Iran-Israel Update

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

It is wrong to suggest in any way that we have lost sight of what is happening in Gaza. Indeed, the G7 statement yesterday specifically referenced our desire to co-operate to end the crisis in Gaza, to work towards an immediate humanitarian pause where hostages can be released, to get aid in, to build the conditions for a sustainable ceasefire and, crucially, to deliver more humanitarian assistance into the region. It is welcome that we have seen an increase in that flow over the past few days and weeks, but far more aid has to get in, and that is pressure that we will continue to put on all partners concerned.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

My condolences, Mr Speaker.

Can I commend my right hon. Friend’s statement? It is clear, as has been said already, that all roads lead back to Tehran when it comes to the terrible violence and wars that take place in the middle east. Every country—not just Israel, but other Arab countries—fear what Tehran is doing in their countries as well, which is something we forget. We know that Iran is committing murder at home and has executed thousands of protesters while this war on Hamas has taken place.

With all of that known, when my right hon. Friend sits down with our international colleagues and looks for other restrictions to place on Iran, will he please consider proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and doing so in a way that makes sure it can no longer foment extremism here in the United Kingdom as well?

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. As I said in my statement, we are urgently working with our allies to see what steps we can take together in a co-ordinated fashion to deter and condemn what Iran is doing. With regard to destabilising activity here in the UK, he will know that the Charity Commission recently opened an investigation into a particular organisation. We will continue to use all the powers at our disposal to ensure that people are not fomenting hate and undermining British values here at home from abroad.

Cyber-security and UK Democracy

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. I shall seek to address as many of them as I can.

When it comes to Chinese motivations, ultimately, it is a matter for the Chinese to be able justify their motivations, but the points that the right hon. Gentleman made were apposite. First, the Chinese look at successful democratic countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan or the Republic of Korea where I was last week, and they want to seek to undermine them. It is no surprise therefore that they should seek to interfere in electoral processes, in the way that we have seen conduct from Russia that aligns with that. Indeed, the successful democratic elections around the world right now stand in contrast to the sham elections that we saw in Russia last weekend.

On the right hon. Gentleman’s point about the public record of the Electoral Commission, I think that that is the essence of what has happened here. These attacks and these attempts were ultimately pretty unsuccessful. I reassure the right hon. Gentleman and Members of this House that there was no infiltration of the closed register of the Electoral Commission, so the concerns that he raised have not arisen. On the further strengthening of the electoral register, that is precisely the work that the National Cyber Security Centre does in co-ordination with GCHQ, working with Government agencies, including the Electoral Commission.

The right hon. Gentleman was right to raise the risk of hack and leak. It is certainly something that we saw in previous elections, and I remain concerned. I also remain very concerned about artificial intelligence, deep fakes in particular, being used to disrupt elections, hence the work that I undertook at the conference last week and the progress that we are making with the accord on artificial intelligence use by malign states.

In relation to targeted sanctions, it is not the case that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office paused targeted sanctions. On the conduct of the former Foreign Secretary—[Interruption.] I am not sacking the Foreign Secretary from the Dispatch Box. On the conduct of the current Foreign Secretary, who sits in the other place, all appointments to Government are subject to the usual propriety and ethic processes. Lord Cameron is addressing the 1922 Committee in his capacity as Foreign Secretary in the usual way, addressing a wide range of issues. It is not a specific briefing on this issue, but if leaders of the principal Opposition parties wish to have a further briefing on this issue I am of course very happy to facilitate that, in the way that they know I have done in relation to other national security issues.

We are highly alert to the risks of hostile states hoovering up currently quantum-encrypted information that could subsequently be decoded with advances in quantum computing. We do extensive work with the National Cyber Security Centre and the Ministerial Cyber Board on critical national infrastructure to ensure that we guard ourselves against exactly that risk. On our relationship with China more broadly, Members of this House should take this moment very seriously. It is a grave moment, against a backdrop of an escalating threat from China, and we will take proportionate action in response to that escalating threat.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

Tomorrow, it will be three years since parliamentarians here were sanctioned; your defence of us, Mr Speaker, has been remarkable. Although I welcome the two sanctions from the Government, it is a little bit like an elephant giving birth to a mouse. The reality is that in those three years the Chinese have trashed the Sino-British agreement and been committing murder, slave labour and genocide in Xinjiang. We have had broken churches, and, in Hong Kong, false court cases against Jimmy Lai. My question is: why two? America has sanctioned more than 40 people in Hong Kong; we have sanctioned none, and only three lowly officials in Xinjiang. Surely the integrated review should be changed. China is not an epoch-defining challenge, strange as that may be, but it is surely a threat. Can the Government now correct that, so that we all know where we are with China?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend’s views are well known to me, I genuinely welcome the constructive, at most times, debate that I have with him, but nobody should be in any doubt about the gravity of this matter. These are not the actions of a friendly state, and they require our serious attention. As he has described, this is an escalating situation. The measures that we have announced today are the first step, but the Government will respond proportionately at all times to the facts in front of us. No one should be in any doubt about the Government’s determination to face down and deal with threats to our national security, from wherever they come.

Defending the UK and Allies

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Our Royal Navy is one of the top five in the world. It is capable of operating in all the world’s oceans simultaneously and we are one of only two countries to operate fifth-generation jets from the sea, so we should be confident and proud of our Royal Navy. As I have said, we are investing in more equipment and capability going into the future. The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight some of the recruitment challenges—the Defence Secretary highlighted some of them the other week—but we are doubling down on all our initiatives to ensure that our armed forces have the staff they need for the future, and that those personnel have the equipment and supplies they need to do their jobs effectively.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I fully support my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. I welcome both his statement about the action he took on the Houthi and the other part of the statement about Ukraine, because we must support Ukraine and its future.

On the reality of the Houthi, we know that Iran has supported, has supplied and continues to direct the Houthi in their attacks; it supported and directed Hamas in their brutal attacks in October; and it has armed and directs Hezbollah on a regular basis and tells them what to do, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. We understand all that, so why are we still reluctant to proscribe the IRGC, which is responsible for so much of the co-ordination of that work? There are still two Iranian banks in the City of London feeding money to those terrible organisations.

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my right hon. Friend for the work he personally does in supporting Ukraine. I agree with him about the risks that Iran poses to the UK and to regional stability. We have sanctioned more than 400 Iranian individuals and entities, including the IRGC in its entirety. The National Security Act 2023 implements new measures to protect the British public—it has been described by intelligence chiefs as “game changing”—particularly in tackling espionage and foreign interference, with tougher powers to arrest and detain people suspected of involvement in state threats.

As my right hon. Friend will know, we do not routinely comment on proscription, but I hope he will have seen the statement today about our proscription of Hizb ut-Tahrir, on which I know he and colleagues have rightly been focused in previous years.

Israel and Gaza

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 23rd October 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

As the hon. Lady well knows, there are established processes and mechanisms to take account of international law. But again, we cannot lose sight, just a week or two later, of the fact that Hamas—an absolutely evil terrorist organisation—have perpetrated a horrific attack on over 1,000 people in Israel, and Israel has the right to defend itself and ensure that that does not happen again.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I commend my right hon. Friend for his recent attempts in the middle east and for his reminder that the UK, regardless of political party, has been behind the two-state solution from the word go. It is also becoming very clear, as he referenced, that Iran’s hand is behind all the genocidal murdering and kidnapping of Jewish Israeli people. I therefore ask a simple question. If we know all this, and we now know it is abroad in the UK creating useful idiots to go out and promote its propaganda, is it not time that we reviewed again the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with a view to banning its activities, and the role of Iranian banks here in the UK, in the City of London? Why are they still here getting money and putting it towards terrorist activities?

