Oral Answers to Questions

Graeme Morrice Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

A nuclear war would be a tremendous danger to the planet. That is why it is better to deter it.

[Graeme Morrice (Livingston) (Lab)]

5. What plans he has to consider delivery of UK defence capability through conventional rather than nuclear weapons as part of the 2015 strategic defence and security review.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon)]

The next strategic defence and security review is a matter for after the general election. My Department is preparing for the review, but our focus remains the delivery of the 2010 review.

[Graeme Morrice]

In a period of changing security threat, and as the national security strategy noted in 2010, is it not sensible to consider how ending the Trident replacement programme would release resources that could be spent more effectively on other security measures, as well as on a range of other public spending priorities, not least our national health service?

[Michael Fallon]

Successive Governments, Labour and Conservative, have been committed to our continuous at-sea deterrent for more than 45 years, and I hope that the Labour party in Scotland will not waiver from that. It would be extremely dangerous to move to any kind of part-time or lesser deterrent, and the Conservative party will not gamble with Britain’s national security.

HMS Concord (Yangtze River Incident)

Graeme Morrice Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Westminster Hall

[Graeme Morrice (Livingston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Dorries. I am delighted to have secured this debate on what is an important topic to many people, and I hope that during the short time available we can provide some insight into the truth that the past 64 years have failed to reveal.

I would like to take right hon. and hon. Members back in time to 1949, to the Yangtze river of China during the Chinese civil war, and an historic event that has taken on the name “the Yangtze incident.” The event happened at a time when Great Britain was at peace, but it took us to the brink of a third world war. Much has been written about the incident, including a book that was made into a film, with Richard Todd in the starring role. Neither the book nor the film, however, comes anywhere near the truth of the story that is yet to be told.

This is not a story about one ship, the Royal Navy frigate HMS Amethyst, and her daring escape after three months’ incarceration by communist forces on the Yangtze river. It is the untold story of HMS Concord, a C-class destroyer that Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, Admiral Sir E. J. Patrick Brind deployed into China’s Yangtze river as part of his endeavour to bring about the escape of HMS Amethyst.

I will first explain the position with regard to the civil war in China. Government policy at the time was governed by the Moscow declaration of December 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union declared a policy of non-intervention in China’s internal affairs. The known facts are that China was split into two warring parties, the Communist People’s Liberation Army, led by Mao Tse-tung, and the nationalist army, under the Kuomintang. As the Chinese civil war raged on, the communists began to make headway on the shores of the Yangtze river near the city of Nanking, and warned that any foreign ships in the river would be attacked. Right hon. and hon. Members might wonder what the importance of that is, and the answer is simple: it endorses the fact that the Yangtze river was a known war zone.

I said at the outset that I would like to take us back in time. The date was 20 April 1949. A British warship, HMS Concord, was stationed at Nanking, to act as guard ship to the British embassy and to evacuate staff and other British nationals if necessary. She had been there for some time, and her relief was long overdue and her stores depleted. The relief ship was His Majesty’s Australian Ship, Shoalhaven, which was at Shanghai and should have relieved HMS Concord on 16 April. The relief did not take place; the Shoalhaven was stood down.

HMS Amethyst, en route to Nanking up the river Yangtze to relieve the guard ship HMS Concord, came under heavy fire from the north bank. At nearby Rose island she ran aground, was severely damaged and suffered heavy casualties, with more than 50 members of the crew killed, dying or seriously injured. The captain was mortally wounded and the first lieutenant, though wounded, took command. The communists continued to fire at Amethyst and, to save further loss of life, about 60 lightly wounded and uninjured crew members were evacuated ashore, but further evacuation stopped when those in the water came under fire. Those put ashore eventually arrived in Shanghai and were treated in hospital.

At this juncture, it should also be remembered that before all of that two other ships, the frigate HMS Black Swan and the cruiser HMS London, were involved, along with HMS Concord, in an attempt to assist Amethyst’s escape. Due to the narrowness of the Yangtze river, none of the ships was able to manoeuvre and they were, in effect, sitting ducks for the communist field guns. All three ships suffered heavy damage and casualties in the attempts, and it was decided that to proceed further would be disastrous for them and their crews. The order was given to return to Shanghai.

