Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill (Sixth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateFelicity Buchan
Main Page: Felicity Buchan (Conservative - Kensington)Department Debates - View all Felicity Buchan's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Caroline.
In considering this clause, we will continue some of the debates we had on clause 4 on Tuesday. We have heard many similar views from a range of parties that the Bill is an unethical attempt to stifle freedom of expression and legitimate concerns of councils and other publicly funded bodies. They will face significant fines for being about to, or likely to, associate with international norms of behaviour. And who will be empowered to conduct investigations into those suspected breaches? Why, it will be UK Government Ministers themselves who are granted that authority! There go freedom of expression and the rule of law. I ask Members to support the SNP amendments.
Amendments 25 to 29 would remove enforcement authorities’ power to give information notices and compliance notices in anticipation of a contravention of the ban.
First and foremost, the powers given to enforcement authorities to be used before such a breach will prevent the sort of deeply divisive activity that we have heard about from representatives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council in oral evidence. It is obviously much better to prevent a breach of the ban in the first place than to wait for a divisive boycott or divestment policy to be put in place before taking action.
I reassure hon. Members that that does not mean that there will be active monitoring of public authorities. Potential breaches will be investigated as and when they are brought to the attention of enforcement authorities by third parties. When flagged to enforcement authorities, it is only where relevant to a potential breach of clause 1 or 4 that an information notice may be issued to require information from a relevant public body.
Finally, the enforcement regime does not provide unprecedented powers for enforcement authorities. It is based on existing regimes. The powers are based on those that the Office for Students already has for regulating universities, and the powers to enforce the ban for local government pension schemes are similar to those that the Pensions Regulator already has. I therefore ask that the amendments be withdrawn.
We wish to test the will of the Committee on the matter. I ask Members to support our amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 7, page 5, line 32, leave out subsection (8).
This amendment removes provisions stipulating that providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach obligations of confidence or other restrictions on disclosure.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Caroline.
Clause 7 sets out the significant powers to compel information that will be made available to the enforcement authorities detailed in clause 6. As we have heard, the enforcement authority will most often be the Secretary of State. The provisions in clause 7 provide enforcement authorities with the power to prepare and issue an information notice to request from a relevant public body information relating to a decision in respect of the Bill. The enforcement authority—usually the Secretary of State, as I say—can request any information likely to be useful for it to assess whether the provisions of the Bill have been contravened or are likely to be contravened.
Provision is also made in respect of clause 4, the gagging clause. Clause 7 means that the enforcement authority can request information if it is satisfied that a public body subject to the Bill is about to publish, may publish or has already published a statement prohibited by the Bill. The most egregious provision is subsection (8), which provides:
“A person providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach—
(a) any obligation of confidence owed by the person in respect of the information, or
(b) any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
“However imposed” is a challenging phrase. It seems to grant the Secretary of State or other relevant bodies the power to issue notices that would not only require all information to be handed over, but override normally protected duties of confidentiality, safeguarding or legal privilege. That is very significant. We would argue that those powers of investigation go beyond the powers of the security services to compel information. There is no clarity or sense of what checks and balances there are. Even the security services, which do not have that degree of power, have oversight mechanisms such as the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Frankly, this seems to be a very strong power to reserve to the Security of State or, indeed, the Office for Students.
We have heard evidence from multiple witnesses who are concerned about these provisions. We did hear from others who are less concerned, but even if colleagues consider the case I have set out to be wrong or overstated, the ambiguity is obvious. At the very least, the Bill is not clear enough. It is important to say that the Government do not—if I have understood properly what the Minister told the Committee last week—want the provisions to supersede legal privilege. That is welcome, and I am keen to have similar commitments regarding safeguarding duties. If that is the case, amendment 10 promotes that.
I believe that the Government ought to accept our amendment, or at least propose an alternative in lieu. What is in the Bill seems overbearing; if not overbearing, it is definitely unclear. That, at least, must be resolved.
