Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJack Abbott
Main Page: Jack Abbott (Labour (Co-op) - Ipswich)Department Debates - View all Jack Abbott's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 days, 18 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 371, in clause 13, page 9, line 5, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person, and”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 61, in clause 13, page 9, line 5, leave out from “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 372, in clause 13, page 9, line 12, leave out from third “the” to end of line 13 and insert
“certificate of eligibility was granted,”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 62, in clause 13, page 9, line 13, leave out from “the” to “or” in line 14 and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 373, in clause 13, page 9, line 17, leave out “declaration was made” and insert “certificate was granted”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 377, in clause 16, page 11, line 12, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
“(d) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person;
(da) a panel has refused to grant such a certificate;”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 63, in clause 16, page 11, line 12, leave out “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 378, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person,”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 64, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out from “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 381, in clause 27, page 16, line 16, leave out sub-paragraph (iii) and insert—
“(iii) a certificate of eligibility,”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 65, in clause 27, page 16, line 16, leave out from “the” to “under” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 388, in clause 34, page 20, line 40, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
“(c) a panel has refused to grant a certificate of eligibility;”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 66, in clause 34, page 20, line 40, leave out from “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 390, in clause 40, page 23, line 24, at end insert—
“‘certificate of eligibility’ has the same meaning as in section (Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance);”.
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
Amendment 391, in clause 40, page 23, line 24, at end insert—
“‘the Commissioner’ has the meaning given by section (Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner);”.
This amendment is consequential on NC14.
New clause 14—Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner—
“(1) There is to be a Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.
(2) The Commissioner is to be appointed by the Prime Minister.
(3) The person appointed must hold or have held office as a judge of—
(a) the Supreme Court,
(b) the Court of Appeal, or
(c) the High Court.
(4) The Commissioner’s principal functions are—
(a) receiving documents made under this Act;
(b) making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit on Assisted Dying Review Panels (see Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels));
(c) making arrangements in relation to such panels and referring cases to them (see section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel));
(d) determining applications for reconsideration of panel decisions under section (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility);
(e) monitoring the operation of this Act and reporting annually on it (see section 34).
(5) In this Act “the Commissioner” means the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.
(6) Schedule (The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner) makes provision about the Commissioner.”.
This new clause provides for there to be a Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.
New clause 15—Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel—
“(1) This section applies where the Commissioner receives—
(a) a first declaration made by a person,
(b) a report about the first assessment of the person which contains a statement indicating that the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 7(2)(a) to (g), and
(c) a report about the second assessment of the person which contains a statement indicating that the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e).
(2) The Commissioner must, as soon as reasonably practicable, refer the person’s case to an Assisted Dying Review Panel for determination of the person’s eligibility to be provided with assistance under section 18.
(3) But where the Commissioner receives a notification that the first declaration has been cancelled—
(a) the Commissioner must not refer the person’s case to such a panel, and
(b) if the person’s case has already been so referred, the Commissioner must notify the panel of the cancellation.
(4) Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels) makes provision about Assisted Dying Review Panels.”
This new clause provides for the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner to refer a person’s case to a multidisciplinary panel, to be called an Assisted Dying Review Panel.
New clause 17—Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person’s case is referred under section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel) to an Assisted Dying Review Panel (“the first panel”), and
(b) the first panel refuses to grant a certificate of eligibility in respect of the person.
(2) The person may apply to the Commissioner for their case to be reconsidered on the ground that the first panel’s decision—
(a) contains an error of law,
(b) is irrational, or
(c) is procedurally unfair.
(3) The Commissioner must consider an application without a hearing.
(4) On the application—
(a) if the Commissioner is satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2) applies, they must as soon as reasonably practicable refer the person’s case to a different Assisted Dying Review Panel for a fresh determination under section (Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance);
(b) in any other case, the Commissioner must dismiss the application.
(5) The Commissioner must give reasons, in writing, for their decision.
(6) The Commissioner must notify the following of the outcome of the application, and give them a document containing their reasons for their decision—
(a) the person who made the application;
(b) the coordinating doctor;
(c) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”
This new clause provides for certain decisions of Assisted Dying Review Panels to be referred to a different panel for reconsideration.
