Dangerous Driving

Helen Jones Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2019 Westminster Hall

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered e-petition 236952 relating to dangerous driving.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Moon. The petition calls for life sentences for causing death by dangerous driving.

To lose a child is the worst thing that most of us could imagine. To lose a child at the age of only four, mown down by a speeding driver, is something we do not even wish to imagine. Yet that is what happened to Mr and Mrs Youens, who started the petition. To listen to their story is to step into a world of horror. To hear about parents called to a hospital knowing that something must be dreadfully wrong; to see their child grievously injured; to have to follow the ambulance transferring her to Alder Hey, unable to go into that ambulance because the doctors were still working to keep her alive; and to hear their story of lying with their daughter until she died is something I do not have the words to describe. I cannot even pretend to plumb the depths of their grief, but I do congratulate them on their courage and tenacity in wanting something good to come out of that grief. They began that process when they allowed some of Violet’s organs to be donated after her death to save other lives. Many of her organs could not be used because her injuries were so severe. Her parents have continued the process with the petition because, as they rightly say, they do not want anyone else to suffer.

Violet-Grace was with her grandmother when a car doing 83 mph in a 30 mph zone mounted the pavement. The car was stolen and had false numberplates. Violet suffered catastrophic injuries and died later. Her grandmother suffered life-changing injuries. The driver and his passenger did not even attempt to help, and they fled the scene. There is evidence that they had to step over the bodies of their victims lying in the road to get out of the car. The driver, Aidan McAteer, fled to Amsterdam to clear his head, as he said later, and smoke some weed. Clearly, he thought it was all about him. Eventually, he returned to this country and was tried and sentenced to nine years and four months. His passenger got six years and eight months. Neither showed any remorse, either at the time or later. In fact, they had their sentences increased while in jail for having illegal mobile phones and posting on social media. That does not seem much for a young life so cruelly taken and other lives destroyed in the process. As Mr and Mrs Youens said to me, the driver and his passenger will be out after serving less time than Violet-Grace lived.

The law does not cope well with such offences. It leaves families believing they have not had justice and the public looking on in amazement at what seem to be unduly lenient sentences. I met some of the families today and heard their stories. They told me that they felt they were treated as though they were the criminals. They were not allowed to show emotion in court and were sometimes told not to sit in the court. They were not allowed to read out all their victim statement in case it upset the perpetrator. They sometimes felt that they were the ones on trial. These cases are not unique. There are a lot of them, and our justice system is simply not working for these people.

I have other examples. In February this year, a driver was sentenced for causing the death of a pedestrian and catastrophic damage to a house when he was driving at twice the legal speed limit. He was a lorry driver—a professional—and he got 10 years and six months. In March, Antonio Boparan was sentenced for causing the death of Cerys Edwards. She was only 11 months old when he hit her in 2008 and she was held to have died later from complications arising from her injuries. He got 18 months, having previously served 21 months for dangerous driving. Families have told me this afternoon of seeing people cheer in court because their sentence was so light and of people who did not go to jail at all. That matters for confidence in our justice system.

It is a long time since I practised law, and I know, from being around the courts, it is very difficult to make judgments on cases unless you have heard all the evidence, but I believe that in the most serious cases we ought to have life sentences available. As Mr Youens said to me, in the wrong hands a car is a lethal weapon.

[Tracy Brabin (Batley and Spen) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend is making a passionate and moving speech, and I am pleased to see so many families here. She, like me, will have spent far too many hours in grieving families’ living rooms talking about these issues and their relatives taken away so swiftly. Does she agree that people who hire high-performance vehicles should be held liable if those vehicles that they give to others are then used in criminal acts of murder on our streets?

[Helen Jones]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. We need to do many things to reform the law. We have had numerous petitions on increasing sentences for death by dangerous driving, and on imposing lifetime bans for people convicted of dangerous driving.

I had a letter from Amy O’Connor, whose brother, Andy, was killed on his way to the gym one morning. It took 15 days to find the van and the perpetrator because the van had been hidden. By that time, it was impossible to do drug or alcohol tests, and the only thing the driver could be charged with—she understands why—was leaving the scene of an accident. She very reasonably asks why do we not increase the sentence for people leaving the scene of an accident when they have caused death or serious injury.