Amendment 10 would remove clause 7(8), which stipulates that providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach obligations of confidence or other restrictions on disclosure.
The intention behind clause 7 is to provide a power for enforcement authorities to issue information notices to require information from a relevant public body relating to a decision in respect of the Bill. As drafted, the clause sets out a necessary and proportionate power for enforcement authorities properly to investigate potential breaches of the ban.
I must be clear that the clause does not place an undue burden on public bodies in scope of the ban. Information may be requested only if the enforcement authority is satisfied that a person has made or will make a decision or statement in breach of the Bill and that the information is likely to be useful for the enforcement authority’s investigation. Subsection (8) provides standard wording in order to give assurance to the person complying with the information notice that they will not be breaching an obligation of confidence or any other restriction on disclosure. The Bill is by no means unique in including such drafting; the same caveat is provided for in the Agriculture Act 2020, the Building Safety Act 2022 and the Health and Care Act 2022, for example.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North has said that he is concerned that the subsection would override the privilege between lawyer and client. I can reassure him that it does not. Legal professional privilege is a fundamental common-law right, including for those public bodies captured by the Bill, and specific words would not be needed to override it. The information power therefore does not extend to legally privileged material; I can confirm that I will clarify that point explicitly in the Bill’s explanatory notes. I would also add that Richard Hermer KC has subsequently clarified, in written evidence to the Committee on this point, his view that it is likely that a court would not deem legal professional privilege to be overridden by the clause.
Subsection (8) does not provide a right to extract the information, nor does it give a power to the Government; it simply provides the person who is disclosing information necessary to investigate a potential breach with protection against a claim for breach of confidence or any other restriction. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
It is really important that legislation passed by the House be clear and unambiguous. As we have heard repeatedly in this Committee from a wide variety of sources, including witnesses who gave oral evidence and those who submitted written evidence, the Bill fails that test.
This subsection is another example of that. The open-ended reference to
“any other restriction on the disclosure of information”
makes no distinction, for example, between somebody expressing a view in a private and in a professional capacity. That cannot be right. Subsection (8) should be deleted.
I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 7, page 5, line 39, leave out from “legislation” to end of line 41.
This amendment is to probe the way the legislation appears to “qualify” the data protection legislation.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Caroline.
Like previous clauses that we have discussed, clause 7 is poorly drafted. It hands enforcement authorities powers that risk infringing on civil liberties such as the right to a private life. The clause allows an enforcement authority to compel a person suspected of contravening a ban to provide information, including personal information about people involved with a decision. It is clear that the intention is to prevent a public body from contravening clause 4, the so-called gagging clause. However, the broadness of the clause risks casting too wide a net and infringing on personal data. My amendment 33 seeks clarity from the Government as to how the clause will interact with existing data protection legislation.
Data law exists to protect people’s privacy and data, but the Bill is confusingly drafted. In its current form, the clause could be interpreted as implying that existing data protection legislation is to be read in line with the Bill, rather than the other way around. That obviously raises issues about an individual’s right to data privacy. The circularity of the drafting could potentially mean information disclosure obligations superseding data protection legislation. As has been raised numerous times under other clauses, the drafting clearly suggests that little thought has gone into the powers granted to enforcement authorities. It is unclear whether any assessment has taken place of the legal necessity of the powers or of whether they are proportionate under the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
The drafting of clause 7(8) is particularly concerning. It provides that disclosure of information under the provisions will not breach
“any obligation of confidence owed by the person in respect of the information, or…any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
That is such a broad definition that it potentially includes everything from contractual restrictions and court orders to legal professional privilege and even statutory restrictions on information disclosures.
Many people have raised these concerns, as we know from our evidence sessions last week and from written submissions. I am sure that granting such expansive powers was not the Government’s intention in drafting the clause. I hope that the Minister will provide an explanation of why they have drafted the legislation so confusingly in respect of data protection and why they are granting such expansive powers to enforcement authorities.