[The Prime Minister]

We have already taken strong action, such as sanctioning more than 350 Iranian individuals and entities, including the IRGC in its entirety. Furthermore, the National Security Act 2023 implements new measures to protect the British public, including new offences of espionage and foreign interference. As my right hon. Friend knows, we do not comment on specific organisations and whether they are being considered for proscription, but he can rest assured that we discus Iran and how best to contain it with all our allies on a regular basis.

Israel and Gaza

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 16th October 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

As I said previously, as a friend we will continue to call on Israel to take every precaution to avoid harming civilians, and we will continue to do everything we can to provide humanitarian support to those affected.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I commend the calm leadership of my right hon. Friend over the past few days, as well as that of the Leader of the Opposition.

Some people forget that the reason we defend Israel’s right to exist and its security is that 6 million Jews were murdered due to a perverted ideology, and we must never return to that. That is why we stand with Israel in its time of absolute need.

I have a Jewish sister-in-law. She is quite clear that she has never felt more threatened than she did this weekend when she saw people take to the streets waving flags bearing Hamas’s crest—I do not know whether the Prime Minister saw this—and calling for Israel to be swept “from the river to the sea”. This is all about getting rid of the Jews in Palestine; there is no question about it. We must be clear about this: we have to protect the Jewish people here, who are British citizens, and we must stamp out antisemitism. I therefore ask my right hon. Friend whether we will redouble our efforts to ensure that, if ever such scenes were to happen again, the people bearing those flags and hurling that abuse would be arrested and prosecuted with the full strength of the law.

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his excellent contribution. He is right: there is no place for demonstrations, convoys or flag waving on British streets that glorifies terrorism or harasses the Jewish community. That is why, last week, I met police chiefs and people from the Community Security Trust in Downing Street to discuss how better we can protect the Jewish community at this time and police these protests appropriately. I am pleased that that work is ongoing, but of course we will remain engaged with all partners. As my right hon. Friend said, anyone who breaks the law should be met with the full force of the law and be swiftly arrested. Many people will have seen incidents online and footage of scenes that are simply unacceptable. I can reassure him that the police are currently reviewing that footage and, where possible and where they can, they will arrest those responsible.

Procurement Bill [Lords]

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Wednesday 13th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Alex Burghart)]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 102B.

It is an honour once again to open the debate on this important Bill, which I am delighted to say is now so close to receiving Royal Assent. The Bill is a key Brexit benefit, delivering a simpler, more transparent procurement framework that will benefit small businesses and meet the needs of UK suppliers and contracting authorities.

Colleagues in the Chamber will also, I hope, remember that, when the Bill was last debated in this House, we offered significant new measures to protect the UK’s public procurement supply chain from threats to national security. Those included new grounds to add suppliers to the debarment list for particular types of contracts that will allow us to ban risky suppliers from bidding for those contracts; the creation of a new national security unit for procurement that will provide dedicated resources in the Cabinet Office to scrutinise national security risks in procurement; and a commitment to publish a timetable for removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from Government Department sensitive sites. Earlier this week in the other place, we went further: my noble friend Baroness Neville-Rolfe provided an official clarification of the definition of sensitive sites and committed to an annual written report detailing progress. I am sure this House will welcome our additional agreements and agree that they demonstrate the Government’s unwavering dedication to tackle these issues seriously.

I will deal today with one amendment that the other place sent back to this House, on the subject of organ harvesting. Let me begin by saying that I think all sides of this House are in complete agreement that organ harvesting is a dreadful practice that has no place in our supply chains. The question before us today is whether Lords amendment 102B is the right or necessary one to make, given other provisions in the Bill. In Committee in this House, the Government removed a discretionary exclusion ground for suppliers engaged in forced organ harvesting. The other place has subsequently proposed an amendment in lieu, with some modifications of the original amendment. This new version of the Lords amendment does not cover unethical activities relating to human tissue; it does, however, still cover forced organ harvesting and dealing in devices, equipment or services relating to forced organ harvesting.

I urge this House to reject this amendment for a number of reasons. First, as I have said previously, I do not believe that the amendment is necessary as, crucially, organ harvesting is already dealt with under existing provisions in the Procurement Bill. Under the Bill, any suppliers failing to adhere to existing ethical or professional standards that apply in their industry, including those relating to the removal, storage and use of human tissue, could be excluded on the grounds of professional misconduct. It is worth adding at this point that, as far as His Majesty’s Government are aware, no supplier in the UK public sector has been involved in forced organ harvesting. This means that it is very unlikely that any of our public money is being spent on that terrible practice. As noted above, however, if such a situation did arise, the exclusion for professional misconduct would apply.

Secondly, the amendment has significant consequences for contracting authorities. It extends to suppliers

“dealing in any device or equipment or services relating to forced organ harvesting.”

That is an incredibly broad provision that would be extremely difficult for contracting authorities and suppliers to verify in respect of all supply chains and customer bases. If there were any doubt about whether that discretionary ground applied, local authorities or NHS trusts would need to undertake significant due diligence to satisfy themselves that the entire supply chain and the end user of all goods provided by suppliers—potentially including oxygen masks, IT equipment and so on—were not used in these terrible practices. It would mean that a small business tendering for Government contracts would need to understand where their customers might be using or selling their products, to enable them to genuinely and legitimately confirm that they were not subject to this ground.

More generally, the amendment would create excessive bureaucracy, requiring each and every supplier bidding across the thousands of contracts awarded by contracting authorities each year to declare that they are not guilty of forced organ harvesting, when we know that there is no evidence of that horrific practice occurring in UK public sector supply chains. We believe that such a burden would be unjustified when the Bill already covers this issue.

Thirdly, the Government are already taking steps to tackle the issue of organ harvesting. We have been explicit that the overseas organ trade, or complicity with it, will not be tolerated. For example, by virtue of the Health and Care Act 2022, it is already an offence to travel outside of the UK to purchase an organ. In addition, the Government continue to monitor and review evidence relating to reports of forced organ harvesting in China, and maintain a dialogue with leading non-governmental organisations and international partners on this very important issue. This Bill creates new rules for suppliers and contracting authorities that will hopefully stay on the statute book for many decades to come.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I apologise for being slightly delayed, Mr Deputy Speaker: I did not see this debate pop up on the annunciator. I rushed to ask a question about this topic. Forgive me.

On the issue of organ harvesting, I understand the difficulties with this particular amendment, so while I am instinctively supportive of what the Lords are trying to do, I understand the Government’s arguments. However, there is a way to tighten this up. Organ harvesting is taking place in China—it is a regular occurrence—but I would not rely too much on declarations from supply chains. We have already unearthed the problem that supply chains are under no obligation to do the due diligence that would enable them to know whether companies, or the people they are trading with, have any involvement with organ harvesting. Tightening that up would be great.

On that basis, does my hon. Friend accept that we now have to make sure that China is on the enhanced tier of the foreign agents registration scheme? That would really put power in the Government’s hands to make sure that supply chains were properly checked. Will he say to our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and to all those concerned that it is time we did so? China is a genuine threat to us, industrially as well as politically.

[Alex Burghart]

My right hon. Friend is an expert on these matters. I thank him for his intervention—I have to say that I was quite surprised that he was not sitting behind me when I stood up in the first place, but I am delighted to see him in the Chamber now. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will have heard his remarks and will consider them carefully. This is obviously a procurement Bill, and we are doing our best to create the post-Brexit framework that will give us an enhanced ability to improve all aspects of procurement in our society.

In Committee and on Report in this House, we thought it was necessary to tighten up national security considerations to make sure that foreign hostile actors could not get involved in public procurement. We have—as my right hon. Friend knows, because he gave us good advice—taken steps to make sure that we remove technologies that come from those hostile actors from sensitive sites. On the broader point he made at the end of his comments, that is beyond my pay grade, but I have no doubt that those above my pay grade have heard what he has said.

