Banking (Responsibility and Reform)

George Mudie Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The hon. Gentleman should tell the businesses in his constituency to use the appeals mechanism that was introduced to enable businesses to challenge decisions by banks and ensure that they are reviewed. Since the introduction of that scheme, 40% of bank managers’ decisions have been overturned through the appeals process.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

When the Governor of the Bank of England appeared before the Treasury Select Committee, he deplored the banks’ refusal to meet the Merlin targets. Furthermore, he said that the Government had chosen the wrong targets, which allowed the banks to hide the fact that they were not lending properly to small businesses. Was he misleading the Committee?

[Mr Hoban]

I gave the hon. Gentleman the figures earlier. As I said, by the third quarter of last year banks had exceeded their Merlin targets for lending to businesses as a whole, and were about 10% ahead of their lending to SMEs in comparison with the same point last year.

Let me say a little more about the credit-easing measures that we are introducing. There will be a £1 billion business finance partnership to co-invest in funds that can lend directly to middle-sized businesses and further stimulate non-bank lending channels for SMEs. Those schemes capitalise on the Government’s commitment to tackling the deficit that the last Government left behind. Unlike the Opposition, we are determined to safeguard our economic stability and protect our credibility in the world market—credibility which has secured our triple A rating and kept our interest rates at record low levels, and which allows us to pursue innovative credit-easing measures to reduce costs for businesses and ensure that more money goes where it is needed.

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[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. The reforms outlined by my right hon. Friend the Business Secretary ensure that shareholders have the information they need to act. We are also giving them the power to vote and their votes will have a binding impact on future pay plans. The pervading culture today and the sense of concern in the wider economy mean that institutional shareholders need to play their part by looking after the interests of the people who invest in their funds—the people whose pensions are dependent on good returns from their investments. Those shareholders owe an obligation to their customers to exercise their rights to determine the pay policies of boards. We need to focus on that in coming years. My predecessor, Lord Myners, talked about it a great deal. Our reforms have provided the tools and we must ensure that we use them to hold institutional shareholders to account.

[Mr Mudie]

The problem for the public is that the Minister can lecture private shareholders in private banks to use their power to limit bonuses in their banks, but Ministers, who are the owners of RBS, have not intervened and used shareholder power to get good behaviour in the bank they own. Why?

[Mr Hoban]

We have been very clear as shareholders that we expect RBS to act as the back marker on bonuses. We have been keen to ensure that it restricts cash payments to only £2,000 a year. It is not just the Government who agree with that view. In an article about RBS, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) pointed out that the Government should not run RBS; they should not get involved in the day-to-day business of banks but should run them at arm’s length. That was a structure set up by the previous Government and I understand that the Leader of the Opposition supported it. [Interruption.] The shadow Business Secretary says that we should change it, but he should speak to his leader. The right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) clearly endorses the structures set up by the previous Government. They should sort out their internal differences—it is not as though they are brothers.

I have spoken for quite some time and others want to speak, so I shall conclude. This Government have secured the stability of our economy by tackling the dreadful deficit left behind by our predecessors. This Government have secured the stability of our financial sector with tough regulatory reforms. This Government are supporting our entrepreneurs in rebalancing our economy, away from the unsustainable and wasteful spending under the previous Government. We are securing stable interest rates through our commitment to tackle the deficit. We are reducing the bureaucratic burden on businesses by slashing red tape and overhauling planning. We are unleashing private sector ambitions by cutting corporation tax to the lowest rate in the G7 and the fifth lowest rate in the G20. We are ensuring that our most ambitious and dynamic businesses have the finance they need to lead recovery in every part of our economy and our country.

Financial Services Bill

George Mudie Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

Yes, I can give that assurance. This is an important point that I want to flag up so that the House understands what we are collectively embarking on. We are seeking to give the Financial Policy Committee the tools to help to dampen down a credit boom or to help in a credit crunch. As my hon. Friend has said, it will be able to alter the maximum loan-to-value ratios in mortgage lending in order to curb an unsustainable rise in house prices. It will also be able to do the reverse, should we face unwanted house price deflation. It will also, potentially, be able to alter capital requirements for banks, in a counter-cyclical way. I should say that these are just possibilities; they are potential tools that the committee might want to use.

