Leveson Inquiry

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

rose—

[Ms Harman]

I will press on with my comments, because many hon. Members want to speak.

That is the core reason why Leveson concludes that statute is, to use his word, “essential”. However, to follow up on the point made by the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt), all that any statute would have to do is set out criteria about what independence means and check once every three years that it is still independent—that is all. The oversight body—the one prescribed by statute—would have no role in hearing complaints, no role in deciding whether they are justified, no role in laying down penalties, and absolutely no role in deciding anything that does or does not go into a newspaper. That would be down to the independent self-regulator set up by the industry.

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[George Eustice (Camborne and Redruth) (Con)]

I, too, begin by drawing attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I receive remuneration for a regular column in PR Week—but hon. Members will realise that that has not had any influence on my opinions on these matters.

A number of hon. Members have alluded to the long history of failure on this issue. I am conscious that I have only 10 minutes in which to speak, but I do wish to reflect on some of that history because the House has not always been very good at learning from the mistakes of the past. This story begins in 1949, with the first royal commission advocating the setting up of a royal commission and saying that Parliament should do something about the issue. Four years later nothing had happened, so the Labour MP C.J. Simmons, a former journalist, introduced a private Member’s Bill, which forced the industry to say that it would now act. In withdrawing his Bill, he said:

“I give warning here and now that if it fails some of us will again have to come forward with a Measure similar to this Bill.”—[Official Report, 8 May 1953; Vol. 515, c. 806.]

In 1962, a second royal commission told the press that it needed to toughen up self-regulation:

“We think that the Press should be given another opportunity itself voluntarily to establish an authoritative General Council…We recommend, however, that the government should specify a time limit after which legislation would be introduced.”

In 1977, there was a third royal commission on the press, after more failure. It said:

“We recommend that the press should be given one final chance to prove that voluntary self-regulation can be made to work.”

Let us fast-forward to 1990 and the Calcutt committee. At the time we were told:

“This is positively the last chance for the industry to establish an effective non-statutory system of regulation”.—[Official Report, 21 June 1990; Vol. 174, c. 1126.]

In 1993, the Calcutt review said that the Press Complaints Commission was not effective and recommended a tribunal backed in statute.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I wonder whether my hon. Friend could describe the problems that these great reviews were looking at. We now look back at what was happening in the ‘40s, ‘50s, ‘60s and, in particular, the ‘70s, when my father was editing a national newspaper, as great examples of fine newspaper work, so what were these commissions dealing with? Is it not actually unnecessary to keep on quoting from these reports, because there was not a real problem in those days?

[George Eustice]

Each and every one of those commissions and inquiries was sparked by the abuse of unaccountable power, and I would say that that is what we are seeing today. People sometimes say, “It was a newspaper that exposed phone hacking.” They are right—one newspaper exposed phone hacking—but Lord Leveson is very clear on this: none of the other papers exposed it, and there was almost a conspiracy of silence. He says:

“There were what are now said to be rumours and jokes about the extent to which phone hacking was rife throughout the industry, but (with one sole exception) the press did nothing to investigate itself or to expose conduct which”,

if it had involved anybody else,

“would have been subject to the most intense spotlight that journalists could bring to bear”.

That one exception was Nick Davies from The Guardian, who wrote a story on 9 July 2009 saying that the huge scale of the settlements being paid to some people in respect of phone hacking suggested that a cover-up had taken place. What did the Press Complaints Commission do about it? Did it then think, “Perhaps we should take a second look at this and investigate it”? No, it did not. As Lord Leveson points out, the PCC “condemned the Guardian” for running the story, which is extraordinary. I think that the Leveson report was a good report.

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[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), whose remarks about the carrot and the stick in relation to costs were well made. There is no doubt in my mind that in order to incentivise the major titles and the print media to join a new regulator, there have to be proper incentives—with members enjoying an advantage over non-members in terms of civil actions and not having to pay aggravated damages.

Along with some other Members, I sat on the Joint Committee on privacy and super-injunctions, which issued its report some months ago. In common with my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice) and the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), I often found myself in a minority on that Committee. There were many divisions and, as we have heard, the final recommendations were the subject of much debate. I found myself in a minority, for example, because of my strong advocacy of a statute of privacy, which I still believe this country needs and which it is incumbent on this Parliament to introduce.

At that stage, I was still thinking carefully about the merits of some form of statutory intervention or underpinning for the print media. I am persuaded now, however, that some form of underpinning is necessary. I do not come to this issue as someone who is an instinctive regulator. I do not support knee-jerk reactions when it comes to the passage of legislation in this House, but I do view the situation now as so serious that only some form of underpinning will do.

