Political and Human Rights (African Great Lakes)

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Westminster Hall

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) on bringing this matter to Westminster Hall for consideration and on giving us all an opportunity to participate in the debate and to underline further some of the things that he spoke about very clearly in his presentation. It is always good for us in the House to be aware of things that are happening elsewhere in the world and to reflect that in Westminster Hall debates, but some of the information that we have as elected representatives comes through our own constituencies. That is one reason why I want to make a contribution to the debate today.

The great lakes region has been the site of more than a decade of unrest. The outflow of more than 2 million Rwandans in the wake of the 1994 genocide was an exodus of unprecedented size and swiftness. There was a debate in Parliament last week on that issue. It was raw for the Members, because some had had the opportunity to go to Rwanda and see how that country had suffered. The failure of the international community to respond effectively set in motion further cycles of conflict in the region, including the devastating war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that has involved many other countries in Africa and has claimed the lives of more than 3 million people. I can tell people trying to visualise what that means that it is the whole of the population of Northern Ireland doubled. That gives some perspective. It gives an idea of the numbers who were murdered.

The hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Tom Blenkinsop) referred to some of the issues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cases of police brutality against migrants have been catalogued. There have been cases involving Congolese soldiers. Some were charged with rape. Unfortunately, in that region, rape seems to be used as a weapon against women. The hon. Member for Islington North referred to that practice, and each and every one of us inside and outside this Chamber is deeply disturbed by it.

According to Mr Rupert Colville, 14 officers were acquitted. He added that the UN human rights workers on the ground were still carefully analysing the judgment, but said that in the light of what is known so far,

“the judiciary has not met the expectations of the numerous victims of rape who had fully participated in the trial.”

In the trial, women were asked for their statements and they made them. The trial that went ahead was for a mass rape that took place in 2012, but again no one has been made accountable for that. It seems that they have all been able to get away with it—or most of them have. Perhaps in his response the Minister can say whether there have been any discussions with the Democratic Republic of the Congo about the atrocities.

Elsewhere in the region, a decades-long conflict in northern Uganda has abated in intensity, but the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army has increased its activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Central African Republic.

There is great concern—it is certainly a concern of mine and I believe that others are concerned as well—in relation to business. From the background notes that we have been given and from our own previous knowledge and discussions, we are aware that some western companies are very keen to push into the DRC and start drilling. We must be ever mindful of the human rights of the local people, their land ownership and their lives.

Let me quote from the notes. A recent report by Kofi Annan’s Africa Progress Panel claimed that five mining deals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone were sold to western firms for $1.36 billion less than they were worth, short-changing the people of the Congo. I am not against big business—far from it—but I like to see fairness and transparency and what is right, and I am afraid that in this instance those are all sadly missing. It seems that some people and some companies—not all—wish to go ahead and override the opinions of local people.

It is important that we also put this point on the record. There is some indication that the world-renowned Virunga national park, home to the rare mountain gorillas, is involved. That is something that we are probably aware of from our own interests outside the Chamber. Again, some companies have said that they will not explore for oil, but one company, SOCO, has declared that it is quite happy to pursue any of the rights for oil in those hills. Other companies—Total, the French oil giant, and Britain’s Dominion Petroleum—have said that they will certainly not do that.

It is important, when we realise that things have been undervalued and the Congolese people let down, to remember the following. Some 7 million children in the DRC lack access to education. Some 2.4 million children are acutely malnourished. Malaria, cholera and measles are a major threat due to inadequate health care, water supplies and sanitation. Roads are a mess, and electricity is scarce and expensive. Some 6.3 million people require food support. That is what is happening in the Congo. Then we see some big businesses relentlessly pursuing dividends for their people.

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Ind)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a first-class speech, if I may say so. What he says about the requirement for transparency is absolutely true, and the UK is currently signing up to the extractive industries transparency initiative. It is fair to say that many of these deals in the past have involved middlemen who take off huge amounts of money and subsequently sell on to extractive industry companies. Perhaps the key thing for us is to ensure that the companies based in the UK adhere to the standards that we would expect them to.

[Jim Shannon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I say to the Minister that there is an indication that some British companies are being morally and financially correct, but other companies are not, and those companies need to be made accountable. I think that that is the point that the hon. Gentleman was making, and I fully endorse it.

As a whole, the region continues to host more than 1 million refugees and 10 million internally displaced persons. That is a vast number—10 million internally displaced persons. One major source of those conflicts has been disputes over group and national membership. Ethnic, racial and religious populations have been identified as illegitimate members of local communities and nations, and their exclusion has been used to legitimise individual persecution, ethnic violence, civil war and genocide. Targeted populations have been forcibly displaced from their homes, social networks and governmental protection, and they have been forced to seek refuge within their own countries and across borders.

If we look at specific countries in the region, it is clear that there is persecution against Christians. Mombasa in Kenya has been perceived as a place where there is freedom to preach and share Christianity, but some in that community have different intentions. Worthy News reported:

“Three people were injured after a mob of about 10 assailants attacked worshipers at a church in Bamburi, Mombasa last week, according to All Africa Global Media. The gang gained entry into the Bride of the Lamb International Ministries compound after they cut through an iron fence; after the assault, they fled to the adjacent Tower of Faith Church where they injured four others.

Bride of the Lamb International Ministries Chairman Michael Peter said that the attacks were intended to target the clergy.

‘This is not the first time our ministry has been attacked,’ said Peter. ‘Over the past few weeks we have had attacks on our churches across the country including our residence here.’

Peter said the ministry had reported the attacks numerous times to the Bamburi police station, but to date no action has been taken.”

That report describes attacks specifically on a religious minority group, namely Christians in Kenya. I will mention a couple of other countries as well, to highlight the problems that we face.

In Zanzibar, Tanzania, there was serious violence driven by—excuse my Northern Ireland accent—“Vugu vugu la uamsho”, the Revival Movement for the Preservation of Islam, which claimed to be wiping out all Christians from the Zanzibar archipelago, mainly Zanzibar Island. Churches were burnt, church property was looted and Christians, especially Church leaders, were threatened with death. The Zanzibar archipelago is the scene of serious hostilities against Christians, not only on the islands but on mainland Tanzania. Many of us would not imagine that there would be any problems in Tanzania, but there certainly are. We must highlight the problems during this debate, and I hope that the Minister will give us some idea of what our Government can do about them.

In Tanzania, there are strong Islamic militant groups that often persecute Christians heavily. On mainland Tanzania, the push for the further spread of Islam is less violent but equally persistent. Part of that push is happening through the constitutional review process and the strategic infiltration of main sectors of society. Such groups are putting people in society so that they can directly influence what happens and impact on those of a Christian faith. If the push for secession succeeds, the presence of the Church on Zanzibar and Pemba Island is likely to be reduced to nearly zero. That cannot be allowed to happen, and I hope that the Minister can give us some answers.

The frantic moves of Islamists in mainland Tanzania will continue. For the Church, that means that difficult times are likely to be ahead. Kenya and Tanzania are just two of the nations in the region in which Christians are experiencing increasing persecution. I recently spoke to a constituent who is a member of a local Church of Ireland congregation in Newtownards, one of the main towns in my constituency, who told me how the lives of two of their missionaries in Tanzania were being made more difficult every day. That is a contribution from some of those I represent, who are telling me what is happening on the ground.

The fact is that although many of the nations we are discussing are Christian on paper, the Government are not supporting those ideals or dealing with the persecution against Christians. There seems to be a somewhat lackadaisical attitude to the incidents that have occurred, and it is time that our Government asked the Governments in those countries to stand up against such actions. That is where we, in this Chamber, must come in. We must speak up for those in the region who are being persecuted, we must stand up for the two missionaries I have mentioned who are linked to that church in my constituency, and we must apply pressure to the Government to do what is right. That can be done in numerous ways, such as through embassies, through the fair distribution of international aid—I am aware of examples of international aid being directed away from Christian religious groups because of their beliefs—and by applying pressure at all levels to ensure that Governments realise that, although we seek to help them and their populations, we cannot and will not do so while closing our eyes to the plight of people whose only crime is to follow Jesus.

I support the hon. Member for Islington North in this debate, and I ask the Minister again what is being done to combat the problems and what the Government will pledge to do from this day forward. My constituents are deeply interested in the matter, and I know that I am not the only MP who has an interest in it. Let us use any influence that we wield for the good of the people in the great lakes region—and, indeed, throughout the world.

