Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Bellingham Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I shall be relatively brief in introducing this group of new clauses. In moving new clause 2, which stands in my name and those of a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House and which mirrors new clauses 3, 4, 14 and 15, I want to introduce a debate about the future of corporate criminal liability in this jurisdiction. I must declare an interest, as over the past few years I have been instructed by the Serious Fraud Office in a number of cases involving the prosecution of large international companies. One of the problems that prosecutors and, no doubt, investigators have found in this jurisdiction when dealing with the modern corporate landscape—to use that hideous jargon—involves trying to fix liability on a company suspected of criminal activity, as a matter of criminal law. It is not difficult to fix criminal liability on an individual if the evidence is there: the person either did or did not do it, and they either did or did not have the necessary criminal intent.

Under current English law, however, fixing criminal liability on a corporation involves resorting to what is called the identification principle. This involves finding someone of sufficient seniority within a corporation who can act as or be described as the directing mind of the company. Through that identified person, we can then move on to fix criminal liability on the corporation. That was fine in the Victorian era, when most companies had one or two directors. An example would be a small business in a market town in the 1860s or 1870s, which would have been owned and directed by two or three men—it was always men in those days. If a fraud was committed on behalf of the company, it would have been perfectly easy to find the directing mind of that company among the small group of directors.

As the industrial revolution and corporate legal development proceeded during the late 19th century and early 20th century, however, it became clear that companies were getting bigger. An increase in international trade meant that companies based in this country had offices, and directing minds, in other parts of the world. In 1912, the United States dealt with this by doing away with the identification principle involving the directing mind and, through case law, by developing a principle in criminal law that a company could be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its employees on the basis that they were conducting criminal activities for the benefit and on behalf of the company.

We in this country reached the stage long ago at which we needed to reform the way in which we look at corporate criminal liability. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless), with his Scottish legal experience, will no doubt inform us whether the situation is the same in Scotland as it is in England, but I believe that it is uncontroversial to say that the Victorian identification principle is no longer apt to deal with international corporations. I am not picking on the company that I am about to mention because I think it has committed a criminal offence; quite the contrary—I just want to use it as an example of a large international company. British Telecommunications is a huge company that employs hundreds of thousands of people all around the globe doing various things in the telecoms world, all of them entirely legitimate and beneficial to the company, its shareholders and our national economy. Surely, however, it is a matter of common sense to say that it would be extremely difficult nowadays to fix upon an individual or small group of individuals as representing the directing mind of that company if it was suspected that an offence had been committed many miles away from the main board and the headquarters of the company in London. I repeat that I have used British Telecommunications simply as an example of a large international company with operations right around the world.

Of course it would be perfectly possible to fix upon an individual, a human being, who had committed an offence. It might well be that that individual had committed an offence for the benefit of the international corporation, but unless that person was of sufficient seniority within the hierarchy of that great big international company, it would be very difficult to fix criminal liability for that person’s offence on the corporation as well. As I have said, the United States has been getting round that problem for more than 100 years by using the principle of vicarious liability, which we are used to dealing with in this country in civil law but not in criminal law.

I believe that there are two ways in which we can approach this question, and this is the whole point of the new clauses that I and others have tabled. First, we could use the American system of vicarious liability, and there are plenty of good arguments for doing so. Secondly, we could approach the problem—as we have done in the new clauses—by using the failure to prevent regime, in which, when a company fails to prevent someone or another body associated with it from committing a specified offence, it thereby becomes liable for the criminal offence itself. We already have that provision on the statute book in section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, and it is about to be added to the statute book through the existing provisions in this Bill relating to tax offences. That follows David Cameron’s speech to the corruption summit at Lancaster House last summer.

In pushing forward these new clauses, I want to invite Parliament, in this House and the other place, and the Government—by which I mean not only the political Government but the non-political Government: the officials who run the Government day by day and advise on matters of policy—to consider whether extending the failure to prevent regime would be an easier and better way to deal with this than turning the whole thing on its head by adopting the vicarious liability principle wholesale.

