Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
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Fiona Bruce
Main Page: Fiona Bruce (Conservative - Congleton)Department Debates - View all Fiona Bruce's debates with the Department for Education
Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Second sitting)
Fiona Bruce Excerpts(3 years, 2 months ago)
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Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)
Q Good afternoon. Can I take you to the very first clause and the wording “reasonably practicable”? Do you think the duty to take “reasonably practicable” steps to secure freedom of speech is adequate? That phrase is used both for the governing bodies of an institution and for student unions, particularly bearing in mind that it is the same phrase that was used over three decades ago in the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. How do you think this Bill will change what, as we heard in this morning’s evidence session, is really an inadequate situation for many academics and students?
Smita Jamdar: The phrase “reasonable practicability” is quite a common one used in legislation—another example of it would be in health and safety legislation—and what it recognises is that it is very difficult for somebody to ensure that something happens without any caveat, because clearly there will be things that you have no control over that are preventing freedom of speech happening. In this case, if we go back to the self-censorship point, you may not know that people are self-censoring, so how do you address that?
Reasonable practicability is actually quite a high legal threshold. It is beyond what is reasonable, for example: it is saying, “If this is something that is practically possible, then subject to a general sense of, say, cost-benefit analysis, you would be expected to do it.” It starts from that quite high threshold; it sounds like a low threshold, but actually it is not necessarily a low threshold and in this case it is enhanced by the fact that what is reasonably practicable will have to be determined by reference to the particular importance of freedom of speech. It is highlighting freedom of speech as something that is of itself important—so, having particular regard to the importance of free speech, steps that are reasonably practicable to take. I think it is strengthening the current position.
In relation to the evidence you heard this morning—I did not hear all of it, but I heard some—I would go back to the point that I made earlier, which is that I am not convinced that even this duty would necessarily address some of the things that people are talking about, because I am not convinced those things are best addressed by legislation, or capable of being adequately addressed by legislation. That would be my view.
Fiona Bruce
Q Thank you. Can I just probe you a little further? What is the distinction between “reasonably practicable” and “reasonably necessary”?
Smita Jamdar: Again, the question of why you would use that formulation is not something I know the answer to. My instinctive reaction to that is that something can be practicable but not necessary, as in not solely necessary—so, there are things that you could do that go beyond strictly what is necessary. They could enhance, for example, rather than just achieve the bare minimum. My instinctive reaction is that “reasonably necessary” is a lower threshold than practicability.
Fiona Bruce
That is very interesting.
Smita Jamdar: I know. I may not be right about that, so I would have to look at the legislation.
Fiona Bruce
I think the Committee would be very interested—I certainly would be—in any further thoughts you have on that, because I do have a concern that we are not raising the bar sufficiently high, bearing in mind that we have had 30 years of the same bar and we have some major problems that appear to have been escalating over that period. Your thoughts on that would be much appreciated.
Smita Jamdar: I will definitely do that, because it is not something I have thought about before, so that was very much a “reacting on my feet”-type response.
Lloyd Russell-Moyle
Q I wanted to bring it to student unions. This Bill puts a liability on student unions, and I have just set the budget for the University of Bradford’s student union in the lunch break. They are, of course, very often financially perilous bodies, relying on money from their parent institution.
Is there a danger that this provides a chilling effect for trustees, such as myself and others across the country, to allow students to exercise their full autonomy? For example, what I mean is that we have the Conservative society, the Labour society and so on, which are all autonomous in their organisation within the student union, affiliating to the student union. Is there a danger that if one of them suddenly decided that they did not want a speaker to come along, we would then have liability for those students’ autonomous actions?
Smita Jamdar: The answer to that has to be potentially, yes. It would very much depend on what the relationship between the group in question and the student union was: whether it was a formal society of the student union, or a more informal gathering. This morning I heard a suggestion that student unions could make a decision at an institutional level about certain events, but then the individuals would still be free to go to the university and say, “We want to hold this event even though the student union has not allowed us to.”