International Criminal Court (Kenya)

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Ind)]

I am conscious that some hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber know quite a lot about this subject and have shown great interest in Africa, particularly Kenya, over the years. Some of what I say will not be news to them, and will be well known to the Minister, but it is important to set the scene and to say a few things that may seem obvious to some, but not to others observing what is going on at the moment. Today, I am particularly concerned about the nature of the ongoing action by the International Criminal Court against President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto, and that is, primarily, the context in which I will speak. I will make a few comments about the ICC, but they will be entirely contextual and legitimate, and I will be careful not to stray too far, Mr Caton.

On Monday 13 October, the African Union will meet to discuss the possibility of African ICC member states withdrawing from the ICC en masse. That meeting will take place in Addis Ababa and was precipitated by the ICC’s treatment of President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto, but the crux has been a long time coming. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in holding people to account in front of the ICC, but the nature of the present action against President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto is of particular concern.

Some nations, particularly African nations, that are signatories to the treaty of Rome are placing the future of the ICC in question. There is a risk that Africans in the UK—I speak to many of them in diasporas of all sorts—and particularly Kenyans will see it as the African criminal court, rather than the International Criminal Court. I want to set out how and why that has happened. I am not critical in any sense of the Government’s position on Kenya over the past year or so; they have handled the situation not elegantly—that may be putting too fine a point on it—but rather well earlier in the year, when President Kenyatta won the election. The Prime Minister encouraged him to come to the UK and met him soon after his election, which sent a significant message. Nevertheless, there is a strange and strained diplomatic relationship, in that we still support the ICC and its ongoing action to bring the President to court.

Kenya is one of our most important allies on the African continent. One of our largest foreign training bases is there, and the UK and Kenya host each other’s large diasporas. Trade with Kenya through Nairobi has been increasing almost exponentially for some years. We have the strongest of historical links, too. I will not go into whether the empire was good or bad. There were many good things about it, although we tend to remember the bad things, but the long view shows benefits that accrued on both sides.

Sometimes our relationship with Kenya has been fraught, to put it mildly, notably during the Mau Mau uprising. It is to the Government’s credit that at the beginning of the summer they recognised that crimes that were broadly described as being against humanity took place when we were running the show, and reparation has been made to Kenyans who were affected. Some people are ambivalent about that, because some Kenyans were fighting against British soldiers at the time, but the Government’s general view—I am not sure what the Opposition’s position is—was that it was right to make reparation. Soldiers who behaved abominably, as some did, cannot be held to account now because they are dead, and we should remember that, but we should also remember the context in which the Mau Mau uprising took place, and the nature of the deployment that our troops faced. However, we bear in mind that we are making reparation for what can today be described as war crimes.

I will not rehearse the democratic period in Kenya, but will fast forward to 2007, when there was bad violence just before the election. There is no question about that, and no one doubts it.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for bringing this matter to the Chamber for consideration. Some 600,000 people were displaced and 1,100 were killed, including 30 women and children who were burned alive in a church. Does he believe that now is the time—time is going by fast—for the International Criminal Court to try those who were responsible for those crimes?

[Eric Joyce]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his important intervention, which goes to the crux of the debate. I will explore some aspects of the decision that sits with the ICC, but it is becoming a political issue. Of course it is right to hold people to account, but things happen in the world, in Africa and, historically, closer to home, and sometimes a choice must be made between justice and peace. That is not to say that standards are lower, but as my argument develops it will be seen that this is one such case.

[David Simpson (Upper Bann) (DUP)]

Innocent people have been murdered and burned alive in churches, so surely the Government must address the whole issue of corruption in Kenya. Countries donate money to African countries where there is a lot of corruption, and Governments must deal with that.

[Eric Joyce]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. It is true that when we think about Africa, politics and governance, we tend automatically to think about corruption. Corruption in many parts of Africa and of course in Kenya must be dealt with in every possible way. We must encourage the authorities to do that, and I think the authorities in Kenya, as in most African states, are willing to do so. Sometimes we are a little too ready and quick to flag up corruption as a synonym for a nation state’s name, instead of remembering that such states are sometimes making enormous progress. I will not rehearse the arguments about Rwanda, which is perhaps the best example, but Kenya is also a good example of a state that is making bounding progress. That is part of what causes me concern about the ICC action.

We know that there was violence before the 2007 general election, and we know that following the election, presidential candidates came together to form a Government of national unity. President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga were the two primary office-holders, and that coalition held together for a full term of office. Significantly, violence was almost entirely absent at the following election, after the coalition—the election that has just taken place. That suggests that a lasting resolution was achieved with the coalition back in 2007, and Kenyan people understand that.However, part of that coalition agreement was that there would be an inquiry, quite rightly, into the violence that took place during the election.

The inquiry was duly conducted by a Kenyan judge, Justice Philip Waki, who felt that six individuals had committed serious offences, but when the Kenyan Parliament took a vote—it votes on judicial or legal matters in a way that we probably would not—it decided not to refer the matter onwards, so the judge decided to refer it to the United Nations Secretary-General, with a recommendation that it should then be passed on to the ICC. That is why the series of six cases has ended up where it has. It was essentially a quasi-judicial process in Kenya, which has ended up as an administrative and legal process in The Hague.

Following a two-to-one decision in a pre-trial chamber in The Hague, the ICC indicted a number of people. Some of those cases have collapsed, but now, six years later, the cases against President Kenyatta and Vice-President Ruto, who won this year’s election, continue. Both men have been indicted and both have made voluntary appearances, unarrested, at The Hague. We have seen them on our televisions; they have freely attended as required, and they have supported the process up to a point.

The action by the ICC, six years after events on which there is one dissenting opinion, has enormous implications for the Kenyan people. It is true that Mr Kenyatta is not the first Head of State to be indicted by the ICC, and I will come to that shortly, but Kenya is of enormous importance to the UK—that is not to say that Sudan is not, but Kenya is particularly important to the UK and all our allies. Kenya has also successfully come through a period of strife, when other countries have collapsed under the terrible weight of internecine warfare. Kenya is the great economic success story of east and central Africa. It is leading the fight against terrorism in Somalia. We know now, given events over the past few weeks at the Westgate mall, how terrible a price the Kenyan people are paying for being at the front in that ongoing battle, but they have not wilted or split. Kenyans have remained united in the face of all that has been thrown at them by terrorists. It seems to me that we reward them by insisting that the President and Vice-President, who are leading them into what promises to be a very decent future, stand trial at the ICC, accused of hotly disputed offences that took place years ago.

People may well say that the ICC has an important role to play, and I would agree. They may say that it is not for us mere mortals to make judgments about evidence, and that there must be due process. They may say that politics should not play a part. I would say, however, that although it is not ordinary for politicians to intervene in judicial processes, the ICC is inherently political, as are its outcomes. It seems entirely appropriate that, at some points, when there are very significant political implications for a particular nation, it is for politicians and not civil servants to decide. In the same way, the Chancellor does not ask his civil servants to read out his Budget in the Chamber or ask them to lead the whole Budget process. In this case, it is for politicians around the world, including in the UK, fundamentally to make a decision. It is beyond the powers of civil servants, Government servants, or the international Government servants—whatever we call them—who run the ICC’s administration and procedures.

It is significant to note that all 32 indictees of the ICC have come from Africa. Eight African states have been involved, so I guess that is about four each. Initially, they were primarily from the Congo, and now a number are from Kenya. Four of those countries—it says this in Wikipedia, and I have also seen ICC officials saying it—referred cases involving their own people to the ICC. The ICC says, “Come on guv, you can’t blame us for taking action, because they were referred to us,” but that is where it becomes inherently political, because we put great pressure on those states to refer cases to the ICC. We cannot just hold our hands up and say, “Nothing to do with us, guv.” Clearly, we put enormous pressure on those states. Cases involving the Lord’s Resistance Army, for example, in Uganda, remain a cause célèbre—although less than they were, I suppose—and there are other cases.

Enormous pressure was put on those states, and they did what we asked, but now, because they did, they find themselves in a terrible bind. The only place that the ICC is able to act is Africa, and that is a terrible state of affairs. It cannot act in nations that are in the orbit of China—we all understand why—or of Russia, so the “stans” and the far east are out. Sri Lanka is out, obviously. India is out. Anything in the orbit of America is out. Obviously, Europe is out—we are not going to indict ourselves, are we? The United States did not sign up to the ICC originally, because it was concerned that former politicians might be arraigned in front of the ICC. It did not sign up for political reasons, and it still has not signed up for the same reasons. Of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the three most powerful have not signed up for political reasons. That takes out the great majority of the countries of the world, leaving those that are not considered to be strategically important, and—guess what?—are in Africa.

