Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Monday 19th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Let us try now, then. I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

In the last year of the last Labour Government, we were spending 2.5% of GDP on defence, a level that has not been matched in any of the subsequent 14 Tory years.

Like the Defence Secretary, the Leader of the Opposition and I were in Munich at the weekend, and the urgency of the need for more help for Ukraine ran through every discussion. Everyone was also profoundly moved by the words of Yulia Navalnaya, speaking even after the news of her husband’s death at Putin’s hands. This is the brutality that the Ukrainians are fighting, and this is why UK support must not falter. We strongly back last month’s UK-Ukraine security agreement, which the Defence Secretary has described as “a 100-year alliance”. Will the Government take the necessary next step and provide an implementation plan for this year and future years, to ensure that Ukraine receives the help that it needs now and for tomorrow?

[James Heappey]

While I am grateful for the history lesson on what was spent under the last Labour Government, the commitment to match our spending in a future Government was conspicuously absent from the right hon. Gentleman’s question. However, let me return to the collegiate spirit in which Defence questions are normally conducted. I absolutely agree that what the Secretary of State set out in his speech about the partnership with Ukraine requires a strategic approach, with very long horizons set for what our co-operation, both industrial and military, could look like.

[John Healey]

Long horizons are fine, but Ukraine needs more help now. I am concerned about the £2.5 billion for Ukraine that was announced last month and described by the Prime Minister as

“the biggest single package of defence aid to Ukraine since the war began”.—[Official Report, 15 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 578.]

The Minister has said much the same today. In response to a question from me last week, however, he would not rule out using that money to cover the UK’s operational costs at NATO bases. Will he rule that out today? Will he confirm today that every penny and every pound of the £2.5 billion for Ukraine will go to Ukraine?

[James Heappey]

I fear that the right hon. Gentleman has missed something over the last two years. The £2.3 billion that the Government have provided for operations to support Ukraine has always included not just the gifting in kind that takes the headlines, but Operation Interflex and other avenues through which we support the Ukrainians. The fact is that next year’s spending and that of the year after will match exactly what we did in previous years, in terms of the breadth of that contribution. It is also true that the long-term strategic alliance that the Secretary of State set out and the commitment year on year to spend more than any other European ally are not mutually exclusive; we are doing both.

Ukraine

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Tuesday 28th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to make a statement on the war in Ukraine.

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

Since I last updated the House on 24 October, the situation on the ground has remained largely unchanged. The armed forces of Ukraine continue to make slow but steady progress in their fight to retake their country, while a small crossing of the Dnipro has been established. Russian forces have made small advances in the northern axis of a pincer movement with which they are attempting to surround the town of Avdiivka.

Over the weekend, Russia launched what was likely the largest wave of one-way attack drone strikes on Ukraine of the war so far, ahead of another likely winter campaign of strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukraine neutralised most of the incoming weapons from the latest assault, and international partners, including the UK, are working with Ukraine to further strengthen its defences.

We will continue to support priority areas for Ukraine in the coming months, including air defence and hardening critical national infrastructure sites. Our foundational supply of critical artillery ammunition continues. We also continue to develop Ukraine’s maritime capabilities, helping it to deny Russia sea control in the western Black sea. With Government help, a UK-based commercial insurance provider has developed an insurance facility for shipping using the Ukraine maritime corridor; the facility charges premiums in line with those under the Black sea grain initiative, which is crucial for re-attracting commercial shipping.

The UK has committed £4.6 billion of military support to date, as we continue to donate significant amounts of ammunition and matériel from our own stocks, as well as those purchased from across the globe. In addition, we have trained more than 52,000 soldiers since 2015. Our support for next year is being finalised, both internally within the Government and with our partners around the world, and will be announced shortly.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[John Healey]

Early on Saturday morning, sirens sounded across Kyiv for six hours. Families took to shelters and fear spread across the city. That day, 75 drones were launched on Kyiv—the biggest strike on Ukraine since Putin’s brutal illegal invasion began, as the Minister said. With attention on the middle east, this is a wake-up call about Russia. Putin can still unleash fresh horrors on Ukraine, still shows contempt for international law, and still wants to redraw sovereign boundaries by force. Six hundred and forty-two days on, Ukrainians are living with fear every day, fighting every day, and dying every day. The defence of the UK starts in Ukraine, because if Putin prevails, he will not stop with Ukraine. I pay tribute to the UK troops who are training Ukrainian forces, flying out military aid and reinforcing regional security through NATO.

Last month, the Defence Secretary said:

“Let’s not forget about Ukraine.”

So why did the autumn statement do just that? There was no 2024 military funding or action plan for Ukraine. At the very time when Ukraine needs confidence that it has strong, continuing support from allies, the Prime Minister is stepping back. UK leadership on Ukraine is flagging: this year’s £2.3 billion of UK military funding runs out in March, while this month Germany announced €8 billion of military aid for next year. When will the Defence Secretary himself make a statement on Ukraine? When will Ministers announce the next delivery of UK weapons? When will the Government pledge funding for fresh military aid and publish a 2024 action plan for the military, economic and diplomatic support that Ukraine needs? When will the Prime Minister demonstrate by his decisions and actions that Britain will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes to win?

[James Heappey]

I do not think there is any doubt in Kyiv—in fact, I know there is no doubt—about the UK’s continued support, and indeed its leadership on gifting within the international community. While I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman is keen to make a political point, I think that deep down he knows that too, because he speaks to the Ukrainians. I know, as he does, that they continue to regard the UK as the standard bearer globally for encouraging others to donate ever more and, crucially, to donate weapons systems with ever more complexity. I have no doubt—as I think, deep down, the right hon. Gentleman has no doubt—that the Ukrainian Government maintain their confidence in us as one of their key allies, if not their key ally, and that the UK’s leadership is certainly not flagging.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the announcement of weapons. The reality is that we are giving a very broad range of weapons. While he might think it is militarily sound to focus on always giving something new, just being resilient in our ability to keep giving what we are giving is every bit as important to the operational planning that the Ukrainian armed forces need to do. This is not a set of gimmicks—a set of announcements. This is about the resourcing of a military operational plan that UK military operational planners are key in developing with the Ukrainians. I am entirely comfortable that across a whole range of weapons systems, the pipeline that we now have in place to deliver every month, not only from our own stockpiles and manufacturing capacity but from those that we can access globally, is a reliable, dependable part of the Ukrainian plan.

As for the plan for next year, I completely accept that the right hon. Gentleman is right to say that a number could have been given in the autumn statement, but surely it is more important to give a number that reflects the discussions that the chairman of the joint chiefs, the Chief of the Defence Staff and General Zaluzhny have had, and those that senior US, UK and Ukrainian politicians have had, in order to understand the Ukrainian ambition for their operations next year, so that we can resource that properly. All the way through, what the UK has done better than anyone else in the world is understand what the Ukrainians want to do next and get there first in delivering that capability, in so doing emboldening others to follow. As soon as the plan for next year is confirmed, I am certain that the amount that it will cost will be announced to Parliament and the plan firmed up, so that the right hon. Gentleman will be satisfied.

War in Ukraine

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the war in Ukraine.

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

Since I last updated the House in my opening remarks in the debate on Ukraine on 11 September, the situation on the ground has remained largely unchanged. Slow and steady progress is being made by the Ukrainian armed forces, which continue to grind their way through the main Russian defensive position. Defence Intelligence estimates that the number of Russian permanent casualties —in other words, those who are dead or so seriously wounded that they cannot return to action—now stands at between 150,000 and 190,000 troops. Total casualties are estimated to number up to 290,000.