On the face of it, because the duty is to secure freedom of speech within the law for students, rather than societies as a whole, you could find that you were caught between what was essentially an internal dispute on the part of a society about whether a particular speaker was or was not welcome to speak at that society. I know that purists would say, “If one person wants this person to speak, we should allow it.” But there are resource issues for student societies and rules about their own internal operation about how decisions are made. I do not think the legislation recognises that nuance. All that would happen would be that, yes, the complaint would potentially land at the feet of the trustees, who would then have to adjudicate on it.
Emma Hardy
Q So you see the bonus as being the advice that is given. Is it not possible for the OfS to give advice on something without having to legislate?
Thomas Simpson: I think the crucial thing is that the legislation puts it within the OfS’s remit. It mandates that this should be within its remit. I think it was already within its remit beforehand; it just was not being carried out.
Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)
Q Good afternoon, and thank you for coming to speak to us, Mr Simpson. You have written extensively on this issue, including a substantial paper you co-wrote in 2020 entitled “Academic freedom in the UK”. You wrote that you were focusing largely on improving oversight of academic freedom to ensure compliance with existing laws. I would be interested to know whether you feel that the Bill will satisfactorily improve oversight by governing bodies of higher level educational institutions, and whether it will also provide satisfactory extra university appeal mechanisms.
Thomas Simpson: One of the really urgent amendments to the Bill, in my view, relates to the opening duty, what you might call the source duty, in clause 1. The point has already been made, and I think that there is some truth to it, that the Bill changes the emphasis of the statutory duty—I do not think intentionally. If we look at the detail, it states:
“The governing body of a registered higher education provider must take the steps that, having particular regard to the importance of freedom speech, are reasonably practicable for it to take”.
I just want to focus on the governing body issue. It focuses the statutory tort from which everything else follows— the statutory duties—on the steps that the governing body must take rather than on the way that constituent parts of the university conduct themselves.
Let me just put that in concrete terms. Suppose there is a case in which someone is not appointed because they are judged to have the wrong view on whatever issue, and they wish to test this and they have evidence that makes them think that is the case. What that person wants to do is test in the courts, “Did I not get the job because of my view?” That is what they want to test. What the statutory duty implies is that the courts will ask, “Did the governing body take the steps that were required to stop that happening?” Okay. That is a very, very different thing. Testing that is asking, “Have they had a discussion on the governing body of which there are minutes to record this happened? Did they put the right training in place? Did they appoint the right people? Is there some error that they have made?” What wants to be tested is whether the individual was treated unfairly in some sort of way.
Sending in the report, we advocated for a direct duty to be placed on higher education providers and not on the governing body of it to take steps. That is a really vital measure.
Fiona Bruce
Q May I look at the subsection after the one you have quoted from. Subsection (2) states that the
“objective is securing freedom of speech within the law”.
Is there some merit in considering an amendment so that it reads, “the objective is securing freedom of speech without unlawful interference”? That would focus the minds of those who are assessing the situation on whether the interference has been unlawful, as opposed to whether the speech is within the law or not, which brings into play all the complexities about the interpretation of what is within the law and is not, in terms of harassment and so forth.
Thomas Simpson: I would need to think more carefully about the specific wording that is at stake there. Perhaps I can come back on that, because another really important question is raised by clause 2: the coverage of the duty. The coverage of the duty is currently specified as the staff of the provider, members, students and visiting speakers. In academic life, there is a really important category of what you might call affiliated academics—people with visiting fellowships or emeritus professorships, guest scholars or life fellows. The wording does not make it plain that such people would be included. Many of the specific controversies are about people not losing their jobs, because part of the charter of the university prevents that from happening or makes it very difficult for it to happen. But honorific positions lead to people being dropped like a hot potato.
Fiona Bruce
Q Thank you. That is a very relevant point. In fact, I will turn to proposed new part A3 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, which is the
“Duty to promote the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom.”