One key feature is that the measures will be independently applied, so there will be no political pressure to, say, keep a housing boom stoked up as an election approaches. Another key feature is that the Financial Policy Committee should act symmetrically—that is the intention of Parliament. Its job will be to act not just to moderate a credit boom but to try to alleviate a credit bust. The precise tools that we give the FPC have yet to be determined, as my hon. Friend has just said. We have sought the advice of the interim organisation that we have created, and it will come to us with proposals for the kind of tools that the permanent body will need. We will then seek the approval of both houses of Parliament through the affirmative resolution procedure—which will of course involve a debate—before we pass those tools over.

I freely accept that we are in largely uncharted policy- making territory, here or anywhere in the world. Many other jurisdictions are considering such measures, but we are ahead of most of them. Surely the experiment of making no attempt to moderate the credit cycle—letting the bubbles grow and burst, then cleaning up afterwards—has been an unmitigated disaster, and we would be failing if we did not look for an alternative approach.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

One suggestion from the Treasury Select Committee was that the Chancellor should not send the proposals to a statutory instrument Committee. That would involve a 90-minute discussion and the proposals would not be amendable. He should instead allow the matters to be debated seriously on the Floor of the House. I wonder why he would think it attractive and helpful to send them upstairs where they cannot be amended; that would suggest a foregone conclusion by the governing party that they would be accepted.

[Mr Osborne]

I would certainly be happy to have a debate about that on the Floor of the House. It is a decision for my colleagues, the usual channels and so forth, but in my opinion the important tools given to this body will have a real impact on our constituents. It will affect the kind of house they are able to afford on their income—the bread and butter of people’s daily lives—and it is important for us all to understand that as we create instruments of policy.

We are seeking to address another flaw in the system by making the Bank of England the single point of accountability when it comes to the prudential regulation of banks, large and complex investment firms, building societies and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff North (Jonathan Evans) reminded us, significant insurance companies. A new prudential regulation authority will be established within the Bank to perform that major new function.

As the shadow Chancellor pointed out, the Federal Reserve in the US already has responsibility for the prudential regulation of major banks, but not of other financial firms. Let me cite what Ben Bernanke said in what I believe was testimony before Congress:

“The Federal Reserve’s role in banking supervision complements its other responsibilities, especially its role in managing financial crises...During the current crisis, supervisory expertise and information have repeatedly proved invaluable in helping us to address potential systemic risks involving specific financial institutions and markets and to effectively fulfil our role as lender of last resort...The Fed’s prudential supervision benefits, in turn, from the expertise we develop in carrying out other parts of our mission—for example, the knowledge of financial and economic conditions we gather in the formulation of monetary policy.”

I raise this matter because at the heart of the new arrangements we are seeking to establish an understanding that today’s financial markets are so interconnected that the failure of a single firm can bring down the whole system, and risks across the system can bring down many single firms. These feedback loops are what proved so devastating in the crisis.

Some critics of the legislation now accept the need for a macro-prudential Financial Policy Committee, but still doubt whether we should give the Bank responsibility for the micro-prudential regulation of individual firms, too. I would argue that because the interconnections are so great, the FPC could not do its job without knowing what is going on in firms, and a prudential regulator could not do its job without knowing about risks across the system. The best way to combine the insights is to put them both under the aegis of the same institution—the central bank.

I understand that the shadow Chancellor is concerned that our Bill does not create additional lines of communication between the deputy governors of the Bank and the Chancellor, bypassing the Governor, so he might like to explain what he meant. I considered the idea, but rejected it. I think we need to force the Bank of England itself to reconcile its internal differences rather than create additional lines of accountability between the Chancellor and a deputy governor. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] He says, “Dear me”, so perhaps he will explain why he wants to institutionalise a regime in which the No. 2 constantly undermines the No. 1.

The Joint Committee and the Treasury Select Committee have raised what I regard as a far more relevant concern—the accountability of the Bank of England, given its important new responsibilities. We have listened carefully to the recommendations from both Committees and while I do not propose to abolish the court of the Bank of England, I do propose to give it important new powers to hold the executive Bank to account. The Governor and the court of the Bank of England have agreed that a new oversight committee, consisting of the non-executive members of the court, should be created. This group of external independent people will ensure that the Bank discharges its financial oversight responsibilities correctly; it will be able to commission both internal and external reports on the Bank’s policy makers’ handling of particular events and particular periods of policy making. Those reports will be published, with market-sensitive information protected, if necessary.