I am often accused of being optimistic in my politics to the point of being quixotic, but when it comes to the ability of the major titles of the print media to agree, first, to the principles of Leveson and, secondly, to a mechanism that will deliver them, I am afraid that my optimism leaves me.

Much has been said about the context in which the Leveson inquiry commenced. Some would say that it was based on a very narrow set of circumstances, but that is belied by the wide terms of reference set out at the beginning of the inquiry. We can see from the title that it is “An inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press”, but it is important to remind ourselves in this debate of what the aim of the inquiry was. Part 1 of the terms of reference state that it was to make recommendations

“for a new and more effective policy and regulation regime which supports the integrity and freedom of the press, the plurality of the media and its independence, including from Government, while encouraging the highest ethical and professional standards”.

That part of the terms of reference is extremely important, because the scene was set for a wide-ranging examination of not just telephone hacking or bribery but the entire regulatory regime that has applied so far.

It is agreed in all parts of the House that so-called self-regulation has failed. Indeed, I would go further and say that I agree with Lord Justice Leveson that the Press Complaints Commission was not a regulator as we know it. It was not independent; it did not have powers to summon parties to produce documents or provide sworn evidence; it could not deal with complaints from third parties, or indeed with issues that were not subjects of complaints. Its remit was narrow, and its status was compromised. If we are to embark on a new course, it will be regulation in the proper sense of the word for the very first time.

Those who argue against any form of statutory intervention say that they do not want the work of our free press to be inhibited by statute. Of course I agree with that, but on closer examination, it would be wholly wrong to say that the work of our journalists is in some way uninhibited now. It is already hedged by statute, whether it be rules about reporting when it comes to contempt of court or, for example, provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 relating to journalistic material that restricts police powers of search. We have existing defamation statutes that allow the defence of responsible journalism that is in the public interest. The Human Rights Act 1998 itself enjoins the courts to have specific regard to the relevant code of conduct when dealing with privacy cases.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Is not the difference that the press has specific protections in law rather than laws that apply, with a specific penal effect, to the press alone? That is a very important difference.

[Mr Buckland]

I take my hon. Friend’s point about the boundaries that are being set. My point, however, is that there is a parallel between existing statute and what I believe is being proposed. I do not view statutory underpinning as somehow creating an entirely new set of constraints within which journalists will have to work. This is not, in my opinion, analogous to the difference between prescribed rights and general liberties that may be defined by their boundaries. My hon. Friend and I often agree about the distinction between different types of law and the tension that exists between them, but I do not believe that we will end up in that situation.

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

There has been a lot of praise of Lord Justice Leveson today, and I am afraid that I am going slightly to divert from that, because to some extent prolixity has been mistaken for virtue. Verbosity is possibly part of the problem of his report, which not only goes on for much too long, but fundamentally has missed the bus. I say that because it was not set up to deal with the internet. Indeed, Lord Leveson says on page 169 that

“most blogs are read by very few people. Indeed, most blogs are rarely read as news or factual, but as opinion and must be considered as such.”

However, we discover from Saturday’s Financial Times, a very good source of information and not one that has been involved with any of these problems, that 82% of the UK population receive news online, compared with 54% who receive it from newspapers. So the report is about regulating yesterday rather than dealing with tomorrow; it should make King Canute feel proud, because at least he was going to deal with the tide that was coming in, rather than a tide that had receded some years before.

I am delighted to say that Lord Justice Leveson has used online content himself; it was reported in The Sunday Times that he was caught by a spoof on Wikipedia and said that The Independent was founded by one Brett Straub, who apparently is a Californian student and had no association with the founding of The Independent. So, on the one hand, not much notice is taken of the internet, but, on the other, it has actually been used in putting together this report of almost 2,000 pages.

I listened with great interest to my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), who said that we should always be very cautious when people say that the status quo is not an option as self-evidently the status quo is always an option. As a Conservative, I would often like the status quo ante, but I shall not dwell on that point. A good deal of the report accepts the status quo. On page 1496, Lord Justice Leveson states that

“I do not recommend that any change is necessary to the substantive criminal law.”

On page 1508, on the civil law, he says that he does not want to go over the ground of the Defamation Bill, because that has already been dealt with, and on privacy he says:

“It does not appear that legislative intervention will do other than generate…litigation”.

On defining the public interest in law, he states that:

“I do not recommend a statutory definition.”

In the criminal law and the civil law, we will maintain that terrible thing, that awful spectre, the status quo. That is rather encouraging because it means that the law of the land is working and has been doing its job.

[Mr Buckland]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Of course I will give way to my hon. and learned Friend.