On 21 April, HMS Amethyst was refloated, and on 22 April Lieutenant Commander Kerans arrived on board from Nanking, where he was assistant naval attaché, and took command. Amethyst remained incarcerated for 100 days, and the fact that HMS Concord entered the Yangtze to aid Amethyst in the aftermath of her escape has been denied. The involvement of HMS Concord was hidden or deleted from any public or official record.

[Caroline Dinenage (Gosport) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for securing this important debate. One of my constituents is a veteran sailor from HMS Concord, and his concern has always been that the Ministry of Defence denied that the ship was ever in the Yangtze. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that Sir John Holmes’s medal review, which acknowledges that the presence of HMS Concord is now no longer in doubt, goes some way towards proving that my constituent and other such gentlemen have, for many years, been right?

[Graeme Morrice]

Yes, indeed. I accept that point, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I know that she has a personal interest in the matter, particularly regarding the award of medals, and I will touch later on the Sir John Holmes review.

Concord’s logbook was removed, and without evidence to the contrary nothing could be proven, until now. Despite efforts to prevent the truth from emerging, personal accounts of HMS Concord’s part in the events, given by my constituent Mr William Leitch of Livingston and members of the HMS Concord Association, provide an overwhelming insight into the risks that Concord was subjected to when ordered into the Yangtze river. Mr Leitch has been in touch with me on the issue over the three years since I was elected to Parliament, and he is delighted that I am able to have this Adjournment debate. He will no doubt be watching live on the internet.

What follows has always been denied by the Government, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. When it was obvious that negotiations for a safe passage downriver were leading nowhere, Lieutenant Commander Kerans informed Admiral Brind in a coded signal that he planned to break out that evening. Admiral Brind, without reference to the Admiralty or the Foreign Office, signalled to HMS Concord, which was patrolling in the South China sea, to proceed upriver to meet Amethyst and, should the Woosung forts open fire, Concord was to return fire in support of Amethyst. When Amethyst made her escape on the night of 30 July 1949, one other ship, the destroyer HMS Concord, entered the Chinese territorial waters of the Yangtze to escort and cover the ship past the massive guns of the Woosung forts, which were the last obstacle before reaching the open South China sea.

The duty quartermaster was ordered to go around the ship and tell everyone, by word of mouth—not piping it over the tannoy as the sound would carry over the water and could alert the enemy—that the ship would up anchor and proceed upriver. The Concord was challenged by a nationalist gunboat and ordered not to travel any further. Stopping until the nationalist ship had left the vicinity, the Concord then sailed past the heavily armed Woosung forts to meet Amethyst. At the forts, Concord, on sighting Amethyst, sent the signal, “Fancy meeting you here”, to which Amethyst replied,

“Never, repeat never, has a ship been more welcome.”

Lieutenant Commander Kerans then signalled Admiral Brind, with a copy to the Admiralty:

“South of Woosung… Have rejoined the fleet… No damage or casualties… God save the King.”

Having passed the Woosung forts without their opening fire, the Concord, still in the Yangtze river, transferred supplies and 147 tons of fuel to the Amethyst, which had only 7 tons left. Both ships made it into the neutral waters of the South China sea and set course for the British province of Hong Kong.

The Concord was soon met by HMS Cossack, whose captain boarded the ship, removed its log book and took with him any evidence of the Concord’s involvement. The move to expunge any mention of its involvement with Amethyst was in motion. Admiral Brind went public and informed the news media that he had decided to authorise and endeavour, despite the risk, to bring about HMS Amethyst’s escape from China’s Yangtze river.

Hon. Members may wonder why there was so much concern to hide the fact that Concord had dashed up the Yangtze to assist Amethyst. The answer is simple: to prevent an international incident when cold war tensions were high. Had the Communists been aware that Concord had gone to the aid of Amethyst and entered Chinese territorial waters, the political consequences might have been catastrophic. Admiral Brind going public on what amounted to a covert mission that he had authorised would obviously upset the diplomatic apple cart.

