Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateFelicity Buchan
Main Page: Felicity Buchan (Conservative - Kensington)Department Debates - View all Felicity Buchan's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAmendments 5 and 6 would remove from the Bill the references to Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the occupied Golan Heights. All Committee members can agree that BDS is a pernicious movement that does nothing to promote peace in the middle east and sows division and hatred in the UK.
Last week, we heard passionate testimonies from representatives of the Jewish community in the UK on the impact of anti-Israel boycotts and divestments on community cohesion and their links to antisemitism. The witnesses set out that the statistics clearly demonstrate the link between antisemitism here in the UK and the situation in Israel: the months with the highest levels of antisemitic incidents in the UK correspond to the months in which conflicts have happened in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. That is why most of us on the Committee agree that we need to legislate to ban public authorities from engaging in such BDS campaigns.
We have seen that BDS campaigns pursued by public authorities often target the settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. For example, in 2014 Leicester City Council passed a motion that stated:
“Leicester City Council resolves, insofar as legal considerations allow, to boycott any produce originating from illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank”.
In 2021, a UN special rapporteur wrote to all local government pensions scheme committee chairs urging them to divest from companies that conduct business in the Israeli settlements. I think we can all agree that we should send a clear message that such campaigns should not be allowed, and the Bill provides that clarity.
For those reasons, it is vital that should a future Government choose to allow public authorities to engage in boycotts or divestments against Israel, it is done through a change to primary legislation and is thus subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. That is the only reason that Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Occupied Golan Heights are named on the face of the Bill. The addition to the Bill is simply about ensuring that we use the most appropriate parliamentary procedure for a decision that would have a harmful impact on community cohesion in the UK.
Several Members referred to UK Government foreign policy. I will make it absolutely clear that the Bill does not in any way legislate for the UK’s foreign policy with regard to Israel. The Bill will not prevent the UK from imposing sanctions or otherwise changing our foreign policy on any country in the future if it is deemed appropriate by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The Bill does not change our policy on the middle east. Our position on the middle east peace process is and continues to be clear: we support a negotiated settlement leading to a safe and secure Israel, living alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state based on 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, Jerusalem as the shared capital of both states and a just, fair, agreed and realistic settlement for refugees.
I will also make it clear that the UK believes very strongly in the importance of complying with international obligations under the UN charter and in compliance with Security Council resolutions. As I stated on Second Reading, the view of the UK Government is that the Bill is compliant with international law and our obligations under UN Security Council resolution 2334. For those reasons, I respectfully ask hon. Members to withdraw the amendments.
I thank the Minister for her statement. I accept what she says about the Government’s commitment to a two-state solution, and so on, but that does not take away from the fact that substantive elements of the Bill, at the very least, place a serious question mark over that commitment. That is objectively true.
As Opposition Members have made clear many times, we are opposed to the BDS movement and all that it stands for, but this is not about that. The question before us is: what is the best way to tackle that? We believe that the best way to do so is on a cross-party basis by getting people together and creating a political consensus that will hold firm and endure. That is where we stand, and that is the basis of our opposition to the Bill.
It is also extremely important that we reiterate our commitment to international law. Again, I hear what the Minister says, and I do not doubt her sincerity for one moment, but there is nevertheless an opinion among those in the legal community that this legislation substantially questions our commitment to international law, and we are extremely concerned about that.
It is important that we conduct this whole debate in a constructive and friendly way, as I believe we have done so far. It is very important that whatever the outcome of our final deliberations and whether or not the Bill becomes an Act, it is nevertheless extremely important that we collectively reaffirm our commitment to peace and stability between Israel and Palestine.
I am a normal person, not a lawyer, and I am open to suggestions about what would be a legally tight definition. The important thing is that if the amendment were passed, I am sufficiently confident that His Majesty’s Government would draw up the correct legal definitions to ensure that the political views the Committee had expressed were made real. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but there is room for co-operation and hopefully a conclusion on this issue.
I will address amendment 18 first and then the others. Amendment 18 would allow public authorities to choose not to procure from or invest in a company if that would give financial, economic or other benefit to a party that has breached international law.