Amendment (a) to new clause 17, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—
“(1) The person applying for assisted dying, their next of kin, any of their relatives (within the meaning of the Family Law Act 1996), the registered medical practitioners who are treating them and anyone who took part in proceedings before the panel or gave evidence to the panel may apply to the Commissioner for the Panel’s decision to be reconsidered.
(2) The Commissioner will allow the application for reconsideration if the Panel’s decision was—
(a) wrong, or
(b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings.
(3) The Commissioner may consider the application without a hearing if they consider it in the interests of justice to dispense with a hearing.”
New clause 21—Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance—
“(1) This section applies where a person’s case is referred under section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel) or (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility) to an Assisted Dying Review Panel (“the panel”).
(2) The panel’s function is to determine whether it is satisfied of all of the following matters—
(a) that the requirements of sections 5 to 9 have been met in relation to—
(i) the first declaration,
(ii) the first assessment and the report under section 7 on that assessment, and
(iii) the second assessment and the report under section 8 on that assessment;
(b) that the person is terminally ill;
(c) that the person has capacity to make the decision to end their own life;
(d) that the person was aged 18 or over at the time the first declaration was made;
(e) that before making the first declaration, but when the person was aged 18 or over, a registered medical practitioner conducted a preliminary discussion with the person;
(f) that the person is ordinarily resident in England and Wales and has been so resident for at least 12 months ending with the date of the first declaration;
(g) that the person is registered as a patient with a general medical practice in England or Wales;
(h) that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life;
(i) that the person made the first declaration voluntarily and was not coerced or pressured by any other person into making that declaration.
(3) Subject to the following and to Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels), the panel may adopt such procedure as it considers appropriate for the case.
(4) The panel—
(a) must hear from, and may question, the coordinating doctor or the independent doctor (and may hear from and question both);
(b) must (subject to subsection (5)) hear from, and may question, the person to whom the referral relates;
(c) in a case to which section 15 applies, may hear from and may question the person’s proxy;
(d) may hear from and may question any other person;
(e) may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.
In paragraphs (a) to (c) the reference to hearing from or questioning a person is to hearing from them, or questioning them, in person or by live video or audio link.
(5) The duty under subsection (4)(b) to hear from the person to whom the referral relates does not apply if the panel is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which justify not hearing from that person.
(6) The panel—
(a) must, if it is satisfied of all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2), grant a certificate to that effect (a “certificate of eligibility”);
(b) must refuse to do so in any other case.
(7) The panel must notify the following of its decision—
(a) the person to whom the referral relates;
(b) the coordinating doctor;
(c) the Commissioner;
(d) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
Where it grants a certificate of eligibility, it must give a copy of the certificate to each of these persons.
(8) If the panel is notified that the first declaration has been cancelled, it must cease to act in relation to the referral (and, in particular, it may not grant a certificate of eligibility).”
This new clause provides for a person’s eligibility to be provided with assistance under clause 18 to be determined by a multidisciplinary panel (instead of the High Court).
Amendment (d) to new clause 21, in subsection (4), leave out paragraphs (a) to (e) and insert—
“(a) must hear from, and must question, the coordinating doctor and the independent doctor;
(b) must (subject to subsection (5)) hear from, and must question, the person to whom the referral relates;
(c) in a case to which section 15 applies, must hear from and must question the person’s proxy;
(d) must consider hearing from and questioning—
(i) persons properly interested in the welfare of the person who made the application for the declaration and other persons they are close to; and
(ii) any other person who has provided treatment or care for the person being assessed in relation to that person’s terminal illness; and
(e) may hear from and may question any other person, including any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”
Amendment (c) to new clause 21, in subsection (4), after paragraph (e) insert—
“(aa) if it considers that the matters mentioned in subsection 2(c), (h) or (i) are established on a balance of probabilities but still considers that there is a real risk that they are not satisfied, then the panel must stay its proceedings until such further inquiries it orders are made,”.
Amendment (e) to new clause 21, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) Where the panel considers it appropriate for medical reasons, it may make provision for the use of pre-recorded audio or video material for the purposes of subsection (4).”