A limited Russian offensive is under way at Avdiivka on the outskirts of Donetsk city. Fighting has been fierce, and we assess that the average casualty rate for the Russian army was around 800 per day in the first week of the offensive. As ever, Putin and his generals show no more regard for the lives of their own troops than they do for the people of Ukraine.

However, even this ex-soldier can admit that wars are not only about the fight on the land. Since the last debate on Ukraine, the Ukrainians have opened up a new front in the Black sea, destroying a Kilo-class submarine and two amphibious ships, as well as making a successful strike on the Russian Black sea fleet headquarters. The consequence, as President Zelensky has rightly said, is that the Russian Black sea fleet is no longer capable of resistance in the western Black sea. As we move beyond day 600—it is day 608, to be precise—of Putin’s “three-day” illegal war, he has still not achieved any of his initial strategic aims, and he has now ceded sea control in the western Black sea to a nation without a navy.

The UK continues to donate significant amounts of ammunition and matériel, paid for from the £2.3 billion commitment for this financial year. That follows the same amount being given the year before, and that is an important point. Our gifting is about more than headline-making capabilities such as Challenger 2 or Storm Shadow. It is the delivery, month after month, of tens of thousands of artillery rounds, air defence missiles and other small but necessary items of equipment that positions the UK as one of the biggest and most influential of Ukraine’s donors. The UK is also the only country to have trained soldiers, sailors, aviators and Marines in support of the Ukrainian effort; we have now trained over 50,000 soldiers, sailors, aviators and Marines since 2014.

Events in the middle east have dominated the headlines, but in the Ministry of Defence and across the UK Government—and, clearly, in His Majesty’s Opposition, as they brought forward this urgent question—Ukraine remains a focus. I think that seeing this very timely question will matter enormously to our friends and colleagues in Kyiv. I remain every bit as confident today as I have been on all my previous visits to the Dispatch Box over the last two years that Ukraine can and will prevail.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Healey]

Members from across the House, and people across the world, are rightly focused on the middle east after Hamas’s horrific attacks. That terrorism must be condemned, civilians must be protected, humanitarian corridors must be opened, international law must be followed, and escalation risks must be managed. I welcome the Defence Secretary’s Gulf visit later this week, and I hope that he will report back to us in the House. I also welcome President Biden’s oval office address, in which he said:

“Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common: they both want to completely annihilate a neighbouring democracy”.

Today lets President Putin know that the UK remains focused on, and united in, solidarity with Ukraine.

Last week, as the Minister said, we passed the grim 600-day milestone since Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. War still rages, cities are still bombed, and civilians are still raped and killed. Ukraine has made important gains in recent days on the Dnipro river. Will the Minister update the House on that? I am proud of the UK leadership on Ukraine, but we must work to maintain that leadership and accelerate support. I fear that UK momentum is flagging. There has been no statement on Ukraine to Parliament from the new Defence Secretary since his appointment in August, and no statement from any Defence Secretary in this House since May.

Labour backs the recent announcements on UK military aid, the new British Army training to protect critical infrastructure, and the £100 million, raised with allies, that will come from the International Fund for Ukraine, but Ukrainians are asking for winter support, air defence, and more ammunition—and where is the UK’s planned response? No new money for military aid for Ukraine has been committed by this Prime Minister. The £2.3 billion for this year was pledged by his predecessor, and the £2.3 billion for last year was pledged by her predecessor. This year’s money runs out in March. Seven months after announcing £2 billion for UK stockpiles in the spring Budget, not a penny has been spent and not a single contract signed. Why? Putin must be defeated, just as Hamas must be defeated. We must not step back. We must stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes to win.

[James Heappey]

I echo the right hon. Gentleman’s words about the despicable attack from Hamas and the absolute right of Israel to defend itself. As I said, I believe strongly that it is important that Putin does not see this as a moment of opportunity to sow more chaos, and does not think that the western donor community is distracted or has a preference for supporting Israel over Ukraine. He must know that our resolve is to support both.

The right hon. Gentleman rightly noted that the Secretary of State will be in the Gulf later this week. I am sure that he will want to talk about what he hears there, but I suspect that he will also want to keep some of that counsel private, as we seek to calibrate how we posture ourselves in the region in order to reassure our allies and deter those who might seek to make a bad situation even worse. The Secretary of State was in Washington last week, and has had a number of calls with other partners around the region. So too have the Chief of the Defence Staff and I, as part of a Ministry of Defence-wide effort to ensure that we constantly calibrate our response alongside that of those who we traditionally work with in the region, and we make sure that nothing we do is misinterpreted.

The right hon. Gentleman and I are, I think, friends, so there is some dismay that he dismisses all my efforts at the Dispatch Box to keep the House updated on the war in Ukraine. I stood here as recently as 11 September to lead an excellent debate on the subject, and have given a number of statements on behalf of the Secretary of State. I am sorry if the right hon. Gentleman is so rank-conscious as to deem my efforts unworthy, but I have done my best.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to point to the fact that the excellent financial contribution made over the two previous financial years is, as yet, unconfirmed for the next financial year. It will not surprise him to know that that has already been the subject of conversation across Government. It is not for me to make that announcement in an urgent question today, but a major fiscal event is forthcoming, and I know that he will not have to wait too long. That does not mean that our plans are uncertain. In fact, I push back strongly on the suggestion that they are. For a long time over the past two years, there has been a sort of misunderstanding that the UK’s capacity to gift is entirely either from our own stockpiles or from our indigenous industrial capacity. The vast majority of what the UK gifts is what we are able to buy internationally, often from countries that Putin would prefer were not providing us with that stuff. However, we have been able to get our hands on it and get it to the Ukrainians with some haste. That is exactly the sort of thing that the right hon. Gentleman asked about.

It is about the small but necessary things, such as winterisation equipment, small arms ammunition, artillery ammunition and air defence ammunition, and our ability to buy that while in parallel stimulating UK industry. I reject what the right hon. Gentleman said about contracts having not been placed; substantial contracts have been placed directly to replenish UK stockpiles of NLAWs, Starstreak, lightweight multi-role missiles, Javelin, Brimstone, 155 mm shells and 5.56 mm rifle rounds. As far as I can see, there is a steady state contribution to the Ukrainians that amounts to tens of thousands of rounds per month, plus air defence missiles, plus all the small stuff, alongside the replenishment of our own stockpiles, which can only happen at the pace at which industry can generate it, but none the less it is happening.

Global Military Operations

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Wednesday 14th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

The Minister has indeed made a powerful case for another defence policy debate in short order, as the Chair of the Select Committee, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), said at the start. This House always welcomes a debate on defence policy, and I look forward to the contributions that we are set to hear from all parts of the House.

As the Minister recognised, this is also an important opportunity for us to reaffirm UK unity in support of Ukraine, which he did. As the Ukrainians mount their counter-offensive, they arguably need UK solidarity, NATO unity and international support more now than at any time in the 473 days since Putin first launched his brutal illegal invasion of their country. Remarkably, they have already taken back more than half the territory that Putin seized in the early days of his war, but as the Minister quite rightly said, these are early days in the counter-offensive, and although there are early signs of Ukrainian gains, they now face Russian forces that have dug in defences and have superior air power and drone technology.

There is also no sign of Putin’s strategic aims having changed, and the Russian military is, despite the damage done by the Ukrainian resistance in their courageous fighting, far from a spent force. Putin is expanding his war effort and massing his troops and firepower, and his Russian industry is on 24/7 wartime production. Again, as the Minister noted, this is long term: Ukraine has now been fighting Russia for over nine years, not one year.

There may be a change in Government next year, but there will be no change in Britain’s resolve to stand with Ukraine, confront Russian aggression and pursue Putin for his war crimes. Let me pay personal tribute to the Minister for his efforts on this. I am proud of Britain’s leadership on Ukraine, and I want to feel the same in six months’ time, so what new support is the UK sending to Ukraine now that the offensive has begun? What are the Government’s aims for next week’s Ukraine recovery conference in London? How have Ministers stepped up production in the UK defence industry, and what use has been made of urgent operational requirements to speed that up?