After Concord and Amethyst had cleared the Yangtze river into the open sea, Sir Ralph Stevenson, the British ambassador in Nanking, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office, with copies to the commander-in-chief Far East station and the Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Canton embassies. He stated:

“No repeat no publicity should be given to the fact that H. M. Ship Concord entered Chinese territorial waters… It might help to lessen the possible repercussions upon British communities in Communist occupied territory if public statements could stress that the escape of H. M. Ship Amethyst was due to the initiative of the officer in command in accordance with the best traditions of a sailor responsible for the safety of his ship and the welfare of the ship’s company and that his intention to do so was not revealed to any of us out here.”

In other words, “If the balloon goes up and politically everything goes pear-shaped, we blame Lieutenant Commander Kerans and hang him out to dry.”

That telegram removed any official mention of the Concord’s involvement in the Yangtze incident. The move to expunge any mention of Concord’s involvement with Amethyst was going full speed ahead. Although Admiral Brind had ordered Concord to enter the Yangtze and escort Amethyst past the Woosung forts, he had no alternative but to comply with Ambassador Stevenson’s instructions. Consequently, a press release was issued and this report appeared in the Evening News on Saturday 6 August 1949:

“A Navy spokesman stated that the destroyer Concord had been waiting at the mouth of the Yangtze and was prepared to go up river to the aid of the Amethyst if needed”.

It is clear from the evidence that on the date and at the time that Admiral Brind gave the order, he committed HMS Concord and the ship’s company to a situation in which the risk to life and limb exerted by enemy forces was significantly above what UK armed services personnel might routinely be expected to tolerate. In recognition of the action, the officers and ship’s company of HMS Amethyst, together with those who served on three other Royal Navy ships that took part in the early stages of the incident, were awarded the Yangtze 1949 clasp to the Naval General Service Medal 1915.

I am concerned that that aspect of the incident is being sidelined. The committee responsible for compiling the 1949 Yangtze campaign awards scheme—the Sir John Holmes review—was not invited to look into HMS Concord’s role in the incident covering the dates from 28 to 31 July 1949. In other words, officially Concord was not there. I hope that hon. Members will appreciate how frustrating that is. The Minister should understand the strength of feeling behind the Concord veterans’ claim that they should be eligible for the NGSM Yangtze 1949 clasp.

The unrecognised heroes of the Yangtze incident—victims of Government skulduggery—are not claiming heroism or bravery; they simply believe that some official recognition should be instituted. Today, a large question mark hangs over the Yangtze incident. I fear that it appears to have been a cover-up that may be ongoing to this day. Indeed, this debate may already have some people cringing in high office within the Government and the Admiralty.

To sum up, for 64 years the true story of HMS Amethyst’s dramatic escape from China’s Yangtze river has been suppressed. The House may now wish to have a full account of the circumstances in which His Majesty’s ships were fired on in the Yangtze river with grievous casualties and damage. I urge the Government to abandon diplomatic caution and investigate the circumstances in the process of awarding medals to those involved in the Yangtze campaign and, in particular, investigate whether the process was corrupted by the exclusion of relevant and important documents relating to the role of HMS Concord in the Yangtze campaign on 30 and 31 July 1949.

I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to offer and, perhaps more importantly, to whether he can confirm that the Government will conduct a review with due diligence and propriety. The House deserves to be told the truth and given an accurate account of HMS Concord’s role in the 1949 Yangtze incident.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graeme Morrice]

Is it not officially recorded that the river was also mined and therefore that there was substantial risk to all vessels on the river?

[Mr Francois]

I am not denying that there was an element of risk involved in this, but it is nevertheless a matter of record that the other ships involved in the action were fired on by the Chinese shore batteries, and also a matter of record that Concord was not.

The independent Holmes review concluded that those making the decision in 1949 regarding eligibility for the medal would have been aware of Concord’s actions, but did not consider these sufficient in themselves to justify a recommendation of an award of the clasp to the ship’s company. If there was a wish to include Concord in the specified list, there was ample time to do so in August, October and November 1949, when the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and Medals reviewed the qualifying criteria for the medal.