The Governor is of course, as is the case today, a key figure in the arrangements. It is important that he or she is not only independent of the Government of the day, but seen to be so. The recent experience of reappointing Governors after their first five-year term has expired has not been a very happy one. It has created unnecessary uncertainty and called into question political confidence in the Governor. Although I would hope that this Government would handle the whole thing better than their predecessors did, it makes sense simply to eliminate the possibility of discord entirely, so schedule 2 provides that the next Governor of the Bank of England and his or her successors will serve a single eight-year non-renewable term. That is a sensible reform.

The third flaw in the current arrangements was the fact that the Chancellor of the day felt he did not have the necessary powers to act in the interests of taxpayers. This is another area where the work of the Joint Committee and the Select Committee have proved invaluable. The Bill makes it clear that the day-to-day responsibility for financial stability lies with the Bank of England. We do not want the Treasury second-guessing that work. Beyond setting the parameters for the regulatory system, the Chancellor should become involved only if there is a material risk to public funds. The responsibility in this regard is made clear in the Bill, and in the memorandum of understanding that we have drawn up with the Bank. The Bill makes it clear that the Governor has a responsibility to inform the Treasury immediately as soon as there is a material risk of circumstances arising in which public funds might reasonably be expected to be used.

The Bill is also rightly clear that the use of public funds is entirely a decision for the Chancellor, as he or she is the person accountable to Parliament, and through Parliament to the public. My predecessor is, again, revealing about the limitations of the current arrangements in his book:

“My frustration was that I could not in practice order the Bank to do what I wanted. Only the Bank of England can put the necessary funds into the banking system…I asked Treasury officials if there was a way of forcing the Governor’s hand. The fact that we had given the Bank independence had a downside as well as an upside.”

Of course my predecessor had, as any Chancellor does, the general power of direction over the Bank that the Bank of England Act 1946 provides, but that general power of direction has never been used, so it is a nuclear option that might blow up anyone who tries to use it. That was the conclusion that my predecessor reluctantly came to.

That is unsatisfactory. The Bank must, of course, be protected from politicians who want to use its balance sheet against the wishes of the Governor simply because those politicians want to avoid using the Government’s balance sheet, but the Bank should not be able to use that as an excuse to withhold its services as an agent from a Government prepared to use its own Government balance sheet. Otherwise, in many situations that becomes, in effect, a veto on an elected Government’s fiscal decision making.

The Bill and the memorandum of understanding give the Chancellor of the day not only the right to be informed when there is a material risk to public funds, but the right to ask the Bank to analyse different options that might be available to deal with the risk, and in the newly added clause 57 the Bill gives the Chancellor a defined power of direction to require the Bank to provide liquidity to a particular firm or to put a particular firm into resolution or to provide liquidity to the general system, provided that the Chancellor does so using the Government’s own balance sheet, and makes that clear.

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[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

May I first align myself with the remarks that my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) made about the Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Bill, the right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley)? The fact that I was still on the Committee at the end of its sittings shows that he was indeed tolerant and patient. I would like also to put on record my admiration for, and thanks to, the Chairman of the Treasury Committee, who is in China at the moment. We have had an arduous 18 months on the Committee going through the regulations. The fact that there are three members of the Committee here today is nothing to do with our being unable to get on the plane to China; it is more that we are so dedicated to regulation that we chose to be here.

I want quickly to raise three matters. I welcome the Chancellor’s open-mindedness—it was not a U-turn; that was an unfair description—in accepting the point about secondary legislation being inappropriate for the macro-economic tools. I hope that he will show the same open-mindedness on the three matters that I will raise, because so far the Government have not accepted the Joint Committee’s or the Treasury Committee’s views on them.

The first issue is the objective of the Financial Policy Committee, which is to ensure the financial stability of the financial sector. One difficulty raised by many of the witnesses before the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee was that no one can come up with a definition of “financial stability”. That clearly presents those responsible for oversight of the FPC with obvious difficulties. On what basis do they judge the committee’s activities and performance? Is the issue stability alone? As the Chancellor himself stated in evidence, we should not be seeking the “stability of the graveyard”. I think of the unfortunate individual in hospital who is seriously ill in the high-dependency unit, but whose relatives are assured that he is in a stable condition. Just as in that example, stability in economic terms does not equal a healthy economy.