This debate is also an opportunity, four days from the start of Armed Forces Week, to celebrate the service of our forces personnel. At home or on global military operations, our forces personnel are essential to our national defence, our national resilience and our national obligations to allies. Theirs is the ultimate public service. On behalf of the Labour party, I thank the serving men and women in our armed forces for all they do to keep us safe. I also want to recognise the unsung work and essential expertise of the non-uniformed staff in defence.

However, after the Minister’s speech, we have to ask: what is the Government’s purpose in this debate? Why is this happening now, before and not after the defence Command Paper is published? Where is the Defence Secretary? Where is his vision for UK leadership and contribution to NATO? Where is his apology for the failure to honour this nation’s pledge under the ARAP—Afghan relocations and assistance policy—scheme to those brave Afghans who put their lives at risk to work alongside our forces? Where is the action that he is taking to fix MOD procurement, which the Public Accounts Committee say is “broken” and “repeatedly wasting taxpayers’ money”? Where is the 2023 action plan for Ukraine that he first promised back in August last year? What has he been doing for the last six months? Part of the answer, of course, is leaning very heavily on his No. 2, the Minister for Armed Forces, as he is today.

Given that the Minister commands such respect across both sides of the House, we look to him to provide us with the reassurance that the new Command Paper, due this month, will be reported first to the House and not briefed beforehand to the media or to policy institutes. If he wants to intervene to give the House that reassurance, he would be very welcome to do so.

[James Heappey]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that the Secretary of State and I have the highest regard for Mr Speaker, who has been very clear on these matters. We will ensure that both Mr Speaker’s instructions and the right hon. Gentleman’s exhortations are noted.

[John Healey]

That is welcome indeed and noted on our side, not least because the new defence Command Paper will be a really important publication. No country comes out of a war in the same way as it went in. Ukraine will, and must, have a serious impact on how our future global military operations and our homeland defence is conducted.

Since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine began last year, 26 NATO nations have rebooted defence plans and budgets. Chancellor Scholz discarded decades-long German policy and boosted defence by €100 billion. President Macron has promised the same budget increase in France. Poland will spend 4% of GDP this year. Finland and Sweden have set aside decades of non-alignment to apply for NATO membership. However, there has still been strategic inertia from British Ministers over any deep rethink of international and domestic planning.

Top Secret Document Leaks

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Tuesday 18th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

As my right hon. Friend notes, the apparently leaked documents are in the public domain. However, that does not change their classification and thus the degree to which any UK Minister or official can comment on their content, so I will not be commenting on specifics of the examples he raised, nor any others over the course of this urgent question. He is absolutely right in setting out the process by which information is gathered, assimilated and presented to decision makers; he is absolutely right that the breadth and scale of information in this data age is enormous; and he is absolutely right that one of the key decisions that any organisation with intelligence at its core has to make is how to allow access to that information so that the relevant people can use it to make good decisions.

My right hon. Friend asserts that perhaps too many eyes now have access to that information. I think that is a matter for different Departments in different countries to consider. As you would imagine, Mr Speaker, the MOD has looked at our own processes as a consequence of what happened last week. We have to place huge trust in our vetting processes to ensure that those who routinely have access to classified information have been risk-managed appropriately. Even beyond that, within the vetted workforce there is a very necessary compartmentalisation of information, so that only those who need to see things to do their jobs see them.

That said, what we are learning in the information age, when it is about getting ahead of the other side’s narrative, is that it is very useful to be able to think quickly about the information we have. There is thus a balance to strike between being overly compartmentalised and being in a position where people can be well informed and quickly make decisions in a way that meets the speed of relevance in modern competition. Suffice to say, and I hope my right hon. Friend and the House will be reassured, that of course the permanent secretary, on seeing what happened in the Department of Defence last week, has had a good look at what is going on inside the MOD to make sure that, if we have any lessons to learn, we do so.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

The US is our closest security ally, so this is of serious concern. The intelligence we share bilaterally and through alliances such as NATO and Five Eyes is fundamental to our UK national security, and it is essential that that continues confidently and confidentially. The Secretary of State for Defence is in Washington, we are told, apparently to discuss this breach, but will he make a statement to Parliament on his return to confirm the reassurances he has received on how British intelligence is handled?

The Minister is right to say that the US agencies are treating this seriously. The Pentagon says that it expects findings from its investigations within 45 days. Two years ago, UK classified documents on Challenger 2 tanks were similarly reported leaked from an online forum for video gaming, “War Thunder”. What action was taken following that leak?

I have a number of questions that the Minister has not yet answered. He has described the documents as inaccurate, but to what extent have they been manipulated and to what extent have they been used as disinformation? Has this leak put at risk any UK personnel? Is the MOD mitigating such risks, and if so how? This is the time when the UK should be accelerating military support to Ukraine, so what assessment have the Government made of the impact of this leak on Ukrainian plans for a potential offensive?

While threats to the UK continue to rise, security breaches have been getting worse on the Defence Secretary’s watch, with 2,000 people affected by data breaches set out in the last MOD annual report and a 40% increase in the number of referrals to the Information Commissioner—and that was last July. How many MOD data breaches have occurred since? Finally, why is no Minister designated as responsible for information security when handling intelligence is so critical to our national security?

[James Heappey]

First, I thought I was clear in my initial answer that the Secretary of State is in Washington for a briefing to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that was requested in December and scheduled in January. It is fortuitous that he is there to discuss these matters in addition, but it would be inaccurate to say that he is there because of what happened last week.

The right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) asks about previous incidents where the UK MOD has been responsible for leaks. I agree with him that it happens too often, but every time it happens, reviews are put in place and lessons are learned in terms of both the way that information is handled digitally and—because this was the case last year—the way that documents are removed from the building. On the former, there has been a wide-ranging and robust effort to assure the digital security of documents and to ensure that all users of secret and above systems are aware of the way that those systems should properly be used, and of how it should not even be attempted to move information from one system to the other. On physical documents, the Secretary of State put in place random bag searches at MOD main building immediately following the leak of hard documents last year, and those searches remain in place now.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to observe that some of those documents have, since their apparent leaking, apparently been manipulated for various misinformation and disinformation purposes. That is why it is important to qualify that colleagues should be suspicious not only of the original content, but of the different versions that are in circulation subsequently, because they have been manipulated for various means. He is of course right to flag his concern, which mirrors our concern, about any force protection implications from such leaks. That was indeed our first concern, and the chief of joint operations was able quickly to reassure us that all those involved in the protection of diplomatic mission in Ukraine are not compromised in any way by the leaks—nor are any of those involved in the wider support for Ukraine and the wider continent beyond.

I do not think that there is any impact on the Ukrainian plans for the offensive. In fact, as the right hon. Gentleman will have seen in the reporting of those, there has been a degree of amplification from the Ukrainians around some of the casualty statistics—I make no comment on the accuracy of the figures being pumped. Indeed, there is reporting that those figures have been manipulated by both sides to tell their story. But I am pretty confident that the Ukrainians are intending to stick to their plan and go for it. I do not have the information today on precisely how many breaches there have been, but I will write to him.

British Special Forces in Afghanistan: New Allegations

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Thursday 14th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on new allegations concerning British special forces in Afghanistan.