The Africans say, “This is the African criminal court, really, isn’t it? It is not an international criminal court at all.” The ICC says, “We are having a look at other cases,” but we know that it will not take action against FARC or anybody else in Colombia, for obvious reasons—because there is a peace process. It clearly will not take action, nor would I particularly want it to. Therefore, we end up with action being taken only against Africans, and even then only when political implications have been considered. In many cases, action has not been taken because of politics. Therefore, people who say that it is up to ICC officials are missing the point; it is fundamentally a political issue.

I shall not bang on forever, Mr Caton—other Members may wish to jump in—but I will say a little more. I suspect that at least one Government Member will correct me if I am wrong, but I recall that, when I arrived in this place, just before the final stage of the International Criminal Court Act 2001, the then Opposition opposed joining the ICC. It may be that they changed and voted to do so at the end, but I remember that, at the time, the argument in the Chamber was that the then Opposition—now the Government—strongly opposed it. They did so because they were concerned—I voted for and still support the ICC’s existence, but the concern was legitimate at the time—that soldiers, deployed as they are around the world, in all sorts of different places, might find themselves captured, not returned to the UK, and in front of the ICC. There was a deep concern about that.

Those fears were largely allayed, and clearly, the Government are a supporter. The fears have not come to fruition, because we are willing and able to try our own people. We show that and have actually done it, so there does not seem to be a great risk. I notice, however, that the Americans still have not signed up, so they clearly think there is a risk. There is at least one politician, famously—it would not be fair to say his name, but I think most of us know who it is—whom many lawyers have said might well be arraigned in front of the ICC. Even that one case, and the fear that others might happen in future, would stop the Americans signing up.

Such fear is significant. UK citizens are not more likely than anybody else to commit serious offences, but the concern was that it might become political, and indeed, I think that has proven to be the case, almost by default. It has not become political on purpose; it has become political because the ICC has been unable to be even-handed across the world, for strong political reasons.

I will not go through the entire history of the ICC, although I quite rightly could. However, it is worth reflecting on the principle of the ICC. I may have sounded very condemnatory of the ICC before, but the principle is entirely laudable. Obviously, it extends out of our experiences with more than one tribunal in the mid-part of the last century, just after world war two.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

I presume that the hon. Gentleman is about to embark on a discussion of the laudable principles that lie behind the conception of the ICC, and I agree that they are laudable. However, does he agree that principles are one thing but the practical outworking of what we have seen, which he alluded to in the earlier part of his contribution, is quite another, and that what we really need to see is a workable ICC that is trying to get itself divorced from the practical and political considerations that inhibit it from doing much of its work?

[Eric Joyce]

The hon. Member is absolutely bang on. His intervention was very thoughtful and considered, and he is absolutely right. The difficulty at the moment is to get past what is a very dangerous phase for the ICC. If the ICC gets it wrong and if the international community gets it wrong in respect of Kenya, the ICC will fall apart; I do not think that it will continue, in a meaningful sense, in existence. I know that there is concern among NGOs and experts, including lawyers, that if there were to be a discontinuation of the case against the President and Vice-President of Kenya, that would effectively be the end of the ICC. I do not agree with that view. I will not put all the arguments as to why I disagree with it. I simply think that that would not be the case. It would be more practically effective to find a way of dealing with the situation, which effectively means putting a case into abeyance, but I will say more on that at my conclusion. I have one or two more points to make quickly before then.

[Jim Shannon]

The hon. Gentleman referred to the ICC and its credibility. The fact is that the Kenyan Government have decided to withdraw from the ICC and that there are cases pending at the court. How does he see the role for Government in trying to ensure that there will still be prosecutions, now that Kenya is no longer—at least on paper—part of the ICC?

[Eric Joyce]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I think that the technical situation is that the case will continue even if Kenya withdraws, although my instinct is that it will be difficult to do anything in that situation. I suppose the ICC may criticise the President’s absence and then carry on with the trial. Theoretically, and it is pretty theoretical, the African nations that are considering withdrawing—I hope that they do not withdraw—would still be subject to any current cases involving them, although not to any future cases. So, for the moment the case against the President would continue. In a sense, therefore, it is academic whether Kenya has chosen to withdraw from the ICC or not, although I hope that it will come back in. I think that Kenya is making a very powerful statement, just as some other African states that are supporting Kenya’s cause at the moment are making a similarly powerful statement.

I will start to draw to a conclusion. I visited the ICC’s former chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, in The Hague a couple of years ago, regarding a particular case; it is pertinent to this debate, so I hope that you will bear with me, Mr Caton. My concern at the time was that all these people being indicted were Africans, and I was concerned about one particular case. I was concerned about President al-Bashir, as a head of state, being indicted, but in particular I was concerned about a chap called Bemba, who was a Congolese leader indicted for an alleged crime in the Central African Republic. I spoke to Luis Moreno-Ocampo and I was with him for much of the day—strangely. He gave me a tutorial in how the ICC operated, and convinced me that he was doing his best and that the ICC was doing its best. It was taking a long time to get a prosecution. It has now had one successful prosecution, that of Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mr Moreno-Ocampo was very convincing and he convinced me that the ICC is indeed a good thing. There are clear difficulties, which the ICC recognises, in pursuing cases in the orbits of nations that do not fancy having the ICC in their own backyard, as I have described before.

Then, however, Mr Moreno-Ocampo was gone, and he has been replaced by the former Gambian Justice Minister. My instinct, although it is harsh to say it, is that, although I have no doubt she will be a very fine lawyer, that appointment in itself was a political nod—“We are only indicting Africans, so we will have an African in charge”. However, just to show the difficulty, she herself—I will not be critical of her personally but contextually—was the Justice Minister in Gambia. Gambia is not the most pure place on the planet. The last time that I was in Gambia, as we were driving to the airport there was lots of security around and we discovered that the President had just shot a whole bunch of prisoners, some of whom were political prisoners essentially. Gambia has its issues, so it seems to me that a political nod in a particular direction may have had the opposite effect to that intended. I think that the ICC recognised the need to make a political gesture, and to some degree therefore it accepts that the whole thing is a political process.

It seems to me that at the moment we tend, right across the board, to apply values straight from our desks and pop them straight down on to the desks of politicians and other leading folk in African states, without really considering the period of development that those countries are going through right now, as we speak. Just as I walked across here to Westminster Hall, I was reflecting—I am not quite sure why—on the fact that most of us would put our hands up and say, “Chemical weapons—bad thing.” However, as far as I can remember, we were developing chemical weapons into the ’80s. Chemical weapons became a bad thing in the ’90s, but I think it was still British military doctrine to use chemical weapons until just a few years before then. I remember that when I was a private soldier, troops alongside me volunteered to go to Porton Down to have chemicals put on their hands—I do not think that Porton Down was looking for a solution to the common cold—and that was in the ’80s.

We have now moved forward and we say that chemical weapons are a horror; Winston Churchill was a fan of chemical weapons, but now we say that they are a horror and it has taken us 15 or 20 years for us to get to that point. Now we say, “Here is a democracy in Africa and we expect you to uphold the same standards that we do here in all the same ways”, without trying to contextualise things. That is a tough gig, as the Africans become increasingly nationalistic, and pan-African nationalistic, if that is not too grand a phrase to use; I am not harking back to a slightly different phenomenon from 60 years ago. However, if Africans are in that zone and in many cases looking towards China rather than looking towards us, it is because there is a very strong taint of a kind of imperialist attitude.

My understanding—what I am about to say may be wrong, but I do not think that it is—is that the Kenyans have refused to accredit three diplomats; the would-be ambassadors from France, Germany and Belgium. I understand that that happened just a few days ago, and I also understand that the Tanzanians refused to accredit the new German ambassador, on account of the fact that she had invited—probably unwisely, because it was clearly a gesture on her part—the former Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, as a guest of honour for a wee party before she left. That was a clear statement, so the Tanzanians went, “That was a nice statement. Here’s another one—off you go.” So that was a neat political statement by a daft German ambassador—a former German ambassador to Kenya—but there is a lot of that going on.

During the election in Kenya, the American ambassador—everyone will have heard references to the British ambassador, which are not true—allegedly said, “Choices have consequences.” And the Kenyans went, “OK, then, so we will choose to do the thing you don’t want us to do, obviously.” The consequence was that the Americans got the person they did not want, ironically just as we got Jomo Kenyatta, who was originally not the guy we wanted. There it is—we handled it then and we handle it now.

To conclude—I have been going on rather a long time—I know that it is a difficult situation for the Government. They have to support the ICC; I have no question about that. I know that the Government are seized of the importance of maintaining the rule of law—as far as we can—but also of the importance of maintaining a strong relationship with a really important ally, for all the reasons that we all know; I will not rehearse them again. However, the fact is that there is a crux and if the crux is not properly climbed then the ICC will fall off and it will no longer be an effective and meaningful international force.

