced and British jobs and national interests handed over to the market.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

Could the shadow Minister explain the national security issues with the Kraft takeover?

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I meant to say that national responsibility was outsourced—and British jobs—and the national interest handed over to the market. That was the concern with the Kraft takeover. If he wishes, I shall follow up with further examples, but the national interest and the responsibility of this Conservative Government for economic security have clearly been lacking. This is the Government who let the Centre for Integrated Photonics, a prized research and development centre, be taken over by Huawei in 2012—an event that our head of the National Cyber Security Centre said that in hindsight we would not wish to happen. National security was outsourced and the British interest again relinquished to the market.