Amendment (a) to new clause 21, in subsection (6)(a), after “satisfied” insert “beyond reasonable doubt”.
Amendment (b) to new clause 21, in subsection (6)(a), after “subsection (2)” insert
“unless it believes that there are particular circumstances which make it inappropriate for the person to be assisted to end their own life,”.
New clause 2—Tribunal authorisation—
“(1) Where—
(a) a person has made a first declaration under section 5 which has not been cancelled,
(b) the coordinating doctor has made the statement mentioned in section 7(3), and
(c) the independent doctor has made the statement mentioned in section 8(5), that person may apply to the First-tier Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for a declaration that the requirements of this Act have been met in relation to the first declaration.
(2) On an application under this section, the Tribunal—
(a) must make the declaration if it is satisfied of all the matters listed in subsection (3), and
(b) in any other case, must refuse to make the declaration.
(3) The matters referred to in subsection (2)(a) are that—
(a) the requirements of sections 5 to 9 of this Act have been met in relation to the person who made the application,
(b) the person is terminally ill,
(c) the person has capacity to make the decision to end their own life,
(d) the person has relevant and available palliative care options available to them,
(e) the person is not liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983,
(f) the person was aged 18 or over at the time the first declaration was made,
(g) the person is ordinarily resident in England and Wales and has been so resident for at least 12 months ending with the date of the first declaration,
(h) the person is registered as a patient with a general medical practice in England or Wales,
(i) the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and
(j) the person made the first declaration and the application under this section voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making that declaration or application.
(4) The Tribunal—
(a) may hear from and question, in person, the person who made the application for the declaration;
(b) must hear from and may question, in person, the coordinating doctor or the independent doctor (or both);
(c) for the purposes of paragraph (b), may require the coordinating doctor or the independent doctor (or both) to appear before the tribunal.
(5) For the purposes of determining whether it is satisfied of the matters mentioned in subsection (3)(g) and (h), the Tribunal may also—
(a) hear from and question any other person;
(b) ask a person to report to the Tribunal on such matters relating to the person who has applied for the declaration as it considers appropriate.
(6) In considering an application under this section, the panel must consist of—
(a) a sitting judge,
(b) a medical practitioner, and
(c) a lay person.
(7) In subsection (4)—
(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to the person who made the application includes, in a case where the person’s first declaration was signed by a proxy under section 15, that proxy, and
(b) “in person” includes by means of a live video link or a live audio link.”
This new clause would replace the role of the High Court with the tribunal system.
New clause 3—Tribunals in Wales—
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, in exercising functions under or arising from this Act in relation to Wales, are to be treated as devolved tribunals within the meaning of paragraph 9 of Schedule 7A to the Government of Wales Act 2006.
(2) The Welsh Ministers may by regulations make provision relating to the procedure to be followed by the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal in exercising functions under this Act in relation to Wales.
(3) Statutory instruments containing regulations made under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by resolution of Senedd Cymru.”
Amendment 67, in schedule 4, page 28, line 32, leave out from “The” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 68, in schedule 5, page 30, line 6, leave out from “the” to “made” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 69, in schedule 5, page 30, line 10, leave out from “the” to end of line and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
Amendment 70, in schedule 6, page 32, line 3, leave out from “of” to “declaration” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.
New schedule 1—The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner—
“Status
1 (1) The Commissioner is to be a corporation sole.
(2) The Commissioner is not to be regarded as—
(a) the servant or agent of the Crown, or
(b) as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown.
(3) The Commissioner’s property is not to be regarded as property of, or property held on behalf of, the Crown.
General powers
2 The Commissioner may do anything the Commissioner considers appropriate for the purposes of, or in connection with, the Commissioner’s functions.
Deputy Commissioner
3 (1) The Prime Minister must appoint a person to be the Deputy Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner (the “Deputy Commissioner”).
(2) The person appointed must hold or have held office as a judge of—
(a) the Supreme Court,
(b) the Court of Appeal, or
(c) the High Court.
(3) The Commissioner may delegate any of the Commissioner’s functions to the Deputy Commissioner, to the extent and on the terms that the Commissioner determines.