Just as a slight digression, I will say that it is possible for someone to spend five years in the ICC and then get found not guilty, as one Congolese chap did at the end of last year. So we suspend certain rules and assumptions—reasonably, because it is very hard to gather evidence—but we should remember that Jean-Pierre Bemba remains there. His trial is now in its third year and he has been there for almost six years, with no end in sight. If he is found not guilty, he will have spent seven or eight years in custody. If anyone tried to do that anywhere else, we would say that that country was a dictator state. We have made allowances and allowed that to happen at the ICC. I am concerned about how long the process takes but I am not critical per se, because I know that it is very hard to gather evidence and to argue the case when we are talking about certain countries, such as the Central African Republic. In this case, it is for the politicians to make a political decision to take the matter out of the hands of administrators and to put the case against President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. That would give the Kenyans a fair crack of the whip at a time when they really need our support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent intervention, and puts the difficult question very well. It is, however, important to remember that Kenya has chosen to be a member of the International Criminal Court. If it withdraws, it will leave an international institution that it chose to join. As we have already heard, several countries have refused to join the International Criminal Court. If we are a member of an institution, we have to accept that it has rules that it must apply to its members without fear or favour. The reason why we need to support the Kenyan Government is that they face the very difficult situation caused by the Westgate shopping centre attack, but equally, the fact is that Kenya chose to be a member of the International Criminal Court and, as a consequence of decisions made in Kenya, the court has been seized of the case and is proceeding with it.

To return to the Westgate shopping mall, rigorous inquiries are taking place, and must continue to do so, into the circumstances leading to the attacks. We need to support the Kenyan Government in their taking steps to bring those involved to justice and to ensure that such an incident does not recur. We must also, however, conduct rigorous inquiries into the perpetrators of the violence that followed the 2007 election, because we cannot take action in one area, but not in another, and I therefore turn to the Kenyan Government’s possible attempts to withdraw from the ICC.

We must reflect on the violence in 2007, when, as we have heard, more than 1,000 people were killed and 600,000 people were displaced. The investigations into the violence culminated in the ICC bringing charges, including against the Kenyan President, of crimes against humanity and of orchestrating ethnic violence. For that reason, charges have been brought against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto.

[Eric Joyce]

I do not dispute my hon. Friend’s earnestness and his argument, but can he imagine a situation in which the UK Prime Minister is held responsible by the ICC for some terrible cataclysm? Does he think that we would agree to send the UK Prime Minister to The Hague?

[Ian Lucas]

That would be massively controversial, but we are a member of an international institution. We are discussing international problems, and the world has to deal with more and more internationally connected issues every day: events in Africa profoundly affect our constituencies in the UK. Far from this being a time for us to withdraw from international action, we should be more involved. If we submit ourselves as a nation to the authority of the International Criminal Court, we must accept that that court has jurisdiction. Such an issue would be difficult and many in the United Kingdom would not want to accept the court’s jurisdiction, but if we have submitted to the court through legislation, as has been mentioned, we must accept the consequences. We cannot duck out when it gets difficult; we must accept that such difficult issues need to be addressed, as they should be by the nations involved.

It is a difficult problem of that sort—nobody pretends that it is not difficult—that we now have to address. The Parliament of Kenya is dealing with the difficulty that, in the hypothetical case mentioned by my hon. Friend, might apply in the United Kingdom. The two politicians are not the only individuals facing charges. I understand that the ICC has also issued an arrest warrant for a journalist called Walter Barasa for offering bribes to prosecution witnesses in the trial of Deputy President William Ruto. However, I believe that this trial is the first time that sitting leaders have been tried before the court.

In September 2013—last month—Kenyan MPs, having tabled a motion, voted to pull out of the ICC, and a Bill is likely to be introduced. The withdrawal will still have to pass through Parliament and could take more than a year to come into effect. The ICC will in the meantime continue with the trials of the President and the Deputy President, but if Kenya does pull out, no charges will be able to be brought in this way in the future.

I listened very carefully to the hon. Member for Falkirk and I am aware, of course, of the perception that exists in Africa, linked to the United Kingdom’s role on the continent—its “imperialist past”. Although I respect the hon. Gentleman’s views, I cannot agree with him in this case. I have to say to him that this is about the creation of international institutions and dealing with the very difficult issues to which the hon. Member for Stone referred. We talk about what is happening in Syria, Egypt, Somalia, and Mali. All these matters have in some way involved international capacity and interventions, whether they be military or non-military interventions, in different places at different times. The process of dealing with the problems has been one of using international institutions, because these are international problems.

[Ian Lucas]

I was not specifically, in the context in which I was speaking, talking about the International Criminal Court. I was talking about international problems being dealt with through international institutions. The United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations are the most obvious example. I was making the general point that international institutions and countries, working together, need to deal with international problems, which manifest themselves within individual countries.

We know that in north Africa, for example, many of the things that have caused major problems in the region have involved groups of people crossing borders at different times. Those borders are often ill defined and not policed in any way. Mali would be one example, and Somalia and Kenya are another. I am talking about a collective approach, through organisations such as the United Nations, and a progression of that. I am saying that, in particular cases, the use of the International Criminal Court is appropriate. For that reason, when countries choose to join the ICC process, it is appropriate that we, as a country that has also submitted itself to that process, support the process.

I think that we need to respect the role of the ICC and international principles of justice and democracy and apply those principles in the future, so I would be extremely concerned about the implications of Kenya withdrawing from the ICC if Kenya were to withdraw, because that would be a step away from dealing with very difficult, shared problems in a collective way. It would be a step backwards, because it would be a step towards more isolation. Ultimately, that would bring about a lower level of capacity to solve the problems that we want to address.

[Eric Joyce]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way again; this will be my last intervention. Kenya will not be isolated, because all the African Union countries will come out of the ICC and it will fall apart. Who knows what will happen soon? I hope that it does not happen, but the risk is that the Kenyans, the Ugandans, the Tanzanians, the Rwandans—most of the African states—will, very sadly and against their own instincts, come out en masse. That is the great risk.

[Ian Lucas]

The real challenge is that if African countries did that collectively, that would lead to a rupture in the relationship between African countries and other countries, which would be deeply worrying and sad.

[Eric Joyce]

Countries that are not members, such as America.

[Ian Lucas]

Well, the United Kingdom is a member and has a very long-standing commitment to the ICC. For that reason, this is a difficult time; people are working through a difficult issue. That is why we should be supporting the ICC at this time, rather than saying that when the going gets tough, we opt out. In those circumstances, the institution will never make any progress. What is needed is for the process to continue and for dialogue to continue. We must support the development of international institutions. Having agreed to set up the ICC and having become a member, if we do not support it when the pressure is on, the institution will never make any progress. It is clear that if that is the case, we will have one less weapon in our armoury to deal with the hugely difficult international problems that we face.

I know that there is a great deal of concern and worry about the ICC proceedings relating to Kenya and that that is affecting our relationship with Kenya. It was inevitable that that would be the case. It is cast into even sharper relief by what has happened in Nairobi in the last month. The hon. Member for Stone has, legitimately and properly, pointed out the practical concerns that are presented by the dilemma that the Government face.

I shall therefore ask the Minister a few questions that he can consider in his response to the debate. First, what does he consider would be the implications of Kenya withdrawing from the ICC? What is his assessment of the position more broadly of African countries on the question of the ICC proceedings against Kenya at the moment and what steps they might take in the months ahead? What specific discussions has he had concerning the operation of the ICC process, and what steps has he taken to try to resolve the dilemmas that we have discussed?

I know that this is a very difficult problem for the UK Government. I know that they will address the problem with rigour, but I do think that engagement is extremely important in the time ahead. We need to remember that Kenya has in the past chosen to be a member of the ICC and it is for that reason that the court is seized of this issue in the first place.

Shaker Aamer

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Alistair Burt]

I can certainly do that, and am happy to write to my hon. Friend; but I want to make it clear that we take the allegations extremely seriously. We have asked the US Department of Defence to respond to specific allegations about treatment and we will continue to do so. As I say, we think independent access, through the facilities that are available, is important; but I will happily respond to my hon. Friend in due course.

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Ind)]

I take the Minister’s point about the issues to do with mistreatment or otherwise, but does he agree that there is not really a precedent for holding someone, ostensibly as a prisoner of war, for 11 years? The only precedent that I can think of is the gulags after the second world war; that is not something that we would care to accept as a common practice.