I thank you, Mr Speaker, for your very careful consideration of this urgent question request.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (James Heappey)]

On 12 July, the BBC broadcast an episode of “Panorama”, claiming evidence of criminality allegedly committed by the UK armed forces in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Defence is currently defending two judicial reviews relating to allegations of unlawful killings during operations in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2012. While I accept, Mr Speaker, that to allow today’s urgent question you have waived the convention that we do not discuss matters that are sub judice, advice from Ministry of Defence lawyers is that any discussion of specific detail of the cases would be prejudicial to the ongoing litigation, and thus I am afraid I simply cannot enter into detail about specific allegations made on specific operations relating to specific people.

[James Heappey]

Let me apologise on behalf of the Department for the fact that you, Mr Speaker, and the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne were put in that position. I was not aware of the request that you had made, but I assure you that, when I return to the Department, I will investigate fully why that was not responded to in the way that it should have been.

We very much recognise the severity of these allegations, and where there is reason to believe that personnel may have fallen short of expectations, it is absolutely right that they be held to account. Nobody in our organisation, no matter how special, is above the law. The service police have already carried out extensive and independent investigations into allegations about the conduct of UK forces in Afghanistan, including allegations of ill-treatment and unlawful killing. No charges were brought under Operation Northmoor, which investigated historical allegations relating to incidents in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2013. The service police concluded there was insufficient evidence to refer any cases to the independent Service Prosecuting Authority. I stress that both these organisations have the full authority and independence to take investigative decisions outside of the MOD’s chain of command.

A separate allegation from October 2012 was investigated by the Royal Military Police under Operation Cestro. It resulted in the referral of three soldiers to the Service Prosecuting Authority. In 2014, after careful consideration, the director of service prosecutions took the decision not to prosecute any of the three soldiers referred. It is my understanding that all the alleged criminal offences referred to in the “Panorama” programme have been fully investigated by the service police, but we remain fully committed to any further reviews or investigations when new evidence or reason to do so is presented.

A decision to investigate allegations of criminality is for the service police. They provide an independent and impartial investigative capability, free from improper interference. Earlier this week, the Royal Military Police wrote to the production team of “Panorama” to request that any new evidence be provided to them. I am placing a copy of the RMP’s letter in the Library of the House. I understand that the BBC has responded to question the legal basis on which the RMP are requesting that new evidence, which makes little sense to me, but the RMP and the BBC are in discussions. As I have said, if any new evidence is presented to the Royal Military Police, it will be investigated.

I am aware that the programme alleges the involvement of a unit for which it is MOD policy to neither confirm nor deny its involvement in any operational event. As such, I must refer in generality to the armed forces in response to the questions that I know colleagues will want to ask, and I cannot refer to any specific service personnel who may or may not have served in those units.

We should continue to recognise that the overwhelming majority of our armed forces serve with courage and professionalism. We hold them to the highest standards. They are our nation’s bravest and best, and allegations such as these tarnish the reputation of our organisation. We all want to see allegations such as these investigated, so that the fine reputation of the British armed forces can be untarnished and remain as high as it should be.

[John Healey]

No one doubts the bravery of all those who served in Afghanistan, nor the extreme risks they faced. And the Minister is right: our British armed forces have a proud tradition of upholding the very highest standards of military ethics and professionalism, and the international laws of armed conflict and human rights. This is fundamental to Britain as one of the world’s leading democracies, so the allegations reported in Tuesday night’s “Panorama” programme could not be more serious—a pattern of suspicious deaths, with newly obtained military reports suggesting that one unit may have unlawfully killed 54 people in a single six-month tour; “drop weapons” planted to fabricate evidence, with the squadron’s reports “causing alarm at headquarters”; and those at the top warned, but not acting to stop the pattern of killings and withholding crucial details from the military police. Verifying the truth in any new evidence should matter most to military leaders and the MOD. This will not be buried.

What action are the Government taking to respond to the growing calls from military figures, including the former Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir David Richards, for a thorough investigation? I welcome the Minister’s statement today that, if there is any new evidence, it will be investigated, but how can he argue that the service police can credibly tackle this task when “Panorama” exposes the systemic failures in their investigations, just as the Government’s own Lyons review highlighted gaps in capabilities in the military police, and when the new defence serious crime unit, designed to fix the problems, will not be up and running until the end of the year?

There were similar claims from the same period against Australian special forces. However, these have been investigated thoroughly via a special inquiry commissioned by the head of the army, not Ministers. That inquiry had independence, justice and military experience, and welfare support. It had privacy, immunity and compulsory questioning powers to get to the truth. Justice Brereton’s report confirmed credible evidence that members of Australian special forces were responsible for the unlawful killing of 39 people. It made 143 recommendations, all accepted by the Australian defence force, and referred 36 matters to the federal police for criminal investigation. Will the Government now do the same and investigate these claims and any cover-up in the chain of command, to secure justice for any of those affected and above all to protect the reputation of our British special forces?

[James Heappey]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: this will not be buried. Absolutely nobody in the Ministry of Defence wants to see these sorts of allegations buried. That does no service to our armed forces whatsoever. These allegations will be investigated fully, if the new evidence is handed over.

The investigation by the RMP itself has already been double-checked, as it were, by a recently retired chief constable and a senior QC, and they agreed that the investigation was sound. Further to that, there has been the Henriques review, published in October 2021, which recognised only too well that there were problems—failings, if you like—in the military justice system that needed to be resolved, so ahead of this there has already been a recognition that the military justice system could work better. The Henriques review identifies many of the ways that it could.

The Secretary of State was clear when I spoke to him earlier in the week on this matter that he is not ruling out any type of public inquiry or review if it is clear that there are failings that need to be looked at. The MOD wants this to be as transparent as possible, so that everybody can have confidence in the service justice system and the reputation of our armed forces can remain untarnished.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Monday 13th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

NATO meets in two weeks to agree its masterplan for the next 10 years, yet there are growing concerns about the UK meeting even its core NATO commitments. Is it true that the Defence Secretary warned the Chancellor that Britain risks missing its 2% spending commitment? What is the Defence Secretary doing about Ajax, given that the Public Accounts Committee’s new report states that the MoD

“is failing to deliver the…capability that the Army needs to…meet its NATO commitments”?

Why has the Defence Secretary failed to set out a vision to ensure that Britain continues to be NATO’s leading European nation?

[James Heappey]

The Defence Secretary is a passionate advocate for our nation’s armed forces and for defence within the Government, but his correspondence with other Ministers in the Cabinet necessarily should remain private. The reality is, as I said in answer to the question earlier from the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman), that the UK exceeds its NATO minimum requirement, and as NATO moves into its new strategic concept and looks at how it will operate across all five domains, it is the UK’s decisions from the IR that are informing what others will now contribute to NATO, rather than vice versa. The right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) finished with a question about the Secretary of State setting out a vision for NATO. I cannot think of anybody within NATO who has set out a more compelling vision for the alliance and the UK’s role within it.

NATO and International Security

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Thursday 19th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I think that it does. It requires a steady flow of orders, it requires a stronger commitment to design and make in Britain, and it requires a long-term strategy so that defence industrial producers and their workforces are not faced with a stop-go of uncertain contracts and, very often in the recent past, a competition that may put them at a disadvantage with overseas suppliers.

I am looking around the Chamber momentarily before I proceed, and I will proceed now.

The bravery of the Ukrainians, civil and military alike, has been extraordinary, and we pay tribute to them in the House again today. Beyond his misjudgment of Russia’s military competence and capabilities, Putin has made two fundamental miscalculations, first of the fierce determination of Ukrainians to defend their country, and secondly of western unity. I believe that the two are linked. Just as Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Donbas region in 2014 strengthened Ukraine’s national unity and resolve to resist Russia, this full-scale invasion of sovereign Ukraine has strengthened NATO’s international unity and resolve to resist Russia.

NATO is becoming stronger. President Biden has doubled down on the United States’ commitment to

“defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of American power.”