This is an excellent Bill. It is a tribute to the officials who have worked on it and to my predecessors who worked on it in the Cabinet Office. I therefore urge the House to reject the amendment made by the other House and support the Government’s motion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to be here talking about Lords amendments for the second day in a row. I am glad to see the Procurement Bill making progress and getting towards becoming legislation. As the Minister has commented on a number of occasions, we have not got to the place that he wanted in relation to his conversations with the Scottish Government about the Bill. To be fair, we have also not got to the place we wanted for the Bill. Neither of us is entirely happy with the position that has been reached, but I do appreciate the work that has been done to communicate between the Governments on this. Both tried to find a compromise solution, but it was just impossible on this occasion to come to one that we were both happy with.

Specifically on the Government motion to disagree with Lords amendment 102B on forced organ harvesting, the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) has laid out a number of very important points and I do not want to go over those. The Minister has said there is an absence of evidence that there is any forced organ harvesting in any of the supply chains involved in UK procurement, and I do appreciate that that is case. However, if the Government are able to find out that there is an absence of evidence on this, surely it should not be beyond the means of those procuring or of companies supplying or buying things that are bidding for Government procurement contracts to find out that their supply chains are not involved. If the Government are able to find out these things, surely those companies should.

The point made by the hon. Member for Llanelli about raising awareness is incredibly important. We have worked very hard with companies through the changes in various Acts, including improving companies’ corporate social responsibility and requiring them to make modern slavery statements. We have worked hard to ensure that companies are taking their social responsibilities seriously, and I therefore do not think that this measure is unreasonable. It would not apply to all companies; it applies only to companies bidding for Government contracts. Surely we want companies bidding for Government contracts to ensure that they are as within the law as possible, upholding human rights and demonstrating corporate social responsibility. I do not think it is unreasonable for us to ask those companies to look into their supply chains and consider whether they are financially supporting organisations or companies that are involved in forced organ harvesting. I think it is reasonable for us to ask them to spend a little bit of time doing this if they expect to take on Government contracts.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Actually, it is simpler even than that. In America, first, it is an offence for a company to have falsified, knowingly or unknowingly, its declarations on supply chains. Secondly, the US Government use companies such as Oritain that use criminal science to test where products were made and whether declarations were correct, and they are therefore able to enforce them. What is happening is that those supply chains are now being rigorously declared by American companies that do not wish to lose Government business. It would not be too much to ask the Government to do spot checks, using such companies that are available to them, and I have recommended it to the Foreign Office, not that that really matters.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I think the right hon. Member makes a reasonable and proportionate suggestion. Although we disagree on lots of things, I am very surprised to find myself agreeing with him for the second time this week on this. I do appreciate his suggestion, and I hope those on his Front Bench are listening to the advice he has given.

I am not going to test the House’s patience by dragging this out. We will be voting with the Labour party against the Government’s motion to disagree, because we believe that the more stringent controls are something it is absolutely reasonable for us to ask of companies. This is not for all companies, as I have said, but just for those that hope to get Government contracts.

Security Update

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 11th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

Proper scrutiny is provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee. I certainly take the reports produced by the ISC very seriously—[Interruption.] I am fully aware of the membership of the Committee, to reassure Opposition Members. It is precisely because we take the recommendations so seriously that the Committee will receive a comprehensive response addressing all these points, including an update on the defending democracy taskforce.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

It is appalling news that we have a potential espionage cell operating in and around Westminster. As a sanctioned individual alongside many of my colleagues, I am particularly perturbed by the news. Notwithstanding that, this should not perhaps come as a surprise, as the ISC, chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), has warned that the Government were ill-prepared and that the necessary security measures were not available.

I ask the Secretary of State a specific question: when was the Foreign Secretary told about the investigation? Was it before he went to Beijing? If he went to Beijing with this knowledge, did he raise it with his counterpart there? It is important to know that. With respect, it is no good coming to the Dispatch Box and telling us that we do not talk about such matters; the Prime Minister did so yesterday, and the investigation is not complete. What did the Foreign Secretary do?

I say to the Secretary of State that the problem lies in the mess we have got into over whether we define China as a threat or not? If it is a threat, why do we not call it that, take the action that is necessary to deal with it on that basis, and sanction some people?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend, who is a former Cabinet Minister and current Privy Counsellor, knows full well that the Government do not provide a running commentary on updates and intelligence received by Ministers. I can assure him that the Foreign Secretary regularly raises electoral interference and interference with our democratic institutions with his Chinese opposite number. Specific cases, particularly those that are subject to an ongoing police investigation, would not, as is generally the case, be raised. On the wider principle, we have been robust and clear-eyed in addressing and raising these points with our Chinese opposite numbers.

On the action we have taken, I set out the steps that I took in respect of TikTok and Huawei, and I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend’s support for the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, which we got to a very good place. There is not just that Act, but the National Security Act 2023, the National Security and Investment Act 2021 and the deployment of the carrier fleet. All those things have happened in the past short number of years. They are evidence of the seriousness with which the Government take this threat.

Afghan Resettlement Update

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 18th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Johnny Mercer]

I thank the hon. Member for his remarks. Clearly, I do not think that I am a human shield for the Government. This is a particularly difficult issue. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), who grappled with this extraordinarily difficult and complex problem before me. I have to say to the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) that this is one of the most generous offerings that this country has ever made to resettle nationals from a foreign country in the United Kingdom. Since 2015, under consecutive Conservative Governments, we have welcomed more than half a million people on country-specific and humanitarian safe and legal routes, so I just do not recognise his portrayal of the Government’s attitude towards those who are resettling here.

We have worked with around 350 local authorities across the United Kingdom to meet the demand for housing. As of data published on 25 May, around 10,500 people have been supported into settled accommodation —around 10,000 had moved into homes, with an additional 500 matched but not yet moved. The hon. Member is right that, from the end of April, families started to receive legal notices to move. That was accompanied by £35 million-worth of new funding to enable local authorities to provide the increased support for Afghan households to move from hotels into settled accommodation.

The hon. Member had many questions for me, and I will write to him on the ones that I have missed, but the truth is that this is an incredibly complex issue that the entire nation has a duty to fulfil. We can sling political remarks across the Dispatch Box on this issue, but we need all local authorities and political leaders in this country to pull together to challenge what is a very difficult situation and to try to encourage these Afghans to move, in what is an extremely generous offer from central Government, into private rented accommodation. We all have a duty not to use these individuals as political pawns, but to provide them with a life in the UK that we can be truly proud of. If we all work together, we can achieve that.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend to the Dispatch Box. I want to ask one simple question: will no Afghans, to whom we owe a debt of gratitude and honour, be made homeless during the course of this process? I also want to ask, peculiarly, whether he has seen the remarks of our right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) in Afghanistan, in which he referred to Afghanistan as peaceful and stable, and said that we should welcome that. I saw that an Afghan woman who will remain nameless promptly wrote on his Twitter: “Shocked. Afghan women have been thrown to the wolves, and that is referred to as peace.” Does the Minister agree that it is not a very welcome statement to have made given the terrible time that those women have had and the persecutions that have taken place in Afghanistan?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. Can I just check that the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) has been informed?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I cannot find him.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Well, really it is discourteous—

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

With respect, Madam Deputy Speaker, this statement was made in Afghanistan and it was relevant to this Chamber. It has been impossible to contact my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East, but I hope, respectfully, that I have the right to reference his statement, because it has a bearing on today’s ministerial statement.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

If the right hon. Gentleman intends to refer to another Member, he should be courteous and inform them of that, even by email, which I am sure is not impossible. He is a very experienced Member of this House, and he knows that.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I will email him immediately.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the Minister.