The UK believes strongly in complying with its obligations under international law. That is why the Bill contains an exception to the ban for considerations that a decision maker reasonably considers are relevant to whether the decision would place the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under international law. Nothing in the Bill breaks international law, nor would it compel any public body to take a decision that would put the UK in breach of international law; but judgment on whether a body is guilty of a violation of international law is not a decision for public authorities. That should be determined by a competent court. I was slightly beaten to that point by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East. Where there has been a judgment that a party has breached international law, the Government will review their response accordingly. Again, it is not the place of public authorities to do so.
The Bill already contains an exception to the ban for considerations relating to labour market misconduct, including modern slavery and human trafficking. That means that public authorities will be able to continue having regard to territorial considerations that are relevant to a breach of international treaties banning forced labour. We recognise that modern slavery often occurs in the supply chains of countries that are not party to international treaties on forced labour and that are unlikely to prosecute the perpetrators. Therefore, the Procurement Bill makes explicit provision for a new exclusion ground that does not require a conviction to disregard bids from suppliers that are known to use forced labour or perpetuate modern slavery.
Amendments 14, 19, 20 and 21 would add an exemption to the application of clause 1 for considerations relating to genocide, ethnic cleansing and apartheid. Apartheid is considered a crime against humanity. Although ethnic cleansing is not recognised as an independent crime under international law, the practice of ethnic cleansing may constitute genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. If genocide or a crime against humanity were ruled to have occurred by a competent national or international court—that is the important point—after consideration of all the evidence available in the context of a credible judicial process, it would send a strong signal to the international community. The Government would take any such ruling very seriously and consider their response, which could include the potential use of sanctions.
It is the long-standing policy of successive British Governments that judgment as to whether genocide or a crime against humanity has occurred is for a competent national or international court. It is not for the UK Government, and it is certainly not for public authorities to decide. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.
I know you are a seasoned political veteran, Sir George—it is always clause 4 that causes a problem, isn’t it? It is always clause 4, and the problem with this clause 4 is that it is the thought police clause. The difference is—[Interruption.] I have been rehearsing that one. I made that wisecrack privately to Sir George the other day, so yes. But this is the thought police clause. The normal police come for someone if they commit an act that is criminal, but the thought police are different. They act if someone “intends” to act in a particular way. Under the Bill, the authorities do not need to demonstrate any proof of intent to publish a particular kind of statement. That is impossible to do in the normal world, so let us just rely on telepathy to find out someone’s intent.
It gets worse, and I thank the hon. Member for Harrow East for taking my intervention. In clause 4, entitled “Related prohibition on statements”, subsection (1)(b) proposes that even
“were it lawful to do so”,
any alleged intent to do so would be a criminal act. You need only consult George Orwell on this, Sir George—prove me wrong if you can—because he says, “Yes, this is the Thinkpol, whose job is to monitor the citizens of Oceania and arrest all those who have committed thoughtcrime in challenge to the status quo authority of the Party and the regime of Big Brother.” Fortunately, there is an escape clause for the Government in clause 4, which states:
“This section does not apply to a statement by a Minister of the Crown”.
Lucky them—but not anybody else.
The convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, better known as the European convention on human rights, was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950—only two years after George Orwell published his book “1984”. The world had just come through a period in which freedom of expression had been brutally suppressed. The ECHR, to which the UK is still a signatory, defines freedom of expression thus:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”
The purpose of the Bill is therefore to break an international convention and undermine a fundamental human right. Why would any Government do that? Is it because this is the red meat that the Tory party is throwing to people—a policy that actively restricts moral and political freedom of expression on human rights, environmental protections and workers’ rights? Are they playing to a narrow audience with dog-whistle policies? We can end this dystopian farce here and now.
Witness after witness, even the witnesses who support the Bill and support the Government’s position on the Bill, said—all of them—that they had difficulties with this clause and how it could possibly be enacted and enforced. We need to take account of that, and I ask the House to support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Airdrie and Shotts. If not, we certainly need to remove clause 4.