Led by Germany, a dozen European countries have already rebooted defence plans and defence spending, while Finland and Sweden have overturned decades of non-alignment, with their centre-left Governments now bidding for NATO membership, a move that we, as the official Opposition, fully support. Putin is right to say that this Nordic NATO expansion does not pose a direct threat to Russia—NATO is a defensive alliance—but the man who is waging war in Europe is certainly in no position to demand conditions on countries seeking NATO’s collective security.

This afternoon the Secretary of State described NATO as the most successful alliance in history, and he was right. It is the most successful alliance in history because of the strength of both its military and its values. It pools military capacity, capability and cash, with a collective budget of more than $1 trillion, to protect 1 billion people. Alongside the solemn commitment to collective defence, the values of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law are also enshrined in its founding treaties.

I am proud that the UK’s post-war Labour Government played the leading role in NATO’s foundation, and Labour’s commitment to the alliance remains unshakeable. The Secretary of State, having said that he did not play party politics, then did exactly that. I gently say to him that the position of Labour’s leadership on its unshakeable commitment to NATO and its commitment to the UK nuclear deterrent has been a settled position from Kinnock to Corbyn and from Blair, Brown and Miliband in between.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

You missed one.

[John Healey]

Check the record.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Monday 28th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I am not sure I agree with the afterthought to the hon. Gentleman’s question, but I know that the Chief of the General Staff and his team were vigorous in the way that the Future Army plans were communicated to the Army and that the Army chain of command had an opportunity to contribute to them. I am not sure that there is a mechanism quite as he envisages it, but the Army is, certainly in my experience, the sort of organisation that enjoys being challenged from within. I know there is plenty of challenge going on, so that the Army can make sure it develops the right plans for the future.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

Mr Speaker, we are proud to receive the letter, which you read out, from the Ukrainian Speaker, and we are proud that President Zelensky said last night:

“Britain is definitely on our side.”

The Government have Labour’s full support for the UK’s military help to Ukraine. Putin’s brutal invasion surely reminds us that the Army’s primary role must be to reinforce Europe’s deterrence and defence against Russian aggression, so why do the Minister’s Future Soldier plans risk leaving the British Army too small, too thinly spread and too poorly equipped to deal with the threats that the UK and our NATO allies face?

[James Heappey]

I fear that the right hon. Gentleman and I have been looking at different sets of plans, because I see an Army that ends up being better equipped, more lethal and more integrated. The choice that was made to introduce the deep recce strike capability into the third armoured division is absolutely game changing, and it is what is required. The de-prioritisation of the close fight that we have seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, in northern Syria and now in Ukraine shows us that the key, defining characteristic of the modern land battle is the ability to strike precisely and in depth, and to attrit our enemy while they are moving towards us. That is what the deep recce strike brigade is going to get after.

[John Healey]

The heart of our UK commitment to NATO is indeed a fully capable war-fighting division, which the former Chief of the Defence Staff has described as

“the standard whereby a credible army is judged.”

Why will this modernised war-fighting third division not be delivered until 2030? Why did Ministers decide it would be built around Ajax when they knew about the deep-seated problems? Why, when it took the German Chancellor just three days to overturn decades of defence policy and boost defence spending by €100 billion, does the National Audit Office say that UK Ministers could take another nine months even to decide whether to stick with or scrap Ajax?

[James Heappey]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that candour is the name of the game whenever I am speaking. I think there are reasons why both sides of the House could reflect on quite why our Army has the age of kit that it has. Governments of both parties have missed a number of opportunities to decide to renew the Army’s equipment inventory over the last 20 or 30 years. The reality is that the Army has to be redesigned to meet the threat as it now is, and I think that two armoured infantry or strike brigades with a deep recce strike brigade is exactly what a modern war-fighting division should look like. Within NATO, there are discussions about how the NATO force needs to transform to meet the modern threat.

Ukraine

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Friday 25th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

First, I join my hon. Friend in sending prayers to the people of Ukraine. Last night, I was watching some of the footage that was emerging, particularly from Kharkiv, of the artillery barrage. It just looked like hell on earth and it was pretty hard not to say a prayer before going to sleep. Thank God for the safety in which we were all sleeping last night compared with those in that city.

As Members will appreciate, a no-fly zone is somewhat difficult to implement in a hostile airspace against a peer adversary. We need to have our eyes wide open to the reality that in such an event NATO jets would, not just possibly but most certainly probably, come into a combat situation with Russian jets, and the risk of miscalculation, escalation and the triggering of article 5 could not be understated in those circumstances. As Members will appreciate, in the air domain the risk of miscalculation is greater, because things are happening at Mach 2 and there is no time for political calibration; it is in the hands of pilots who are flying at well over the speed of sound. No-fly zones come with all sorts of problems. I understand exactly why the Ukrainian ambassador is asking for this, but we need to be clear that it could well trigger an article 5 moment and we need to be clear-eyed about that reality in considering it.

I said in my answer to the original question that I do not propose to provide a commentary on the additional hardware that we will supply to the Ukrainian armed forces, nor the routes by which we would do so, if indeed we will. The Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister are clear about this in terms of the requirement. We know that other European countries are keen to do likewise, but obviously this has to be provided at a pace and through routes that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to absorb, in order to minimise the risk of the cache simply being destroyed or overwhelmed by advancing Russian forces.

NATO is taking huge measures to reinforce its eastern flank. I have outlined in my initial response what the UK has done. That effort has been more than matched by our best friends in the world in the United States, and other NATO countries are also rallying to the flag. For the past 10 years or so, NATO has had a network of enhanced forward presence battlegroups—the UK’s is in Estonia. Those are all being reinforced, and new forward presence battlegroups are being put in place. If the aim of what is going on right now is not just territorial gain in Ukraine, but to push NATO away from Russia, President Putin is achieving precisely the opposite, because NATO is drawing the line around NATO countries ever thicker and ever stronger.

It will not surprise my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough one bit to know that in the MOD we are quickly considering whether the threat has changed and whether more money is required—no Defence Minister would ever say that it is not, but that is a conversation that needs to happen within Government. I think my hon. Friend would agree that this is not a retail moment of politics, where an issue arises and a solution is offered within the news cycle, and then everybody moves on to the next thing. This is something that will define our role in the world for the next 20 years, and we have got time to make the right decisions.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

The whole House appreciates your willingness to allow this urgent question, Mr Speaker, and the manner in which the Minister is briefing the House and the way in which his colleagues are prepared to keep the House informed during this very rapidly developing crisis.

Yesterday, President Putin launched a war in Europe. He is invading and killing people in a sovereign country that Russia itself guaranteed to respect. His attack on Ukraine is an attack on democracy and a grave violation of international law and the United Nations charter. Putin will not stop at Ukraine; he wants to divide and weaken the west, and to re-establish Russian control over neighbouring countries. These are the actions of an imperialist and a dictator, and Britain has a long tradition of standing up to such tyrants. We believe in freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the right of a country to decide its own future, and those are the very values that Ukrainians are fighting for now in their country. We must support their brave resistance in any way we can, and our thoughts are with the comrades and families of those on both sides who have been killed in these first hours of fighting.

On Wednesday, the Prime Minister told the House that the UK would shortly be providing a further package of military support to Ukraine. We understand the Minister’s comments about detail, but has that further military assistance been provided? The Minister knows that he has Labour’s full support for doing so, and he also knows that what was announced and delivered before—the UK’s short-range, hand-held anti-tank missiles—are working well. He knows that the Ukrainians need more of those missiles urgently in order to defend Kyiv and their other cities, so can he confirm that he is willing to go that bit further? The Minister has just said that Russia has failed to take any of its day one objectives. Which are the major objectives that it has failed to meet, and what is the Government’s assessment of why it has failed?