[Alistair Burt]

Let me now deal with some of the questions that colleagues have raised in the debate, starting with why Mr Aamer is in Guantanamo Bay, which is the central question. I will say what I said before: he is not being held by the United Kingdom, so we do not have a reason why he is detained. In our view the detention is wrong and he should not be there. I make that very clear. The United States must satisfy itself that it has reasons.

It is genuinely very difficult to comment on why the United States might think that Mr Aamer is rightly in Guantanamo Bay. We have to discuss the detail with the US to seek to secure his release. That is sensitive, and we do not discuss intelligence matters. We have always held the view that indefinite detention without review or fair trial is unacceptable. We welcome the President’s continuing commitment to closing the detention facility and to maintaining a lawful, sustainable and principled regime for the handling of detainees there. Beyond our making it clear that we do not consider the detention of Mr Aamer to be right or correct, the United States plainly has a different point of view. The process of our arguing for Mr Aamer’s release is seeking to persuade the US; to a certain extent the parliamentary and public pressure in the United Kingdom adds to that sense of persuasion that the detention is not right or appropriate. That remains the Government’s view.

Government Policy (Kenya)

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Wednesday 20th March 2013 Westminster Hall

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Ind)]

It is difficult to overstate the importance of Kenya to the United Kingdom and, indeed, the wider international community. Perhaps first and foremost, Kenya is at the centre of international efforts to ensure the security of our own citizens. Citizens of Kenya have played a high price for that role and for their pivotal location in the world in recent years, from the US embassy bombing in 1998 through to the al-Shabaab attacks of last year, yet that is rarely reflected in public discourse here in the UK.

It is not necessary to go into detail about the way in which Kenya has co-operated magnificently with her allies, because a good deal of that information is public. However, much of it, by necessity, is unknown by those who are not directly involved. What is a matter of considerable public knowledge is Kenya’s leadership role in stabilising its northern neighbour, Somalia. Authorities, from the UN Secretary-General to the leaders of all the major states involved, have officially recognised that Somalia is where it is today—fragile but, I hope, on the road to recovery—because of the efforts of Kenya’s servicemen and women in defeating al-Shabaab and securing Mogadishu. What is more, Kenya has done that while showing restraint and ensuring the appropriate UN and African Union mandates are complied with, such as by re-hatting Kenyan troops as African Union Mission in Somalia—AMISOM—troops.

Kenya’s role extends well beyond military action, too. Virtually all humanitarian efforts in Somalia are mounted from Kenya, and they have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. Experts are in universal agreement that Kenya has deployed only appropriate force to assure its territorial integrity and that it has gone far above and beyond the call of national duty to help developed nations, such as the UK, to secure the safety of their citizens—here in the UK and abroad.

Anyone who has served in the British Army knows, like many others, how important Kenya has always been to our military capacity. The unrivalled training facilities that Kenya has always provided so freely have been a fundamental component of the UK’s capacity to launch military operations, including, for example, in our defence of the Falkland Islands just over 30 years ago. Many British servicemen regarded Kenya as the reason why we were able to mount that operation, given the personal and unit training capacity. Anyone who goes on the British Army’s website will read about the UK’s continuing reliance on, and gratitude for, Kenyan facilities, notably in respect of Operation Herrick in Afghanistan, but also in respect of British Army operations around the world.

Beyond military and security considerations, I have recently spoken to private equity investors who are interested in projects in Mogadishu, which is testimony to how astonishingly quickly Governments and investors can act together to build much needed infrastructure and services, following even the direst of civil collapses. That has been made possible by Kenya, first and foremost. It will be some time before we can be sure that Somalia is unstoppably on the road to proper reconstruction, but when it is, we will have Kenya to thank for that.

Communications in Kenya are also fundamental to investment throughout the region. I have visited Africa many times over the past dozen years, and virtually every time, I have travelled through Nairobi. It is a simple fact that Kenya is Africa’s pre-eminent junction for flows of trade and investment, people and, inevitably, information. From a trade and investment perspective, Kenya has many buoyant businesses, and it is the world leader in mobile payment systems. The Minister will be well aware of the UK’s early role in facilitating M-PESA. Off the top of my head, I believe that the former Commonwealth Development Corporation—now the CDC—was involved in seedcorning that project in Kenya.

M-PESA is a payment system that utilises the Safaricom network and harnesses microfinancing principles to deliver a superfast and highly effective means of bill payment. It has been so successful that conventional banking institutions have made significant efforts to become involved, through the Government, in the regulation of such systems. That is because mobile platform providers such as Safaricom enjoy confidence among local consumers at a higher level than that for the banks. Although Kenya, unlike many African states, has a relatively mature local banking system, I understand that almost 20 million Kenyans—it has population of just over 41 million—have M-PESA accounts. That enables them to make payments and transfer cash. It involves trading in what we would view as relatively small amounts, but those amounts fit the size of the domestic markets that small traders are accessing.

M-PESA has also been successfully extended into Tanzania. One of the critical aspects of the system is that in Kenya, and across Africa, the mobile infrastructure is developed, but fixed-line infrastructure is undeveloped, so services are jumping ahead. In the UK, we are looking at 4G and considering how we might be able to access new services through mobile platforms, but people in Africa really have no choice. The sophistication of mobile platforms such as M-PESA is remarkable, and in that way Kenya leads the world.

About 15 or 16 months ago, I attended the Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi, at which many of us were privileged to meet a number of senior Kenyan Government Ministers. It is clear that Kenya takes its role in internet governance very seriously, because it makes an enormous investment in new media technologies.

I said that Kenya is a junction for people and information within Africa. I know people who arrange to meet African colleagues and potential clients from across the continent in Kenya. I know people who go on holiday there, and I also know people who, a few days ago, helped to secure the release of 25 mariners from the Somali pirates who were holding them hostage. Of course, the UK Government are wary of that detail, but I will say a word or two about it, because it is pertinent to Kenya. The whole business of security in relation to piracy off Somalia involves significant reliance on Kenya, and such security is another area of activity that has saved the lives of many people.

Kenya suffers the consequences of—if I can call it this—non-terrorism related piracy. I know that we might call all Somali piracy terrorism, but there is a clear distinction in my mind, because while it is all done for money, some people are highly motivated by simply the commercial gains, whereas others, such as al-Shabaab, are motivated by what they can spend the money on. Nevertheless, piracy continues, and Kenya helps to do everything that it can to help to fix the problem at the macro level and, more significantly, in very practical ways that, for good reason, are rarely discussed.

I should say, perhaps as a side note, that while it is in vogue for some non-governmental organisations to say that they do not negotiate with hostage takers, responsible employers ensure that their employees are properly insured in case they are taken captive, particularly in dangerous areas of the world. That insurance is almost invariably taken out on the London markets, and the unsung people who get on with negotiating and sorting immediate crises are almost invariably British. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of people and companies involved in ship security for anti-piracy work off Somalia are British. Britain has an enormously important role to play, and Kenya sits at the core of things, because during an arrest operation, pirates are often taken to Kenya and then the Kenyan justice system endeavours to deal with the situation, which is clearly a contentious issue in itself. The Kenyan Government have handled things responsibly, and there is clearly a close relationship between the various navies of the developed nations and the Kenyan Government, because invariably such people could end up—and in some cases do end up—on trial in Mombasa.

Having stressed some aspects of our crucial mutual relationship with Kenya, I would like to move on to recent events regarding the Kenyan presidential election and the International Criminal Court. Media reports are still reporting the result of the Kenyan presidential election as “razor-thin”. In fact, President-elect Uhuru Kenyatta won by almost seven points on an 86% turnout in an election that was regarded by observers as fair and free, and was, thank God, peaceful. Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the losing candidate, has observed the law and rules, and lodged a court appeal, which will be considered in due course.

Going into the election, there was a perception in Kenya that the UK and US Governments, as well as some others, were not wholly impartial. It was said that UK diplomats had sought to encourage an Odinga win and that they had made comments during the tallying process that had seemed to work towards enabling a second-round run-off, which might have disbenefited Kenyatta, the first-round winner. I have scoured all the sources I can—as you know, Mr Bone, our resources in this place are very good for scouring the international media—and I also have many contacts and friends in the media across the world and in theatre in Kenya, but I can find no source whatsoever that serves as reasonable evidence of such a public bias. I could find no example whatever of a public comment by a UK diplomat or Minister anywhere. We can draw, in this place at least, our own conclusions about that.

There is a well-known quote by a senior US official that is now said everywhere in Kenya. I do not know the exact context in which he said it—it might have been in a speech—but that comment is “choices have consequences”. It is certain that the comment was made, although I would not wish to put it in the wrong context, and whether it is accurate or not, it did, in itself, have consequences. As I think the Minister will know, the quote was taken by some in Kenya as an implied threat that if Kenya did not vote for the developed world’s preferred candidate, there might be a price to pay in one way or another.

