Strategic Defence and Security Review

Ian Davidson Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ian Davidson (Glasgow South West) (Lab/Co-op)]

The debate has been excellent, but I do not believe that it has addressed the aircraft carriers issue in as much detail as it deserves, and I hope to remedy that.

When the Secretary of State and others discuss the nuclear deterrent, great emphasis is placed on the need for a continuous at-sea presence, yet in respect of Britain’s global reach by aircraft carrier we are apparently happy to settle for a presence every now and again. We are building two aircraft carriers but one is to be mothballed, so the second will not be available when it is in refit—or, indeed, when the French are seeking to use it. Therefore, we will have only occasional use of our own aircraft carriers: for us to end up with part-use of one when we are building two does not seem to me to represent the best use of money.

There is no guarantee that we will ever have much access to the French carriers. We will be able to use them only when the French are not using them, or when they agree. There will, of course, also be times when a carrier is being refitted. Therefore, although we are going to the expense of building two carriers, we cannot receive a guarantee that we will have a continuous at-sea global presence by aircraft carrier.

In defending the implementation of the “cats and traps” policy, the Defence Secretary has mentioned that we want to have interoperability with the United States. However, it is unclear whether any agreement has been struck with the United States about our being able to borrow one of its carriers or use its decks, or whether the United States will want to use our carriers if it ends up one short. There is no point in arguing that we want to have “cats and traps” for the sake of interoperability with the United States unless some deal has been done whereby that will be a benefit—but no mention has been made of that so far.

When the Minister sums up, will he tell us whether catapults are to be fitted to both aircraft carriers? If not, we will have aircraft designed for catapults and traps but only one aircraft carrier they can fly off. On the other hand, if we fit catapults to both carriers, we will end up spending half a billion pounds fitting them to mothballed aircraft carriers. Neither of those options seems to me to represent an effective use of money. It would be helpful if the Minister were to tell us whether the French or the United States had asked us in any way, shape or form to fit catapults and traps to our aircraft carriers, or did this situation arise simply as a consequence of the Air Force’s obsession with fast jets?

The Government seem to have an unhealthy obsession with fast jets, and to have inadequately appreciated the additional capability provided to us by vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft. Yes, it is true that they carry lighter weights and can fly less far, but they are also much more effective in providing close air support, as our troops who have served in the Falklands and Afghanistan can testify. As the previous Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), said, we are giving up this capability not just in the short term but permanently; if we scrap the Harriers or do not upgrade them in future, we will lose that entire capability. To base our entire fast jet defence structure on the concept that we must have generation five because at some point in the future somebody else might have it is to focus too much on one element of need. It would be useful if the Minister told us how much each of the “cats and traps” will cost, because if he does not have that figure to hand, this would appear to be a leap in the dark.

The lack of political balance in how the British media treat the various parties is nowhere more glaringly obvious than in the discussion about aircraft carriers without aircraft. Can we imagine the meal the press and television would have made if a Labour Government had for one moment proposed that we should have aircraft carriers without aircraft? I am not necessarily the brightest, but I recognise that the secret is in the name: the concept of an “aircraft carrier” means something that carries aircraft. The fact that we will have aircraft carriers without aircraft—and that the Government have got away almost scot-free with it—represents something of an imbalance. I am looking forward to hearing the Minister announce that he has devised a new system of guns without bullets, rockets without explosives and so on. Those are equally ludicrous suggestions.

The Government have been insufficiently radical in examining structures. I understand that under their proposals the joint strike fighter will be flown off the carriers by joint RAF/Fleet Air Arm groups, crews, pilots and so on. In those circumstances, why do we need a Fleet Air Arm? Why do we need to have RAF pilots flying off aircraft carriers? That is an example of the sort of culture of defence in the forces. I served on the Public Accounts Committee for many years and we constantly got the feeling that the service personnel at the top were all far too cosy, that it was all too much of an old pals act, that they were drawn from too narrow a social base and that they were all scratching each other’s backs. Only 7% of children go to a private school, yet 90% of top generals did—so it is difficult to accept that the forces represent the society that they seek to defend.

Thinking back to my days in the borders, I recall that in some towns the reaction to any proposed change was “Aye been”, on the basis that things had aye been like that, so must not change. Although we must be proud of traditions, we should not be prisoners of tradition. There is an unwillingness on the part of the Government to challenge some of the existing structures, be it the Fleet Air Arm or the need to maintain an RAF. There is no evidence that some of those more drastic options have been fully discussed or thought through.