I shall start by explaining why we do not support amendment 24, and I will then explain why we feel strongly that clause 4 needs to stand part of the Bill. I will address a few of the specific questions, but I will do so at the end, because I think it is important that hon. Members see the logical flow of the argument.
Amendment 24 seeks to ensure that none of the provisions in clause 4 will conflict with the Human Rights Act 1998. This amendment is unnecessary, as the Government’s assessment is that all the provisions in the Bill are consistent with the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights, including article 10, the right to freedom of expression.
The purpose of the European convention on human rights, which the Human Rights Act implemented into domestic law, is to regulate the relationship between the state and the individual and specifically to protect private persons’ fundamental rights from potential interference by the state. This includes private persons’ article 10 right to freedom of expression. Public authorities, which form part of the state or perform the state’s functions, are the potential perpetrators of ECHR violations and therefore do not have these rights. Public authorities do not have the rights; the rights are to protect private individuals and private bodies against state interference. This assessment was supported by several of the witnesses that the Committee heard from last week, and that is why we believe that the amendment is unnecessary.
Clause 4 prohibits public bodies from publishing statements indicating that they intend to engage in activity prohibited by this Bill. That includes statements indicating that the public body would have acted differently were the legislation not in place. It is important that we focus on public bodies, because this does not restrict the rights of individuals. We talked earlier about the difference, and the simplest way to express that is that if an individual is speaking on their own behalf, they are speaking as a private individual. However, if I say that I am speaking on behalf of my university or my local authority, then I speak on the behalf of a public body.
Academic freedom has been mentioned. If I am a university professor, which I am highly unlikely ever to be, I can say whatever I want. If, however, I stand up and say, “I, Felicity Buchan, speaking on behalf of Imperial College,” which is in my constituency, that is representing the view of Imperial College, as opposed to that of Felicity Buchan.
The Minister is being generous with her time. If the councillor in the hypothetical scenario I gave wanted to make a point, would he have to say, “I am Joe Bloggs. I just so happen to be a councillor. I just so happen to be the leader of the council,” or can he say, “I am a councillor Joe Bloggs and I just so happen to be the leader of the council.” I still do not understand.
I will go into detail on it. Give me one minute and I will go through all those scenarios.
As Members of Parliament, we are always having to declare our interests if we think there is going to be a conflict. I asked a question yesterday about veterans’ health. I am the honorary president of the Royal British Legion. When discussing such topics, particularly when in front of the media, we know exactly where there could be a conflict of interest and therefore make the determination that it should be declared. We should therefore allow the legislation to stay as it is, because the distinction is clear between speaking on behalf of a public body and speaking as an individual elected to represent a point of view.
I agree. That is the distinction between representing a public body and speaking as an individual, even if someone is an elected councillor.
I am going to go into the detail on some points, and then I will take questions.
This clause does not impact an individual’s freedom to express a view. It is clear that declarations of boycotts and divestments are divisive and undermine community cohesion. These types of policies have no place in public bodies. We have seen examples of public bodies making declarations to boycott and divest as far as the law allows. Recent cases of declarations of anti-Israel boycotts that are not intended to be implemented, such as in Leicester, Swansea and Gwynedd councils, have been strongly opposed by Jewish groups. Such declarations are harmful even where the law does not allow boycotts and divestments. Therefore, such declarations cannot be made under the clause.
We heard repeatedly in evidence that a declaration stating, “We would boycott were it legal to do so,” is enough to trigger community friction and antisemitism issues. For instance, in 2014, Leicester City Council passed a motion targeting the activity of the Israeli state with a boycott
“insofar as legal considerations allow”.
I am grateful to the Minister for the case that she is making. We agree with everything she said about that hateful speech, but the problem is that she just said, a minute before, that so long as a person essentially walks out of the council building, or says, “I am talking in an individual capacity”, despite being the leader of the council, they can say all those things and there is no protection under the clause. What meaningful advantage does the clause actually provide?
This very much has the advantage of preventing Leicester City Council from making such a declaration. So anyone representing the views of Leicester City Council and saying, “I am standing here giving the views of Leicester City Council” is not allowed to do that.