NATO Summit

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Thursday 13th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Briefly, with regard to NATO membership, it is important that President Zelensky’s words are listened to. He said that he viewed the NATO summit as providing a meaningful success for Ukraine—for his country and its people—because significant progress was made on the path towards NATO membership. It is a question of when, not if, and as the Secretary-General said, what was a two-step process has now become a one-step process, with more political support and momentum behind Ukraine’s membership than at any time in NATO’s history. That is something that President Zelensky understands and appreciates, and over the course of the two days, it was crystal clear that there is an incredibly strong feeling among all alliance members to support Ukraine on that journey as quickly as practically possible.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I welcome the Prime Minister’s statement. I returned from Ukraine in the last few days, where I was quite close to the frontline working with a charity. The one thing that I must tell the Prime Minister is that the people of Ukraine are enormously grateful for the leadership that he and the UK have shown within NATO. They never stop telling us how much they welcome the UK’s leadership in this matter.

While I was there, the Ukrainians were very clear that in their assaults, their biggest problem is that they are losing many men trying to clear the minefields. They do not have the right equipment; in fact, at night, they go forward with bayonets trying to get to the mines—it is shocking to see. I urge the Prime Minister, if at all possible, to make it a priority to talk to the US Government and try to get them to release the right equipment that would allow the Ukrainians to make those assaults in the right way, not losing so many lives.

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my right hon. Friend for all his commitment, and indeed for his personal visits to Ukraine to see at first hand what is happening and how best we can tailor our support. He is right about the mines that have been left by the Russian armies—it is a considerable effort to have them cleared. I want to reassure him that we are in close communication with the Ukrainian military about exactly what capabilities and equipment it needs to clear minefields and support its armed forces as they make progress. We will continue to have that conversation and work with allies to get it all the kit it needs.

Procurement Bill [Lords]

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Alex Burghart]

I thank my right hon. Friend for the constructive conversations that we have had in getting ready for today’s debate. He is slightly pre-empting some remarks that I will come to later. I hope that he saw the announcement that the Government made the other day. It is in the nature of the work that we are doing that, first, we wish to remove devices and components that pose a security risk to sensitive sites—I will say more about the timescale for that later. Secondly, we intend through the use of the unit and the provisions in the Bill to prevent similar devices and components from entering our sites in future. It is a two-part process: first, get rid of what is already there and, secondly, prevent other such services from coming in in future.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

The Minister has mentioned sensitive sites. I do not quite understand what that phrase means—I am hoping that we will get a proper explanation in due course—but what I would observe is that, as far as I can see, every single Government site is by nature and definition sensitive. The Department for Work and Pensions is very sensitive because any disruption of its payments would render the UK in a terrible state. Is it not the case that all Departments of central Government are by nature sensitive sites and, therefore, should take upon themselves the reality that they must all rid themselves of these things?

--- Later in debate ---

[Florence Eshalomi]

The hon. Member is absolutely right: those SMEs will work with local councils in a local area, and they know the local area. In some cases the contracts that are outsourced are not value for money. This is about ensuring that, in public contracts, public money is spent in the right way. If we are to lower the risks faced by SMEs seeking to enter the supply chain, it is vital that the measures in the Bill have an impact.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

One of the biggest problems during the pandemic, which came out of China and became a global pandemic, was the question of everybody scraping around trying to find PPE, most of which was manufactured in China. Is it therefore part of the hon. Lady’s argument that we should have strategic manufacturing of PPE—either here or certainly in democracies that we can trust—to which we get earlier access, or will we just leave it to be produced somewhere else?

[Florence Eshalomi]

I agree with some of the amendments the right hon. Member has tabled on the issue of China and national security. Throughout the Committee stage, we argued consistently for removing risks from countries with a high national security risk, but we have concerns about the approach of naming specific countries in the Bill. It is important that we work with the whole House to get the right framework. I urge the Minister to consider our amendment 17, which is a careful mechanism for assessing the impact of the new rules that he is championing.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, national security has been an issues of extreme interest to the House. On Second Reading, we heard a tour de force from the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), on national security. In Committee, I raised multiple concerns with the Minister about the place of national security as a discretionary exclusion ground and its role in the debarment system. I am pleased that the Minister was listening to all those points, and we welcome amendment 57 and similar Government amendments, which we believe will address many of the concerns raised in Committee. I welcome the amendments originally tabled by the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton, which will establish a list of high-risk suppliers as part of the Bill. Our amendment 15 would exclude suppliers identified as a security threat from public contracts. Although that offers some benefits over alternative proposals, there is a balance, so we are not minded to press amendment 15 to a Division.

Procurement practices affect not only our services, but the many workers who rely on procurement-related roles for their jobs and livelihoods. Public money, and the jobs that will create, should not be given to those who treat their workers unfairly. Our amendment 18 would give contracting authorities the power to exclude suppliers that have significantly and repeatedly breached the rights of their staff. It would affect only those who have not taken self-cleansing measures to correct their conduct and the causes of breaches. The amendment would ensure that authorities have the right to turn away the worst offenders on workers’ rights, and would ensure that publicly funded jobs are protected jobs.

It can only be right that those seeking public contracts in the UK are transparent about where they pay their tax. The public would not expect their hard-earned money to go to those seeking not to pay into the system themselves, but a study from the Fair Tax Foundation found that, between 2014 and 2019, one in six public contracts were won by companies with links to tax havens. Our new clause 10 would mean that multinational companies bidding for large public contracts need to provide information about their tax arrangements in the UK. That would be open to the public and create greater transparency on how public money is spent. Amendment 16 would create a discretionary exclusion ground for suppliers that have violated UK sanctions or export controls, ensuring that authorities have the power to exclude from the procurement system those who continue to profit off businesses in places such as Russia. New clause 11 would require authorities to undertake a public interest test whenever deciding to outsource public services, to ensure that it truly offers value for money. Finally, new clause 14 would allow public authorities to choose not to buy goods or services from countries on the basis of their human rights records. That would give authorities the power to set clear policies, not to hand public funds to those committing atrocities around the world.

I pay tribute to members of the Committee for their engagement on this very long Bill. We have definitely shone a light on it, and had many discussions about paperclips. In particular, I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Birkenhead (Mick Whitley) and for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle), who embellished the Committee with a wealth of examples of procurement practices from their constituencies. I hope the Minister will listen to us on why additional amendments are important to strengthen the Procurement Bill in the interests of all taxpayers across the country, and I look forward to hearing from other Members.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I rise to speak to the amendment in my name and those of 26 others in the House of all parties.

The real issue here is the existence of a specific law in China that makes pretty much all companies in China, but particularly those involved in technology, a public risk in procurement to the United Kingdom. Article 7 of the People’s Republic of China national intelligence law 2017 states:

“Any organisation and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of.”

In other words, under the Chinese national intelligence law, they must completely comply with all demands and requests for information in the business they are in, and deny they have done that to any other country or authority that asks. We have had Chinese companies coming to the House and lying to Select Committees about what they are doing, all saying that they have no obligations under the national intelligence law. They do have obligations under that law and they will lie for their country as a result.

We need to start by understanding the problems, and I thank my hon. and right hon. Friends on the Front Bench for having listened to the arguments and changed the terms, first by referencing the national intelligence law, which is very important, because many Departments will play fast and loose unless what they must do is made very clear. We have been encouraging the Government, who came out with views on Hikvision, Dahua and other companies supplying surveillance equipment to the UK, knowing that they are a surveillance risk not because they are cameras in a particular fashion but because what they glean is available completely to the Chinese authorities under the national security laws.

We have heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) about the small devices—a growing threat that I have not referenced but which also gets caught by the national intelligence law. China is leading in this technology, which is one way in which it can keep track of its own people, but they are now using it more broadly. I had a suspicion and heard that the cars that my hon. Friend was referencing were Downing Street cars. There is a very good chance that the Prime Minister and others may have been tracked by the Chinese Government without our knowledge.