As you will be well aware, Mr Bone, I am not an academic expert. I was not present on the ground during the election period on this occasion, and of course I do not claim the expert knowledge of our diplomats and Ministers. However, I think that it is fair to say that there was a strong perception in Kenya that powerful nations were threatening Kenyans against voting for Kenyatta, who is now the President-elect, but that made them more likely to do just that—why would it not?

Going into the election, analysts were suggesting that Prime Minister Odinga perhaps had a two or three-point lead. I was never particularly convinced of that, and such a lead would be more or less within the margin of error in any case, but the vote was clearly very tight. However, I believe that a significant element of Mr Kenyatta’s margin of victory came in the form of a statement by Kenyans that if they were required to choose between sovereign self-determination and the patronage of foreign powers, they would always choose the former. It seems to me that it would be best if Kenyans did not feel—whether there is any foundation to this or not—that they needed to make that choice ever again.

The situation is ongoing, however, owing to the still-live International Criminal Court indictments of Mr Kenyatta and Deputy President-elect Ruto. I know that the Minister will wish to be measured and careful with his words on that subject, as he is with all his words. Although it is essential that we respect the processes of the ICC—Kenya is doing precisely that at the moment, as are the President-elect and Deputy President-elect—it is important to understand the political nature of the ICC. I am aware that the UK and other international Governments are seized of the situation’s trickiness, to say the least, but it is important to put these matters on record.

Two years ago, I had the privilege of spending several hours discussing the nature and processes of the ICC with its then chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo. He was incredibly generous with his time, and I left his office with a far greater understanding of, and much more good will towards, the ICC than I had had when I entered it. My concern was that although the role of the ICC is of great importance and its writ runs across the world—a country does not need to have signed up to and ratified the ICC, in the admittedly unlikely event that it is referred to it by a full member of the UN Security Council—everyone who had been indicted was African. All 30 people who have been indicted to date are African. At the time, the number was a little less than that—perhaps 15 or 20. However, the fact remains that all 31—I shall come to the one shortly—who have been indicted by the ICC are African.

When I went to see Luis Moreno Ocampo, I was unsure of the sense of indicting a Head of State, in the form of President Bashir of Sudan, and I had doubt about the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who was indicted over allegations regarding incidents in the Central African Republic. However, I was struck by the fact that to the untrained eye, to put it mildly, the ICC was keeping away from countries that might have implications for powerful nations such as China, Russia, the United States and ourselves, and focusing all its efforts on less powerful African states. As Mr Ocampo convinced me, two wrongs do not make a right. There is, of course, evidence that major abuses have taken place in Africa, and the ICC should of course be able to investigate those cases and, if necessary, indict people. Nevertheless, the fact that all 31 indictments to date have been against Africans conveys the clear impression that the likelihood of an ICC indictment depends on a country’s strategic importance.

To cut to the chase, I have no idea—I am not a lawyer, and I am certainly not an international lawyer—about the merits of these cases. I do not even endeavour to look at the legal processes in the ICC. I am not an expert, so I would not wish to argue the merits or otherwise of the indictments in respect of Deputy President-elect Ruto and President-elect Kenyatta. The violence after the 2007 Kenyan election was of course serious, yet none of us can have any doubt that far more serious events have taken place in other parts of the world.

More to the point, there is strong face-value evidence that the ICC acts when it thinks that it can have a benevolent effect—I mean that in the broadest sense. For example, although the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone were not ICC ones, it is clear that the violence there came to an end, and people were brought to account, because of the combined effect of careful and decisive military intervention followed by a due process of international justice. Indeed, that is the purpose of the ICC, although I stress that the Sierra Leone case and the Liberia case, involving Charles Taylor, were not under the ICC. The principle is very clear. It does follow, however, that sometimes it is more sensible and effective for the ICC to allow other mechanisms to take priority.

In theory, or in practice, the ICC is quasi-independent or quasi-autonomous—call it what you will. Ultimately it can be answerable to the UN Security Council, but its judicial and investigative processes are entirely independent. I am sure, Mr Bone, that you love quasi-autonomous bodies in the UK, and non-departmental bodies in theory act independently—and often, one might say, unaccountably—of Government. The processes of the ICC are robust and must be independent, but in the end it is a political organisation. I believe that the oversight is political, and that political oversight needs some kind of expression.

This week, the ICC has been considering the cases of Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto. Although those cases are technically separate, Mr Kenyatta’s co-accused has now been discharged, and many experts say that much of the evidence that there apparently is against Mr Kenyatta comes from a compromised source. Although, of course, the Minister cannot comment on the legal processes of the ICC, I simply flag up to him that it would be unconscionable if, for a considerable period, a cloud or a pall hung over the President of Kenya and the Government of Kenya, and indeed our relationship with Kenya, which is of such fundamental importance. This is not something that we can simply leave to technicalist and—I mean this in the nicest possible way—bureaucratic processes in The Hague that, even if they are legal, are disconnected from a wider political process.

You will be pleased to hear, Mr Bone, that I am drawing my remarks to a conclusion. At the weekend, another alleged war criminal who has been indicted, Bosco Ntaganda, who has been on the run for some time from the eastern Congo, surrendered himself to the Rwandan Government. I do not know the merits of the case against Bosco Ntaganda, although I do know the case quite well. It seems to me that the ICC exists precisely to deal with the fear that is created in places such as the eastern Congo by rampaging bandits and the rape and murder that frequently accompany them, rather than to deal with what are essentially matters of state. However we have arrived at this situation, this really cannot be up to the ICC and its processes. Governments cannot stand by and say, “It’s a process that has nothing to do with us,” when it comes to something as fundamental as our relationship with Kenya.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important to distinguish between the ICC process, which he has outlined at length, and what we hope will be the long-term strategic stability of the Kenyan nation in Africa, and its connection and relevance to the UK in terms of our investment and assistance in aiming to ensure that a peaceful, prosperous and corruption-free Kenya is the legacy for the future?

[Eric Joyce]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. We all agree with the international rule of law and we see that the ICC has a role, but we also understand that there is an even larger public benefit at play across the world. It is for politicians to fix this. We benefit enormously as a nation from our relationship with Kenya, so this is not entirely altruistic, but those of us who care about African states, as all of us do, and particularly the importance and pivotal significance of Kenya, need to get the balance right. The hon. Gentleman will be aware of particular cases when we have to say, “This is an overall objective.” It is about peace and strong relationships, and ensuring economic growth and development, and the protection and security of our citizens. We somehow have to make international justice work where it can.

There is a degree of symbolism in the ICC. The US and China have not signed up to it and Russia has not ratified the treaty. In each case, I understand why that has happened. I remember vividly our debate in the House 10 or 11 years ago when we passed the Act that implemented the treaty. There was genuine concern on both sides of the House that the ICC could be misused. Those three major states and India stayed out of it because they were concerned that it would not dovetail well with how they saw the world, which I can appreciate—that, in itself, is an indication of the political aspect of the ICC. That is not to be cynical, but apportioning strategic importance to countries, and thereby excluding them from the ambit of the ICC—in effect, that is done by indicting only Africans—is a significant issue. If we choose to do that, we need to recognise that Kenya is far too important to be treated as if it were a minor and strategically unimportant state, although of course the UK Government would not treat anyone as if they were unimportant.

It might be strange if I were to make a speech about President-elect Uhuru Kenyatta without referring to what some might call our post-colonial legacy, although I will not bang on about it—I do not have a PhD in post-colonialism. His father was president of Kenya at an important time. People feel strongly attached to his father’s legacy for the nation of Kenya now. I am of course talking about President Jomo Kenyatta. Britain has played with an entirely straight bat. To be honest, I think that there has been a little bit of hubris because one American diplomat made one unfortunate comment, although it might have gone beyond that—I really do not know.

When it comes to African states, it is always possible that internal politics reflect the possibility of external post-colonial influence by a misguided British Government, and that be can be reflected in the conduct of internal politics, as to some degree has been the case. The current and previous Governments dealt with that well. Frankly, however, President-elect Uhuru Kenyatta saw an opportunity, as any proper politician would, to jump all over it, thinking, “This is an opportunity to establish my own credentials as a defender of the nation and our national integrity.” He is, of course, also his father’s son, which helped enormously. He was already a strong candidate, but that all helped his campaign. Any politician would have done the same in that situation.