[Gareth Johnson (Dartford) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on her speech. Although we need a change in the law to make life sentences available for death by dangerous driving, I cannot understand why, in the worst cases of death by dangerous driving, the Crown Prosecution Service does not bring a charge of manslaughter, thereby giving the court the option of a life sentence for the worst types of offending.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Jones]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point on something that I will come to later. I understand why it is difficult for people to understand the law in this area, because we often punish the type of driving rather than the outcome. We used to have three offences—dangerous driving, careless driving and reckless driving—but the offence of dangerous driving as it was then was abolished under the Criminal Law Act 1977 because it was felt there was not sufficient distinction between dangerous driving and reckless driving. However, soon after, it appeared to people that the law was not punishing the most serious cases effectively. In fact, a review of the law by Dr Peter North in 1988 showed that many people thought that the law was not dealing with the most serious cases properly. Also, recklessness is obviously very difficult to prove, as it is subjective.

At the time, the Government were focused on dealing with drink-driving, to which I will return, because I think we can learn some lessons from it. The offence of causing death by dangerous driving was not introduced until the Road Traffic Act 1991. Even then, it was clear to many people that the law was still not being used effectively. There were widespread complaints that the Crown Prosecution Service was often charging people with the lesser offence of careless driving, because it felt that it was more likely to secure a conviction.

Attempts were made to address that, with advice to Crown prosecutors in 2007, and revised guidance in 2013 that set out some of the constituents of dangerous driving, such as excessive speed, racing, aggressive driving, ignoring traffic signs or lights, and failing to have regard for vulnerable pedestrians. Most of those elements were present in Violet-Grace’s case. There were also attempts to deal with people’s fears through changes to advice from the Sentencing Advisory Panel.

It is also fair to say that Governments of all colours tried to fill in the gaps in the law so that it operated properly. In the Road Safety Act 2006, the Labour Government introduced the offence of causing death by careless driving, and causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. In the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, the coalition Government introduced the offence of causing serious injury by careless driving. In the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the offence of causing serious injury when driving while disqualified was introduced, punishable by four years’ imprisonment and a fine. Causing serious injury through careless driving was punishable by a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment.

All those measures were welcomed by road safety campaigners and had widespread support across the House, but they still did not deal with people’s fears that the worst offences were neither being dealt with nor sentenced appropriately, even though, in 2003, the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving had been increased from 10 years to 14 years. That matters because if the law is to work effectively people have to have confidence in it. It has to do three things: protect the innocent, punish the guilty and deter further offences. There was a widespread belief that that was not happening.

That belief was why, after a consultation, the current Government announced in October 2017 that they would increase the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to life. At the time, the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), who was then a Justice Minister, said that the decision had been taken to reflect

“the seriousness of the worst cases, the anguish of the victims’ families, and maximum penalties for other serious offences such as manslaughter”.

He said that the change would be introduced when parliamentary time allowed. The same thing was said in answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins), who has also campaigned on this issue.

I must ask the Minister, why the delay? Everyone in Parliament knows that when we are not debating Brexit we have very little business. The proposed change could be dealt with swiftly, almost in a one-clause Bill. It would receive widespread support across the House and the support of the general public. I know that the Government want to deal with other issues, but why wait for a big Bill when we could get on and do this now? Surely we do not need to wait for someone else—God forbid, another child—to be killed before we act.

I would go further. In the Violet-Grace case, the car was stolen, which was clear evidence of criminal intent, and it had false numberplates, went through two red lights and was doing 83 mph. The driver had previous criminal convictions for burglary and failing to comply with a court order. He should have been charged with manslaughter—something the hon. Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson) mentioned. This was a criminal act by a known criminal, with a complete disregard for other people’s lives. However, that is not what the petition asks for; it asks simply for life sentences to be made available for the offence.

The petition also asks for a minimum tariff of 15 years, which I think is a little more problematic. Generally, our law does not set minimum sentences; it sets maximum sentences and leaves it to the trial judge, who has heard all the evidence, to set the tariff. Clearly, if we went down that road there would have to be changes to the sentencing guidelines to reflect that. My fear about setting a minimum tariff is that it might have the opposite effect to what is intended: it might make juries more reluctant to convict in some cases, and lead to the situation that we have seen before of people being charged with careless driving instead of dangerous driving.

The same, or at least a similar, problem comes with calling for consecutive sentences. Normally in our law, sentences are served concurrently for convictions arising from the same incident, and consecutively if they arise from different incidents. I understand entirely why families want consecutive sentencing for offences when someone has been killed and someone else has been seriously injured, but my fear is that the tariffs set would be lower. Therefore, those proposing the change would not necessarily achieve what they want. However, that could be looked at and considered.