Arising from that—and equally important—the relevant question for all sectors to emerge from our witnesses was: in exercising its power to seek financial stability in the financial sector, will the Financial Policy Committee ignore the effect that that might have on the other sectors, in the real economy? To be fair, the original suggestion that the Government advanced was that the Financial Policy Committee could not take decisions to achieve financial stability if it believed that those decisions risked medium to long-term economic growth. An interesting and important point is that it was originally left to the FPC to make that judgement itself, with no mechanism for the Chancellor to have his say. The negativity of that formulation led HSBC, the British Bankers Association and several other witnesses to the Joint Committee to suggest that the relevant clause be redrafted, to give the FPC a positive duty to support economic growth.

I would like to put on record what was said by Stuart Gulliver of HSBC and Bob Diamond, neither of whom would immediately be recognised as friends of mine, or otherwise. Stuart Gulliver said:

“the…Treasury should be setting out what the Government’s goals are for growth, employment and job creation and saying to the FPC, ‘Use your macro-prudential tools to ensure that you achieve the Treasury’s goals.’”

Just as interestingly, both he and Bob Diamond cited the experience of the Pacific economies that actively manage the flow of credit and even its sectoral allocation, using a variety of macro-prudential tools. The people in small businesses and medium-sized enterprises would be very interested in that. The Joint Committee agreed a recommendation that the Bill be redrafted so that, like the MPC, the FPC must have regard to the Government’s growth objectives and other economic objectives. The Government have responded to the Joint Committee’s points on other related items in this area, but have not responded in favour of the more positive and widely supported suggestion that the FPC should be given a brief to have regard to the Government’s growth and economic policies. That is a real worry, and I hope that the Government will approach it with an open mind in Committee.

[Mr Ruffley]

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s argument closely. Does he agree that it is imperative for the Governor of the Bank of England to return to Parliament to explain in detail the indicators that he thinks should be used in the attempt to get a handle on the definition of financial stability, and that we need a full and frank debate on what those indicators should be?

[Mr Mudie]

That is an important point. I think that it was Charles Goodhart who raised the question of indicators. They are certainly interesting, but on a wider scale, I think it more important to establish that, given that the Monetary Policy Committee is linked to a target of 2% inflation, the Financial Policy Committee should be linked to growth employment measures that ensure that there is no “safety low level” of stability, and be forced to have a look at the problems of the real world out there.

[Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman’s speech seems to allude to a search for an equilibrium that never exists in the real world. Does he think that that disconnection between the reality of life as a dynamic process and the search for stability is at the heart of the inability to define financial sustainability?

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[Mr Mudie]

I think that it is more an indication of the way in which the banks have moved away from the real world into the investment world, computer schemes, and making money by using money, rather than funding the small and medium-sized enterprises on which we depend for a rebalanced economy.

This is a very similar—Madam Deputy Speaker, I think that I have thrown away my speech. However, the second issue that I want to raise is that of accountability. I want to draw the Chancellor’s attention to the danger of giving great powers to unelected officials, which can have a significant effect. One of the witnesses drew a parallel with the responsibility given in the sphere of health to the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. NICE determines the availability of drugs and treatment, and when a particular decision is made, elected politicians are under great pressure to reverse it. It does not wash with most constituents to tell them that the decision is one for the regulator. They may understand that politicians have given up the power, but they rarely accept that we do not retain the ability to alter a decision that is painful to them—and why should they?

That is very similar to what will happen when powers are given to the Bank of England and the Financial Policy Committee. The Chancellor is handing power to the Bank on matters that will inevitably extend beyond the financial sector to the real economy. One example is interpretation of the financial stability objective. The Chancellor is given the opportunity to set an annual remit for the FPC, but to ensure the Bank’s independence, the Bill accepts that the FPC may refuse to accept the Chancellor’s remit. The Joint Committee recommended that the Treasury, not the Financial Policy Committee, should have the final say on the interpretation of the remit. It did suggest, however, that the FPC should make public its objections to the annual remit, and should alert the Treasury Committee. Giving evidence to the Joint Committee, Lord Burns said:

“if there is any part of this set of proposals that concerns me, it is probably to do with the governance of the FPC in relation both to its accountability to Parliament through the Treasury and the extent to which it can be defined as ‘independent’.”