We must therefore remember that first and foremost China poses a significant threat to us, our interests and the way we live our lives. Until we all agree and come to those terms, we simply cannot move on; that is the key. Government Departments and the Government have dragged their feet over this because we do not want to upset the Chinese—but it takes a lot to upset the Chinese because they carry on as before. The amendment is intended to get the Government to accept that we should reference the national intelligence law because that defines all Chinese business and companies and therefore they are a threat.

There are other Chinese companies that are a problem that will not be named, and surveillance cameras are part of this. I must confess that when my brother-in-law went around an area of a farm looking at the surveillance cameras, he spotted that they were Hikvision cameras—they are not listed in the contract because the contract provider is a UK organisation, but we discovered that they are everywhere.

Once I heard the news that the Government clearly wanted Departments to get rid of those cameras, I made a set of freedom of information requests to all Departments about whether they had cameras, where they were, whether they were on their buildings, and what plans they had to get rid of them, having spotted that a lot of Departments still had them, including the Ministry of Defence. All Departments—bar I think the Wales Office, which came clean and said it did not have any or was getting rid of them—claimed that, under section 24 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, they did not have to answer because it was a security risk. The security risk is having the cameras, not answering the damned question! Excuse my language, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is all about where the cameras are and what they are doing, and that is the point of the amendment.

I hope that Ministers will take this matter forward and tell Departments to stop obfuscating. If they are asked a direct question they should tell the honest truth and explain that under the new rules under the Bill they will be getting rid of those cameras, which is absolutely critical.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point on national security, particularly the risk posed by this equipment. I credit him and others across the House who have worked to encourage the Government to move on this matter. As well as the national security issue, does he share my concern that companies such as Hikvision are involved in human rights abuses in China, for example with the Uyghur Muslims?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I did not send the hon. Lady a copy of my speech but I am glad she has jumped into this because I want to move on to that point now.

Finishing on the point I have been making, however, it is good that the Government are moving on this, but I do not think they have moved enough because I am very worried about the word “sensitive”, which the Minister is talking about. I will come back to that, but this move will begin to bring us into line with the United States, who moved on this under their Hikvision Act, which banned it back in 2019. It is worth reminding colleagues, too, that the European Union is also ahead of us on this now, because the President has said that they must do some “de-risking” on the issue of threats from China. So we are coming back into line on doing that and the west is waking up to this threat.

It is not just about all the threats that are clear under the obligations and the data China collects—it data-harvests, by the way. When the Government said that they were banning TikTok from Government telephones, I made the observation that that is not enough because people might still have TikTok on their own phones. Having run a Department for six years, I know that Ministers’ telephones sit on their desks next to their Government telephones, and therefore the Chinese will be data-harvesting on the back of that. One of my Government colleagues said that he wants to get in touch with the younger people; fat chance they are going to listen to a word they are saying. The truth is he should get rid of TikTok like the rest and be real about it. We must now make it clear that Government telephones and the telephones of Ministers should no longer have TikTok.

[Damian Green]

I am glad that my right hon. Friend has moved this amendment, which as he knows I strongly support. To return to my point about timescale, security cameras are normally replaced every five to seven years. Does he think we have five to seven years in which we can leave these cameras in place in public sector buildings, or would he like their removal to be accelerated?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The Cabinet Office must now decide the pace of this change. I hear that it is talking about six months and will come forward with a clear and explicit decision. In line with what my right hon. Friend has just said, it ought to explain the timescales for how Departments are going to take them away and how quickly, and an endpoint. That is critical, because otherwise, as I saw with the FOIs, Government Departments will do whatever they can not to do this because they are frightened and they say it will cost them extra. What really costs us is if they fail to do it.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

On telecoms, not TikTok in this instance. According to reports last week, the UK telecoms arm of CK Hutchison, 3 mobile, is merging with Vodafone. Vodafone is extensively involved in Government contracts and evidence by Unite the union published this week is basically saying that CK directors supported the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. In fact, the chair of the company, Victor Li Tzar-kuoi, is adviser to the Hong Kong Chief Executive. The right hon. Gentleman knows that John Lee, the Chief Executive, has been involved in the suppression of protests and in the arrest of trade union colleagues of mine, members of Unite. Does he share my concern that people linked to this company now are going to have access to Government contracts in the UK?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

That is not the subject of the amendment but I will touch on it briefly. I have already spoken to the unions on this and I am very much in line with their position. The Government need to look very carefully at what has taken place, particularly because it reduces competition in the market. The links to the authoritarianism of the Chinese is one of the big worries, so I suggest that the Government have a serious look at that.

Returning to the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), these cameras are also being used in internal suppression in China. We know about the suppression of the Uyghurs; that is a genocide that is taking place. Even though the Government will not say it is genocide, everybody else believes it is: Parliament here has said it; the Americans have now said it; and so, too, have many other countries. I do not know why we cannot say this is genocide, but that is a question for another debate. The fact is that many of these instruments are being used as part of that suppression in the camps as well as to watch carefully so that suppression can take place. Right now, forced labour, forced sterilisation and re-education in camps are all taking place in China.

The hon. Member for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi) referred from the Dispatch Box to the Opposition’s amendments. It is worth reminding her that China poses a risk in just about every single area with its human rights abuses and abuses of workers’ rights, yet so many of our companies want to ignore that.

While I welcome much of what the Government have done, I do not plan to move new clause 1 today, but only because I want more from the Government. I think they understand that.

I come back to the “sensitive” point. The truth is that, by definition, all Government Departments must be sensitive. As I said, I spent six years in charge of the DWP, and what I know is that there is arguably no more sensitive Department, because stopping payments for one or two days from the DWP would wreak havoc across the United Kingdom. People would not be able to get money to pay their rent, to buy their food or to live—all those things of vital importance. So a foreign power might be able to use information to target a Department such as the DWP that is not on the list because it may not appear as sensitive as the Ministry of Defence, GCHQ or—God bless us—the Foreign Office, when in reality, it is much more sensitive.

When we try to use a word like “sensitive” to give ourselves a little bit of a break, the problem becomes: who defines sensitive, and how often we will redefine it? I recommend that the Government describe all Departments as sensitive or else get rid of the word. That would put the onus on the Departments to come to the Cabinet Office to say, “We need an exemption for a period” or, “We can’t do this as fast.” The current wording means that they will not have to do that if they are outwith the term “sensitive.”

The reality is that we have had a number of Dispatch Box commitments from a load of Government Ministers about interpreting these things, but they never come to fruition. We were promised guidance in the other place on slavery during the passage of the Nationality and Borders Bill, but that was never put in. We really want the Government to commit at the Dispatch Box to changing what they are doing with “sensitive” when the Bill goes to the other place. “Sensitive” is too weak a position. It lets Departments off the hook and will put all the onus on the Cabinet Office. That must be reversed to ensure that this removal gets done.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I really appreciate the right hon. Member giving way again. Would he consider asking the Government for removal from all sites and, when they produce their timeline, to have them say, “These are our priority sites, which will be done first, but there will be removal from all sites off the back of that”? That would cover removal from all sites but allow the Government to prioritise if they cannot do things overnight.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I agree that that would be the common-sense way of doing it; I think we are all on the same page on this one.

The thing about our new clause is that, without the word “sensitive”, the position is simple. The new clause uses the same language as the Cabinet Office’s announcement in November, which recommended the removal of Chinese CCTV from sensitive sites. Now, that was the wording. Okay. But when we ask, “What has happened? How many Departments have felt under pressure to do that?”, we start to discover that they are not doing it because it is too difficult, and they want the requirement to go away. My answer is: do not use the word “sensitive” in that respect. It is about national security law, and Government Departments must either be completely defined as “sensitive”—if we want to use that word—or be bound to rid themselves of all companies obligated under the national security law. If they are unable to do that, they must make their case so that we can question that publicly and comment about what is going on.