It is clear that we should get on with increasing the maximum sentence, but that by itself is not enough. I referred to how we tackled drink-driving in this country. We did two things: we not only brought in the breathalyser and ensured that serious sentences were available, but did a public education campaign that, in the end, changed people’s attitudes. It used to be quite socially acceptable to knock back a load of pints and get behind the wheel of a car. It no longer is. I am not saying that that does not happen, but it is no longer socially acceptable.

We need to do those two things. Mr and Mrs Youens are already doing their part by speaking at speed awareness courses to alert drivers to the damage that they can do. We need to do our part as politicians and introduce a proper public education campaign, because the aim in the end is surely not to have lots of people serving life sentences; it is to deter them from committing the offence in the first place and to save people’s lives. Will the Government please now get on with that?

I know that the Government are looking to include other provisions in a road safety Bill, dealing with such things as cycling. Those measures are worthy in themselves, but they are delaying action on something that many of us believe needs action now. The Government would have the support of the public and widespread support among all parties in the House, and such action would rebuild confidence in the law and recognise the campaigning of bereaved families. Most importantly, it might save lives—and surely saving even one life makes this worth doing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Jones]

I thank all those who have spoken in the debate. They have raised a number of issues about road safety, changing the culture and the treatment of victims. However, there is one thing on which we all agree, and that is the need to increase the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving to life. The Minister says that he cannot give us a timetable for that at the moment, and he wants us—rightly—to work together on getting it through, but I say to him that it is the Government who have to introduce a Bill. This is in the Government’s hands. If they introduced a short Bill simply to raise the maximum sentence, it could go through the House in a day, I am convinced. If the Government tried to include in it other things or, heaven forbid, to make it what the Clerks call a Christmas tree Bill—one on which the Government could hang anything—there would clearly be amendments tabled to it.

I urge the Minister to show the relatives of victims not words, but action. Bring forward the Bill and bring it forward soon, and it will have a clear, unimpeded passage through the House, I am certain. That is what people want to hear from him; that is what needs to be done. If he has been given no timescale for this, he needs to go and have a word with the Government’s business managers and get a timetable. We can all agree that that needs to be done and it needs to be done swiftly. That is no less than the relatives of victims deserve and no more than most people in today’s debate have asked for. For heaven’s sake, let us just get on and do it.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered e-petition 236952 relating to dangerous driving.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 4th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. I pay tribute to the work of his Committee. We have seen welcome increases in the number of prison officers, and that will help with stability. Retention rates are very important. I will certainly study very carefully the recommendations of his Committee, and work with him and other Members to make sure that we achieve our common goal.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

Prison officers do a very difficult job on behalf of the community, but the loss of thousands of staff, leading to the highest-ever number of assaults in prisons last year, has put them under enormous stress. Does the Minister accept that warm words are not good enough in this situation and there needs to be a serious increase in the number of prison staff to alleviate the pressure on officers?

[Robert Buckland]

I am pleased to inform the hon. Lady that there has indeed been a significant increase in the number of prison staff. We are now up to over 4,500 extra prison staff from the low point. I take her point that with increasing staff, more constructive work can be done with prisoners. The key worker scheme that we have now rolled out in the majority of adult male closed prisons, where prison officers work with six named prisoners, is already yielding results and making prisons safer places. I very much take on board the point she makes about assaults.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 13th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart]

This point is central. We need to make sure that prisoners are appropriately challenged and punished, particularly if they assault prison officers. Far too many prison officers who are protecting us —protecting the public—are being assaulted. We are therefore piloting in HMP Isis in London a system whereby the Metropolitan police is putting officers into prisons to follow up and increase the chance of prosecution. That is also why we pay tribute to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who has worked with us to double the maximum sentence for assaults on prison officers, and that comes into effect today.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

The Minister would not need to be talking about training for new officers had the Government not got rid of 7,000 experienced prison officers to start with. Does he now accept that that was a massive mistake and has contributed to disorder, the rising drug use and assaults on prison staff within our prisons?

[Rory Stewart]

To agree with the hon. Lady to some extent, clearly the fact that we are recruiting 2,500 more officers reflects the fact that we think we need 2,500 more officers. Looking forward, the key is to make sure that people are supported both in college and on the landings to have the skill and experience they need. The challenge now is not numbers, but training and the estate.