The risk for the UK is that it is seen as trying to impose “white man’s justice” by going to Africa to tell those nice black folk how to get on and run their countries. Countries across Africa will rebel immediately against that, and that will become part of their internal politics. We can see it in Zimbabwe. There is a tiny risk in Zimbabwe that we sometimes look as though we are on one side, when we need to be very careful to be right down the middle. That is not to say that we should have the same international detachment to international justice as the Russians and Chinese—I understand why they do it; they have very different political systems. The risk for the UK is that we look as though we are reflecting past traditions, as I am certain that Ministers and officials know.

Britain needs to play the whole Kenyan situation with a straight bat—I am a Scotsman, so I have no idea of the rules of cricket; I just use the metaphor—and to be seen as doing so by the Kenyans. We should do whatever we can from now on to facilitate an absolute normalisation of our relationship with Kenya.

[Mr Peter Bone (in the Chair)]

It might be helpful for Members to know that nobody has indicated to the Chair that they want to speak. If those who wish to contribute would stand, it would be helpful.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone. I apologise to you and other Members, because I must leave before the end of the debate. I commend the hon. Member for Falkirk (Eric Joyce) on securing the debate and on the well-informed way in which he introduced it. He was right to warn in his closing remarks against a patronising neo-colonial attitude, and yet it is right to praise Kenya for being, in many respects, a model of stability over many decades, a sometimes patchy but none the less committed democracy in east Africa, and for the stability it has helped and attempted to bring to the rest of the region. He was right to refer in his opening remarks to Kenya’s important contribution in relation to Somalia, both in African Union forces on the ground and in anti-piracy operations, for which the whole international community has good cause to be grateful.

Kenya is an important and overwhelmingly democratic member of the Commonwealth of nations. It has strong cultural, political and other links to this country. I am probably not alone in having strong constituency links to Kenya; Cheltenham is twinned with Kisumu. The strong civic, educational and voluntary organisation links between Kisumu and Cheltenham extend to youth conferences, through the charity Global Footsteps, which operates in both Kenya and the UK, and are an example of the strong links between the two countries. Nevertheless, Kenya has faced challenges, many of which the Department for International Development has highlighted.

Although absolute poverty has declined somewhat, it remains high in Kenya. DFID figures show a decline from 52% in 1997 to 46% in 2006, which is progress, but not great progress. They also highlight the fact that inequality remains high, that about 25% of Kenyans do not have enough income to meet their basic food needs, and that progress on the millennium development goals has been patchy and especially weak on issues such as maternal and child health. New approaches to providing basic services, such as health and education, are needed if the millions of poor Kenyans are to prosper. I entirely endorse that view.

DFID also highlights the political risks. Kenya’s image as a stable democracy faced great challenge at the time of the previous elections. The violence and issues with the ICC that followed pose a risk to not only Kenya’s reputation, but its progress. It is striking that the one year in which an otherwise incredibly impressive economic growth rate was not achieved was that which followed the election violence.

Kenya’s level of corruption and transparency, and the impunity that still exists, are difficulties. It is sad to note that Kenya is ranked 154 out of 182 countries on the Transparency International corruption perception index. Important parts of British Government policy towards Kenya are directed towards what might be termed the more traditional forms of aid and development support, but strong emphasis is also rightly placed on governance. The DFID programme stretches to work on health—HIV/AIDS, in particular—education, humanitarian aid and social protection, but it also includes trade growth, private sector development and a deliberate programme on governance.

That programme has included making people aware of the importance of their right to vote and how to register, which resulted in 12.7 million voters, 49% of whom were women, registering for the referendum not long ago on Kenya’s constitution. UK aid has also been used to increase the transparency and accountability of Parliament by opening parliamentary committees to the public and showing live debates on TV—something to which I am sure we can all relate. It has also provided support for organisations independent of Government that investigate corruption and monitor how taxpayers’ money is spent. For example, the National Taxpayers Association monitors Government use of taxpayers’ money. That emphasis on governance is absolutely right and important.

We have just seen a presidential election, and I suppose that it is absolutely right to congratulate Mr Kenyatta on his victory, but at the same time it is right to point out that he has in the past bravely said that he will comply with the International Criminal Court process. His commitment is welcome, and I hope very much that he maintains it. Kenya is a party to the International Criminal Court, and that is a matter of pride for Kenya. I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Falkirk was implying criticism of the International Criminal Court process—a process I consider extremely important—but he mentioned that it sometimes seems to go light on countries such as China. Unfortunately, and regrettably, China is not a party to the International Criminal Court.

[Eric Joyce]

I do not intend to be critical of the ICC per se. I referred to the fact that the ICC’s remit effectively covers the whole world, because permanent members of the Security Council can refer cases to it whether or not the country involved is a member. Technically, therefore, the ICC covers China, Russia and anywhere else, but those countries might not consider it in their interest, and I can understand that.

[Martin Horwood]

I take that point. It is important that, as far as possible, all countries comply with, take part in and support the International Criminal Court process. It is a matter of pride for this country and for Kenya that we have been parties to the International Criminal Court system and that we support it, and I hope that Mr Kenyatta continues to support his country’s participation in the process.

Some interesting comments were made during the election campaign, particularly the references to the British high commissioner and the implication that there was undue influence on behalf of the British Government in the election. That was an unwise accusation, which I am sure is rejected absolutely by the British high commissioner, Christian Turner, who has a very high reputation. We ought, perhaps, to approach that with humility; we all sometimes say things in election campaigns that we regret. Once in a position of responsibility, however, we need to move on, and the same should apply to Mr Kenyatta. He should now swiftly bury the hatchet and move on to building much better relations with the British Government, because there is a potential benefit for both parties.

I have referred to Kenya’s growth rate. It has achieved a rate of 5% over most years in the past decade, which is something I suspect the Chancellor of the Exchequer would give his eye teeth to be able to report about the UK later today. Kenya’s economy is the largest and most diverse in east Africa, and the country is potentially a very valuable economic, trading and political partner for this country. I think that we would all want to see a process whereby Kenya moved from being an aid recipient, and came out of that post-colonial mentality and relationship entirely, into a relationship in which Britain and Kenya regarded each other as friends, and economic and political partners. That should be the future for Kenya, and I hope that British Government policy towards Kenya will do its utmost to make that a reality.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Burt]

My hon. Friend makes a fair point.

The focus on Africa is due to the number of cases, as has been mentioned, but it is unfair to infer from that that there is an unfair bias. The support of African nations and states for this work, which adds an essential element of transparency and accountability for some of the issues of the past, should not be neglected. It is important, as hon. Members have said, that the net is spread fairly and widely to catch those who have been most active contrary to the law.

Polls have consistently shown a strong desire for justice among the Kenyan people. In Kenya, the ICC became involved only after the Kenyan Parliament’s decision not to establish a special tribunal. We judge that that has helped to challenge the culture of impunity and to show there is no place for hate speech or incitement to violence in the new Kenya. Consequently, we continue to urge the Kenyan Government and all those facing charges to co-operate with the ICC. We welcome the co-operation that has already been provided, which marks Kenya out as a country that wishes to respect its international obligations. We are equally clear that a defendant is innocent unless proven guilty by a court of law. It is not for the UK, nor anyone other than the court, to pass judgement.

[Eric Joyce]

It is not my intention to be overtly critical of the ICC. Indeed, the Minister will be aware that Rwanda has successfully taken custody of Bosco Ntaganda, and Rwanda, like Kenya, regards the ICC as important. The processes are not exactly as we would understand them in the UK, and it would be a mistake to think that they were in all respects. For example, it is possible to be held by the ICC for five years before trial and then acquitted. Jean-Pierre Bemba’s case is under way, and he has been at The Hague for five years, but his case is far from over.

[Alistair Burt]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. Of course, the ICC’s processes are independent of the UK. I am sure that concerns have already been, and will continue to be, expressed. When taking on such an extraordinary responsibility on behalf of nations that are states party to the agreement, it is essential that the functions of the ICC are performed fairly, efficiently and quickly. Justice delayed is justice denied, as all hon. Members recognise, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman’s concerns will have been heard.

I stress that, despite media reports to the contrary, the UK has never threatened sanctions against Kenya on this issue. The charges are being made against three individuals, not against Kenya as a whole. The people of Kenya should not be arbitrarily punished for the alleged crimes of their leaders.