That is a stark reminder of how much is being conceded by the Chancellor. His annual remit on how the Financial Policy Committee should interpret and pursue the financial stability objective can be disregarded by the committee. To illustrate the importance of that, I cannot do better than to read out the words of the Joint Committee:

“The tools available to the FPC could allow a reversion to a level of central intervention in credit flows that has not been practised in the UK since the period of ‘Competition and Credit Control’ in the early 1970s. Such interventions would, for example, often affect mortgage availability and loans to households and companies. Given the wide range of possible interventions, and absence of any quantifiable target for financial stability corresponding to the inflation target for monetary stability, the FPC’s decisions will be more politically controversial than those of the MPC.”

Bizarrely, the Government have not accepted that when there is a difference, the FPC must accept the will of the elected Government, but have accepted that the FPC may make its defiance public. The Chancellor is not only allowing the FPC to defy him, but encouraging those unelected officials to tell the world that they have done so. That strikes me as a very strange working method.

The third issue that I wish to raise concerns a different aspect of a matter that has been discussed by those on the Front Benches. Who is in charge in a crisis? That is the question that was asked by Lord McFall at the time of the Northern Rock crisis. It shook the regulators, and it voiced the thoughts of the general public. There is a genuine wish to prevent such a situation from arising again. The accepted answer is that the Chancellor is responsible, and that therefore he should be in charge when there is a crisis. That seems sensible and straightforward to most people, but not to the territorially sensitive Bank of England. Nigel Lawson heard about the Johnson Matthey crisis, and the need for him to commit Government money, on the morning when it broke. He was understandably upset. Before the resort of using public money is accepted, the Chancellor should be made aware of the difficulties.

I shall now depart from my script, because I have only a minute left. We in the Joint Committee and in the Treasury Committee were trying to be helpful to the Chancellor. We made a recommendation, which the Chancellor accepted, that when a crisis arose or he was warned of one, he should take direct command. The memorandum of understanding—this is a different point from the one raised by the shadow Chancellor—has been nicely arranged, by the Bank, I presume, to ensure that even in those circumstances he does not have direct control. The Bank remains operationally in control, and the Chancellor can speak only about matters relating to the public funds to be used to deal with the crisis. We wanted to give him the opportunity to make a full range of decisions to avoid the use of public funds, and I hope that the Minister will consider that.

Tax Avoidance (Public Servants)

George Mudie Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for generously welcoming the steps that we have taken to deal with this issue. As I said in my statement, and in answer to several questions, I was not made aware of any tax benefit to any individual in this case. There is a great deal of information in the public domain that has been released under freedom of information, and I would urge him to study it.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

So, is the Chief Secretary to the Treasury actually telling the House that the information passed to him when clearing the arrangement did not include details relating to the unusual aspects of the case, and that they were withheld by the Minister for Universities and Science?

[Danny Alexander]

No, I am not saying that at all. What I am saying is that the arrangements were put in place by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Terms and conditions of employment are a matter for individual Departments. My role is to sign off the salary level for appointments paying over £142,500. As I have said in answer to several questions, in this case we reduced the salary and the expenses payments. I think that that was an appropriate response to the information that I was provided with.

Oral Answers to Questions

George Mudie Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

That was mentioned explicitly in the Financial Services Authority’s report on the failures of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Lord Turner suggested three options for changing the law, and the Joint Committee that has scrutinised the draft Financial Services Bill has recommended that the Government give consideration to the report’s recommendations. We agree with that, and we will be publishing a joint consultation document with the FSA later this spring, which will consider a range of possible measures.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

John Hourican of RBS is expected to get in excess of £4.3 million in his remuneration package in share options alone. When RBS was asked about this, it said that he had met his performance targets, but refused to say what those targets were. On the ground of transparency, will the Chief Secretary agree to put in the Library a copy of the performance targets of the chief executive of RBS and of Mr Hourican?

[Danny Alexander]

I will certainly look into the matter that the hon. Gentleman has raised, but it was his party that set up the contracts for many of the executives at RBS, and his party that allowed the bonuses to be paid out. It was also his party that awarded Fred Goodwin a knighthood that he should never have been given, so I do not think that we are going to take any lessons on this from him. We have certainly been looking hard at the remuneration proposals for this year, and I can assure him that bonuses will be far, far lower than they were last year.