The Holmes review considered the award of the clasp to HMS Concord’s ship’s company thoroughly and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the omission of the ship as a qualifying unit for the clasp was wrong or unreasonable, and that there was no new reason to overturn the original decision. Consequently, the review upheld the original position taken at the time. The review also concluded that there was no evidence to support claims that the ship’s company was overlooked deliberately, for diplomatic or political reasons. The findings have since been endorsed by the Honours and Decorations Committee, in late 2012, and Sir John wrote to Mr Peter Lee-Hale, the chairman of the HMS Concord Association, in January this year, setting out the reasons for his conclusions.

I am advised that for many years the men of HMS Concord wanted this position reviewed again by an independent authority—someone independent of the Ministry of Defence. The Holmes review has now taken place. It was an independent review that went back to the original documents at the time. As a result, I am reassured that this matter has now been subject to a comprehensive and thorough review by impartial authorities and, although I recognise the depth of feeling about this matter, well expressed by the hon. Gentleman, and fully acknowledge the efforts of the ship’s company, I can only reiterate that there are no plans, I am afraid, to reconsider the qualifying criteria for this medal.

I entirely accept that the hon. Gentleman is acting in good conscience, as are all those who advocate a change. I therefore recognise that the Government’s position, which I have re-stated today, will no doubt be disappointing for the veterans of HMS Concord and their families. However, the actions of Concord’s crew in 1949 have been brought to the public’s attention through the coverage of their long campaign for additional recognition. This debate will place another entry in the parliamentary record.

In conclusion, I wish to take this opportunity to once again pay tribute to HMS Concord’s contribution to the defence of our nation and to her crew, whose actions were fully in line with the proud traditions of the Royal Navy.

Scottish Referendum (Trident)

Graeme Morrice Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Westminster Hall

[Graeme Morrice (Livingston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson), the Chairman of the Scottish Affairs Committee, of which I am a member, on securing the debate.

Scotland plays an essential and pivotal role in the defence of the United Kingdom, and I welcome the opportunity to speak on one of the most important impacts of the referendum debate: the future of the Trident nuclear deterrent in a separate Scotland. It is no secret that I am an advocate of the decommissioning of all nuclear weapons, lock, stock and barrel, regardless of where they are sited—in Scotland, the UK or anywhere else. Indeed, I believe that nuclear disarmament should not just stop at Carlisle and Berwick-upon-Tweed, as the Scottish nationalists would have it. However, the removal of Trident from the Clyde, if that is the proposition, needs to be considered extremely carefully, with a full examination of all the implications and exploration of the alternatives. I therefore welcome the report as a significant contribution to that debate. Rather than putting up barriers and creating false divisions, as the nationalists constantly do, we all need to work together and play an active and constructive role in an international effort to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons.

The UK is a proud and prominent signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Its three pillars must continue to be the prism for our nuclear policy: non-proliferation, disarmament and the facilitation of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. I also believe that the formal response from the Scottish Government is not a meaningful contribution to the debate, and that many people throughout Scotland and the rest of the UK do not welcome it. If the SNP were to insist on the removal of Trident from Scottish territory by the “speediest safest transition”, as it says, any armed submarine on patrol would be recalled and, in effect, the UK would at that point no longer be able to maintain its nuclear defence capacity. The continuous at-sea deterrent would stop and it is not clear how quickly the UK could restore it, if that was the choice.

The SNP has claimed that the panacea for the vacuum that would be created through the removal of Trident from Faslane and Coulport would be the basing of conventional naval forces there. However, moving nuclear weapons from the Clyde after Scottish separation would be an enormous exercise costing billions of pounds and thousands of jobs. The Faslane site employs 6,700 military and civilian workers, with that figure due to rise to 8,200 by 2022. Of course, there is also a multiplier effect, across the west of Scotland and beyond. It is therefore for the Scottish Government to explain how the quality and quantity of such jobs would be matched if Trident were relocated. I do not think that the speeches of the hon. Members for Angus (Mr Weir) and for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) put any meat on the bones in that respect.