The clause has the potential to allow a severe intrusion on an individual’s right to privacy under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, which provides the right to a private life. The grounds on which information can be requested are very wide: someone would need merely to be suspected of being in the process of potentially making a prohibited decision or statement to be required to hand over information. That is compounded by the requirement to provide any information that is
“likely to be useful to the enforcement authority”.
It would be beneficial if the Government explained what kind of information could be requested through an information notice.
Amendment 33 is a probing amendment, so I will not push it to a vote, but I hope that the Government will provide further detail on what evidence individuals will have to provide when issued with an information notice, as well as looking again at the broad powers granted under the clause.
Amendment 33 would remove the part of clause 7 that refers to compliance with data protection legislation, specifically the requirement that the provisions of the clause should be taken into account when determining whether the provision of information would contravene data protection legislation. Importantly, an information notice does not require the provision of information if this would be in contravention of the data protection legislation.
The clause provides a lawful basis for sharing information. This is a standard drafting mechanism that respects the principles of data protection; it does not alter the principles of data protection. As I have already set out, the Bill is by no means unique in including this drafting, which features in various pieces of existing legislation, such as the Building Safety Act 2022 and the Agriculture Act 2020. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the Minister for her response, but I do not think it goes far enough in addressing the concerns that I and other Members have raised. I heard what she said, and I understand from her previous contributions that some additions will be made to the explanatory notes. I am slightly concerned that, when they made concessions on clause 7 and others, the Government said that there will simply be additions to the explanatory notes, rather than anything on the face of the Bill. I hope the Minister will go back and seriously consider how to tighten up the language in the clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Monetary penalties: power
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I rise to speak to amendments 11 to 13, which relate to clauses 9 and 10. Clause 10(1) states that:
“The Secretary of State must, by regulations, prescribe a maximum penalty for the purposes of section 9”.
Clause 9 states that an enforcement authority may impose a monetary penalty on someone if they do not comply with the provisions of the Bill. Similarly, clause 10(2) states that:
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about matters to which the enforcement authority must, or must not, have regard in exercising its powers under section 9”,
which refers to the power to impose monetary penalties.
The regulations set by the Secretary of State will be highly consequential, because they will show how the sharper elements of the Bill, which we have already discussed, will interact with the rights and freedoms of individuals. They will outline the monetary penalty, but also what the enforcement authority—most often, the Secretary of State—will weigh in making a decision. As drafted the Bill does not specify when the Secretary of State must make these regulations and when they will take effect. That leaves a degree of ambiguity, and a gap where people will be waiting to see when the provisions start to bite.
The Minister previously talked about measures being necessary and proportionate. It is necessary to have an enforcement regime, and proportionate for the shoe to drop at some point; otherwise there is no point in having the legislation. Also, having made a significant number of points around Henry VIII provisions, and, at length, been quite displeased by some of them, even someone with my hard heart would say that it is proportionate for those to be set by regulations, because they will change over time.
The quid pro quo for that is what I have set out in amendments 11, 12 and 13, which remove some of the ambiguity and has the Government say when they intend to set the regulations. These probing amendments—I will not press them to a Division—set out what ought to happen within 60 days of Royal Assent, which would give a degree of clarity for those who are getting their decisions in order and understanding when the provisions are likely to fall. I think that is proportionate. If 60 days is too short or long a period, I hope the Minister will say when the Government intend to do this. I suspect they want to get on with it, but people ought to have that clarity.
Amendment 11 would require the Secretary of State, via regulations, to set a maximum fine that can be imposed on public authorities in breach of the ban within 60 days of the Bill being passed. The suggestion by the hon. Member for Nottingham North to set a deadline of 60 days for the Secretary of State, while well intentioned, is inappropriate.
It is crucial that the threshold for fines is carefully decided in consultation with enforcement authorities, including the Office for Students and The Pensions Regulator. Since that will also be done by the affirmative procedure, the measure will need to go through both Houses. It will need to go through the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords, and it would need to be debated in both Houses. Clearly, it is a piece of legislation that the Government want to be implemented, so I give the Committee my word that we will do this as expeditiously as possible. It is wrong, however, to commit to 60 days.