(4) The delegation of a function under sub-paragraph (3) does not prevent the Commissioner from exercising that function.
(5) The functions of the Commissioner are to be carried out by the Deputy Commissioner if—
(a) there is a vacancy in the office of the Commissioner, or
(b) the Commissioner is for any reason unable or unwilling to act.
Appointment and tenure of office
4 (1) A person holds and vacates office as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner in accordance with the terms and conditions of their appointment as determined by the Secretary of State, subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
(2) An appointment as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner is to be for a term not exceeding five years.
(3) A person may not be appointed as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if a relevant appointment of them has been made on two occasions. “Relevant appointment” here means appointment as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.
(4) The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner may resign by giving written notice to the Secretary of State.
(5) The Secretary of State may by notice in writing remove a person from the office of Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if satisfied that the person—
(a) has behaved in a way that is not compatible with their continuing in office, or
(b) is unfit, unable or unwilling to properly discharge their functions.
Remuneration
5 The Secretary of State may pay to, or in respect of, the person holding office as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner—
(a) remuneration;
(b) allowances;
(c) sums by way of or in respect of pensions.
Staff: appointed by Commissioner
6 (1) The Commissioner may appoint staff.
(2) Staff are to be appointed on terms and conditions determined by the Commissioner.
(3) The terms and conditions on which a member of staff is appointed may provide for the Commissioner to pay to or in respect of the member of staff—
(a) remuneration;
(b) allowances;
(c) sums by way of or in respect of pensions.
(4) In making appointments under this paragraph, the Commissioner must have regard to the principle of selection on merit on the basis of fair and open competition.
(5) The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 does not require insurance to be effected by the Commissioner.
Staff: secondment to Commissioner
7 (1) The Commissioner may make arrangements for persons to be seconded to the Commissioner to serve as members of the Commissioner's staff.
(2) The arrangements may include provision for payments by the Commissioner to the person with whom the arrangements are made or directly to seconded staff (or both).
(3) A period of secondment to the Commissioner does not affect the continuity of a person's employment with the employer from whose service he or she is seconded.
Staff: general
8 (1) Before appointing staff under paragraph 6 or making arrangements under paragraph 7(1), the Commissioner must obtain the approval of the Secretary of State as to the Commissioner's policies on—
(a) the number of staff to be appointed or seconded;
(b) payments to be made to or in respect of staff;
(c) the terms and conditions on which staff are to be appointed or seconded.
(2) A function of the Commissioner may be carried out by any of the Commissioner's staff to the extent authorised by the Commissioner (but this is subject to sub-paragraph (3)).
(3) Sub-paragraph (2) does not apply in respect of—
(a) the Commissioner’s function under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels) of making appointments to the list of persons eligible to be panel members;
(b) the Commissioner’s function of determining applications for reconsideration under section (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility).
Financial and other assistance from the Secretary of State
9 (1) The Secretary of State may—
(a) make payments to the Commissioner of such amounts as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;
(b) give such financial assistance to the Commissioner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(2) The Secretary of State may—
(a) provide staff in accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary of State and the Commissioner under paragraph 7;
(b) provide premises, facilities or other assistance to the Commissioner.
Accounts
10 (1) The Commissioner must—
(a) keep proper accounts and proper records in relation to them, and
(b) prepare a statement of accounts in respect of each financial year in the form specified by the Secretary of State.
(2) The Commissioner must send a copy of each statement of accounts to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General—
(a) before the end of August next following the end of the financial year to which the statement relates, or
(b) on or before such earlier date after the end of that year as the Treasury may direct.
(3) The Comptroller and Auditor General must—
(a) examine, certify and report on the statement of accounts, and
(b) send a copy of the certified statement and the report to the Secretary of State.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament each document received under sub-paragraph (3)(b).
(5) In this paragraph, “financial year” means—
(a) the period beginning with the date on which the Commissioner is established and ending with the second 31 March following that date, and
(b) each successive period of 12 months.
Application of seal and proof of documents
11 (1) The application of the Commissioner's seal is to be authenticated by the signature of—
(a) the Commissioner, or
(b) a person who has been authorised by the Commissioner for that purpose (whether generally or specially).