Finally, NATO leaders meet today. Does Britain support NATO’s response force now being activated in full? What further contribution will the UK make to reinforcing NATO allies on the eastern flank, and when will the 1,000 UK troops on stand-by to help with humanitarian assistance be deployed? The Minister also mentioned the doubling up of British forces in Estonia. When will those be deployed and in place?

Since the end of the cold war, we have taken peace and security in Europe for granted. We can no longer do so, and I fear that we will be dealing with the consequences of this Russian invasion for years to come.

[James Heappey]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his question and the way that he and his Front-Bench Labour colleagues have engaged with the Government throughout all of this. It just goes to show that at times of national emergency this House is at its very best.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that NLAW—the next generation light anti-tank weapon—has already proven to be invaluable. They are unsubstantiated reports, but none the less we are aware of a number of circumstances in which they have been used to defeat Russian armour. We are therefore very aware of their utility, both in open battle, during the initial phase of the conflict, but also in the urban domain, in any resistance or insurgency that might follow. It will not surprise the right hon. Gentleman to know that NLAW, among other systems that have similar dual utility in both open battle and whatever may come next, is high on our list of things that we are looking to supply.

I can sense the right hon. Gentleman’s frustration, and I know that the House would like to hear the full detail. Suffice to say that the Secretary of State has instructed military officers in Defence to look across the full UK inventory for everything that we have right now that might be usable in the circumstances and to look at whether that could be sent forward and absorbed by the Ukrainians. However, one has to be clear that most systems require some degree of training, so it is not just the logistics of moving them to the country, nor indeed the challenges of the export of systems, in that we would need all the countries that have intellectual property or that operate the system to give their permission for it to be donated. It is also the ability to train up Ukrainian forces to use it thereafter. However, we are leaving no stone unturned, and the right hon. Gentleman should be assured that we want to see as much British kit in the hands of the Ukrainians as we can manage.

The right hon. Gentleman asked which objectives were not taken. He will forgive me if, while clearly we indulge in a bit of information manoeuvre from the Dispatch Box to remind the Russian public that President Putin may well have bitten off more than he can chew, we are not going to compromise the intelligence that we have got altogether. Suffice to say, we are pretty certain that in the Kremlin last night there will have been some pretty urgent reflections on the speed of the advance compared with what they anticipated. The Russian people should be calling President Putin and the kleptocracy that surrounds him out on that, because young Russian men and women are being sacrificed in the name of President Putin’s hubris.

As for the NATO response force, further contributions are under consideration. The UK is already the second largest contributor in terms of the surge forces that have come forward, second only to the United States, but we are clear that we may need to provide more in land, sea and air, and we will do so if other NATO allies are unable to respond at the pace that we could. The 1,000 troops that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned who are on standby for humanitarian support in the countries immediately adjoining Ukraine will be deployed as and when those countries ask for them, but thus far no request has come. They remain at high readiness, forward present at a camp very close to RAF Brize Norton, so that they can be deployed at hours’ notice, but at the moment Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland have not yet asked for that support.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about when the enhanced forward presence battlegroups will have been doubled up and when the brigade headquarters will be in place. I encourage all colleagues to follow the excellent Twitter feed of the 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, the Iron Division as they call themselves. There were some fantastic pictures yesterday of Challenger 2 tanks being loaded on to low loader trucks to be driven north through Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, and into Estonia. That is an extraordinary effort for a battlegroup that was not supposed to be deploying for three more months and was in the middle of a training routine in Germany. It has turned that around very quickly. It is a testament not only to the Royal Welsh battlegroup but to the brigade headquarters, 3rd Division and the Field Army that that work has been completed so quickly; we expect them to be complete in Tapa by 1 March.

Migrant Crossings: Role of the Military

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I thank my right hon. Friend for elaborating on his urgent question. I take issue with his point that the Navy has to make a binary choice between work at home and work overseas. Ships are deployed all over the world right now, and other ships are making ready to set to sea in response to whatever crises may unfold in the Euro-Atlantic over the coming weeks.

In addition, there is capacity to do as we do year round, which is to deploy naval resources into the channel for purposes such as fishery protection and, indeed, securing our border. That is an important point. The purpose of our nation’s armed forces is to secure the UK’s national security interests both at home and abroad, and I would argue that deploying our armed forces to ensure that our borders are robust is a perfectly appropriate use of them. Indeed, as I know my right hon. Friend is very aware, there are parts of Europe right now in which state-sponsored illegal migration is being used as a sub-threshold weapon of competition. I am not suggesting for a second that the migration across the channel is that right now but, in the absence of robust defence of our borders, it could be in the future, and the MOD therefore has a perfectly reasonable role to play in ensuring that our borders are robustly protected.

My right hon. Friend specifically asked about pay. Clearly this will be a multi-agency effort under Royal Navy command. Where agencies are already doing things in the channel, they will continue to be funded by the Departments that own them.

Success is that we do not allow anybody to land in the UK on their own terms. For how long? Until the deterrent effect is achieved and the cross-channel route for small boats collapses.

There is a limit to my right hon. Friend’s question, which is the role of the Royal Navy and the military within the channel—that is what I am here to answer today—but I completely agree that this is just one part of a wider system. Indeed, he is right to note that the MOD has plenty of equity in providing stability in countries such as Iraq and in the Sahel, where the majority of migrants are coming from, and we are engaged in that.

Nobody is pretending that the presence of a rear admiral and a few extra Royal Navy ships solves this issue. It is regrettable that only part of the Government’s solution should appear in the papers, and I will do my best to answer any questions my right hon. Friend asks.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

This Government now really are desperate. They are desperate to distract attention from accusations about the Prime Minister lying and partying in Downing Street, and they are desperate to prop up a Home Secretary who has been utterly failing for two years as the number of cross-channel migrants has tripled. The military are there to protect the nation, not Tory Ministers.

The Minister has confirmed today that the armed forces will be involved in what he calls operational delivery. He says the details are still being worked through, so let me try again. What will the armed forces now do? Will naval vessels be deployed in the channel? Will the Navy be used to push back migrant boats? Will the Navy use sonic weapons, as No. 10 wants? Will it step up the use of drones for surveillance? Will it transport migrants from British beaches? What military accommodation will be used to house and process migrants? We are told by the media that Rear Admiral Utley has been put in charge. To whom will he report, the Home Secretary or the Defence Secretary?

This announcement is official confirmation that the Home Secretary is failing. Our armed forces are always the Government’s last resort. The military aid to the civil authorities code means such assistance is granted only when

“the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task”.

Who will pay the military’s bills for this work? What will be the arrangements for co-operation between the UK and French military? The Minister promised me last month that he would

“publish details of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities…tasks on a fortnightly basis beginning in January 2022. These updates will be placed in the Library of the House.”

When will he actually do this, and will he publish the detailed terms of this MACA agreement?

The Navy was used before, in 2019. Two patrol vessels were redeployed from defence tasks to the channel. They intercepted no boats, at a cost of £780,000 to the taxpayer. Will the Minister guarantee that this military deployment in the channel will not compromise our armed forces in any of their fundamental defence tasks? When will the Home Secretary step up to do her job to secure a proper security agreement with the French, break the smuggling gangs, and prevent more tragic deaths of migrants in the channel?