Youth Unemployment and Bank Bonuses

George Mudie Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I want to raise three points. The hon. Member for Devizes (Claire Perry), who has left the Chamber, said that all we were proposing was a wish list. It is a wish list and I cannot understand why the Government are opposing it. Regardless of how they view our performance and their performance on youth unemployment, not enough is being done, and the first wish in the motion is for £2 billion to be put in to help with youth unemployment. I think that is a decent thing to have on a wish list. Secondly, we are asking for that money to come from the people who caused the difficulty, and that would be a very good thing.

I heard some of the comments directed at my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) and I think of parallel universes. I envy Government Members if they have the situation that they described in their constituencies. I have represented my constituency for 20 years as an MP and 20 years as a councillor and it is probably in its saddest state since the ’80s, which were a desperate time. Unemployment among youngsters then was along the levels we are seeing now, and as a result their lives were blighted and their self-esteem and confidence went. That situation affected families and communities, and it was one of the saddest times to represent a community. When the Labour Government came in they put in a lot of money and effort and they made a difference, but they did not finish the job and those issues remain. Communities are blighted by low self-esteem, low confidence and low ambition, and the real fear now is that that will be entrenched beyond any help or hope. I do not understand how anyone can abuse the shadow Chief Secretary when she raises the issue of youth unemployment, or read a speech with the kind of blandness we have just heard, as though they were describing a perfect world. This is about people’s lives and their families’ lives being ruined.

[Rehman Chishti]

Looking at what we are doing now, does the hon. Gentleman welcome the Government’s pledge to put £150 million towards the creation of university technical colleges, which will improve the skills of our young people?

[Mr Mudie]

I would rather the Government had not trebled tuition fees. I would rather that instead of spending £150 million they were taking the opportunity to raise £2 billion to put into youth employment. This is a very serious, non-political matter and people’s lives are going to be ruined unless they get urgent help. We should see that as a priority, and we should have no compunction about taking that money from the people who caused this difficulty. Governments, rating agencies and regulators also played a part but the sheer greed and irresponsibility of the banking and financial industry takes my breath away.

[Jake Berry (Rossendale and Darwen) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Mudie]

No, because I am short of time.

The people who caused the difficulty earn huge salaries because of gambling in the investment market, which has brought country after country and bank after bank to their knees, and which is now imperilling people’s standard of living—their homes, jobs and future. I find that unacceptable.

The shadow Minister has called for leadership, but real leadership would not involve avoiding questions about whether there is going to be a limit of £2,000 on bank bonuses. The senior director of RBS will be disappointed if he is not allowed to take his £4 million and the chief executive is expecting £2.5 million, but this is in a bank that the Government own. If we want leadership, it should come from the Chancellor and the Government, who should take the steps that are needed.

[Esther McVey (Wirral West) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Mudie]

No, I am sorry because I will be stopped quite soon.

The last point I want to make concerns the irresponsibility of the banks in refusing to operate Project Merlin, which would have brought jobs for younger and older people. The cynical and shoddy way that they got out of that agreement is totally unacceptable, as is the way they are refusing to fund small and medium-sized businesses. If we are going to rebalance the economy, that is the area that will provide the jobs. We need the Government to show some leadership because the banks must be forced to fund and put resources into that sector.

Jobs and Growth

George Mudie Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I am delighted to see the Chancellor still in his place. Oh, he is just going. I have that effect on him. I think he has heard enough in the previous four speeches, three of which were by members of the Treasury Committee—its best members; the rest are coming now. The last four speeches were very thoughtful, in contrast with what happened when the two Front Benchers had a go at one another. The public must see that as the Chamber at its worst; it was described as vaudeville. That is not the fault of the individuals concerned; it is the way this place is.

Following on from the speeches of the Front Benchers were speeches from the former Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling); the Chairman of the Select Committee; the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie), who represents the seat in which I was born; and my good friend from the Treasury Committee, the hon. Member for Sevenoaks (Michael Fallon). They were very good speeches, but that contrasts with what we heard before them, which is sad, in a way.