I wish to touch on the defence industrial strategy, because there has been a lot of discussion about the terms of business agreement—TOBA—between British Aerospace and the Ministry of Defence. That is an ideal example of good practice, rather than bad practice. People could haggle about the detail of the deal, but the concept of the Government making a plan with a firm in the private sector that gives it a guarantee of work for a period that will allow it to invest, in both capital resources and personnel, in return for that flow of work is sensible. We cannot go on with a system of simply buying off the shelf—one here, one there and one somewhere else. Without question if we had not built aircraft carriers we would never have had the capacity to build Type 45 destroyers. That capacity would simply have been lost, because the work force would have been dispersed.

I hope that when the Government come to examine the defence industrial strategy, or whatever their equivalent of that is, they will overcome their tendency simply to buy the cheapest on all occasions, but will look forward and identify what industrial and commercial capacities we want to retain for the long term.

[Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for the points that he has been making about the skills base. That is particularly important in Plymouth, where proposed changes in base porting and the removal of frigates mean that Babcock will have a huge trough in its work load, which will cause us real problems. Does he share my concern, and my belief that those factors should have been considered before the SDSR, not after it?

[Mr Davidson]

Yes, I do share that view. The Government, rightly in many ways, have said—the previous Government said this too—that defence is not simply a job creator for people on the home front, so to speak. The question of jobs and, more importantly, continuing capabilities is a valid part of this whole discussion and negotiation. We could probably always buy almost any individual item more cheaply somewhere else, but if we do that we will end up beholden to someone else for everything. We must identify the capacities we want to retain, as Lord Drayson’s defence industrial strategy did, and then be prepared to enter long-term agreements with suppliers for them. That will involve manpower and personnel planning to avoid peaks and troughs.

In the minute that remains, I want to ask the Minister about base closures. The Government must start making commitments fairly quickly, not only to individual locations but about what they are prepared to do when bases are shut. Will they promise Kinloss or Lossiemouth that they will clean up the land sites and spend money on infrastructure and making those sites available for firms to move in, or are they simply going to pull up sticks and move away? Many of those communities have served the country well for some substantial time, and I hope that we will reward them appropriately, or at least that we will not leave them swinging in the wind.

My final point is about our agreement with the French. I hope that we are going to be as hard-headed about it as they are, and that it will not mean that they take over our industrial capacity rather than our being able to contribute to joint developments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

We have had a good debate, including 15 contributions from Back Benchers. As one of them said earlier, the debate has been well informed.

May I begin by paying tribute to the men and women of our armed forces and their families? It was a privilege to work with them as a Minister. May I also say a big thanks to the civil servants with whom I worked? They have been unfairly targeted as the problem, when in fact they are dedicated individuals without whose work we could not project the operations and power that we have in support of our armed forces. May I also put on record the thanks of Labour Members to Sir Jock Stirrup and Bill Jeffrey at the MOD? It was ironic that the Defence Secretary congratulated those two individuals when he was the one who basically announced their departure in the Sunday newspapers the week before the official announcement. Those two people were committed to the defence of this country, and I put on record my thanks to them.

The hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) raised the issue of cadets and the university training squadrons. As a Minister, I had responsibility for those, and I met some fantastic individuals who greatly benefited from those organisations. I put on record my thanks to the volunteers who work hard—unpaid—in the cadet force throughout the country. They are a large volunteer army who work to support young people. Those young people not only experience military life, but take that discipline and structure into their lives.

The hon. Gentleman referred to reserves. I am a little disappointed that there will be yet another review of reserves. The previous Government reviewed reserves, and it would have been interesting to see the implementation of that work. I am also disappointed that there are as yet no terms of reference for the next review. It will be interesting to see how reserve forces fit into the restructure of the Army.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman on his call for the Government to take a more purple approach. However, in my experience—perhaps he shares it—the biggest problem on occasions for Defence Ministers is inter-service rivalry at chief level on different programmes. He also reiterated and repeated the point about a £38 billion black hole. As on many things, this Government believe that if they repeat something often enough, it will become fact, but I have now tabled a question to ask where that figure comes from. It has been a convenient cover for the spending cuts review.