[Mr Buckland]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the elevation he has given me. Does not his point have to be succeeded by a second point? Lord Justice Leveson says that regulation is necessary to cover areas of complaint that do not neatly fit into heads of damage or criminality, such as accuracy, at which the press are not always terribly good.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am very concerned by my hon. Friend’s suggestion. If we are to legislate for accuracy, I hate to think what that might do to this House or to politicians and the speeches they make in election campaigns.

More important than the fact that the report suggests no changes to the criminal and civil law is the underlying risk to freedom of expression it contains. Let me start with page 1512 and the subject of the possibility of aggravated, exemplary and restitutionary damages. They have been used in some other countries in the world as a means of crushing opposition. When people say things that the Government of the day do not like, the Government bring complaints or actions for damages, sometimes against individual politicians, and bankrupt them. They are then no longer able to criticise the Government. Although it sounds very fair when we are talking about the hard, sad or disgraceful cases we have heard about in this debate, none the less we should allow newspapers to refuse to fit neatly into some regulatory system thought up by a Government-appointed bureaucrat or risk those fundamental freedoms we have been fortunate enough to have for many centuries.

That brings me to the appointment of the first appointment panel. Who is to appoint the panel? We hear that it will be made up of distinguished public servants with experience of senior appointments. We are actually going back to a 1950s view of the establishment. Perhaps I should welcome that, because I might have fitted very nicely into a 1950s vision of the establishment, but I am surprised that this House by and large wishes to see that return. The report suggests that appointment should take place in

“an independent, fair and open way”—

like the appointment of the new Governor of the Bank of England, I am tempted to say, although I thought it was an excellent appointment. It was advertised for the first time, lots of good and qualified people applied and then the Chancellor appointed who he wanted to in the first place. It was a very good appointment, but this reference to a “fair and open way” should make us deeply suspicious.

The key matter—the nub of all this, which brings it all back under state control—is the role of the recognition body. Under Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals, the recognition body is, unfortunately, under the control of a Government appointee. It is a Government quango where the chairman is appointed by a Secretary of State. That is difficult because that recognition body will have the right of first recognition in saying whether a particular set of regulators will be suitable—there could be more than one—and on the second anniversary and every subsequent third anniversary, it will be able to say whether the statutory tests have been met.

Now what if one of those regulatory bodies did not meet the requirements for equality and diversity that Lord Justice Leveson is so keen on? What if it dared to appoint someone from UKIP who might live in Rotherham, for example, to one of its panels to be an investigator? Do we then find that the checking body, Ofcom, would disapprove that body and, by effect if not by immediate law, would be able to choose the detail of the way in which the press was regulated?

There is another concern—that people will seek advice. By their very nature they will go to the recognition body and say, “This is what we propose. Is it all right if we do this? Will you allow us to continue when we come to our next review?” So there is an insidious power in that recognition body which will undermine the freedom of the press and will assert political correctness throughout the land.

[Mr Buckland]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It is a privilege to give way.

[Mr Buckland]

It is an attractive and seductive argument that my hon. Friend sets out, but in many other walks of life—for example, my profession, the medical profession and the judiciary—there are over-arching bodies of statute that do the job of verification that he is so concerned about. They are independent. Why should not the proposed press regulatory body work?

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am not particularly concerned that my doctor is an agent of the state who is going to take out my tonsils because he thinks that that may progress political correctness in some way. A doctor is completely and utterly different from a journalist writing freely, criticising boldly something that has become the perceived wisdom of the nation at large. That is a liberty that should be precious to us. It is an absolute one that we have in the House.

Is it not interesting that we give ourselves that absolute liberty—that absolute liberty under the Bill of Rights that nothing said in this House can be challenged in any court or tribunal? The press are an aid and a boost to that of our fellow subjects to do the same—to question the wisdom of the great and the good, of those fine panjandrums who are going to form the appointments panel.

Finally, I question the naiveté of Lord Justice Leveson, who says that there is no foundation in the suggestion that it is easier to amend an existing Act than to bring in a new one. Anybody who knows how this place works or who looks at the history of legislation coming through will be aware of this point. Let us take, for example, the Great Reform Bills. In 1832 there were riots to get reform through; in 1867 it was a much simpler process. Every time an Act is put on to the statute book it is simpler to develop it further and move it forward. That ignores the ability to use statutory instruments, which are a part of most legislation, if not all of recent years, and statutory instruments can be put through on a negative resolution of the House and hardly further debated at all.

By creating statutory control we will find that the recognition body has extremely large powers to intervene and enforce its will by stealth, and that legislation will be amendable in future, to the great risk of our liberties.