Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Cartlidge and Stuart C McDonald

Tuesday 24th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Scottish National party spokesperson, Stuart C. McDonald.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I wonder if I might suggest that another review of partygate could help inform Government policy on legal aid and access to justice. I say that because of the widely perceived link between a person’s ability to pay for legal advice and the number of fixed penalty notices that that person might receive, compared to others attending the very same event. So during his consultation, will the Minister speak to junior Downing Street staff and civil servants about their views on the significance of access to and the affordability of criminal legal advice?

[James Cartlidge]

It’s a nice try, but our discussions in Downing Street are about the measures that we are bringing forward to tackle crime, not least the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which the Labour party voted against and Opposition Members spoke out against, and which will see violent and sexual offenders serving longer in prison. That is where our focus is and the focus of the British people is.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between James Cartlidge and Stuart C McDonald

Report stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

May I start by picking up a point that the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan) made in her excellent maiden speech, on which I congratulate her? If nothing else, recent events reassure us that our constituents quite rightly do not like the Prime Minister, the Government or any public authority operating as if they were above the law or as if the rules that we all have to follow do not apply to them.

Although the Bill may not attract as many headlines as the various partygate stories, it raises the same issues, but in a much broader and more profound way. The Conservative Government are once again trying to put themselves above the law and make sure that basic principles of administrative law and rules passed by this Parliament do not constrain them. That will be the impact of the first two clauses, so I fully support all the amendments that seek to leave out or ameliorate them. I adopt all the arguments that my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) and all Opposition MPs have put forward today.

I would like to take on the argument made by the Attorney General and others that the Bill is about parliamentary sovereignty, as troubling and overrated a concept as that is. The Bill does not assert the sovereignty of Parliament; it promotes untrammelled Executive authority. It is not about ensuring that Parliament’s will is respected, but about Government and public authorities being able to exceed or ignore the rules and restrictions that Parliament has placed on them. For us to vote for the Bill would be not so much an exercise of parliamentary sovereignty as an exercise in parliamentary stupidity, inviting the Government to ignore the limits we place on them and helping to exacerbate what Lord Hailsham called elective dictatorship.

My main point relates to Scotland and to amendments 42 and 43, which I support. To build on points made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), it is absolutely not for this Parliament to impose clause 2 and changes to Cart and Eba judicial reviews on Scotland’s legal system. As the independent review of administrative law made clear, judicial review is a devolved matter. The review’s report was absolutely clear that it would be for the institutions of devolved government to decide whether to follow its recommendations. Without exception, every single submission from a devolved jurisdiction was opposed to, or at least not persuaded of, the need for reform.

Scotland has undertaken its own reform of judicial review in recent years. For this Parliament to interfere with it risks setting up two parallel systems of review in our jurisdiction, whereby someone challenging a devolved social security decision might face totally different obstacles from someone challenging a reserved social security decision. Again, the independent review was clear, describing such a two-tier system as “highly undesirable”. As my hon. and learned Friend alluded to, the analysis of judicial review in Scotland in the review is limited, as its authors acknowledge, but none of the overall judicial review figures cited—less than 400 cases commenced each year, of which less than 50 make it to a hearing, with 30% successful—justifies these rather obnoxious proposals.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Law Society of Scotland have both concluded that there is “no evidence” of any problem in Scotland that needs this Government to interfere. They, too, confirm that this is a devolved issue. In its briefing on the Bill as long ago as Second Reading, the Law Society of Scotland set out that, unusually, there are two grounds for arguing that the Government should not bulldoze these provisions through: not only are they legislating on a devolved matter, Scots private law, but they are narrowing the competence of the Scottish Parliament because clause 2 creates a rule special to a reserved matter and the Scottish Parliament does not have the competence to abolish or modify such a rule. It is a double whammy.

Indeed, for reasons that my hon. and learned Friend set out, it is a triple whammy. As was pointed out to the Government review panel, the Scottish competence of judicial review derives from article XIX of the Acts of Union of 1706 and 1707. The Law Society of Scotland warned the panel that

“care always has to be taken so as not to render the Court’s”—

the Court of Session’s—

“jurisdiction in judicial review ineffective”,

and that if reforms in the area go too far, they may

“be in breach of the Acts of Union”.

I object to the whole purpose of part 1 of the Bill, but even if the Government insist on pressing ahead, the overwhelming view from Scotland is “Get your hands off our judicial review laws.” That is why everybody in this House should support amendments 42 and 43.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)]

I am grateful to all Members who have contributed to the debate so far. In particular, I congratulate the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan) on an excellent maiden speech. I know that part of the country well and she described it aptly: it is both historic and beautiful. I wish her well in the months ahead.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Cartlidge]

Those matters should be determined with—I hate the phrase—two bites at the cherry, which is common across most areas of law. That is perfectly adequate. The process takes up 180 days of High Court judges’ time on case with almost no chance of success. High Court judges’ time, in the context of the backlog we have, is very precious indeed.

I now turn to the amendments 43 and 42, tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin). Just to be clear, the unified tribunal system, created by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, is a reserved matter where it relates to matters of reserved policy. The measures on Cart and, particularly in relation to Scotland, the Eba case will apply to the unified tribunal system within the UK, but it will not apply to matters heard that would fall inside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and it will also not apply to devolved tribunals.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Minister give way?

[James Cartlidge]

I am sorry; I have one more important Government amendment that I wish to cover. I apologise to the hon. Gentleman.

If the measure did not extend to Scotland even on matters that are not within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, that would create an inconsistency within the unified tribunal framework based purely on geography.

Finally, the group also contains Government amendment 6 to clause 2. Subsection (4) of new section 11A sets out a number of exemptions, circumstances in which the supervisory court could still review a decision of the upper tribunal to refuse permission, or leave, to appeal the decision of the first-tier tribunal. One of those exemptions, subsection (4)(c)(ii), is if the upper tribunal acts in

“fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice”.

Clarifying the meaning of the natural justice exemption is the intent of the amendment. The Government accept that the meaning of natural justice is currently established in case law and relates to procedural impropriety. However, the understanding of the term has developed over time through common law and could develop further in the future.

As our intention is for substantive procedural errors to remain reviewable but errors of fact or law to be ousted, it is the Government’s view that the wording would be clearer if the amendment referred to procedure in the context of natural justice. That is not a change of policy; it is how the Government, and I am sure the majority of right hon. and hon. Members present, understood the clause during our previous debates and votes. However, this clarification should confirm to the courts exactly how Parliament intends the ouster clause to be interpreted.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.