There are plenty of arguments for and against the extension of the section 7 failure to prevent bribery model. I have attended a number of meetings with criminal lawyers who are far more experienced than I am. Indeed, I see one sitting just two Benches in front of me, behind the Minister. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) will know, as I have come to learn over the past few years since I have taken an interest in corporate crime, that a number of difficulties are created by the failure to prevent model. I will not rehearse them all now, but some of those difficulties were set out on Friday 13 January 2017 in the Ministry of Justice’s “Call for evidence” paper, which sets out five options for a failure to prevent regime.

I favour the failure to prevent model over the vicarious liability model because it is already set within our system. The new clauses would not extend the principle but merely extend the ambit of the criminal offences that could come within a failure to prevent system. The provisions will not be brought into this Bill because it is highly unlikely that the Government would accept any of them—albeit they may nod politely at them—when the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence process is still open. However, I hope that the Government will look carefully at the shape and design of the new clauses with a view to considering vigorously whether what we have proposed as a matter of principle is worthy of greater thought.

The intention of new clause 2 is to create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, as defined by reference to the offences listed in part 2 of schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Again, I will do my best to be brief. That schedule brought in the deferred prosecution agreement system for dealing with errant companies. I declare an interest, with both capital and small letters, in that not only have I been instructed by the SFO in two of the three deferred prosecution agreements that have so far taken place, but I brought the system into law when I was Solicitor General—at least I began it before I got the sack. There is a cloud in every silver lining, is there not?

[Sir Henry Bellingham (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

Very few in this case.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

Very few. I am diverting myself, because I deliberately said “a cloud in every silver lining” not “a silver lining in every cloud.”

The short point is that schedule 17 to the 2013 Act contains about 50 economic and financial criminal offences that can be dealt with through deferred prosecution agreements between either the Crown Prosecution Service or the SFO on the one hand and corporations—that is to say respondents and defendants that are not human beings—on the other. Those offences are perfectly capable of being moved across into the failure to prevent regime. As I said, section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 makes it an offence to fail to prevent bribery, and we are about to have an offence of failing to prevent a tax offence, so why not—I ask rhetorically on this occasion—extend the failure to prevent regime across to these other offences? New clause 3 does exactly the same, save that it limits the offences to those set out in its subsection (2).

New clauses 4, 14 and 15 contain provisions suggested by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) that broadly address the same issue that I am discussing. I will not press new clause 2 to a Division, because these are probing amendments designed to create a public discussion, and I hope that they will inform the Ministry of Justice’s discussion paper. I also hope that they will encourage the Home Office and the Minister, with whom I have had some useful discussions about this and other matters to do with the Bill, to consider carefully and positively the extension of the failure to prevent regime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Neill]

The reason was very properly and sensibly set out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield. There is a risk of a competitive disadvantage, and as I have said, we must bear in mind the situation in which Gibraltar finds itself. I suggest it would be inappropriate for it to be at a competitive disadvantage compared with other Mediterranean jurisdictions, some of which are not well disposed towards it.

Gibraltar has done a great deal, and continuing dialogue is a sensible way forward. It would not be appropriate to legislate, particularly as undermining Gibraltar’s constitution, even if it was legally possible theoretically—I suspect it would be challenged in the courts—would be most undesirable politically, because our commitment to Gibraltar must be made particularly clear as we leave the European Union.

It is worth adding that Gibraltar has taken very considerable practical steps and has been recognised internationally for doing so. It is worth simply saying that it has transposed all the necessary EU directives into its law—perfectly willingly, without any difficulty and of its own volition—and it has also complied with all OECD initiatives in this regard. It has gone beyond that to establish a central register, under the terms of the fourth anti-money laundering directive, for which the deadline is this June. It has entered into an exchange of notes to accelerate access to all UK authorities for investigative purposes. It has agreed to the EU5 proposal for the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership with participating countries, covering all EU countries, including Spain. Gibraltar has therefore been extremely willing to co-operate, even with countries that do not always behave well towards it, and that needs to be recognised. The Gibraltar Government are actively looking at the 5 July 2016 EU proposal to amend the fourth anti-money laundering directive by introducing a register, and that ought to be their decision. As I think the Minister would confirm, Her Majesty’s Government have worked very closely with Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar on this issue. A constructive dialogue is taking place, which is the right way to deal with it.