Two kinds of people watch the parliamentary channel during the day. There are people who will find the Front-Bench speeches lovely, because they are party animals of either party, and they like the cut and thrust, but there are also 100,000-odd additional people who are, or could be, looking at that channel: those who, in the last year—in the last quarter or month—have lost their job. Almost a million youngsters between 16 and 24 are out of work; they could be watching that channel, hoping that they will see that action will be taken to get them a job. They will have been despairing, until the last four speeches.

The hon. Member for Sevenoaks said that he saw some common ground. I think that there is some, inasmuch as whatever the bluster, something is clear after 15 months: cutting the deficit at the speed first suggested, backed up by a lack of a coherent growth policy—there was no growth policy; a document was hatched and brought forward six months later as an autumn statement—meant that the people watching knew that we were going to have a hard time. This debate will be an achievement if there is any acceptance in the Chamber that we cannot do what we have been doing for the past 15 months, but must do something additional—something different—because what we have been doing is not working. There are signs of that. The fact that the Chancellor went to the Bank of England and asked for credit easing to be done through the Bank, which was refused, and the fact that he is now taking the steps to do it himself, is good—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. Will the hon. Gentleman please make his comments through the Chair?

[Mr Mudie]

Shall I start again, Mr Deputy Speaker? You have put me off. Can you remind me where I was?

The Chancellor was turned by the Governor, but he was treated very well by the House because he had spent half an hour saying that he would not spend money. He now has the job for the next two months, until the autumn statement, of making a reality of credit easing, which means that because the Governor will not do it from the Bank of England, it will have to be done by the Government through public expenditure. And that, from a man who was saying that there is too much public expenditure and the only way is to cut, is a major achievement and a major philosophical breakthrough.

There are clear signs that the Chancellor realises that he boxed himself in. It was described three or four months ago on a radio programme as flexibility—“I have flexibility in my programmes”. That would give him the ability to move off plan A, but it is now clear that he is moving off with a vengeance because he sees the danger. When we in the House speak about growth, that means a lot to politicians, but the ordinary person does not realise that it means their job, the security of their home and their income. If the Chancellor is moving on that, it is very good.

I shall put three suggestions on the table for the Chancellor. First, he could reconsider the disastrous decision to abolish regional development agencies and the disgraceful decision to give the local enterprise partnerships that he set up in their place less money, no staff, no powers, no authority and no influence. They have pulled together in every area in the country schemes that have been presented to Lord Heseltine to filter out and put forward for funding. As only one scheme has come from each area, there is a whole list of good schemes sitting on the table that could be put into operation.

Secondly, when we speak about infrastructure, we invariably go to roads. The key, however, is housing because it triggers so many additional jobs and so much additional expenditure. There is one thing the Chancellor could do without spending any money. I know there is a balance. An average two-bedroom house costs £160,000. To get a mortgage requires a deposit of £32,000. Need we look any further to understand why youngsters are not buying houses? I know we have to protect people from being irresponsible, but such a value-to-loan ratio has knocked house purchase off the table. As we are not building social housing, it is a real block. Perhaps the Chancellor could speak to the Financial Services Authority and to the banks and say, “Ease off and look at each case on its merits.”

Finally, during the 1980s recession we had some very good community programmes—youth training schemes and so on. They were sometimes derided but they kept youngsters at work and gave them some self-belief and purpose. Youngsters got up and turned up on time. The schemes prepared them for work and kept them intact as individuals. In Leeds we had 2,500 places and we did enormous work across the city with unemployed people who, to this day, pay tribute to the fact that such schemes kept them going when they would have disintegrated as personalities if they had not had that discipline and chance. I should like the Chancellor to think about those.

Eurozone

George Mudie Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The first thing I would say to my hon. Friend is that he is right to allude to the debt dynamics in some of the countries involved, and I mentioned that specifically in the case of Greece. The difference between the Greek situation and the Irish situation at the moment shows that countries can take different paths, and with political will they can deal with their problems. However, if the political system is unable to address those problems, the rest of the international community has to step in.

My hon. Friend’s second allusion—the decoupling—is, I guess, a reference to the break-up of the euro. As he knows, I was against Britain joining the euro—I perhaps did not argue the case on quite as many occasions as he did—but as the world stands today, the break-up of the euro would be absolutely calamitous for the British economy, and it is not in our interests to advocate that. It is profoundly in our national interest to try to make monetary union work. Monetary unions can be made to work, but greater fiscal integration and fiscal union are needed, and—this is a crucial additional part—we also need the competitiveness of the other, peripheral European economies to be greatly improved.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

The Chancellor has said that the asset purchase facility is the best way to get money into the real economy and stimulate growth. Why is the Bank of England refusing to use the asset purchase facility, when the last Government used it successfully, and instead allowing the money to be channelled through the banks, which keep hold of it for their own security, and not to be sent into the real economy?

