Chief Constable Dismissal Procedures

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Thursday 29th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am grateful for this opportunity to raise in an Adjournment debate the issue of the role of the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the police and crime commissioner in chief constable dismissal procedures. Inevitably, this relates to the recent experience of the Avon and Somerset constabulary and of its former chief constable, Nick Gargan.

The Avon and Somerset constabulary has a wonderful history and reputation. It is a fine police force, if not one of the finest in the country, and it deserves the best possible leadership. It has now been without a chief constable since May 2014, and there are concerns that more than £500,000 has been spent, and that the inquiry has been mishandled, in the ultimate removal of Mr Gargan.

The story started with a slew of lurid, even criminal, allegations. Although my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Charlotte Leslie) will cover in detail the failings of the IPCC, it is worth noting that it did nothing to stop rumours abounding. It continued to pretend that criminal charges were being considered when they were not, and used the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to investigate. One of the team examining the issues was the support commissioner, a Mrs Williams, who was not necessarily impartial as she herself was the subject of an earlier unrelated complaint from Mr Gargan.

Although in some ways the police and crime commissioner may have been a victim of the process, Mrs Sue Mountstevens is not herself without blame. She has an elected mandate to oversee the police force in Avon and Somerset. She used this, shortly after her initial election, to remove the previous chief constable and was then instrumental in appointing Mr Gargan. When the report on Mr Gargan was ultimately produced, recommending eight written warnings for misconduct, her initial reaction was to accept it, but she later changed her mind and applied under section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to force the chief constable to resign.

This change of mind came about because of letters from superintendents and from the Police Federation indicating their lack of confidence in the chief constable. However, that correspondence must have been predicated on the IPCC report, and on leaked information pertaining to it, that we now know to be fundamentally flawed. So the lack of confidence in the chief constable was based on rumour and error, not on facts. This led to the removal of a second chief constable during this police and crime commissioner’s term of office, but it was done essentially because of the PCC’s willingness to bow to pressure, and not because of a mature considered judgment.

This leads me to the issue of the section 38 powers and how they were used. I have corresponded with Sir Thomas Winsor about this, and he has sent me a thoughtful letter and a copy of a valuable lecture that he gave in relation to these powers. In his letter, he says that the use of the powers in this instance does not involve double jeopardy and that

“the chief constable was therefore not dismissed for the misconduct of which he was found guilty; as said, he could not have been, because there was no finding of gross misconduct”.

That is to say that Mr Gargan was not fired for misconduct because it had not been gross misconduct. That is intelligent sophistry, but it is none the less sophistical. I disagree with it because the loss of confidence was instrumentally caused by the misconduct allegations and the punishment for misconduct. Additionally, a number of leaks relating to criminal activity and to some of the material found on Mr Gargan’s telephone led people to think that much more serious things had happened than were in fact proved.

[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

In short, is not what we have seen trial by media and smear, resulting in an irresistible pressure on a public servant to resign before the facts of the case were ultimately known or due weight and consideration were given to those offences?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

My right hon. Friend, as so often, hits the nail on the head. The one block that there should have been to this, the police and crime commissioner, turned out to be weak in the face of this trial by media and this public pressure. That is deeply unsatisfactory, because it means that the loss of confidence in somebody who has been found not guilty may be sufficient to remove them from the job, so if someone throws enough mud and a little bit of it sticks then that could justify a lack of confidence, and thus leak, rumour and gossip replace hard fact, which risks the independence of the constabulary. In his own lecture, Sir Thomas Winsor said that

“sufficient security of tenure is essential to safeguard those aspects of a Chief Constable’s role that relate to operational independence. Operational independence would be seriously compromised by a power for a Police and Crime Commissioner to dismiss the Chief Constable at will.”

At the heart of our concern is the fact that a flawed process, a weak police and crime commissioner and the power of gossip allowed a chief constable to be dismissed. That must undermine the ability in future of chief constables to take difficult decisions if they know that unfounded or minor misdemeanours may be used to force them out.

[Mr Ian Liddell-Grainger (Bridgwater and West Somerset) (Con)]

It is even worse than that. The chief superintendent’s letter did the damage. The man who signed it was Chief Superintendent Wylie, who suddenly then became promoted to commander in Somerset. I am sorry, but that is too much of a coincidence. This is worse than anything that Chief Constable Gargan did. This is completely out of hand.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West will make some remarks in relation to the vested interests that emerged through the course of this process, which we should be concerned about. We should note that the no confidence in the chief constable arose before the final publication of the report, so it had to be based on rumour and not on fact.

[Dr Fox]

Smear!

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Yes, and smear. It has been a damaging process for confidence in the police service. It has been damaging to the Avon and Somerset constabulary. It has obviously been particularly damaging for Mr Gargan. It is against a long-standing tradition of English justice—this is the most important point—that somebody should be tried for the same offence twice. I know that Mr Gargan would like to meet the Police Minister to discuss these matters, so that Her Majesty’s Government are fully informed about all that has gone wrong in this process. That would be helpful. Furthermore, a more general review of section 38 powers is needed, and the role of the IPCC needs to be examined and the backbone of police and crime commissioners X-rayed to see what, if anything, they are made of. That may help to ensure that such a serious problem does not arise again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hayes]

Smear and innuendo are never acceptable in any aspect of public service, and my right hon. Friend is right that the system must be robust in guarding against vexatious and unhappy claims. As I have said, I will not comment on the specifics of the case, but as a matter of principle he is, of course, right that the system needs to be sufficiently well designed to ensure that complaints that have merit are dealt with properly.

We have heard today, particularly from my right hon. Friend, about what might be described as “double jeopardy”—the time-honoured principle that people are not tried twice for the same thing—and it has been suggested that it should not be open to a PCC to call upon their chief constable to resign or retire when they have been subject to misconduct proceedings.

I think that it is important to note that the process of misconduct hearings, and the sanctions that may result, are rightly different and separate from the process set down in section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which enables the PCC to call upon a chief constable to retire or resign. The PCC holds the chief constable to account on behalf of the public. They are best placed to make decisions on both the appointment and dismissal of a chief constable. We have set out a clear process that must be followed, and I shall come to it momentarily.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that clarification, but in this case the section 38 process followed immediately from the report into the misconduct allegations, so the two were intimately and intricately linked.

[Mr Hayes]

With the precision and eloquence for which he is renowned, my hon. Friend has put that on the record.

The Government recognise that the decision to call upon a chief constable to resign or retire is significant and should not be taken lightly, and in that regard I take the point made by my right hon. Friend a moment ago. That is why we have established detailed procedures that must be followed whenever a PCC might wish to invoke their section 38 powers, and we remain satisfied that sufficient safeguards are in place with regard to the power of PCCs to dismiss chief constables.

These issues have, of course, been debated in this House previously, most notably during the passage of the 2011 Act. It is worth noting that the IPCC has no role within the section 38 process, although it is equally important to note that the PCC is obliged to have regard to the views of Her Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary and to seek the views of the relevant police and crime panel, as well as providing the chief constable with the opportunity to make representations. The process is detailed and requires the PCC to take into account independent views. The final decision will remain that of the PCC, but I remain confident that the process offers sufficient checks and balances and that the interests of the people and communities who elect PCCs are properly served in this way.