I conclude on this simple point. The new clause is there to try to make it clear that we face a most significant and dangerous threat from the Chinese Communist party in control of China today. It is everywhere. It is using slave labour to produce polysilicon to collect solar rays. We all beat our chests proudly and proclaim that we are heading towards net zero, but on whose backs is that? It is people working in slave labour conditions to produce these things, people under surveillance, and people taken away on genocides. A Government already doing this internally are now referring it out to us. We must make it clear beyond peradventure that Government Departments must now rid themselves of equipment and never place contracts with other companies on equipment that comes under the rule of the national security law. I am looking for commitments from the Government today that, by the time the Bill gets to the other place, that will finally be resolved. If so, they will have my approval and that of many others in the Chamber.

[Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)]

I rise to speak in favour of a number of new clauses and amendments to improve transparency and accountability regarding public procurement and providing value for money for the taxpayer, including those tabled by Labour Front-Bench Members. The House will be aware that trade unions and others have long raised concerns that existing procurement policy pushes public authorities to privatise and marketise public services, including through private finance initiative contracts, which allow private consortiums to make high profits out of public assets—often far above the true value of the asset.

A particularly controversial element of procurement policy has been the use of private finance initiative regimes in NHS contracts. The evidence is clear that many of them have left NHS trusts heavily in debt owing to the need to repay private companies for capital assets, with high repayments meaning that some NHS trusts pay 12 times the initial sum borrowed, giving some investors profits of 40% to 70% in annual returns. Indeed, the poor performance of many of the private outsourcing and consulting companies brought in at significant cost to the taxpayer to provide parts of the covid-19 response stood in stark contrast to the consistently proven effectiveness of our publicly run NHS, for example, but that did not stop more and more contracts being awarded to those seeking to make money off the back of our country’s worst health crisis. Amendment 2, which would prevent VIP lanes by ensuring that any contract awarded under emergency provisions or direct awards should include transparency declarations, is therefore critical.

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[Bob Seely]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum), and I think that some of the things she said will be echoed on the Government Benches.

I want to speak, in the time I have, to new clauses 1, 13 and 16, and I will try to theme them. Before I do so, I want to thank the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), for his excellent work on the Bill. People moan about Parliament, but we have a Government bringing forward this legislation and Back-Bench MPs from across the House trying to shape it for the betterment of the nation. There is a lot of good in the Bill and I thank the Minister for listening, as he has clearly and obviously done.

I want to talk about the strategic, political and human rights ramifications of supply chain dependency. I thank the Government for their excellent work and the fact that they are moving on this. We will have a national procurement centre, which will look at high-risk firms not only from China but potentially elsewhere. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) on their really good work on this.

However, my criticism is that while the Bill is a start, the new clauses that I am speaking to would allow us to go further, and I want to explain why that is. We urgently need to understand the UK’s economic dependence on systemic threats or competitors—namely China, but not only China—and the political, economic and ethical ramifications and risks of that dependency. Not to do so is to betray our national interests. I am concerned at the lack of urgency on this issue, which has become significantly more pressing in the last five years. I thank the Government for focusing more on it, but more needs to be done. I think we are at the starting gate. The reality is that we have high levels of dependency and they are increasing, not decreasing.

Here are some facts. First, as an act of state policy, China is aiming to become less dependent on others, while encouraging others to be more dependent on it. It is decoupling from us, but making sure that we are coupled to it. The Made in China 2025 plan had the goal of raising the domestic content of China’s core components and materials to 70% by 2025. In 2020, it set a goal to become largely self-sufficient in technology by 2035. At the same time, the belt and road initiative means that China is now the largest lender to developing countries and is effectively encouraging debt dependency, which we have talked about in the past. President Xi, at the seventh session of the Chinese Communist party’s finance and economy committee, said that China must develop “killer technologies” to strengthen the

“global supply chain’s dependence on China”.

So this is not a case of, “Gosh, is this happening?” It is stated policy. We do not need to debate whether it is happening; we are being told by the leader of the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist party that it is.

China is already the largest importer to the UK and many other countries. We import more than 50% of our supplies from China in 229 categories of goods. Some 57 of those categories are in sectors critical to the UK’s national security. I therefore agree entirely with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green was saying only a few minutes ago. It is difficult to say what is strategic and what is not. In the US, it might be agricultural production. Here it might be the details of 20 million people on the DWP’s databanks. The 57 categories of goods cover communications, energy, healthcare, transport, critical manufacturing, emergency services, agriculture, Government facilities and information technology.

I do not care that we are 85% dependent on China for plastic Christmas trees—although, I do worry about the environmental impact—but I do care that we are 96% dependent on China for phenylacetic acid, which is a basic building block for many drugs; 83% dependent for TV receivers and decoders; and 68% dependent for laptops. China controls near 90% of rare earth processing, which we are now beginning to worry about. And the point about solar panels was well made.

I asked the Foreign Secretary yesterday about having an annual statement on dependency, not just on China but on states in general. He said that one was not needed. With great respect to the Foreign Secretary, I profoundly disagree. We argued during the passage of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 that we need an annual statement of dependency. New clause 13 is about establishing an understanding of the nature of our extreme dependency. I did a report with the Henry Jackson Society a couple of years ago. We found that although we are the least dependent of all the Five Eyes nations, we still have a critical dependency on China in 230 areas of our industry, manufacturing, information technology and so on.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Just to add to my hon. Friend’s list, as we move to electric vehicles we are about to make ourselves even more dependent. Even battery factories in China are turning themselves into car factories selling to the UK.

[Bob Seely]

I agree completely and I thank my right hon. Friend for that point. I would not even like that dependency on our allies. Would I like that level of dependency on the United States? No. On Australia? No. But to have that level of dependency on a Communist dictatorship that is investing massively in AI and big data to spy on their own people and increasingly on us as never before, to threaten peace in the Pacific, and to have a stated aim of dominating while freeing itself from dependency on the west, is really an extraordinarily dangerous position for us to find ourselves in.

We know that Chinese Communist party companies such as Huawei actively seek to gain a monopoly position by systematically destroying economic rivals. That is not fair trade; it is trade as a weapon for a Communist party dictatorship. It did it with Huawei, undercutting and deliberately destroying rivals on price through cheap subsidies. It is now doing the same with cellular modules, seeking to dominate and take control of the market. It does that through IP theft, economic espionage, subsidy, access to super-cheap finance, shared technology and other forms of state support.

Companies such as Quectel and Fibocom—the manufacturers of cellular modules—will, like Huawei, claim to be private. They are not. Nothing is private, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green said, in a Communist state. It was profoundly depressing for me, a couple of years ago, to hear two former senior Conservative Ministers, who should know better, say that Huawei was a private company. That is a rather more serious way of accidentally misleading the House than whether somebody ate cake or not, but that is another matter.

What are the dangers? We know that the Chinese leadership see themselves as being in competition with the west. Why? Because they tell us. A 2013 “Document No. 9” concludes that western constitutional democracy and universal values were a fundamental threat to the PRC. Of course our values are a threat to dictatorships. Our values are always a threat to communists. Earlier this year, a work report delivered to the National People’s Congress set out the belief that

“external attempts to supress and contain China are escalating”,

and the term “self-reliance” appeared multiple times. Again, the idea is to create dependency on China for us, while at the same time freeing China from dependency.

What is the worst-case scenario? Frankly, it has happened in Russia, so we should at least be alive to the idea that the worst-case scenario may be happening in the Pacific.