Let me move on to exact circumstances. Under the clause, individuals, including councillors, are not prevented from making statements of their personal opinions freely in their own capacity. Councillors are not a public authority and, therefore, they will not be prevented from expressing their support for or voting in favour of a BDS motion. For example, representations made by councillors during a debate that indicate that they would be in favour of their local authority engaging in boycotts or a divestment campaign will not be captured by the clause. It will apply only to statements made on behalf of a local authority. Therefore, if a local authority published the minutes of a debate or a meeting in which a councillor said that they would be in favour of their local authority engaging in such campaigns, this would not be captured.
As I have promised, I will make that distinction clear in the Bill’s explanatory notes. We want this to be very clear. There is a real concern that recent declarations of anti-Israel boycotts, even when they are not implemented in practice, have driven and contributed to rising antisemitism.
I want to return to the example that the Minister cited relating to a personal or public persona. She said that if Felicity Buchan said something in a personal capacity, that would be fine, but if she said it as a professor or representative of an organisation, that would not. If Felicity Buchan were an extremely well-known, recognisable public figure, which she may well be one day, is it considerable that her personal persona would be divisible from her public persona in any credible way that courts or the wider public would recognise?
The Bill is not distinguishing between personas, individual or public. It is a sentiment that I am giving as an individual, as opposed to doing so as leader of my council or head of my university, representing my university. It is about the distinction between the individual and the public body.
I am coming to the end of my remarks. We will put that distinction into very clear guidance in the explanatory notes.
It is important that we get to the bottom of this. There is a real enforcement difficulty here. Some newspapers are not always friendly to my party, some are not friendly to the Labour party, and some, believe it or not, are not friendly to the Conservative party. A newspaper could come up with a scenario in which it was quoting someone directly and giving the impression that that was their view on behalf of a public body, without expressing that that person was speaking in a personal capacity. That is a real difficulty. Of course, the other difficulty is that the Felicity Buchan we are referring to is a Minister of the Crown, so anything that Felicity Buchan says is completely exempt under the clause.
On the point about what a newspaper may or may not infer, clearly for there to be enforcement it needs to be proved. We will go on to talk about enforcement later, but I think there is a clear distinction between stating something in a personal capacity and representing one’s institution. On that basis, I recommend that the amendment be rejected and that clause 4 stand part of the Bill.
I thank hon. Members for all their comments. I agree with Opposition Members that clause 4 needs serious reworking or simply removal from the Bill. As has been mentioned, and as we heard in our evidence sessions, the clause marks a dangerous attack on the article 10 right to freedom of expression set out in the Human Rights Act. We must ensure that the Bill does not impede the rights of individuals freely to express their views.
I am sorry, but I am not reassured by the comments in the impact assessment and from the Minister that the Bill requires such strong provisions preventing freedom of expression. I am surprised that the Government have sought to include such provisions in the Bill. They seem to have failed to acknowledge that the clause has the potential to engage individuals’ human rights, as is proven by the lack of a human rights memorandum to accompany the legislation. I remind Government Members that this Government claim to be a bastion of free speech.
Clause 6 sets out the enforcement authorities for the Bill’s provisions. Subsection (2) sets out that the enforcement authority is the Secretary of State or the Treasury, unless otherwise stated. Subsection (4) states that for any decision or statement made by an English higher education provider, the enforcement authority will be the Office for Students. On the face of it, that seems a fairly benign set-up for enforcement, but it creates a distinction in how the Bill treats different public bodies, on which I would like to press the Minister.
On the one hand, the Bill is saying that enforcement against higher education providers will be given over to a third actor, the Office for Students. On the other hand, it is saying that local government will be policed by national Government instead. Amendment 8 tries to put those things on a more consistent footing and to say that there should be less variance in enforcement. The amendment puts forward the Office for Local Government as a more suitable authority for enforcement of the Bill’s provisions in relation to local government.