[Mr Osborne]

I am not sure that the asset purchase facility was the enormous success that the hon. Gentleman implies. It probably did do a good job—again, I defer to the views of the Chancellor at the time, who would have seen the data closer up. The asset purchase facility helped to stop the collapse in the corporate bond market at the time, but it never led to the big increase in lending that the previous Government hoped it would. The Bank of England did not make use of the £50 billion facility that was made available. Although the facility remains, to date the Bank has made use of only around £1 billion. Instead of revisiting the theology, as it were, of who is responsible and the role of the Bank, my view has been that in order to maintain the proper division of responsibility between the Bank and the Government, who are accountable to Parliament, the Government should undertake credit easing operations with their own balance sheet, and that is what we are working on at the moment.

Independent Banking Commission Report

George Mudie Excerpts

Monday 12th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

I hesitate to read out bank share prices, as they might have changed in the 45 minutes I have been on my feet The reaction from the banks today has not dramatically affected the prices of UK bank shares. There has not been a dramatic fall, nor indeed a dramatic rise. They have remained broadly flat—unlike those of French and German banks, which are very substantially down today. What that also suggests is that John Vickers—and, I would argue, the Government—did a good job in trying to price the proposals into the share price by giving clear signposts about the way in which we were going, so that it did not come as a big surprise. I completely agree with my hon. Friend about the Financial Conduct Authority. As a member of the Select Committee, she can look at some of the Vickers’ proposals potentially to change the FCA’s remit. We need to consider that, as do Members who are looking at the Bill.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

On ring-fencing, Vickers suggests 2019 as a back-stop, but page 151 of the report makes it clear that “efforts” should be

“made to complete it sooner.”

Does the Chancellor accept that recommendation from Vickers and, if not, why not?

[Mr Osborne]

I, too, used the phrase “back-stop” in the statement. Vickers recommends that the changes be completed by 2019, but also recommended in his press conference that they be legislated for in this Parliament and that some of the changes might take place before that. We need to consider all these issues, but I think we need to pay attention to the 2019 date that Vickers sets out in his report.

Oral Answers to Questions

George Mudie Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Osborne]

As my hon. Friend points out, we have taken more than 1 million low-paid people out of income tax. We are committed to further such moves through this Parliament, and that is in stark contrast to the 10p tax raid in the previous Parliament. Of course, we now discover that, before the decision was made, the shadow Chancellor knew all about its impact on the poorest fifth in our society.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

The Chancellor thought it proper in his Mansion House speech to give the bankers of the City first go on his views about the ring-fencing of banks. Apart from that being discourteous to the banking commission, which he set up, does he not think it discourteous to this House that he is prepared to give bankers that information but not to come and explain it to the House and take questions?

[Mr Osborne]

First, the announcement was made with the consent of the Independent Commission on Banking. Secondly, it is established that the Chancellor is able to give the Mansion House speech each year. I seem to remember that the last-but-one Chancellor announced the renewal of the nuclear deterrent at the Mansion House without coming to the House of Commons to do so. If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to say something about banking reform at the Mansion House in the years to come, I will therefore be grateful.

Oral Answers to Questions

George Mudie Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

I would urge my hon. Friend and other colleagues from Cornwall to encourage businesses and the local authorities to support bids from private sector businesses. The regional growth fund is there to support private sector-led bids that create growth and jobs and that support economic development across England, and I would urge her to work with chambers of commerce and local enterprise partnerships.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

In view of the indifferent growth in the regions, does the Minister regret the Government’s decision to abolish regional development agencies and to give to their authorities no money, no staff and no authority?

[Danny Alexander]

No, I do not; I think that that was the right decision. The balance of policies that we are putting forward—on enterprise zones, local enterprise partnerships and the regional growth fund—is designed to ensure that ideas that come from the regions have a much greater chance of success. Our decision was the right one, and the hon. Gentleman will have noted that inequality among the regions actually grew during Labour’s 13 years in office.