Suicide: Coroners’ Courts

Helen Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 5th September 2018 Westminster Hall

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to be here under your chairmanship, Sir David, for this short debate on the standard of proof for a conclusion of suicide in the coroners’ courts. To say that any suicide is a tragedy is to state the obvious. It is a tragedy for the person concerned, who could see no way out other than to take their own life; it is a tragedy for their family and friends, left with an intolerable burden to carry; but it is also a tragedy for us as a society, because we have failed to offer them another way out and failed to support them through their illness.

Suicide is an increasing problem for us. The rates are now highest among middle-aged men and have gone up by 40% in 10 years. It is also the biggest killer of young people between 15 and 34. It is a real public health emergency, yet we are often prevented from openly discussing suicide by the stigma that surrounds it. Nowhere is that stigma more obvious than in a coroner’s court. Suicide ceased to be a crime in 1961, yet until very recently the courts held consistently that the standard of proof for a conclusion of suicide had to be the criminal one of “beyond all reasonable doubt”. In effect, the state, having decided that suicide is not a crime, still treats people in a coroner’s court as if it were. That is something we should alter.

It is settled in English law that there are two standards of proof—the civil and the criminal—but a coroner’s court is not a criminal trial. It is not even litigation. It is, as Lord Chief Justice Lane said,

“a fact finding exercise and not a method of apportioning guilt.”

A coroner’s duty is to investigate someone’s death and to find out and record the facts in the public interest. That public interest duty is important, and I will return to it later.

An inquest can find that someone died in a number of ways or it can record an open verdict, but its decision is not conclusive in any subsequent litigation. The rules of procedure prohibit a coroner’s court from any finding of fact that may seem to determine criminal liability. The coroner’s court no longer has a connection with a criminal court. It used to have, and could name a person who was thought responsible for a homicide, which committed them to trial, but that power was abolished in 1977. Why, when suicide is no longer a crime and when the courts no longer have that power, do we still stick to the criminal standard of proof?

The Minister will probably be relieved to hear that I do not have time today to go through all the cases that have led us to the current position, but it is important to note that it has come about through case law; it is not in statute or in the coroner’s rules of procedure. Many of those cases were decided some time ago, when attitudes to suicide were very different from what they are today. Many of them resulted from people challenging a coroner’s verdict on suicide. That was understandable prior to 1961, when suicide was a crime and when a conclusion, or verdict as it was then, of suicide could have significant financial implications for those left behind. For instance, insurance companies often did not pay out when there was a suicide verdict. That is no longer the case, yet we continue on that road.

The situation was probably set out most clearly in the case of R v. Her Majesty’s Coroner for Dyfed, ex parte Evans, where Lord Justice Watkins held that a coroner’s jury could not return a verdict of suicide based on the balance of probabilities; it is only permissible for a coroner’s jury to return a verdict of suicide if they find, upon evidence proved to their satisfaction, that the deceased intended to, and in fact did, take their own life. That is a very high threshold to meet.

Other cases that have contributed were not in fact about suicide, but about unlawful killing. In the famous one, ex parte Gray, Lord Justice Watkins, again, referred to an earlier case, ex parte Barber, which he said had held that a verdict of suicide was only permissible if proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Other cases established that the presumption ought always to be against a conclusion of suicide, and that intent was crucial. That was understandable when suicide was a crime—every first year law student knows that to prove a crime, both the mens rea and the actus reas must be proven—but it is not understandable when it is not a crime, and many of the key cases on intent were decided many years ago, when attitudes were very different and suicide was a criminal office—for instance, the case of Southall v. Cheshire County News Company Ltd was decided in 1912, and that of ex parte Lockley was decided in 1944. None the less, they still haunt us today.

This is a real problem that still has an impact on many cases. In the case I referred to earlier, ex parte Evans, and in a similar one, R (Jenkins) v. Her Majesty’s Coroner for Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys, the challenges to the coroner were all based on intent. Family and friends gave evidence that the deceased were in a positive frame of mind prior to their deaths. That puts us in a position where we are returning conclusions that go against the facts. What we know about suicide now is that when someone has decided to take their own life, they often seem in a calmer and better frame of mind because of that decision. In those two cases, where people tragically threw themselves in front of trains, the facts of the case were very clear—those individuals intended to end their own life. We end up with conclusions that go against the known facts.