I hope that the Minister will cover this issue in her response, because I do not know why there is divergence. She can put me right if I am wrong, but I fear that this is a continuation of central Government’s heavy-handed manner with regard to local authorities. Part of the problem with our approach is that we get devolution when local leaders get the answer “right”, but not so much when central Government disagree with them. Adding clause 6 to the Bill unamended will continue the trend of the Government wishing to keep the reins on local government. Given that they have already chosen to use the Office for Students, surely aligning that with the Office for Local Government would make an awful lot more sense.
Amendment 9 is similar to my amendment 4 on Henry VIII powers. The Government are reserving the ability to change the enforcement authorities as they wish under subsection (6). Amendment 9 seeks to delete that provision and ensure that we can set out, through normal parliamentary processes, who will enforce the legislation. Local councils are not going to change that much, and public bodies generally are not going to change that much, but the Government need emergency powers to vary the enforcement agency. If the Government wish to do things a certain way, they should put that in the Bill, and if they wish to change it they should return to Parliament through primary processes.
I urge the Committee to reject the amendments. Let me explain why.
Amendment 8 would establish the Office for Local Government as the enforcement authority in relation to a decision or statement made by local authorities, except where specified otherwise. We have carefully considered the most appropriate enforcement authorities across the sectors that are covered by the Bill; for example, the Pensions Regulator has an existing role in regulating the administration and governance of the local government pension scheme. Although we are expanding some powers, the enforcement authorities listed in the Bill already have an existing role in enforcement for those public authorities. That is not the case for the Office for Local Government, which the hon. Member for Nottingham North is proposing.
The Office for Local Government is not envisaged as an enforcement authority for anything. It is intended to provide data and analysis about the performance of local government and to support its improvement, but it is not envisaged to have a role in regulating local government’s activities. It would therefore not be appropriate for it to have an enforcement role against local authorities in this context. Furthermore, Oflog is an office of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and, as such, does not have a statutory basis. The effect of amendment 8 would therefore be to keep responsibility with the Secretary of State.
Amendment 9 would remove the power given to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office to change the enforcement authorities in relation to a decision or statement captured by the Bill. The Bill will provide a power for the Secretary of State and other enforcement authorities to issue compliance notices, and to investigate and fine public bodies, where there is a breach of the ban. Public bodies subject to the ban will also be susceptible to judicial review if they break this law.
We have carefully considered the most appropriate enforcement authorities across some of the sectors covered by the Bill, such as the Pensions Regulator. For higher education providers on the register of the Office for Students, the Office for Students should be the responsible enforcement authority. As the Bill is drafted, the Secretary of State or the Treasury should be the enforcement authority for all other public bodies subject to clauses 1 and 4. Ministers of the Crown are not subject to the additional enforcement regime but are subject to judicial review.
In time, the most appropriate regulators for each of the sectors covered by the Bill may change. The Bill provides the necessary flexibility, via the power given to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office, to update the respective enforcement authorities if they change. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw his amendments.
I am grateful for the Minister’s reply. I do not intend to press either amendment to a Division, but I will make a couple of points in response.
The Minister mentions that Oflog may not sit elegantly with the Office for Students, because the Office for Students has an existing role doing this type of activity, whereas Oflog does not. However, Oflog was only established in June, so of course it does not have a similar record or similar experience, but that is a person-made thing that could be changed. The Minister also says that Oflog was not envisaged as an enforcement authority, but I cannot believe that the Office for Students was ever really envisaged to be an enforcement authority either.
Similarly, the default enforcement authority in the Bill is the Secretary of State. I do not think that many people go to the ballot box imagining the capacities of different Secretaries of State to kick doors in; I hope not, anyway, because they certainly would not cast a ballot for me. I am therefore not wholly convinced that that is a brilliant argument against the amendment.
I also cannot accept the final point that the most appropriate agency may change in time. If that were the case as a result of the disestablishment of the Office for Students, say, that would itself require primary legislation, and the enforcement agency would be changed routinely as part of that. I do not think that Ministers should have the ability to change enforcement agencies on a whim—because one agency does not give the answers they want, for example—but I think there is a real risk of that. However, I do not think that that is enough to divide the Committee at this point, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jacob Young.)