If we look at last year’s National Audit Office report, we see that the figure on the procurement side could only be between £6 billion and £36 billion. The only way to get to the figure of £38 billion is to apply a cash freeze over the next 10 years. In addition, the figure of £38 billion would apply only if we had to pay for equipment tomorrow, which people know we do not. That figure has been a convenient cover for some of the things that the MOD is implementing.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) made a good contribution. I thank him for the support he gave me when he was Defence Secretary. It is interesting and strange to hear Government Members now thanking and praising him for being such a good Defence Secretary, given that last summer he was being pilloried by every national newspaper and Conservative Members. However, he has been rightly rehabilitated. He raised issues concerning Afghanistan, including the date of 2015, which was plucked out of thin air by the Prime Minister. It is important that we have a conditions-based draw-down from Afghanistan, and it is clear that if, come 2015, we need to retain that combat role for longer, that ought to be our position. It would be a huge mistake if the hard work, dedication and sacrifice put in so far in order to make progress in Afghanistan were to be jeopardised for purely political purposes. That would be wrong.

My right hon. Friend made an interesting and important point about the withdrawal of Harrier and short take-off and vertical landing capacity, which leads to another issue raised by the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) and my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson). I am glad that today the latter did not call for a third, fourth or fifth carrier, as he normally does. However, he summed up the matter quite well: they are called “aircraft carriers”. It is in the name! They should have aircraft on them.

Over the past few weeks, the Government have tried again to throw mud and confuse the issue by saying that the contract entered into for the carriers was a wicked plot by the last Labour Government, and that it was a bad deal. That continued yesterday with this nonsense from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, when he said to the Treasury Select Committee that this was an “unusual contract”. It was not an unusual contract at all; it was a complex contract. It was exactly what my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West talked about: it was about restructuring the shipbuilding industry in this country to ensure our continuing sovereign capacity. However, it is now convenient to demonise the contract for political reasons.

The contract is also supported by BAE Systems. By chance, I have a letter sent by Mr Ian King to the Prime Minister when the review was ongoing, pointing out that the contract represented a long-term restructuring of the maritime manufacturing capacity in the UK and that BAE Systems had already invested about £500 million of its own shareholder money in it. Clearly, he sent the letter because he was worried about the Government cancelling the contract for the second carrier. The final paragraph of the letter reiterates the problem with the Government’s approach to the review. Instead of having an all-encompassing review involving the industry, it tended to excluded people. He wrote:

“But I fully stand behind it and would welcome the opportunity, which we have not had, to present this to you”

to explain the reasoning. That has been the problem with the review, unlike our approach, which was about involving industry, Opposition parties, academia and others. Instead, we have had a cuts review, which has been Treasury-led and has led to some very short-term and dangerous decisions.

[Mr Davidson]

Does my hon. Friend accept that had the second carrier been cancelled, the results would have been the closure of the shipyards and a permanent loss of capacity, and Britain would no longer have had the ability to build the Type 26?

[Mr Jones]

That is an interesting intervention. I would have to refer to Mr King’s letter, which states that if the second carrier had been cancelled, the shipbuilding yards would have closed by 2012, removing all capability for future naval shipbuilding in this country. We have to stop the spin and excuse-making, and the Government have to start explaining and justifying some of their decisions.

In his usual robust way, the hon. Member for North East Hampshire, who is Chair of the Defence Committee—I was privileged to serve under him—said that the process of the review was rubbish, which is obviously a technical term. It was rushed, and the Committee made it clear that mistakes will be made, and that they will be at the cost of our security and defence.

The right hon. Gentleman, the hon. Member for Gainsborough and the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) referred to the deterrent and Nimrod. The revision of history, which is remarkable, is that somehow we can take capacity such as Nimrod out without an explanation of what will replace it to protect our nuclear deterrent. That worried the Secretary of State when he wrote to the Prime Minister stating that cancelling Nimrod would seriously affect the deterrent. I would like to know what will replace it, and at what cost. The parliamentary answers that I have received so far have been uninspiring.

The Trident issue is important. It is clearly a political fudge to help the coalition Government stay together, and it is interesting that the Liberal Democrats are going around trumpeting the fact that they have won the argument. The fact is that we were accused of moving the main gate on the run-up costs for the carriers, but that is exactly what the Government have done with Trident. The only difference is that when we considered the matter, there was a question mark about whether the first boat that goes out of service in 2024 could continue until the new in-service date of 2028. It would be interesting to know what has changed in terms of the engineering capability to be able to do that. It is clear that the Labour party has been, and is, committed to the nuclear deterrent. It is important that decisions are taken, not just for the country’s security, but for the skill base and confidence that that skill base needs in procuring that vital piece of equipment for our defence needs.