It seems to me that the current position is also legally unsupportable. We are basing our approach on cases decided a long time ago, when suicide was a criminal offence, and on some cases that did not even involve suicide at all. Other cases in the coroner’s court are decided on the balance of probabilities. In civil litigation, a court can decide based on the balance of probabilities, even when criminal facts are involved—for instance where someone seeks compensation for a fraud, or where people sue for compensation, perhaps following a rape or the murder of a family member, we decide on the civil balance of probabilities measure.

Given this situation, it is not surprising that there are other common law jurisdictions that have refused to follow these precedents. In Canada, for example, where the coroners’ court system is closely modelled on our system, the Supreme Court decided that suicide should be decided in the coroner’s court on the balance of probabilities. Until recently, we have had all these decisions in English courts that have gone the other way. That only changed recently, in a case, R (Maughan) vs. Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire, that is now subject to appeal—I have therefore had to take advice from our omniscient and helpful Clerks about what I might say about it—concerning a narrative verdict and the instructions to a coroner’s jury. The judges held in that case—subject, of course, to appeal—that it is no longer tenable to use the criminal standard of proof given that there was no connection with the criminal courts, and that cases, whether they involve a narrative or a short-form verdict, should be decided on the balance of probabilities.

It remains to be seen what happens in that appeal. The judgment may, of course, be overturned, but I believe it is time for the Government to end this situation and legislate to make clear that the civil standard of proof should be used in a coroner’s court for cases involving suicide. I believe that for a number of reasons. First, by continuing to use the criminal standard of proof, we are in fact maintaining the stigma around suicide, which prevents us from discussing it openly and dealing with it effectively. In the past, Ministers have argued that that is not the case, but Professor Louis Appleby, who knows something about this issue, told the Health Committee during its inquiry in the previous Parliament:

“There is a principle here, which is that that standard of proof is a reflection of a system that is full of prejudice and stigma, which we ought to dismantle.”

The second reason is that, in the current system, we may be hugely underestimating the number of suicides we are dealing with. Academics who have looked at this matter, such as Professor Pritchard at Bournemouth, have concluded that we may be underestimating by between 30% and 50%. The first step in dealing with the problem is to know how widespread it is. Currently, we do not know that properly. In the past, some Ministers have been concerned about making changes that may offend faith groups. As a born and bred believing Catholic, I say gently to the Minister that that is not the duty of the state. The duty of the state is to find out the facts, as was said in the recent case, without fear or favour. The view that any faith group takes of suicide is a matter for them, not for the Government.

The third, and understandable, reason is that coroners are often reluctant to reach a conclusion of suicide because they fear the upset it would cause to the family. I understand that. I have nothing but sympathy for families left to deal with the after-effects of a suicide. In fact, I think we should offer them more support than we currently do, but again that is not the courts’ role. The public interest in knowing how many suicides we are dealing with and how they are occurring overrides that concern. In the end, if we are not able to discuss suicide openly and if people are prevented from being honest about their suicidal thoughts and seeking help because of the stigma that attaches to it, we cannot design services effectively and we may lose the chance to save lives. That, to me, is far more important.

This is not a party political matter—the current position has prevailed under Ministers of different political parties—but it is time to get hold of the anomaly and deal with it. If the Minister did that, he would have widespread support from the National Suicide Prevention Alliance, from PAPYRUS, which works to prevent young suicide and is based in Warrington—it gave me a great deal of help in preparing for this debate—and from the Health Committee, which recommended this change in its report on suicide prevention in the previous Parliament. He would also have the support of the former Chief Coroner, Peter Thornton, who wrote to the chair of PAPYRUS in 2013:

“I am supportive of the change which would reduce the standard of proof for suicide to the civil standard and have expressed that view to the Ministry of Justice.”

He would also have support across the House.

In the end, this matter is too important to leave to the lawyers and the courts. It is a major public health issue, which we need to tackle. Unless we get it right, we will not be tackling it effectively. We will lose the chance to prevent more deaths in the future, and we will be culpable for that. Some things in politics are not easy, but they are nevertheless right. I strongly urge the Minister, who has seen coroners’ courts operating and is concerned about this issue, to do the right thing and make this change for the benefit of many individuals and their families in the future.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Edward Argar)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Warrington North (Helen Jones) on securing this debate on such an important, complex and sensitive issue. I am grateful for her passionate and thoughtful views. Her erudite speech highlighted, if my recollection is correct, not only her distinguished time as a parliamentarian but her previous career as a distinguished solicitor, as was evident from her careful and clever deployment of her legal knowledge.

