(3 days, 5 hours ago)
Commons Chamber
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I do not think I have ever been wished happy birthday like that—an important first for me.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement, and all those who worked tirelessly to keep our essential public services running during what was an extremely challenging incident. Last week’s outage should serve as a wake-up call about the resilience of our national digital infrastructure. A technical fault at a single company caused widespread disruption across our NHS, police forces, schools, businesses and Departments. At least 47 NHS trusts reported difficulties, with some NHS services resorting to pen and paper to keep the basics going.
The Minister tells us that there were no major impacts on critical services, but acknowledges that the Government are still working to understand the full extent of the disruption. How can he therefore be confident in that assessment? Can the Minister tell the House how many appointments, treatments and operations were delayed? Do we know of any incidents in which patient safety was compromised? Can he provide assurances that no critical communications have been permanently lost?
While I welcome the Minister’s assurances regarding the UK’s telecommunications networks, that is a separate issue from the resilience of internet-based telephone systems that depend on the affected platforms. Many public bodies advised people to contact them by telephone instead, but increasingly our telephone systems are integrated with the very same digital platforms that failed last week. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact caused by affected telephone systems, particularly within the NHS?
No one disputes that there are immense benefits to digitisation and even standardisation across our public services, but those benefits must be balanced against the risks of over-reliance on individual providers. Indeed, the Government’s own cloud procurement guidance explicitly recognises these risks. Have the Government undertaken a comprehensive audit of our dependence on individual technology suppliers across our critical national infrastructure?
The Minister speaks of diversifying the Government’s supply arrangements, yet only last month the Government declined to introduce the supplier diversification targets recommended by the Science and Technology Committee. In light of last week’s events, does he expect to reconsider that decision? When did the Government last conduct a cross-departmental exercise simulating the prolonged failure of a major technology provider? What assessment has been made of the impact of the outage on the functioning of central Government? The Minister assures us that Departments have contingency plans in place for precisely such circumstances. Which Departments activated those plans last week, and how effective did they prove to be? Without asking him to disclose sensitive information, can he confirm that independent back-up systems are in place to ensure that the machinery of government can continue to function in the event of a more prolonged outage?
Thankfully, there is no indication that the incident was the result of a cyber-attack, but that makes the scale of disruption all the more alarming. If a technical fault can wreak such havoc, what might be achieved through a sophisticated and co-ordinated attack by a hostile state, backed by artificial intelligence? What if the outage had lasted a week, rather than a day? What if it had coincided with a national emergency? In January, the Government announced their £210 million cyber action plan. Will the Minister say more about the lessons that will be drawn from the incident, and will he consider whether further provisions are needed in the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill to address supplier concentration?
The Minister says that he will engage further with Microsoft. Given the £1.9 billion spent on Microsoft licences across the public sector in 2024-25, will the Government seek contractual remedies, and what specific improvements in resilience will they demand? We have a duty to ensure that services can continue to operate, regardless of the fortunes of any single technology company. Will the Minister commit to a comprehensive review of our exposure to those risks, and report back to this House on the practical steps that the Government can take to address them? Digital transformation is vital, but must never come at the expense of national resilience.
A very happy birthday to the shadow Minister, and I am sorry that she has had to spend it in the Chamber with me, dealing with these serious issues. She asked a number of questions, and I am grateful for the way that she approached them. The questions she raised are those that the Government have been asking for some time, including through the Government resilience action plan in 2025; the cyber action plan came from the £210 million that we invested in that.
I can only re-emphasise that it is very early in the situation, and that there was no real impact on the public sector. When I said that we do not yet fully understand the disruption across the whole economy, that was more about the private sector. Understanding the impact and disruption that the outage had on the economy as a whole will take more time. We are not aware of any delays in the NHS, or of NHS patients who were put in danger, and 999 services remained as they have always been.
The hon. Lady asked about the assessment of different telephone systems, and diversification across Government. The cyber action plan is there to ensure exactly that; it looks at legacy systems and diversification. The national cloud infrastructure procurement process is about diversification of cloud services; the Government can use that big procurement to diversify our tech stack, ensure that we are seeding British companies, and ensure that we have some sovereignty here. There are only a few suppliers in the marketplace—the big ones that we all know. More than 90% of the civil service uses some kind of Microsoft product, so diversification must be part of the assessment. A comprehensive audit has been done of our resilience in Government. The hon. Lady asks what might have happened if there was a hostile state involved, or if the outage happened during a national emergency. All our plans are in place for that. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, along with the National Cyber Security Centre, stands up the co-ordination group. It ensures that there is only one point of contact, and ensures co-ordination not just across Government, but between companies.
As I understand, this was not a cyber-attack. If we think about the incident as being a five-lane motorway, one of the lanes was already down because Microsoft was working on it. There was a bug in the fourth lane of the motorway, if I can stretch the analogy. That overloaded the capacity; pretty much all the traffic was pushed into one or two lanes, and that caused the system to fall over. It was an incident after an incident. Three things happened that meant that we ended up in this situation. Microsoft resolved this relatively quickly, working in co-ordination with DCMS and the NCSC, and we are not aware at this stage that there is any legacy from that. It seems that the backlog is through, and everyone who sent or was to receive something should have got it. We are pleased that the backlog is now gone, and I encourage Members to determine whether they and their constituents have received the email traffic that they should have got by Friday afternoon; by 2 pm on Friday, the incident had passed.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons Chamber
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Celebrating culture as a community can be an incredibly unifying experience, and many people will have enjoyed Notting Hill carnival this weekend, but 636 people were arrested for crimes including sexual offences and possession of weapons. Last year, it cost about £16 million just to police the carnival, and this year a further £4.6 million of taxpayers’ money was provided for additional safety measures. Given those figures, are the Minister and the Secretary of State satisfied that this particular cultural event represents good value for taxpayers? What discussions is the Secretary of State having with colleagues about whether the present approach is sustainable?
I congratulate the hon. Lady on her position and welcome her to her place. I look forward to the many discussions the ministerial team will have with her shadow ministerial team. I am sure that she will do a marvellous job.
It was the 60th anniversary of Notting Hill carnival. Everyone is concerned about the 636 arrests. It is a carnival that has been enjoyed by tens of millions of people over the past 60 years. Its policing is the responsibility of the Mayor of London, and we will work closely with the Mayor of London on what will happen over the next 60 years of the Notting Hill carnival. It is something that we should celebrate and enjoy, but that has to be done safely, without discrimination for anyone and without fear or favour for anyone.