Finally, before I move on to Crown dependencies, it is worth saying that Gibraltar’s record of effectiveness in the exchange of information was recognised by the 2014 OECD “Phase 2” review, when it was ranked as largely compliant. That is actually a very high ranking, which ranks Gibraltar as being as good in terms of compliance as the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Gibraltar, therefore, is doing the job. That really needs to be stressed, so that others do not misuse the linkage, which, in Gibraltar’s case, is not borne out by the evidence: it has some 135 tax information exchange mechanisms with some 80 countries; it has already implemented the Financial Action Task Force recommendations with the United States and the United Kingdom; and it is implementing common reporting standards, the global standard, along with the UK and other countries. I therefore suggest it would be heavy-handed and inappropriate to involve Gibraltar in this approach when it is already doing so much.

I would like to touch on the Crown dependencies, as did my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield. Frankly, I think the constitutional position is more difficult because they are not, and never have been, subject to the United Kingdom. Their allegiance is purely to the British Crown, not the United Kingdom. The difficulty of attempting to legislate for them would be real and profound in constitutional terms. That is why the relationship falls under the Ministry of Justice and their legislation is signed off by the Privy Council. The new clauses that seek to bring them into the position here are not well-conceived legally in that regard. That is the key issue.

It is also worth observing, since the Justice Committee recently visited all three Crown dependencies as part of an inquiry, that they, too, are up to the highest standards of reporting and ensuring information is readily available to the authorities. It is worth saying in relation to Jersey, but it applies to them all, that a report by Moneyval, an established body of international repute, stated:

“Jersey’s combination of a central register of the UBO with a high level of vetting/evaluation not found elsewhere and regulation of TCSPs of a standard found in few other jurisdictions has been widely recognised by international organisations and individual jurisdictions as placing Jersey in a leading position in meeting standards of beneficial ownership transparency.”

Similar provisions, in different legislative forms, have also been made in the two other Crown dependencies. Again, it would be unfair, inappropriate and disproportionate to lump the Crown dependencies in with this issue.

We all share the same objective. We want to make sure there is maximum transparency and honest money in our system. For the reasons I have set out, however, I hope those who support the new clause, and other new clauses that have not yet been moved, will reflect and conclude that this is not the appropriate legislative vehicle to achieve that objective.

[Sir Henry Bellingham]

I, too, would like to say a few brief words on new clause 6. I declare an interest: I chair the all-party British Virgin Islands group and I am a former Minister with responsibility for the overseas territories.

I am well aware of the challenges in Africa. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) mentioned the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He and I will remember when Tullow Oil had its licences expropriated by the Kabila Government. It transpired that the interface company was a BVI-registered shell company in which Kabila, and part of Zuma’s family, had shares. It would have been very useful if we had been able to confirm that at the time.

I entirely accept that looking to the future and envisaging public registers across the world makes a lot of sense. What I am very worried about—this is the only point I am going to make—is that if new clause 6 is passed and territories like the BVI lose their business model, there would be a massive exodus by legal services, accountancy firms, banks and so on. They would have to then rely on tourism, and it could well be that they move back to being dependencies.

The other issue is this: would it solve the problem? No. The companies registered in the BVI, the Cayman Islands or the Turks and Caicos Islands would simply register elsewhere in countries that do not have public registers. They would go to Panama or Colombia. Indeed, I saw recently that the United States, Hong Kong and Singapore have said specifically that they will not bring in public registers until the rest of the world moves on. New clause 6 is well intentioned, but we should be very mindful of the unintended consequences.

Apart from the BVI losing its business model, those unintended consequences would include, above all else, the loss of some excellent intelligence and exchange of information arrangements. For example, the BVI has in place a beneficial ownership secured search system that enables our crime and fraud agencies to co-operate immediately and confidentially to get the information required. If these companies were registered elsewhere in the world, we would lose that crime-busting capability.