(2) A document purporting to be duly executed under the Commissioner’s seal or signed on the Commissioner’s behalf —
(a) is to be received in evidence, and
(b) is to be treated as duly executed or signed in that way, unless the contrary is shown.
Public Records Act 1958
12 In Part 2 of the Table in paragraph 3 of the First Schedule to the Public Records Act 1958 (bodies whose records are public records), at the appropriate place insert “The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner”.
House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975
13 In Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (offices disqualifying person from membership of House of Commons), at the appropriate place insert—
“The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner or the Deputy Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.”
Freedom of Information Act 2000
14 In Part 6 of Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (public authorities for the purposes of the Act) , at the appropriate place insert—
“The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.”
Equality Act 2010
15 In Part 1 of Schedule 19 to the Equality Act 2010 (public authorities subject to public sector equality duty), at the end of the group of entries for bodies whose functions relate to health, social care and social security insert—
“The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.””
This new Schedule contains provision about the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner.
New schedule 2—Assisted Dying Review Panels—
“Introduction
1 In this Schedule—
(a) “referral” means a referral under section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel) or (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility) (and similar references are to be construed accordingly);
(b) “panel” means an Assisted Dying Review Panel.
List of persons eligible to be panel members
2 (1) The Commissioner must make appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of panels.
(2) A person may be appointed to the list only if—
(a) the person (a “legal member”)—
(i) holds or has held high judicial office,
(ii) is one of His Majesty’s Counsel, or
(iii) has (at any time) been requested to act as a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court by virtue of section 9(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981,
(b) the person (a “psychiatrist member”) is—
(i) a registered medical practitioner,
(ii) a practising psychiatrist, and
(iii) registered in one of the psychiatry specialisms in the Specialist Register kept by the General Medical Council, or
(c) the person is registered as a social worker in a register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales (a “social worker member”).
(3) In this paragraph “high judicial office” means office as—
(a) a judge of the Supreme Court,
(b) a judge of the Court of Appeal, or
(c) a judge or deputy judge of the High Court.
Tenure of persons appointed to list
3 (1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, persons on the list hold and vacate their appointments in accordance with the terms on which they are appointed.
(2) An appointment to the list is to be for a period not exceeding five years.
(3) A person who has held appointment to the list is eligible for re-appointment for one further period not exceeding five years.
Membership of panels
4 (1) The Commissioner must make arrangements for determining the membership of a panel.
(2) The arrangements must ensure that a panel consists of—
(a) a legal member,
(b) a psychiatrist member, and
(c) a social worker member.
Decisions of panels
5 (1) The legal member of a panel is to act as its chair.
(2) Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (3).
(3) The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.
Panel sittings
6 (1) Panels are to determine referrals in public (but this is subject to sub-paragraph (2)).
(2) The chair of a panel may, at the request of the person to whom a referral relates, decide that the panel is to sit in private.
Staff and facilities
7 The Commissioner may make staff and other facilities available to panels.
Practice and procedure
8 (1) The Commissioner may give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels.
(2) Panels must have regard to any such guidance in the exercise of their functions.
Reasons
9 Panels must give reasons, in writing, for their decisions.
Money
10 The Commissioner may pay to or in respect of members of panels—
(a) remuneration;
(b) allowances;
(c) sums by way of or in respect of pensions.
House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975
11 In Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (offices disqualifying persons from membership of House of Commons), at the appropriate place insert—
“Person on the list of those eligible for membership of an Assisted Dying Review Panel.””
This new Schedule contains provision about Assisted Dying Review Panels.
Amendment (c) to new schedule 2, in paragraph 4, after
“(c) a social worker member.”
insert—
“(3) The Commissioner must ensure that each member of a panel has had training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.”
Amendment (a) to new schedule 2, in paragraph 4, after
“(c) a social worker member.”
insert—
“(3) Each member of a panel must have fluent proficiency in the Welsh language if services or functions in the Act are to be provided to an individual in Welsh.”
Amendment (b) to new schedule 2, in paragraph 8, leave out sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) and insert—
“(1) The Commissioner must give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels.