President Xi has told his army to be ready to re-take Taiwan by 2027. As I said, let us please stop pretending that dictators do not mean what they say, because they have a depressing habit of meaning what they say. I wish they did not; I wish they would overpromise and underdeliver, but they tend to do what they promise.

Either the UK is militarily involved or it is not. Either way, an assault on Taiwan, either by slow strangulation—a sort of Berlin scenario—or direct invasion, would profoundly alter the state of the world. We would have to put on the mother of all sanctions. The minute we do that, we will risk not only a global economic meltdown, but an economic meltdown probably worse than covid. It will strain to breaking point our relationship with the United States, the European Union and Australia—and not just our relationship but the interdependent relationships.

I am not saying that will happen—although, I think we are heading in that direction—or that we should stop trading with China; I am saying that it makes a great deal of common sense, frankly, to know what our levels of dependency are. That is why I would love the Minister to commit to at least developing an understanding of what our trade dependency is.

There is another reason to be concerned about supply chains: what is happening in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, which other Members have rightly mentioned. A 2022 UN report found serious human rights violations in the region. They seem to be about the most significant human rights abuses currently happening in the world, whether we use the “G” word or not—genocide. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps alone produces 8% of the world’s cotton. China overall produces 20% of the world’s supply of cotton. Effectively, this is a new slave trade in cotton, as shocking as that sounds. It is not happening 200 hundred years, in the 19th century, in the southern United States; it is happening now, in the early 21st century, in Chinese-controlled central Asia.

There are many other things coming out of the Xinjiang province that tell the story of using forced labour, as both Opposition and Government Members have eloquently spoken about. There is forensic technology available, which we could be using in this country, that can pinpoint the region of origin for items tainted by modern slavery, such as cotton. When it comes to new clause 60, on eradicating slavery and human trafficking in supply chains, I ask the Government to set an example by saying that we will, at the very least, commit—a good Government word—to bringing in that forensic technology within a period of time. That would enable us to understand whether western companies are using slave cotton—an incredibly horrible phrase to use in this age—in their manufactured goods.

Finally, we have spoken about Chinese surveillance technology, and I speak again in support of new clause 1. We have got to get this stuff out of the country for a start. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green says, with all the dual-use capabilities and new styles of conflict, not just in conventional military but in data domination, it is really difficult nowadays to say where security starts and finishes.

In summation, we need to understand, as a critical matter of national importance, our supply chain dependency on any country, but specifically China. I implore the Government to use the Bill, even at this late stage, to bring in a statement of dependency so that we can begin to understand and to take measures to work out not how to stop trading with China, but how to trade more safely. That way, if we need to take sanctions in future, and for the health of our relationship with that superpower, we can begin to work out how to diversify our supply chains in future and, at the same time, do something about the horrors happening in Xinjiang.

--- Later in debate ---

We should remember that the House voted unanimously to recognise the Chinese genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Although it may not have been a binding vote and the Government have yet to come round to the thinking of the vast majority of Members, it was nevertheless a vote in the House, reflecting the clear evidence provided by Sir Geoffrey Nice in the Uyghur trials about 18 months ago. There is compelling, detailed, startling but convincing evidence of what was going on then, and of what is still going on under the noses of the world. Having been trialled in places such as Tibet for decades before, these practices are being increasingly extended towards Hong Kong, where, as we see daily on our television screens, the rule of law is being increasingly snuffed out,.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. May I return him to the procurement point about what is national security and what is not? He will know, as I do, that if we go to Hong Kong we can see that HSBC, for instance, is already, in a way, in league with the authorities. The changes it is imposing include freezing the pension funds of people who are over here under British National (Overseas) passports and, at times, freezing their bank accounts. It says that it has to obey the Chinese Government. Is that not what we are saying? There is no particular definition. They are all operating, once these companies are in China, under the rule.

[Tim Loughton]

My right hon. Friend is, of course, right. He and I and others in this place who have been sanctioned in China and beyond have drawn attention to how effectively respectable global British companies are becoming complicit in the suffocation of the democratic principles, freedoms, liberties and rule of law that we all take for granted, and they need to answer for it. Are they on the side of the rule of law, of international freedoms and liberties in all the areas we have described, or have they thrown in their lot for a mess of pottage—or whatever we want to call it—with the Chinese Communist Government, notwithstanding their complete abrogation of any pretence to democratic accountability and freedoms for the individuals who not only happen to live within its borders but against whom they are increasingly able to extend their tentacles globally, not least in this country?

Hikvision and Dalua are both subject to China’s National Intelligence Law, which stipulates that

“any organisation or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according to law”.

The law also permits authorities to detain or criminally punish those who “obstruct” intelligence activities. The presence of vendors who are subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign Government which conflict with UK law may risk failure by the carrier to adequately protect networks from unauthorised access or interference.

In the UK, Uyghur people face a sustained campaign of transnational repression in the form of threats, harassment, cyberattacks, and online and in-person surveillance. LBC and the Financial Times have recently reported instances of Uyghur people seeking refuge in the UK being offered thousands of pounds a month and blackmailed by Chinese security officers to spy on Uyghur advocates. In that context, the Government must take seriously the threat posed by the presence of this equipment to British national security and the safety of exiled and dissident populations seeking refuge in the United Kingdom. Without urgent action, the UK risks facilitating a system of surveillance designed to extend Chinese domestic policy across borders.

The evidence, which is presented by reputable sources such as IVPM, Axios, The Intercept, The Guardian and the BBC, is deeply troubling. These and other reports paint a harrowing picture of the situation in Xinjiang and provide substantial evidence of Hikvision’s involvement. IVPM’s investigation reveals that Hikvision, a leading provider of surveillance technology, has actively contributed to the surveillance state in Xinjiang, where more than a million Uyghurs are estimated to be held in what we now know to be internment camps. Hikvision’s technology is reportedly used to monitor and control the Uyghur population, facilitating its repression. Worse, it is credibly accused of constructing the surveillance state in Xinjiang in close partnership with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a report corroborated by The Guardian, which published leaked documents outlining Hikvision’s close collaboration with Chinese authorities in developing and implementing surveillance technologies in Xinjiang. The evidence suggests a concerted effort by Hikvision to profit from this oppression.

Axios, in its comprehensive reporting, explains that Hikvision’s surveillance cameras are integrated with sophisticated artificial intelligence systems to track, profile and identify individuals in Xinjiang. Let me be clear: this technology is trained to recognise Uyghur-looking faces with a view to profiling them, flagging them when they are doing things of which the Chinese Government do not approve, and then facilitating their persecution through mass surveillance and control with the aim of suppressing their cultural, religious, and political freedoms.

The scale and sophistication of Hikvision’s surveillance technology exacerbate the already dire human rights situation in the region. The Intercept’s exposé provides damning evidence that Hikvision’s technology has been directly used in the internment camps, enabling the Chinese Government to monitor and suppress the Uyghur population. One source revealed that Hikvision’s cameras were installed throughout the camps, capturing every move and expression of the detainees. This raises alarming questions about the company’s complicity in the perpetration of human rights abuses that our own Government have described as

“torture…on an industrial scale”.

The evidence leaves no room for doubt. Hikvision’s involvement in the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang is deeply troubling, and, even without the security concerns so ably highlighted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, would warrant the company’s removal from our supply chains, consistent with our modern-day slavery commitments. We cannot turn a blind eye to the suffering of millions of innocent people, and help those who persecute them fill their pockets with public money.