Coroners’ courts are the oldest part of the judicial system in England and Wales, but they have not stood still; they have continued to evolve their processes. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 set out a comprehensive suite of reforms to coroner law and practice, which was implemented in July 2013. The dedication and commitment of the Chief Coroner, His Honour Judge Mark Lucraft QC, and that of his predecessor, whom the hon. Lady mentioned, both in working towards continued improvement and in providing leadership, guidance and support to coroners, is second to none, and I am grateful to them both for their service.

In 2017, almost 230,000 registered deaths in England and Wales were reported to coroners—43% of the total number of deaths—and inquests were opened into 31,500 deaths by the 88 coroners’ areas across England and Wales. As the hon. Lady said, by definition bereaved families engage with coroners at an extremely difficult and stressful time in their lives. I believe that the coroner service does a wonderful job of working to ensure that its engagement is as respectful and caring as possible.

As the hon. Lady alluded to, I had first-hand experience of that when I recently had the privilege of visiting the Westminster coroner’s court to open a garden of remembrance—a personal initiative taken forward by the excellent Inner West London senior coroner, Dr Fiona Wilcox. I was also able to observe an inquest into a suicide, and I saw for myself how deftly and sensitively Dr Wilcox handled the legal process, alongside sensitively handling a bereaved family and their feelings. I pay tribute to her and all her coroner colleagues for their dedication and professionalism, often in very difficult circumstances. It is a service of which we can be proud.

As the hon. Lady said, put simply an inquest is a court hearing held by the coroner to establish who died and how, and when and where the death occurred, but it differs from other types of court hearing because it is inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, and does not establish criminal or civil responsibility, as she said, deploying her legal knowledge. At the end of the inquest the coroner—or jury, where there is one—reaches a conclusion. Historically, the standard of proof for a conclusion of suicide has been established by case law, as the hon. Lady said. Although suicide was decriminalised in 1961, case law continued to apply the criminal standard—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—as opposed to the lower civil standard.

To go to the crux of the debate, as the hon. Lady said, there have been calls for the Government to address that situation, not least by campaigning organisations such as PAPYRUS, which she mentioned and which campaigns energetically not only on this issue but on the broader one of preventing suicide among young people. As she said, the Health Committee recommended lowering the standard of proof for suicide in the reports of its suicide prevention inquiry, published in December 2016 and March 2017. The Government made it clear in their July 2017 response that they had been considering whether to make such a change. Recently, however, the matter has moved on as a result of evolving case law, with the judgment handed down by the High Court on 26 July in the case of R (Maughan) v. Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire. Before continuing, I put on record my sincere condolences to the family of James Maughan on the sad loss of their loved one in difficult circumstances.

In brief, the case, which has been alluded to, was a judicial review of the jury inquest held into Mr Maughan’s death. The senior coroner invited the jury to record a narrative conclusion, rather than a short-form conclusion of suicide, which he directed should be determined on the civil standard of proof. The judicial review claim was made by the bereaved family on the basis that the jury’s conclusion was unlawful because it amounted to a conclusion of suicide reached on the balance of probabilities, rather than on the criminal test of beyond reasonable doubt.

That judicial review claim was dismissed by the High Court on the basis that previous case law applying the criminal standard of proof was incorrect and that the correct position in the opinion of the court was the application of the civil standard. However, the High Court gave the bereaved family leave to appeal the judgment, which they have now done. A date has not yet been confirmed for the Court of Appeal hearing of the case. Pending that hearing, I hope that the House understands that it would not be appropriate for me to discuss the judgment of the High Court, other than the factual account that I have just put on the record, the forthcoming appeal, or any issues relating to or arising directly from either one, because that might impact on the case.

[Helen Jones]

I realise that the Minister cannot comment on the case, but may I ask whether he has had discussions with his colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care about the impact of the existing situation on any assessment of the number of suicides and the design of services to meet them?

[Edward Argar]

Such issues of suicide prevention are discussed regularly with the Department of Health and Social Care. I am about to come on to suicide prevention and the broader point that the hon. Lady made, in particular about understanding the scale of the issue. If she allows me one more paragraph, I shall come on to exactly that.

I appreciate that the point I made about being slightly limited in what I can say given the legal context will disappoint the hon. Lady. I hasten to add that my intention is never to disappoint her—

[Helen Jones]

I am frequently disappointed.