(2) Such guidance must prescribe a procedure which in relation to each application appoints a person nominated by the Official Solicitor to act as advocate to the panel.
(3) Panels must have regard to such guidance in the exercise of their functions.”
This amendment would require Assisted Dying Panels to follow an adversarial process to test the evidence by appointing an advocate to the panel.
I call Jack Abbott—you left us on a cliffhanger.
I feel huge responsibility for my “EastEnders”-style ending, Ms McVey. Unfortunately, my speech is not going to be as radical as some may have hoped.
I was discussing the bandwidth or capacity of the professionals involved in the process. We have been very good at leaving party politics at the door, but Opposition Members have mentioned the state of the NHS and the wider healthcare system on a couple of occasions. I could probably go further and mention the huge backlogs in the courts and wider criminal justice system. It is fair enough to consider the Bill in that wider context; I have considered that point deeply, as I know Members from across the Committee have.
We asked earlier whether there is capacity in the system to support the panels—that is, are there enough psychiatrists and social workers? However, it is inconsistent to then also say that we need more psychiatrists and social workers in other areas of the process. I am not sure that we can have it both ways. This is something to consider—the Committee has discussed it—but ultimately it is a matter for Members of the House.
The Committee is not here to debate whether the systems in place can deal with an assisted dying Bill. Whether or not assisted dying is introduced into our healthcare and judicial systems, it will not fundamentally change the challenges that the country faces in these areas. We are here to ensure that we present back to the House a Bill that has the safeguards and balances that I mentioned this morning, so that it can progress. I certainly would not want to produce anything that paralyses the system, but new clause 21 would not do so. In fact, in the long run, the panel approach would help the process along. For that reason, I am not sure that the capacity of professionals provides a valid argument against the panel—if anything, quite the reverse. As I said, that point really was not worthy of an “EastEnders” cliffhanger.
We have had positive murmurings and acknowledgments about amendment (e) to new clause 21. The panel approach represents a huge leap forward. I appreciate that Members in the room and across the House may say that the approach does not go far enough. I go back to my earlier point: for some Members, no amendment, change or safeguard will ever be enough for them to support the Bill. As a Committee, we have to come out with a strong, robust process that puts the patient first, and ensure that we are acting in their interests. We must make sure patients are safe and have the capacity to make these decisions, but I do not want any individual looking to go down this route to be stuck in endless meetings or courtrooms, when they should be spending time with their loved ones. I think this strikes the right balance between safeguarding—bringing in all of the professional expertise that we have been looking to do as a Committee—and making sure this process is fair and equitable. I urge Members to support amendment (e) to new clause 21, but I will also be supporting the new clauses today.
On Second Reading on 29 November, the hon. Member for Spen Valley said:
“Under the Bill, any terminally ill person who wants to be considered for an assisted death would have to undertake a thorough and robust process involving two doctors and a High Court judge. No other jurisdiction in the world has those layers of safeguarding.”—[Official Report, 29 November 2024; Vol. 757, c. 1019.]
There can be no doubt that the High Court judge safeguard was presented to the House as globally exceptional, unusually thorough and robust, as compared to other jurisdictions. It was also a prominent feature of the public campaign around the Bill. We were told it was a Bill designed for exceptional circumstances, with robust safeguards—the High Court judge being the pre-eminent one. It was not a trivial detail; it was the centrepiece of a safeguarding regime arranged around a small number of vulnerable people. Over 60 Members of Parliament are on the record as saying that it was this safeguard that helped persuade them to vote in favour on Second Reading.
I am sorry; I did not intend to give that impression. That is not what I am suggesting. What I am saying is that we have seen the rejection of a series of amendments that would have restricted eligibility, or ensured that only certain people would be eligible: those for whom we all understand the reason for the case for assisted death. Whether our amendments related to the burden, the pain, or questions around capacity and coercion, our amendments would have restricted access to only the most desperate people.
On that basis, it would have been appropriate to have a High Court stage, because the High Court could have accommodated that lower demand. Given the opportunity that the Bill affords to a larger group of people to gain access to assisted death, it has become obvious—I presume, in the mind of Government and others—that there is insufficient capacity in the court system to accommodate the regime being instituted here.