It talks about promoting academic freedom for academic staff, and what you call affiliated academics could probably be included. What about academic freedom for students?
Thomas Simpson: That is a very good question. One of the possibilities that exist, and that I would commend for revision of the Bill, is to think about a wider definition of academic freedom. In the English law context, we talk about the duty to protect freedom of speech in section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, and the Education Reform Act 1988, which prevents dismissal. The much longer discussion of academic freedom tends to associate a number of other activities with it. Freedom as to how you teach would be a classic component of academic freedom—your freedom not to have your curriculum dictated to you as a teacher—as would your freedom to criticise your own institutions. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has established that, and it goes back to UNESCO’s 1997 definition and prior cases.
The ability to publish and disseminate the results as you see fit is another activity that would classically be viewed as part of academic freedom. Currently, the Bill does not provide any specific protection for that, so a valuable addition to the Bill would be to expand the definition of academic freedom to include those kinds of activities. The wording for that needs to be carefully thought through, because this would be an innovation in terms of the recent history of legislation in the UK, but I think that would be a really valuable function for it.
The Chair
Four more Members have indicated that they want to ask a question. I call Kevan Jones.
Michelle Donelan
Q Do you think that breaches of the current duties are going under the radar? What impact do you think they are having on individuals? That is what Bill is intending to impact—it is intending to change the lives of academics and students.
Dr Harris: To give an example, one of our members is Dr Abhijit Sarkar, a scholar of Indian political history at the University of Oxford. He specialises in research into far-right Indian politics, or so-called Hindutva. He posted on Instagram about the president-elect of the students’ union. He alleged that she herself was a Hindutva, a far-right Hindu nationalist. He backed it up with the fruits of his research and pointed out the various signs and tell-tales of codes that British people like me would not pick up on. It is sort of like what Searchlight do in pointing out the signs of the far right.
There was an extreme campaign against Dr Sarkar, and I have some details of the threats made against him, which have gone to the university. They include: “You die with your spine broken”, “You and your subhuman kin need to be culled and wiped from the subcontinent” and, “I request to start a campaign to bring that bastard to India” In response, the university disciplined Dr Sarkar and called him in for investigation. I cannot, and Dr Sarkar cannot say, what the outcome of that was. What is telling for me is that this was a situation where an academic was really fulfilling a public watchdog role. He was telling people that these were the tell-tale signs of far-right nationalism. When his life was threatened, the university still could not bring itself to take his side. They could not stand behind him and say, “We are with you and we support your academic freedom.”
That, I suspect, is a major part of the trauma that is caused by this. It is this feeling of isolation—that there is no one who has got my back. We see that with the gender critical feminists. There is a member whose mental health has been destroyed—I cannot mention her name. There was a campaign of harassment against her and it was brought to the attention of the university. Nothing happened and she was managed out in a sham redundancy. This is the effect. What has come before us—the cases we have dealt with—are not exhaustive; I suspect they are representative of a wider phenomenon, and I think it is too much already.
Fiona Bruce
Q Good afternoon, Dr Harris. Do you think the duty to take reasonably practicable steps to secure free speech is adequate—the duty in clause 1 and elsewhere in the Bill?
Dr Harris: It is difficult to say, and that is the problem. The Government and their lawyers have perhaps missed some opportunities to bring greater clarity and perhaps have not been as ambitious as they could have. “Reasonably practicable” steps largely replicates the wording of the 1986 duty. The problem is that in that interim there have been very few cases where the courts have considered the meaning of that. One ambiguity is if a court were asked to consider what “reasonably practicable” steps means. There is a possibility that they would say it is pretty much for the university’s discretion to decide what is reasonably practicable, and the court will simply insist that it not be irrational—that it not be Wednesbury irrational. That is a very low standard of irrationality. It is: “Don’t be completely unreasonable.” In the light of that, it is disappointing that there has not been more to state what that means.