If a newly separate Scotland insisted on the removal of Trident from Faslane and the UK were forced into developing a new base at great expense, one would assume that the associated costs would be included in the separation negotiations. In that event, one would imagine the difficulty, both practically and politically, for a UK Government trying to establish facilities suitable for storing nuclear weapons and home-porting the Trident fleet in England or Wales.

I am concerned that this particular aspect of the debate is being sidelined. It is hard to find any clarity on an important issue for the people of Scotland and the rest of the UK. The Scottish Government need to be more open with the Scottish people on this matter and, in particular, the affected work force.

It has been mentioned that in a sitting of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs this morning, we took evidence from the unions representing the work force on the Clyde. From their responses to our questions, it was abundantly clear that there is a distinct lack of information being provided to them by the SNP on what would happen to Faslane and Coulport in the event of a yes vote in the pending referendum. Despite what was said earlier by members of the Scottish National party, it was reported to us today that November will be the earliest opportunity for the work force to get some answers, perhaps, to their legitimate questions and concerns. The work force and, indeed, the people of Scotland must be able to make the best possible informed choice and be fully aware of the implications of that choice, so the SNP cannot continue to duck this issue.

Perhaps the Minister can confirm what discussions the devolved Administration in Scotland have had with the UK Government and the Ministry of Defence on the implications and additional costs of a separate Scottish state removing Trident and establishing a new naval base, post-separation. In particular, I should like a response about whether he accepts the view that Trident warheads could be deactivated in a matter of days and that the nuclear warheads, missiles and submarines could be removed from Scotland within 24 months, and whether this timetable would constitute the “speediest safe transition” of nuclear weapons from Scotland.

It is clear from the evidence that Scotland could not carry out this process by itself—the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire admitted that earlier—as all handling and transport of the warheads would have to be carried out by specialist staff from the UK. That would require the fullest possible co-operation between the Scottish and UK Governments.

The SNP has said that once an independent Government signed up to non-proliferation treaty rules, Britain’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent at Faslane and Coulport would have to leave Scotland “as quickly as possible”. Immediate removal could mean leaving the rest of the UK without use of its submarines for up to 20 years while a new base was found. Clearly, this is an absurd and unsustainable position.

I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to offer during this debate, and, perhaps more important, what the SNP has to say by way of facts and figures, not the usual assertions and myths that we have heard once again this afternoon. The people of Scotland deserve to know what they will be voting for in 2014. The issue of Trident is too important to ignore.

Army 2020

Graeme Morrice Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, I can reassure my hon. Friend that we recognise the value of the link between specific regiments and the regions and nations. It is a potent aid to recruitment.

[Graeme Morrice (Livingston) (Lab)]

Following on from the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Gordon Banks), will the Secretary of State provide the House with further details of what the proposed changes to the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—5th Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Scotland—will mean in practice? How many troops will it lose, what capabilities will it retain, and what will its new role as a public duties company entail?

[Mr Hammond]

It will have between 100 and 150 officers and soldiers. Its principal duties will be to provide a guard at Edinburgh castle and at the palace of Holyroodhouse. It will also have additional ceremonial duties around Edinburgh, and as I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) a few moments ago, it will support other units of the Royal Regiment of Scotland in other homeland resilience roles.

Oral Answers to Questions

Graeme Morrice Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I agree absolutely that we must secure our legacy in Afghanistan for the sake of all those who have made the ultimate sacrifice. The tempo of our withdrawal will depend on the situation on the ground and on decisions that our allies take: we have to go in lockstep with our major allies.

[Graeme Morrice (Livingston) (Lab)]

T4. Will the Secretary of State update the House on the planned cuts of almost 50% to the Ministry of Defence police budget and explain further how such a massive reduction can have anything other than a detrimental impact on national security?

[Mr Hammond]

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), tells me there is to be a written ministerial statement on that subject tomorrow, but let me say this to the hon. Gentleman: if he is concerned about cuts, perhaps he should be aware of a passage in a letter written by his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to his party’s defence spokesman, in which the right hon. Gentleman says that there is no easy future for defence expenditure, and clearly a Labour Government can expect to have to make further savings after the next election. The hon. Gentleman might want to talk to the Leader of the Opposition about the matter.