I think the question of High Court capacity has been driven by the desire for a system that can cope with many thousands of deaths per year. I have seen ranges suggesting between 6,000 and 17,000 deaths per year. If Members have other calculations or estimates, I would be grateful to hear them. In fact, it would be good to know whether the Government have done any estimation of the numbers we are looking at.
It is not simply a case of averting those desperate cases of people who help their relatives to die by going to Switzerland or who assist them in committing suicide in other ways—we heard from Max Hill that only a handful of cases cross his desk every year. It is clearly the intention to greatly widen the scope beyond that desperate group. It is unclear what the overall number is, but my strong sense is that we are looking at many thousands, and for that reason, it has been decided that the High Court would not have the capacity to cope with this.
We go back to the inconsistency argument. On the one hand, we are saying that we must have more psychiatrists, social workers and palliative care experts in the process. This change is now being proposed, and the hon. Gentleman is using that as a reason to say that there is bad faith here and the sponsors of the Bill just want to widen the scope. I do not think he can have it both ways.
I am not suggesting bad faith here. I think there is a genuine view, and it might well come from the Government’s official advice, that the Bill, as drafted and as amended, will allow many thousands of people to gain access to assisted death every year. On that basis, we will need a system that can cope with them. The judiciary clearly communicated that it could not cope, and I understand why it would do so.
I appreciate that, but just this morning we heard from the hon. Member for Reigate that, because there are not enough psychiatrists and social workers, this panel is not workable either. Again, there is an inconsistency here. There is either enough capacity in the system or there is not—which is it?
I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Member, but I am afraid I am going to have it both ways. I think the Bill is profoundly flawed, particularly if large numbers of people will be going through this system. Whether they are going through a judicial system or a panel system, there will be huge capacity constraints on the professionals involved, and we have transferred that responsibility and that problem from the judiciary to psychiatry and social work—unless, of course, it is a rubber-stamp exercise, which I fear it might be, but even then, we are still involving psychiatrists and social workers in a rubber-stamp exercise.
But that demolishes the central argument that the hon. Gentleman is making. On the one hand, he says that we are expanding access, but on the other, he says that the panel system will not be able to expand it. If the motive of the promoter of the Bill was to expand the system to make more people eligible, the hon. Gentleman has just said that the constraints of the panel will mean that that does not happen anyway. He is conflating different things and being totally inconsistent.
All right. I regret my failure to assuage the anxieties of the hon. Member.
Let me explain why it was so important that we had a judicial stage. My complaints were never against the principle, but always against the practicalities, for the reasons I have just given and will go on to say more about. The value of a judicial stage is that it gave the doctors certainty and, indeed, protection for the process they were responsible for.
I want to cite the evidence from the Medical Defence Union, which provides doctors with insurance against claims of medical negligence. Responding to the suggestion that judicial involvement could be replaced by some other decision-making body, it stated:
“The MDU strongly rejects this assertion. The involvement of the judiciary is essential. Its absence leaves doctors unduly exposed. Media reports suggest that an alternative safeguard is being mooted. No ‘independent panel’, however so constituted, can replace the legal authority of a course of action sealed and ratified by a judge. Doctors deserve that certainty when relying upon this Bill to provide the very best for their patients at the most delicate moment of their duty of care.”
I will also cite the evidence that we received from Ruth Hughes, a senior barrister with 17 years of experience in mental capacity law. I cannot say that she is a King’s counsel because she does not become one until later this month—congratulations to her. She stated in her written evidence that
“if there is no judicial declaration because the judicial safeguard is not enacted, then there is a risk that the estates of persons who have been assisted to die will be sent into turmoil. This is due to the possibility of arguments being made that beneficiaries of the estate have ‘influenced’ the person into obtaining the assisted death.”
She said that
“even if there is no conviction but another person asserts there was ‘influence’…not undue influence”—
and certainly not coercion, which is banned by the Bill—
“but a lower standard of ‘influence’ by a beneficiary of the estate…then the personal representatives will be advised to obtain directions from the Court as to how to administer the estate.”