[James Heappey]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. I do not share his view of the Home Secretary; we have worked closely with her on a number of issues, including Op Pitting over the summer, where she made a number of courageous decisions about how to accelerate border flow at the Baron Hotel, and indeed throughout the past year when the MOD has been trying to support the Border Force. The fact is that this is not a MACA request; it is something quite different. It is asking the Navy to take primacy, from a command-and-control perspective, to bring to bear all the Government’s maritime assets that set sail, across all agencies, in order to try to cohere a more robust response at sea. It is an evolution of what we have been doing rather than a replacement of something that had previously existed.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, there may be a requirement for more naval assets—warships—to be in the channel, but they sit too high off the water to be a credible platform from which to cross-deck people from a dinghy, so the presence of naval assets is probably from a command-and-control perspective rather than from an interdiction or interception perspective. There are better platforms within the Government’s inventory, and things that we can lease from the open market, that will be much more effective for mid-channel cross-decking under RN command and control.

Neither the Royal Navy nor the Royal Marines will be engaged in pushback, but that tactic has been developed by Border Force, and if it is applicable it will be used. The Royal Navy will not use sonic weapons. The Royal Navy or the wider military may be involved in transportation of people when they reach the shore as they enter the processing system. There may be a use for military accommodation. As I said, this is a UQ responding to a partial revelation of the plan, and I make no apology for the wider plan being still in development.

Rear Admiral Utley continues to report to the fleet commander, who reports to the First Sea Lord, who reports to the Secretary of State. Costs will lie where they fall, other than for novel capabilities, in which case there will be a chat with the Treasury. The MOD and the Navy enjoy excellent relations with the French MOD and the French Navy. We are confident in our ability to manage the cross-channel relationships.

I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman if I promised him an update on MACAs; I forgot that I had done so and I will make sure that that is rectified.

UK Military Personnel Serving Overseas: Vaccination

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Wednesday 23rd June 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

Whether that was right or wrong can be a matter of debate, but the MOD position has been very clear throughout. I happen to believe that it is the right decision, because there was no decision to prioritise other professions beyond those within the NHS—military medics, it is important to say, were all vaccinated as a matter of priority alongside their NHS colleagues while they were working in high-risk covid environments.

The other thing that I would just pick up on in my right hon. Friend’s response to my initial answer is his assertion that 80 people on our deployment to Mali had covid. That is simply not the case. The correct figure, as was answered in a parliamentary question last week, is that cumulatively, since the deployment began, 24 people have tested positive for covid. If you will indulge the detail of that, Madam Deputy Speaker, there were six positive tests in March, two in April and one in May for the Chinook detachment, and two in December, six in January, one in February and six in March for the long range reconnaissance group.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

This is frankly shocking. Defence Ministers have failed in their first duty to our armed forces, which is to ensure that they are properly trained, equipped and protected when they are deployed overseas, especially in conflict zones such as Mali. Six months ago, when Labour called in this House for Ministers to ramp up testing and to set out a clear plan to vaccinate our troops, the Defence Secretary said:

“We are working on a list right now of who we can prioritise”.—[Official Report, 12 January 2021; Vol. 687, c. 189.]

Why was it not done? Why was top priority not given to troops sent overseas?

The Minister has just said it is only being done in line with the national programme. The MOD has been clearer, saying recently:

“UK personnel have been vaccinated in line with national priority guidelines…which saw vaccines rolled out to priority groups in order of age and risk.”

These are guidelines for civilians in Britain, not for troops fighting terrorists, 3,000 miles from home, in countries with jab rates among the lowest in the world— it is still at only 0.2% in Mali. I say to the Minister that that is wrong. How on earth did the Defence Secretary not stand up for the forces he deployed to Mali, Kenya, Oman, Afghanistan and elsewhere? These troops train together and fight together; they should be jabbed together.

How many and what proportion of UK military personnel deployed abroad, country by country, have contracted covid? How many have now been double jabbed, and when will all of them be done? Have all those deployed on core defence tasks, such as the continuous at-sea deterrent, now been double jabbed?

Will the Minister comment on the circumstances of HMS Defender in the Black sea today?

Finally, will the Minister now make full vaccination mandatory before overseas deployment? The Australians made that commitment in February, and it is high time British Ministers now did the same.

[James Heappey]

The detail of vaccines and positive tests by country is held, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I am not sure you would indulge me if I were to go through the spreadsheet. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would accept it if I were to write to him and place a copy in the Library, so it can be a matter of record.

The headline stat, as I said in my answer to a parliamentary question last week, is that 98.6% of people deployed overseas have had their first dose, and 56% have had their second dose. I accept that there could be a debate on all professions, whether they be clinicians in the NHS, teachers or members of the armed forces. We made a judgment that, where the medical facilities are sufficient to safely administer the vaccine in a deployed environment, those people would receive their vaccine in line with their age cohort in the general UK population. Where it is not possible to do that, such as with the continuous at-sea deterrent, they were fully vaccinated before deployment.

I am also grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising the activities around HMS Defender in the Black sea earlier today. No warning shots have been fired at HMS Defender. The Royal Navy ship is conducting innocent passage through Ukrainian territorial waters, in accordance with international law. We believe the Russians were undertaking a gunnery exercise in the Black sea and provided the maritime community with prior warning of their activity. No shots were directed at HMS Defender, and we do not recognise the claim that bombs were dropped in her path.

Afghanistan

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Tuesday 20th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I thank my right hon. Friend for calling for this urgent question. I do not entirely share his analysis of what would have happened next. The relatively benign, by Afghan standards, security situation in the country at the moment is not the norm; it is the consequence of the accommodation that the US and the Taliban had come to last year. That means, in effect, that there are three options for the international community. One is to prepare for a fighting season this summer once the 1 May deadline expires. The second is to come to a new accommodation with the Taliban that effectively removes all of the political imperative to reaching a solution. The third is to agree that, effectively, the military mission is done and that what remains now is a political one, and the way to accelerate that is to force the hand and agree to leave as we have done.

My right hon. Friend asks some great questions about the route to being in Afghanistan and the prosecution of the campaign thereafter. I think that those of us who have served, as he has done, take some solace from the way that these things are considered deliberately after the event. It is not for me to agree to such an inquiry right now, but one would hope that the lessons would be learned. I do not necessarily accept all of his analysis of how the campaign has played out, but obviously we have reached the point where the military mission has effectively culminated and what remains is a requirement for politics. To keep our people there indefinitely with 1 May approaching does not seem to me to be the right use of the military instrument.

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

The House will appreciate the Minister wanting to respond to this question himself. He saw two tours in Afghanistan and I know that more than 50 from his regiment were among the 454 British personnel who lost their lives there. We honour their service and their sacrifice.

There certainly have been some gains in governance, economic development, rights for women, education for girls and in ending Afghanistan as a base for terrorism abroad, but Afghanistan is more failure than success for the British military. Now, with the full withdrawal of NATO troops, it is hard to see a future without bloodier conflict, wider Taliban control, and greater jeopardy for those Afghanis who worked with the west and for the women now in political, judicial, academic and business roles. The Chief of the Defence Staff has said that this was

“not a decision we hoped for”.

Did the UK Government argue against full withdrawal? What steps will NATO allies take now to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a breeding ground for terrorism directed towards our western democracies again? There is US talk of over-the-horizon operations and of building anti-terrorist infrastructure on the periphery of Afghanistan. Will Britain play any part in this, and where?

The Minister said that Britain’s remaining 750 troops will be out by September. When will their withdrawal begin? How many UK contractors helping Afghan forces to maintain equipment are in Afghanistan? Will they withdraw at the same time as UK troops? How many Afghanis who helped British troops are still in Afghanistan, in danger and in need of the special scheme to settle in the UK? Ending military deployment should mean expanding diplomatic and development support, yet Britain cut direct aid to Afghanistan last year by a quarter. This year, will the Government reverse that cut?

Finally, where does this withdrawal leave the Government’s strategy of forward deployment in a region that sits between the three main state threats identified in the integrated review? Does this cause the Secretary of State to reconsider his decision to cut Army numbers by another 10,000?