The same arguments apply to amendments 12 and 13. We agree that expediency in setting out details of the enforcement regime is important, but we need to take into account proper consultation with the regulators and enforcement authorities, as well as due scrutiny in both Houses. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw the amendments—I know that he said they were probing amendments.
I am grateful for that answer from the Minister. I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis. The point about consultation is important, so I hope that is a full consultation, both with potential enforcement authorities and those who speak for those that are going to fall under the provisions, such as the Local Government Association.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Application of prohibitions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
One definition of a human being is that they learn from their mistakes. To do so, they must review their actions against a set of criteria, often through an impact assessment, so as to identify any error, misjudgment or unintended consequence that they may have created. That sometimes leads to a revision or reversal of prior actions. I am sure that we all agree with that statement, given that we are all human beings, are we not? The principle applies to presumptions as well as actions. I am sure the Government hope this legislation will impact only on the countries and territories explicitly named in the Bill, but that may be presumptuous. New clause 1 provides a list of countries whose behaviour might change as a consequence of the Bill being enacted. It might change them for the better, but we ought to be aware that some will see it as a green light to expand their breaches of human rights, confident in the knowledge that the UK has turned a blind eye to their behaviour, all in the interest of expanding trade. We believe that the impact assessment and the timescales proposed are realistic and essential to the reputation of the UK. I ask the Committee to send a clear message to those countries by supporting the new clause.
I urge hon. Members to reject the new clause. It would give the Secretary of State or Minister for the Cabinet Office a new duty to conduct an assessment, six months after passage of the Act, of its impact on the UK’s trade and diplomatic relations with the countries identified by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office as human rights priority countries.
The UK Government’s trade positions and diplomatic efforts will not be affected by the Bill. Its intent is to ensure that the UK speaks with one voice internationally; it is not to hamper diplomatic relations by publishing arbitrary impact assessments for the countries listed in the new clause. The Bill makes clear where the power to conduct foreign policy is, and allows other public bodies to focus on their core duties. It does not change any aspect of the UK’s foreign policy.
That is not to say that the Government will not carry out impact assessments on international matters when needed. Indeed, we are already committed to producing independently scrutinised impact assessments, such as those for new free trade agreements. Moreover, as with any Act that the House passes, once the Bill is an Act it can be subjected to post-legislative scrutiny by a parliamentary Select Committee to assess how it has worked in practice since coming into force. The additional impact assessment proposed by the hon. Member for Glasgow South West is unnecessary. For those reasons, I ask him to withdraw the new clause.
I have listened carefully to the Minister. If I understood her correctly, she said that the Bill does not change Foreign Office policy. Many Opposition Members believe that some provisions in the Bill actually do change Foreign Office policy, and we explored that in an earlier exchange. Many of us believe that we are using a domestic Bill to change Foreign Office policy, and if we are doing that, I insist that the Committee divide on the new clause.
May I take this opportunity to thank the entire Committee? We have worked effectively and expeditiously. I also thank the two Chairs and the Clerks.
Similarly, I want to put on record our thanks to you, Dame Caroline, and Sir George, to the top-class Clerks for all their help, to the civil servants for their work and to my colleagues. I draw special attention to my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy), who was shadow Secretary of State on Second Reading, for her efforts and support while we have been getting our work together, and to the Minister for her collegiate work, both inside and outside this room. I also thank her colleagues.
May I clarify for the record that, as a general rule, Members of Parliament do not make contact with people who are not their own constituents? I will not ask my hard-pressed team in the constituency to respond to people who are not constituents. That is parliamentary protocol. No constituents have got in touch with me about this matter, and I will not be requesting that my team respond to non-constituents, because we need to work with people who really need our help.
I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby. It may be useful if I spend one minute explaining how the witness list comes about. Each party suggests witnesses, and then a Programming Sub-Committee agrees the list of witnesses. I just wanted to clarify that point.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly to be reported, without amendment.