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The Chancellor’s answer to that is growth—it is the right answer. The biggest part of the answer is probably addressing how we generate growth in the economy. His answer is, rightly, that we do it through productivity gains, which are essential. He highlights the productivity challenges in the public sector, which are relevant to this debate. He pointed out a terrible figure with which I was not familiar: the output of the public sector since the pandemic has fallen by 6%. So while the private sector has recovered its productivity, the public sector has not. That is a chronic problem. His answer is that we need to be “much, much more efficient” in the public sector.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am fascinated by the speech my hon. Friend is making, because he is right in one sense about this. We did a report at the Centre for Social Justice about four or five years ago where we looked at productivity. So often we make international comparisons, but the whole figure for productivity contains that which a country wants to put into it. For example, France does not put health or education into its productivity measures. Health and education have shocking productivity outcomes in terms of cost, which means that France is able to declare itself as having a higher level of productivity. London and the south-east have the highest productivity in Europe, but the real story is that the rest of the UK does not meet the average for the whole of the Europe, which tells us what our problem really is.

[Danny Kruger]

My right hon. Friend makes important points, and I recognise the difficulty of comparing our productivity figures with those of other countries. The comparison I am making is with our own recent history, but he is absolutely right in what he says. Indeed, the point about what is measured matters enormously. In our debates, we often make the mistake of thinking that the only things that matter are those that can be easily quantified. That is a great challenge we face, particularly in the social sector.

The Government are rightly committed to improving the efficiency and productivity of the public services—I absolutely support them on that—but we face another great challenge that does not get enough of a mention: the need to reduce demand on the system as a whole. We are spending so much not just because we are inefficient, but because the demand on the system is so high. I do not need to run through all the details of the enormous budgets we spend on social breakdowns and the consequences of social problems that we should have averted, in criminal justice, in the health budget, in what is called “social protection”. Some £150 billion is categorised under “social protection” in the public finances—not pensions, but paying for people who have tough lives. We should be seeking to reduce the cost of those budgets, because each one of those costs represents, in a sense, people in trouble. Both for financial and social reasons, we should be trying to reduce that expenditure.

How do we do that? We need social reform. I am not going to bore the House with long thoughts on that, but we need public sector reform, as has been mentioned a bit today, and that includes procurement reform. I acknowledge what Labour is suggesting in some of its amendments and in some of the speeches we have heard: an objection to the whole model of outsourcing. I recognise the objections to some of the failures of public service management—new public management—over the past generation, and some of the challenges of outsourcing and of competition in the public sector or for public services. However, I do not think insourcing everything is the answer. Reverting to a pre-1990 model of everything being delivered by the central state, as one of the amendments and Unison are championing, is not the right model. We need a better model of outsourcing that relies much more on civil society and, in particular, on the local, community-based services in which the UK is so rich and which do such a great job. We need to be able to measure their value properly and commission their services effectively. That is what this Bill aims to do.

I declare an interest, in that I set up and ran for many years projects working in prisons and with youth services. I have personal acquaintance with the challenge of EU procurement, not only social fund commissioning, but central and local government contracts. None of this is easy and I am familiar with all of that. I am familiar with the frustrations of getting on the frameworks; expressing interest; bidding through tenders; and being treated as bid candy on a long contract. I am also familiar with going through a pointless competition process where there is only one obvious provider—the one that helped to design the service—which still has to jump through loads of competitive hoops only for some other random provider to come in and swipe the contract; I speak bitterly from experience. The challenges that small social enterprises face are significant.

The difference between procurement and commissioning is not often acknowledged. We often have procurement departments doing work that is too complicated for them on their own. We need to have proper commissioning where people who are paying for a service work collaboratively with providers, stakeholders, service users and other parts of the system. Everybody needs to bring their assets, resources, skills and experience to co-design the service that is needed locally. The Bill brings us much closer to that model. I greatly welcome the measures that have been included, especially around the simplification of tendering. The single portal is an important development and it is good for transparency as well. The Tell Us Once registration is essential, as is the help that will be given to SMEs and social enterprises, including the active reduction in the barriers to tendering, lower reporting requirements and so on.

Most of all there is the shift from the most economically advantageous regime to the most advantageous regime. That small excision of the word “economically” is an important recognition of the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) was just making about the need to go beyond a purely commercial estimation of the value of social projects. I would go further. In 2020, I wrote a report for the Government who were trying to maximise and sustain the enormous contributions that communities were making during the first lockdown. I suggested that we recognise and declare that the whole of Government commissioning—the whole of public service spending—is to deliver social value for the public. Essentially, that is what we all believe and it should be stated much more explicitly in my view. I just bring the House’s attention back to the Conservative Government’s Social Value Act 2012, which gets those principles right.

I recognise that we need to take enormous steps forward. I honour what the Government have been doing around national security. I also honour the steps that have been taken to ensure greater opportunities for SMEs and social enterprises, and I commend the Bill to the House.

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[Alex Burghart]

It is a pleasure to wrap up a very interesting Report stage on this landmark piece of post-Brexit legislation that will allow our country to rewrite its procurement rules for the first time in decades.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), who had interesting reflections on the Bill. One could be forgiven for being able to listen to her remarks and not understand that the SNP has absented Scotland from the legislation. That is a great shame, and I believe that deep down she recognises the potential of the legislation. As the years go by, and small and medium-sized enterprises, and other businesses and contracting authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland benefit from the new regime, we will take pleasure in reminding businesses and contracting authorities in Scotland that it was the SNP that chose to keep Scotland out of it.

I touched on new clause 1, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), in my opening remarks. I am grateful for his saying that he will not push the new clause to a vote today. In return, I am pleased to reaffirm what I said earlier: we are happy to talk to him and other colleagues who are concerned about the definition of “sensitive”, to ensure that it captures the issues about which he is concerned. We do not consider “sensitive” to attach itself just to sites of military significance or intelligence centres controlled by the agencies. It goes further, and we will take his points away regarding ministerial movements.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

May I be clear? On the question I was asking, and have been asking, the Government have moved, particularly in reference to the national security laws of China, but my key point is that the Government should consider that all Departments fall into that category. There should not be any “B” definition. It would be far better if everybody were incorporated into that definition by the time the Bill got to the other place. Supplication would then have to be made for a variation or change, which the Cabinet Office will make a decision about. Start with the power; then let them come and ask for it to be changed. That is the way to do it.

[Alex Burghart]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments. He will have heard me say earlier that we understand his views that “sensitive” could incorporate a broader range of assets, where information gleaned on the movement of officials and politicians could be detrimental to our national security.

I reaffirm our commitment to make a statement in the House within six months of Royal Assent, setting out the timeline for the removal from sensitive sites of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China. I state again my gratitude to my right hon. Friend for his important work in this area and for the constructive dialogue that we have had with colleagues on the matter.

Amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer), introduces a new ground for the exclusion of suppliers involved in forced organ harvesting. The amendment replicates an amendment made to the Bill in the other House, and subsequently removed by Committee of this House. I reassure her that the Government are not turning a blind eye to the extraordinarily important subject that she raises and highlights consistently.

We are in full agreement that complicity in the abuses associated with the overseas organ trade must not be tolerated. The Government have taken action to address that issue on a number of fronts. The Health and Care Act 2022 prohibits commercial organ tourism. I know the hon. Lady was involved in discussions leading to those provisions being included in the Act. The Government continue to monitor and review evidence relating to reports of forced organ harvesting in China, and maintain a dialogue with leading NGOs and international partners on that very important issue. I reassure her that forced organ harvesting is already covered by the exclusion grounds for professional misconduct. These grounds cover serious breaches of all ethical and professional standards—whether mandatory or not—that apply to different industries and sectors. The mandatory grounds in relation to corporate manslaughter and human trafficking are also relevant in this context. We have sought to limit the grounds—particularly those which, like this one, require an assessment of factual circumstances by the contracting authority—to those where there is a major and particular risk to public procurement. We are not aware of any evidence that a supplier to the UK public sector has been involved in forced organ harvesting, but I want to reassure the hon. Lady that the Bill will be able to deal with this horrendous practice appropriately.