Her point is that, even if the bar for the assisted death is met, in terms of influence, coercion and so on, the testamentary or probate challenges that the estates will then go into are considerable.
The fact is that somebody has to be the judge—somebody has to take legal responsibility for the decision that is made. In the common law system, we do not give powers of life and death to panels; we give them to legally constituted bodies with judicial authority. To cite the MDU again:
“To put it plainly, without judicial involvement someone will have to take responsibility for the legality of the action.”
I do not want to make implications about what the hon. Gentleman might be saying, but am I correct that, with the adversarial position that he is supporting, a person coming to the end of their life, who had gone through this process, would essentially have to argue their case in front of a judge?
No, I do not think it is necessary for the applicant to come to court and present their case—that might be completely impossible or inappropriate—but a case does need to be made to the judge about why it should proceed, which is part of the original proposal. Indeed, that is what is proposed under the panel system as well: the case is made for whether it should go ahead.
My suggestion is that there needs to be representatives of the applicant—who may want to appear themselves—but there also needs to be somebody who is putting the other side of the story: “Maybe this isn’t the right thing to do. Has the judge considered these parts of the evidence, or this aspect of the report from the assessing doctors?” That would be an appropriate procedure, which is completely consistent with how these important decisions are taken in other aspects of our system.
There is a difference between an adversarial system and an inquisitorial system, which is what I believe is proposed for this panel. The panel would take not an adversarial but an inquisitive position. I do not think that is a million miles away from what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but there is a distinct difference. If he is arguing for the panel to take an adversarial position, that is very different from where the panel currently is.
Yes; it would be inappropriate to ask a panel to operate in an adversarial system. It would be inappropriate to ask a psychiatrist and a social worker to act as a judge. We need a proper court system, as we always do with other important decisions in which two sides make arguments. Let me try to explain. I agree that what is being proposed is an inquisitorial system through a panel, which is completely alien to the British common law model of making important decisions. That is what is being suggested, but I do not think it is appropriate.
I do not believe in assisted dying; I think it is the wrong thing to do. But if we were to do it, we should have a proper multidisciplinary team at the outset—I sort of feel that that is where we have got to through these debates, and if the debates had happened properly and prior to the Bill being drafted, something more like this system might have been proposed. Perhaps a doctor does the first declaration as proposed, but we then go into a proper multidisciplinary team, rather than just having the options to refer to psychiatrists if appropriate or to maybe consult palliative care specialists.
The involvement of all the appropriate specialists in assessing capacity and coercion, making clear the alternatives that the patient has, making a proper diagnosis, and hearing from family members—all the appropriate processes that should be followed in a case like this—should happen at the very beginning of the process. There is no need for a lawyer at that stage on the multidisciplinary team that we have created; it will be a proper combination of clinical and social work professionals. Their reports would then feed into the judicial process, which would be the second or third stage, if we have a doctor at the beginning. The judge would then hear arguments from, as it were, both sides. That need not be a distressing or time-consuming process, but it would be an appropriate one under British law to make decisions of life and death. That court would clearly hear arguments made by both sides.
My hon. Friend makes a really good point, especially on the issue of coercion. Amendments on coercion training have been agreed to. Does my hon. Friend think the court system as it stands can deal with his concern about coercion, or will the panel be more able to deal with that kind of concern?
That is my next point—and it is a good question. As I said, the panel is done with the right intention and would improve the process in many ways. My view is similar to that of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire—it is possibly one aspect on which we are in agreement—in that I think it comes at the wrong part of the process. If it was earlier in the process, it would improve things. Court capacity is an issue, but I take the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire that if we want the courts to do it, they need to get on and do it.
I keep coming back to the issue of what we are asking the state to do. Implementing the wishes and autonomy of the patient is important, but we also need to take very seriously what we are asking the state to allow to be done in its name. There is also the crucial matter of public trust, the condition of the national health service and the issue of capacity in the courts. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich touched on, there is considerable disquiet and concern about how robust this process is going to be. Even though I think having the panel at the start of the process would improve what was put to the House on Second Reading, having judicial oversight at the very end would provide reassurance to the vast swathes of the public who are concerned about this, as well as to Members.