Leveson Inquiry

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), whose remarks about the carrot and the stick in relation to costs were well made. There is no doubt in my mind that in order to incentivise the major titles and the print media to join a new regulator, there have to be proper incentives—with members enjoying an advantage over non-members in terms of civil actions and not having to pay aggravated damages.

Along with some other Members, I sat on the Joint Committee on privacy and super-injunctions, which issued its report some months ago. In common with my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice) and the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), I often found myself in a minority on that Committee. There were many divisions and, as we have heard, the final recommendations were the subject of much debate. I found myself in a minority, for example, because of my strong advocacy of a statute of privacy, which I still believe this country needs and which it is incumbent on this Parliament to introduce.

At that stage, I was still thinking carefully about the merits of some form of statutory intervention or underpinning for the print media. I am persuaded now, however, that some form of underpinning is necessary. I do not come to this issue as someone who is an instinctive regulator. I do not support knee-jerk reactions when it comes to the passage of legislation in this House, but I do view the situation now as so serious that only some form of underpinning will do.

I am often accused of being optimistic in my politics to the point of being quixotic, but when it comes to the ability of the major titles of the print media to agree, first, to the principles of Leveson and, secondly, to a mechanism that will deliver them, I am afraid that my optimism leaves me.

Much has been said about the context in which the Leveson inquiry commenced. Some would say that it was based on a very narrow set of circumstances, but that is belied by the wide terms of reference set out at the beginning of the inquiry. We can see from the title that it is “An inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press”, but it is important to remind ourselves in this debate of what the aim of the inquiry was. Part 1 of the terms of reference state that it was to make recommendations

“for a new and more effective policy and regulation regime which supports the integrity and freedom of the press, the plurality of the media and its independence, including from Government, while encouraging the highest ethical and professional standards”.

That part of the terms of reference is extremely important, because the scene was set for a wide-ranging examination of not just telephone hacking or bribery but the entire regulatory regime that has applied so far.

It is agreed in all parts of the House that so-called self-regulation has failed. Indeed, I would go further and say that I agree with Lord Justice Leveson that the Press Complaints Commission was not a regulator as we know it. It was not independent; it did not have powers to summon parties to produce documents or provide sworn evidence; it could not deal with complaints from third parties, or indeed with issues that were not subjects of complaints. Its remit was narrow, and its status was compromised. If we are to embark on a new course, it will be regulation in the proper sense of the word for the very first time.

Those who argue against any form of statutory intervention say that they do not want the work of our free press to be inhibited by statute. Of course I agree with that, but on closer examination, it would be wholly wrong to say that the work of our journalists is in some way uninhibited now. It is already hedged by statute, whether it be rules about reporting when it comes to contempt of court or, for example, provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 relating to journalistic material that restricts police powers of search. We have existing defamation statutes that allow the defence of responsible journalism that is in the public interest. The Human Rights Act 1998 itself enjoins the courts to have specific regard to the relevant code of conduct when dealing with privacy cases.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Is not the difference that the press has specific protections in law rather than laws that apply, with a specific penal effect, to the press alone? That is a very important difference.

[Mr Buckland]

I take my hon. Friend’s point about the boundaries that are being set. My point, however, is that there is a parallel between existing statute and what I believe is being proposed. I do not view statutory underpinning as somehow creating an entirely new set of constraints within which journalists will have to work. This is not, in my opinion, analogous to the difference between prescribed rights and general liberties that may be defined by their boundaries. My hon. Friend and I often agree about the distinction between different types of law and the tension that exists between them, but I do not believe that we will end up in that situation.

[George Eustice]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is wrong for the press to support statutory regulation when it protects their commercial interests and oppose it when it protects the interests of civil society?

[Mr Buckland]

I think that the Homer Simpson approach that we often observe—the contradictory approach that is taken to so many issues—is worrying, and demonstrates an inconsistency. I simply ask those who say that existing laws provide adequate protection for members of the public why we allowed ourselves to get into a position in which, in effect, a culture of impunity existed in certain parts of our print media. I think that Lord Justice Leveson deals very comprehensively with the reality of the law as it stands.

As I have said, the press operate within a framework, but when play is made of the criminal law, the context within which that law operates is far too often ignored by those who cite it. First, when it comes to criminal complaints there needs to be a victim and some form of complaint, which will come about either when the complainant goes to the police or when the police themselves have some intelligence or information about an alleged crime.

The problem in the context of, for example, telephone hacking or bribery is that very often the victims do not realise that they are victims for many years. That was certainly true in the case of some of the victims of telephone hacking, who became aware of the emergence of private and sensitive information into the public domain via the newspapers, and then began to suspect even their families and friends of having breached a confidence before realising, or being told about, the grim reality. The same can be said of bribery: those who have lost out as a result of it will not necessarily know of the wrongdoing at the time, and may not know of it for many years.

There are issues relating to the way in which evidence can be gathered. We know, and rightly stress, the importance of exemptions when it comes to journalistic material. Also, the police will naturally prioritise the individual offences, such as violence and dishonesty, while the issues raised in this inquiry have in recent times dropped low down the list of priorities. As Lord Leveson says, the mere fact that we now have lengthy investigations into telephone hacking and bribery does not necessarily mean that the police have always been able to conduct such inquiries. In fact, the co-operation of News International has made all the difference in that respect.