The right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr Donaldson) paid tribute to the armed forces in Northern Ireland, and I add my thanks to them. When I made visits as a Minister, I paid tribute to the work of 19 Light Brigade in Afghanistan. The right hon. Gentleman made serious points about the rise of terrorism, which shows the wide spectrum of the defence and security issues facing us. I also pay tribute to a member of his family whom I met on several occasions. His brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Donaldson, makes a great contribution to the armed forces. He is proud of his brother, although when I first met him he asked me whether I knew his brother, and I said that I had met him once or twice.

The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) made an interesting point about defence industrial strategy. We have been told that it will come out in a few weeks, post the review that we have had. It will be interesting to see whether it gels together, having set the framework already.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) and the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) talked about St Athan. Again, the Government are revising and rewriting history. A savings measure in the defence review suggests that extra savings will be made by centralising training and with greater use of electronics. That is exactly is what St Athan is about, so I do not know how they will achieve that without St Athan.

The hon. Member for Colchester (Bob Russell) rightly paid tribute to the Paras in his constituency. I was pleased to visit Colchester on several occasions. On one occasion, I threw him out of a plane—unfortunately, with a parachute attached. However, he is a great supporter of the Colchester garrison, and I pay tribute to its sacrifice and its work.

The hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) was also trying to rewrite history, when he talked about strategic thinking—he was trying not to get in trouble with his Whips. It seems that year zero is now 1997 and that nothing happened before. There is a clear point to be made—a point that was also made by the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin)—about strategic thinking, which is important across Government. However, I have been at the coal face on occasions, and with the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, day-to-day decision making can interfere with the process. Sometimes it is important to step back, but it is difficult to do that when having to make clear decisions on Iraq and Afghanistan.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) apologised for unfortunately being unable to attend this part of the debate. He made important points about Yemen and congratulated the Government on establishing the new National Security Committee. A promise was made in opposition that the NSC would have Opposition Members on it, but that promise seems to have been ditched. It has also been said that the previous Government did not have something like that, but we did, with the NCIS committee—the committee of the National Criminal Intelligence Service—which met weekly under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Its key issue most weeks was the contributions being made in Afghanistan. That was important.

One issue that was mentioned by the hon. Member for Colchester, and which needs to be raised again, is helicopter capacity in Afghanistan. It is interesting that since the coalition Government have come into being, all the equipment problems that we had in Afghanistan seem to have ended and everyone is now happy. We were criticised heavily by both the hon. Gentleman and the Conservatives when they were in opposition about helicopter capacity. I tabled a question last week to find out why the order for 22 Chinook helicopters had been reduced to 12. I consulted my former colleagues last night, because the reply that I received in a written answer says that 22 helicopters were never ordered. That is not true. We ordered 12 helicopters, and then there was a letter of understanding with Boeing for a further 10. I am sure that that is standard practice, so as to improve price controls and ensure that the specifications are up to date, so it will be interesting to know what has changed since, and also whether the unit cost of the 12 helicopters being purchased will increase, now that the overall number has been reduced.

In his best-selling book, “Cameron on Cameron”, the Prime Minister said that we need

“a defence review based on our national security, not on Treasury guidelines”.

How hollow that sounds today. In government, we were keen to ensure the widest possible participation in the debate about the future defence needs of our country. We included academics, industry and Opposition parties, in full consultation, to try to reach a consensus on defence, thereby not only ensuring the right posture for our future defence needs, but performing the important role of supporting our armed forces. Unfortunately, that was binned in May. What we have seen since is a Treasury-led cost-cutting review. Industry has been excluded from most of the work streams. The Conservative Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire, has said that

“mistakes will be made and some of them may be serious.”

As my right hon. Friend the Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) said earlier, let us hope that that is not true, even though it sounds as if it will be.

The SDSR was an opportunity to step back for a moment—to learn the lessons of the past decade and put in place a sustainable posture for our armed forces and defence. Sadly, that opportunity has been missed. As the Defence Secretary himself said, in his unexplainably leaked letter, the process is looking less like a proper SDSR and more like a “super CSR”. The Conservatives in opposition offered a great deal for our armed forces at the election. They promised a larger Army, but they have cut it. They promised to look at after-hours service personnel, but one of the first things they did was to freeze pay and reduce pensions. They promised a strategic defence review, but they have given us a cuts package and a review. Even today, we have heard the Defence Secretary say that some of these Treasury-led proposals will present us with what he called “calculated risks”—I would say “dangers”—for the future of our country’s defence and security.

In conclusion, my fear is that the dangerous short-term decision making in this review will be a repeat of the 1990s, when short-term savings were the mantra rather than long-term strategy.