[Edward Argar]

I hope not by me—yet. I can only assure the hon. Lady that I have of course noted the points that she and other hon. Members have made today and in the past. I will consider them very seriously, along with the Court of Appeal ruling when judgment is handed down in that case. I shall respond as appropriate at that point. Clearly, however, while the case is being heard I shall stray no further.

To come on to the hon. Lady’s wider point, I shall touch on the broader issues underlying the debate: the importance of preventing suicide, tackling potential contributing factors and understanding what it is that drives suicide in some cases. As she said, a verdict of suicide in a coroner’s court of course means that a tragedy has already occurred, and every death by suicide is a tragedy with a devastating effect on families and communities. That is why the Government updated the national suicide prevention strategy last year—to strengthen the delivery of its key areas for action, such as expanding the strategy’s scope to include addressing self-harm as an issue in its own right.

I am encouraged that data published by the Office for National Statistics this week show that in 2017 the suicide rate in England reduced for the third consecutive year. The rate is now at its lowest for seven years, which brings us closer to achieving the national ambition to reduce suicide by 10% by 2020.

[Helen Jones]

As the Minister knows, evidence given to the Health Committee stated that apparent reductions in suicide are often linked to changes of practice in the coroners’ courts. Will he therefore look seriously at what the Health Committee recommended on coroners being given more training in how to construct their narrative verdicts, and on giving the Chief Coroner more resources to ensure similar practice across all the courts?

[Edward Argar]

I am happy to look into both those matters. My understanding is that the suicide registration statistics, which are used to calculate the suicide rate, already include deaths by undetermined intent, where a suicide conclusion was not reached but where it is likely that the death was caused by suicide. There is a slight difference in the calculation of the rate, but I shall look into the points that the hon. Lady made.

I am encouraged that the suicide rate among men—the highest-risk group, as the hon. Lady said—reduced for the fourth consecutive year. That is of course a reason to do even more, because every suicide is a tragedy, and we must seek to do everything we can to prevent any suicide if at all possible.

To address suicide prevention in mental health settings, this year, the previous Health and Social Care Secretary launched a zero-suicide ambition across the NHS, starting with mental health in-patients but seeking to include all mental health patients. My opposite number in Health, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Jackie Doyle-Price), has a personal commitment to that agenda. She is working extremely hard to ensure that the record levels of spending on mental health by the Government continue to drive improvement.

Clearly, suicide prevention must be a key Government priority. The hon. Member for Warrington North is absolutely right to highlight the fact that the issue is not a partisan or party political one; it is about doing what is right and improving the situation for everyone. I thank her for securing the opportunity to focus on such an important issue in the specific context of the operation of the coroners’ courts and system.

The recent High Court judgment has thrown a spotlight on a particular aspect of the national debate around the complex and sensitive network of issues involving suicide. I may not have been able to go into the level of detail that the hon. Lady might have wished, but I hope that I can offer some reassurance with my commitment: we await the decision by the Court of Appeal with keen interest, we will consider it carefully, and we will continue to reflect on the particular issue that she has highlighted so eloquently. Furthermore, should she so wish, I am happy to meet her to discuss it further.

Question put and agreed to.

Worboys Case and the Parole Board

Helen Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 28th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

I will, as always, look very closely at the excellent recommendations of the Justice Committee.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

The Court said that the wider context of Worboys’ offending was not taken into account by the Parole Board. When the Secretary of State draws up his new rules, will he ensure that they take into account the perpetrator’s actions after he has been in prison? In Worboys’ case, he continued to appeal against his sentence, refused to admit liability in a civil case and finally admitted his guilt only nine months before his first Parole Board hearing, thus ensuring that he piled further agony on to his victims. Although Parole Board decisions should not be decided on the basis of campaigns, does he accept that it is the duty of the House to ensure that justice is seen to be done? It certainly was not done in this case.

[Mr Gauke]

I accept that hon. Members are perfectly entitled—indeed, it is our responsibility—to make many of these points. When it comes to the assessment of risk—is someone safe to be released?—that is the job of the Parole Board in these circumstances. Somebody’s behaviour after they are imprisoned is clearly relevant, and such a consideration should be taken into account.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart]

Yes. We have empowered governors by having in place a new procurement contract, which means that we in the Ministry are going to do the central procurement bureaucracy, but the governors will be able to choose who they use to train and educate the prisoners. I saw a good example in Altcourse Prison in Liverpool of how governors are also going to be able to choose which companies to pair with. The excellent work on metal welding that I saw in Altcourse will really contribute to those prisoners getting jobs in the community.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that whatever plans he comes up with will require there to be enough prison officers on the estate so that they can release prisoners from their cells and take them to education and training classes? Does he now accept that the Government’s dash to reduce the number of prison officers has seriously hampered the chances of preventing prisoners from reoffending?