Much has been said about defamation. Like the Versace hotel, the law of defamation is open to all, but it is too expensive, and we as parliamentarians must support the ordinary person to get cheap and effective redress of any grievance through a robust independent regulatory system, which must be underpinned by statute.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

There has been a lot of praise of Lord Justice Leveson today, and I am afraid that I am going slightly to divert from that, because to some extent prolixity has been mistaken for virtue. Verbosity is possibly part of the problem of his report, which not only goes on for much too long, but fundamentally has missed the bus. I say that because it was not set up to deal with the internet. Indeed, Lord Leveson says on page 169 that

“most blogs are read by very few people. Indeed, most blogs are rarely read as news or factual, but as opinion and must be considered as such.”

However, we discover from Saturday’s Financial Times, a very good source of information and not one that has been involved with any of these problems, that 82% of the UK population receive news online, compared with 54% who receive it from newspapers. So the report is about regulating yesterday rather than dealing with tomorrow; it should make King Canute feel proud, because at least he was going to deal with the tide that was coming in, rather than a tide that had receded some years before.

I am delighted to say that Lord Justice Leveson has used online content himself; it was reported in The Sunday Times that he was caught by a spoof on Wikipedia and said that The Independent was founded by one Brett Straub, who apparently is a Californian student and had no association with the founding of The Independent. So, on the one hand, not much notice is taken of the internet, but, on the other, it has actually been used in putting together this report of almost 2,000 pages.

I listened with great interest to my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), who said that we should always be very cautious when people say that the status quo is not an option as self-evidently the status quo is always an option. As a Conservative, I would often like the status quo ante, but I shall not dwell on that point. A good deal of the report accepts the status quo. On page 1496, Lord Justice Leveson states that

“I do not recommend that any change is necessary to the substantive criminal law.”

On page 1508, on the civil law, he says that he does not want to go over the ground of the Defamation Bill, because that has already been dealt with, and on privacy he says:

“It does not appear that legislative intervention will do other than generate…litigation”.

On defining the public interest in law, he states that:

“I do not recommend a statutory definition.”

In the criminal law and the civil law, we will maintain that terrible thing, that awful spectre, the status quo. That is rather encouraging because it means that the law of the land is working and has been doing its job.

[Mr Buckland]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Of course I will give way to my hon. and learned Friend.

[Mr Buckland]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the elevation he has given me. Does not his point have to be succeeded by a second point? Lord Justice Leveson says that regulation is necessary to cover areas of complaint that do not neatly fit into heads of damage or criminality, such as accuracy, at which the press are not always terribly good.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am very concerned by my hon. Friend’s suggestion. If we are to legislate for accuracy, I hate to think what that might do to this House or to politicians and the speeches they make in election campaigns.

More important than the fact that the report suggests no changes to the criminal and civil law is the underlying risk to freedom of expression it contains. Let me start with page 1512 and the subject of the possibility of aggravated, exemplary and restitutionary damages. They have been used in some other countries in the world as a means of crushing opposition. When people say things that the Government of the day do not like, the Government bring complaints or actions for damages, sometimes against individual politicians, and bankrupt them. They are then no longer able to criticise the Government. Although it sounds very fair when we are talking about the hard, sad or disgraceful cases we have heard about in this debate, none the less we should allow newspapers to refuse to fit neatly into some regulatory system thought up by a Government-appointed bureaucrat or risk those fundamental freedoms we have been fortunate enough to have for many centuries.

That brings me to the appointment of the first appointment panel. Who is to appoint the panel? We hear that it will be made up of distinguished public servants with experience of senior appointments. We are actually going back to a 1950s view of the establishment. Perhaps I should welcome that, because I might have fitted very nicely into a 1950s vision of the establishment, but I am surprised that this House by and large wishes to see that return. The report suggests that appointment should take place in

“an independent, fair and open way”—

like the appointment of the new Governor of the Bank of England, I am tempted to say, although I thought it was an excellent appointment. It was advertised for the first time, lots of good and qualified people applied and then the Chancellor appointed who he wanted to in the first place. It was a very good appointment, but this reference to a “fair and open way” should make us deeply suspicious.

The key matter—the nub of all this, which brings it all back under state control—is the role of the recognition body. Under Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals, the recognition body is, unfortunately, under the control of a Government appointee. It is a Government quango where the chairman is appointed by a Secretary of State. That is difficult because that recognition body will have the right of first recognition in saying whether a particular set of regulators will be suitable—there could be more than one—and on the second anniversary and every subsequent third anniversary, it will be able to say whether the statutory tests have been met.

Now what if one of those regulatory bodies did not meet the requirements for equality and diversity that Lord Justice Leveson is so keen on? What if it dared to appoint someone from UKIP who might live in Rotherham, for example, to one of its panels to be an investigator? Do we then find that the checking body, Ofcom, would disapprove that body and, by effect if not by immediate law, would be able to choose the detail of the way in which the press was regulated?

There is another concern—that people will seek advice. By their very nature they will go to the recognition body and say, “This is what we propose. Is it all right if we do this? Will you allow us to continue when we come to our next review?” So there is an insidious power in that recognition body which will undermine the freedom of the press and will assert political correctness throughout the land.

[Mr Buckland]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It is a privilege to give way.

[Mr Buckland]

It is an attractive and seductive argument that my hon. Friend sets out, but in many other walks of life—for example, my profession, the medical profession and the judiciary—there are over-arching bodies of statute that do the job of verification that he is so concerned about. They are independent. Why should not the proposed press regulatory body work?