Another ambiguity is that obviously since 1986 the Human Rights Act has become law, which means that this duty now sits alongside the section 6 duty of the Human Rights Act that a university must not act incompatibly with the article 10 right to freedom of speech, so I think that there is a bit of a missed opportunity to say how the two duties sit alongside each other. Do they essentially mean the same thing or does the Bill superimpose a positive duty—the Human Rights Act says that you must refrain from incompatible acts, and then the Bill says further that you must positively take steps to secure freedom of speech?
That is one potential interpretation, so I think my answer is that there is too much pot luck in this. There is too much hoping that when the courts get around to asking what this means they will tell us. I think Parliament should decide what it wants to do and say it, rather than leave a gap to be filled by the courts. Saying “all necessary steps such as are reasonable to secure freedom of speech” would be a very clear way of at least achieving clarity. Some may disagree, but it has the benefit of being a clearly defined duty.
Fiona Bruce
Q The word “reasonable” qualifies it, so that for example if security costs were a quarter of a million pounds those steps probably would not come within the clause, but if security costs are modest to ensure that an event goes ahead then the university should take those steps.
The Chair
Dr Harris, may I remind you to keep your answers brief?
Dr Harris: Sorry. Yes, correct—that is possibly how it might be interpreted. This has been litigated in the case of Ben-Dor, where it is perhaps contestable whether the court was right to say that the amount that it would have cost was an unreasonable amount. Ideally, what we would see here is an elaboration of what “reasonably practicable steps” means. You could say it shall include a duty to cover such security costs as are necessary to enable an event to take place safely.
Fiona Bruce
Q In your evidence, you say that you
“believe Parliament should decide, in this Bill, how this conflict is to be resolved”—
the conflict being that between whether provocative speech is free within the law or conduct having the effect of harassment. Can you clarify that, because this is a really complex but very important issue in our deliberations on the Bill?
Dr Harris: I will be as succinct as I can. Opponents and supporters of the Bill can hopefully find agreement that it potentially puts VCs and universities in a very difficult position. It will create borderline cases where it is difficult for the university to know whether in allowing an event to go ahead they may open themselves up to liability for harassment. It may be harassment of employees, for instance. Alternatively, if they decide that it is not quite harassment, could they then be sued because they failed to secure freedom of speech?
This is the result of the duty being essentially parasitic. It says that you must secure free speech as the law defines it. The Bill does not amplify or further define the right to free speech. I think that there is a conflict there. I do not think that it is fair to just lumber it on universities. I think there is a danger of universities responding by being completely risk averse—becoming simply anodyne—and I think it is for MPs to show some thought leadership. We have these two incommensurate values: the prevention of offence related to protected characteristics and protection of free speech, and I think it is for MPs to decide how we reconcile those two values. I do not think we should outsource the decision to universities.
Emma Hardy
Q Interestingly enough, those were the points that I was going to cover. That is interesting indeed, with your comments about the competing obligations under the Bill and the Equality Act. I know you have suggested that MPs resolve this, but, looking at some of the other evidence that we have had, would one step towards that be to make it explicit on the face of the Bill that universities, in doing this, must also take equality legislation into account, along with some of the non-statutory guidance—Prevent, and all of those other things? My concern is that none of that is in this at all.
Dr Harris: I think that there are a number of options. In the Bill at the moment, the OfS has the power to issue advice. However, as you say, there is nothing equivalent to the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015, whereby the university will be under a statutory duty to give due regard to that advice.
There are a number of options. One would be that there be new guidance, perhaps from the OfS and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, setting out clearly the scope of the Equality Act, when it is not a justifiable grounds for infringing free speech, and the true extent of a university’s liability—for instance, like the fact that universities are not liable under the Equality Act for what their students do. That is quite important. That is a good, soft way of doing it, but the potential drawback of that is that the Equality Act is already fairly clear in its definition of harassment in section 26, in that it has this safeguard of
“whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.”.
What we are seeing in relation to reporting websites where students can report harassment—it was seen at the University of Essex, regarding Rosa Freedman and Jo Phoenix—