[Rory Stewart]

Among the many challenges that face education in prisons is the issue of numbers, which is why we have now committed to having 2,500 more prison officers on the estate, and we are delivering that ahead of target. That will allow us to have in place the key-worker programmes, in which each officer will be paired with six prisoners to guide them through the process.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to be encouraging more alternative dispute resolution, and I think that there is agreement on both sides of the House that we should incentivise cases being settled and not going through the courts, because of the cost and the trauma for those involved. The LASPO review provides an opportunity to look at all of this in the round, but I do not think that the answer will be exclusively about money; it will also be about the positive incentives that we put in place.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

It is estimated that providing early legal help in family court cases would cost less than £14 million because, as the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) has just said, many cases would be resolved before getting to court. Why does the Minister continue to insist that this is not a cost-effective way of dealing with cases? Does he actually know how many cases are proceeding with litigants in person, and how much that is costing the courts system?

[Dominic Raab]

There is a range of support for early legal help, as I have already detailed—£100 million of support—and that can be online or telephone support, but also representation. Since 2015 we have invested £5 million in the litigants in person strategy. There is a range of support available, but of course we can review this in the round through the review.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 31st October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I thank the Chair of the Select Committee. That is, of course, why we have taken through the Data Protection Bill. We have extradition relations—very vigorous ones—with countries all around the world, and we see no reason why we would not continue to do so with our EU friends and allies.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

Given that it took countries such as Iceland and Norway 13 years to negotiate extradition arrangements with the EU, does the Minister accept that not maintaining the European arrest warrant puts people in this country at risk of seeing criminals go free and that those criminals may well include terrorist suspects?

[Dominic Raab]

No, because we are not in the position of Iceland. We start from the position of the European arrest warrant, with strong, intensive co-operation on extradition, and we will make sure we continue that operationally for many years to come.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 5th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I am happy to join my hon. Friend in his salute to Lord Thomas, who has been a formidable and exemplary leader of the professional judiciary. What has struck me in the short time that I have held my office is the enormous respect and affection in which Lord Thomas is held by his colleagues on the judicial bench. I am sure the entire House will want to wish him all the best.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

In the last Parliament, a joint report of the Petitions Committee and the Women and Equalities Committee found widespread exploitation of women at work, and especially of young women in vulnerable employment. Now that the barrier of fees has been removed, will the Minister look seriously at the report’s recommendations and work with other Departments to ensure that women are aware of their access to justice?

[Dominic Raab]

As I explained earlier, we will take into account all the recommendations and findings of the Select Committee report as we chart the way forward.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)]

12. What steps her Department is taking to improve safety in prisons.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

16. What steps her Department is taking to improve safety in prisons.

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Elizabeth Truss)]

Last week’s violence statistics show the very serious issues we have in our prisons, including a 43% rise in the number of attacks on officers. This is unacceptable, and I am determined to tackle it. I have already announced an investment of £14 million in 10 of our most challenging prisons, and I shall say more with the launch of our White Paper shortly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Elizabeth Truss]

The incident at HMP Lewes has been resolved and the prison remains secure with no threat to the public. The prisons Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for East Surrey (Mr Gyimah), spoke to the governor, Jim Bourke, offering support for him and all his staff. We are going to make sure that we have sufficient staff in that prison. I shall have more to say about staffing when we launch the White Paper.

[Helen Jones]

The number of front-line prison officers has fallen by over 30% under this Government, and the Secretary of State’s own Department’s statistics show a correlation between those cuts and increased levels of violence in prisons. Does the right hon. Lady now accept that what she has announced goes no way towards solving these problems and that there needs to be a thorough investigation so that we can have the safe levels of staffing required in our prisons?

[Elizabeth Truss]

I have acknowledged that we have a serious issue. I think we have to recognise that there have been a number of causes. The prison and probation ombudsman said that the emergence of dangerous psychoactive substances was a game changer for prison security. We are taking measures to put in place proper testing for that, which we announced in September. I acknowledge that there is an issue with staffing, which is why I have already taken steps in 10 of the most challenging prisons to increase staffing levels, and why we are due to do more in the White Paper.