[James Heappey]

First, I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his reflections on the service and sacrifice of the UK armed forces. I am not sure that I accept his characterisation of the situation as defeat. Many members of the armed forces will reflect, as I do, on their tactical and operational successes in their individual tours and in the districts for which they were responsible. If they arrive in a district and the school is shut, but when they leave, it is open; or if they arrive in a district and the market has six stalls, but when they leave, it has 20—those are the sorts of successes that show them with their own eyes that their service has been worth it and they have done good.

The shadow Secretary of State picks up on what the Chief of the Defence Staff said in his interview on the “Today” programme last week, and I do not think that anybody in the UK Government would shy away from his very honest assessment of what happened. I think we should be clear that the disagreement, to the extent that there was one, was over a matter of months, rather than over staying there for four years more.

As I said, there is a logic to this, because we were at a decision point no matter what. On 1 May, the accommodation would run out and we would be preparing for a fighting season; or we would need a new political accommodation with the Taliban, and that would remove the political imperative altogether; or we would take the decision, as the President did, and with which NATO subsequently agreed unanimously, to leave and, in doing so, to force the pace of the political process. I think that is the right thing. The opportunity to prosecute counter-terrorism missions from the wider region into Afghanistan is something that we are working up with our NATO allies and the Americans at the moment. I am sure that the UK will have a role in that.

The exact withdrawal timeline is not one that I intend to share publicly—I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will understand the operational security reasons why that is the case—but a withdrawal from Afghanistan this year is not unexpected. It was completely within our planning last year and over the winter. We can achieve the timeline that is required without any cost to our other planned military activities this summer. I can reassure him that my right hon. Friends the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary are working with all appropriate haste to make sure that those who have served alongside us in Afghanistan are looked after in the future.

UN Mission in Mali: Armed Forces Deployment

Debate between James Heappey and John Healey

Wednesday 9th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. It was good to have the written statement last Thursday, as troops began to arrive in Mali; it is better still to have his oral statement today, with the Minister ready to answer the range of questions that arise from this new deployment.

Let me say at the outset, as I said to the House on Monday, that Labour strongly supports this commitment of UK troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, and we do so with our eyes wide open to the risks they face. The public expect Ministers to be open about this too, so I hope the Minister will undertake to give regular reports on progress to Parliament during this deployment.

The Minister rightly said today that deploying “to MINUSMA does not come without risk.” The UN has described this as its most dangerous mission, with 227 personnel killed since 2013, so what assessment has he made of these risks and what specific steps have been taken to reduce them? Last week the French base in Mali at Gao was attacked; where will our troops be stationed and how secure will the British base be?

The Defence Secretary has told us:

“This deployment reflects our continued commitment to multilateralism and international peace and security”.—[Official Report, 3 December 2020; Vol. 685, c. 14W.]

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain does have this special responsibility, which we in Labour also take seriously; too often, however, there has been a view that, somehow, peacekeeping is beneath Britain, so I hope to see confirmation in the integrated review that this has changed as part of the Government’s plans for a post-Brexit global Britain.

Certainly, as with Mali, where Britain has special military skills we should step up, and the Light Dragoons and the Royal Anglian Regiment are filling a capability gap in Mali as long-range reconnaissance specialists. Since the Government first announced the intention to deploy these troops in July 2019, however, Mali has become more complex, less stable, more violent. This deployment is rightly limited; what measures must be met for the Government to judge it a success, are there circumstances in which the Government would widen the scope or increase the size of this UK military mission, and could troops in this UN deployment also serve in the distinct and complementary French-led Barkhane mission?

The Government have said that

“it is stepping up its engagement in the Sahel across the development, diplomacy and defence pillars”.

The Minister says that there is, rightly, very significant development interest in Mali, with 6.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. There are also significant security concerns, with drugs cartels, arms traffickers, and al-Qaeda and Islamic State terror groups all active in the region. When co-ordinated action and help are clearly needed, the deep cuts made in the spending review to the conflict, stability and security fund could not have come at a worse time for the Sahel. Will the costs of this Mali deployment be met from that fund? How much in development aid is planned for Mali and the other Sahel countries over the three-year period of this military deployment, and how are Britain’s development, diplomatic and defence activities being co-ordinated within Government?

Finally, Britain’s responsibilities as a leading UN member are being met with this Mali mission, alongside our continuing commitment to peacekeeping operations in eight other countries around the world. I pay tribute to our armed forces personnel who serve in these missions. They will, as the Minister says, continue to make the UK proud.

[James Heappey]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his positive response to the statement. As we were saying in the Remembrance Day debate a few weeks ago, as people deploy on missions such as this it matters enormously to see support on both sides of the House for what they are going out to do. He rightly asked some questions that I will do my best to answer, starting with, of course, an intent to regularly update the House either verbally—although that met with no support from my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—or otherwise on the progress of the mission and the threat as it evolves.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to pick up on the line in my statement that says that this mission is not without risk. This is a dangerous part of the world in which to be operating. It is because it is such a dangerous part of the world that the case for being there as part of a peacekeeping force is so easily made. We should be clear that, despite all the training, all the equipment and all the mitigations that we will put in place—I will explain some of those in a second—our troops are accepting a risk to life and limb in serving in the Sahel, and we thank them for that. We genuinely believe that it is in the interests of the UK and the people of Mali that we contribute to that mission.

We have recognised that in previous deployments perhaps there has been a gung-ho willingness to expand the mission quickly and get on with things without fully understanding the realities of the threat on the ground and how that manifests itself in relation to military operations. In this first rotation—the first six months—we will be expecting the Light Dragoons battle group to deploy and to find its way in the immediate vicinity of Gao, the city in which the UN camp where they will be based is. If, over time, we come to understand that they can operate at range, we will consider that on its merits, depending on the mission design from the UN force commander. Our intention is to find our way slowly, to build our confidence and our understanding, and then to grow the mission, within the confines of MINUSMA. It is important to stress that there is no UK agency in being able just to decide what we do; we are under the command of the UN force commander.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the camp. It is a brand-new camp, and it is indeed in the UN super-camp at Gao. That camp is protected by a German early warning system called MANTIS—the modular, automatic and network capable targeting and interception system—which picks up the IDF, or indirect fire attack, which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned in his reply. That allows people in the camp to take cover and adopt all of their drills when there is incoming indirect fire. Sadly, as a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, I know that that is just the reality of being in camps in those places, but these early warning systems give people great confidence that they can find cover before the rounds start landing.

This is, indeed, a complex mission. The UN’s mission is made all the more challenging as a consequence of the changing political tides in Mali—there was a coup only four months ago—and that means that the military mission, as designed by the UN force commander, and the political mission have some work to do to evolve and to react to those new political realities in Mali, hence our caution over the speed at which we unleashed the Light Dragoons on their mission. We want to see how things develop, and we will update the right hon. Gentleman and colleagues as that happens.

There is no scope to widen the size of our force; we are limited by what the UN requires of us. There is also no scope for us to decide unilaterally, as the United Kingdom, that we want to do more; we are within the UN’s mission. MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane are entirely separate; there is no opportunity to flex one from the other, as to do so would be to break the rules on UN peacekeeping contingents. In any case, the missions are so different; Barkhane is a more offensive, counter-terrorism operation, chasing both JNIM—Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin—and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara around not only Mali, but Burkina Faso and Niger. MINUSMA is a Mali-only peacekeeping operation led by the UN.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked me about funding. We are talking about £80 million over three years, which is indeed funded by the conflict, stability and security fund. It will matter enormously to people deploying on this operation to see the tone of these exchanges. Our intention is to keep the House informed as best as we can. This is a dangerous mission, but our people are well-trained and well-equipped. They are ready and they are up for it, and I wish them a good tour.