A number of colleagues mentioned the important issues of trade and development. The UK remains the biggest cumulative investor in Kenya and the second largest training partner after Uganda, and trade is in Kenya’s favour. The hon. Member for Strangford made an important point about the sort of engagement that takes place with the UK and the way in which we hope that we conduct business. It is noticeable that, in winning contracts abroad, a key part of the offer of many big UK companies is capacity building and training, which is in stark contrast to others who seek contracts with the aim of maximising profit, sometimes to the exclusion of local workers. UK companies are urged by UK Trade & Investment, although many do it naturally, to ensure that their offer for winning a contract is supported by efforts on further education, vocational training and capacity building, so that something long-term and sustainable is offered to those places in which the contract is being run. That is one reason why total trade exceeds £1 billion. UK exports rose by 38% from 2010 to 2011, and a substantial number of the largest tax-paying companies in Kenya are from the UK.

The hon. Member for Falkirk is right that a more secure Kenya means a more secure United Kingdom. Increased trade benefits both countries, so we will continue to take an interest.

On the growing influence of China, naturally the UK welcomes competition and free trade. We are determined to meet the challenge. As the hon. Member for Wrexham said, UKTI is active in Kenya, and it covers the region as well from Nairobi. Further efforts are being made to secure our trade and commercial interests. As all hon. Members have suggested, the relationship is deep and it is supported by long-standing ties and the recognition that growing trade is in our mutual interest.

Finally, on the development issues that were raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham and touched on by other colleagues, UK aid is supporting the Kenyan Government’s Vision 2030. We are the second biggest bilateral donor after the US and our budget is growing. We will be spending up to £150 million in aid a year by 2014, which is a doubling since 2011, to tackle conflict, to increase stability and to improve education, health outcomes—particularly in relation to malaria—and the livelihoods of the poor. We are focused on helping the poorest Kenyans and we are definitely here for the long haul.

Water is, of course, vital, as the hon. Member for Strangford said. The Department for International Development provides significant funding for water projects, and Kenya is part of its humanitarian climate change work, so we continue to work with the private sector and other donors on efforts there. Those of us who support charities such as WaterAid know how extraordinary the commitment is.

I was delighted by what the hon. Gentleman said about the importance of faith in Kenya and the number of churches per 100 yards. That was a remarkable statistic to hear from someone from Northern Ireland who knows his faith well, and I thank him for providing that context.

In general, the debate has demonstrated hon. Members’ wide interest in Kenya and their understanding of its contemporary problems and issues, as well as their wish to look ahead and ensure that those will be overcome by fair and impartial courts that are able to deal with concerns that arise and by the Kenyan people’s belief that that is the way to resolve their disputes. We look forward to the resolution of disputes and to a long and growing relationship with Kenya. I am grateful for colleagues’ interest and how they expressed themselves, and particularly grateful to the hon. Member for Falkirk for raising the matter as he did.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd October 2012 Westminster Hall

[Pauline Latham]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point. The situation is difficult, because Rwanda has itself suffered terrible conflict. I understand that the money that has been given to Rwanda was not to support the Government but for humanitarian reasons.

The war has had economic as well as political implications. Fighting was fuelled by the country’s vast mineral wealth, with all sides taking advantage of the anarchy to plunder natural resources. That vast mineral wealth has also led to illegal exploitation.

In September last year, the DRC held its first democratic elections. Observers hoped that for the first time the Congo’s history of poor governance and rebellious factions could be put to rest. However, for those living in many parts of the country there has been no such relief.

In April of this year, a rebel military group, the March 23 movement commonly reported as the M23, was formed. It is based in eastern areas of DRC and mainly operates in the province of north Kivu. The group is currently involved in a conflict in the DRC that has led to the displacement of large numbers of people. On Friday, the United Nations Security Council reiterated its condemnation of and demanded an end to all external support being provided to armed groups, particularly to the M23, which has been destabilising the DRC over recent months.

Several experts currently based on the ground—for instance, the director for central Africa of the International Crisis Group—recently confirmed to the all-party parliamentary group on the African great lakes region that many facts point to a likely resumption of attacks from rebels and army in the coming weeks or even days. That has been confirmed by the M23, which declared in a statement released last Saturday to announce the new name of its military wing, the Congolese Revolutionary Army—ARC—that it expected imminent attacks from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, FARDC.

The M23 mutiny has also contributed to a less commented-upon consequence: the increase in activities of other armed groups in other parts of the Congo, especially the Ituri region of the Orientale province and the Masisi territory of the north Kivu province. Rebel groups took advantage of the security vacuums created by redeployments of the army to M23-affected areas. Casualties since April are hard to assess precisely, but the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights declared that preliminary findings from missions of the UN joint human rights office in the DRC, carried out in Masisi territory, suggested that civilian massacres perpetrated by the FDLR—the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda—and the group known as Raia Mutomboki may constitute crimes against humanity.

In particular, the DRC’s eastern provinces of north and south Kivu have witnessed increased fighting over recent months between Government troops and the M23. The ongoing violence has led to an alarming humanitarian situation, marked by rape, murder and pillaging. The fighting has displaced hundreds of thousands people, including many who have fled to neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda, as well as within the DRC. Peacekeepers from the UN organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC—MONUSCO—have been aiding the DRC Government’s troops in their efforts to deal with the M23. Last week, six UN peacekeepers and a local interpreter were wounded in an overnight ambush, while returning from a patrol with 12 other peacekeepers, near Buganza in north Kivu province, after finding the bodies of four civilians.

As well as expressing deep concern about the deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis in the eastern DRC, caused by the M23 and other armed groups, the UN Security Council also condemned the M23’s attacks on civilians, humanitarian actors and UN peacekeepers, and its abuses of human rights, including summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence and the use of child soldiers. An M23 combatant, who recently spoke to Human Rights Watch, was candid about the recruitment of child soldiers in Rwanda. He said:

“We recruit everywhere in Rwanda and street children are very susceptible to recruitment.”

Let me very clear about where I stand on the issue. As far as I am concerned, Rwandan military and civilian officials who recruit children under the age of 15 for the M23, or any other group, are responsible for war crimes. Sexual violence is a common tragedy facing women and children in the DRC and the charity Tearfund estimates that 48 women and children per hour are raped in the country, mostly by armed groups as well as civilians. If that happened in this country, there would be an outcry.

The correlation between rape and the spread of HIV has been demonstrated in several cases. Some reports estimate that 20% of raped women are HIV-positive. Diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and nematode infections resulting from poor water, sanitation and hygiene are also commonplace in the area. The links between sanitation and sexual violence become apparent when, owing to the lack of access to private latrines, women face no choice but to find private places to defecate, often at night and a considerable distance away from their homes, further increasing their risk of sexual violence. The organisation War Child states that this is the

“most dangerous place in the world to be a woman”.

Those sentiments were echoed by Hillary Clinton, who added:

“It truly is one of mankind’s greatest atrocities. This country has witnessed humanity at its worst.”

Rape as a tool of war is, in my opinion, a war crime and must be condemned in the strongest manner possible by the whole international community.

There are now more than 2 million internally displaced persons—IDPs—in the DRC, the highest number within the past three years, with 1.5 million IDPs in the Kivu provinces alone. There are now more than 320,000 new IDPs from north Kivu since April, owing to the M23 mutiny alone—as mentioned in the latest UN Security Council presidential statement released on Friday, which I referred to earlier—and more than 400,000 new IDPs across the provinces since the mutiny.

Aid workers in the region claim that they have exhausted their resources and capacities and that numerous IDPs are unreachable either because they are in remote areas or for security reasons, and dealing with that would require humanitarian corridors to be set up. The global UN-led DRC humanitarian action plan is still only 47% funded. The UN refugee agency has launched an appeal for almost $40 million to cover the needs of 400,000 internally displaced people in north Kivu, south Kivu and Orientale provinces and of 75,000 refugees—25,000 in Rwanda and 50,000 in Uganda—who have appeared since the M23 rebellion started in April.

The UNHCR has warned that the situation remains volatile and that it expects further displacement this year. It fears that the number of new IDPs may reach as many as 760,000 in the coming months. The agency also said that it was particularly alarmed about the large number of human rights violations in north and south Kivu, where more than 15,000 protection incidents, including, murder, rape and forced recruitment, have been reported since April.

Given the magnitude of the new displacements, the World Food Programme has launched a new emergency operation from September 2012 to June 2013, which will assist approximately 1.2 million people in five provinces. Three weeks ago, it declared:

“We need additional funding to be able to continue to assist this very poor population. So far we have mobilised only 15% of the total cost of this emergency operation.”

UK aid to the DRC will increase from about £147 million in 2011 to £258 million a year by 2015, which amounts to £790 million between 2011 and 2015, with £176 million to be spent on wealth creation, £130 million on humanitarian aid and £109 million on governance and security.

In 2010-11, the DRC was the UK’s seventh largest recipient of bilateral aid and the third in terms of bilateral humanitarian assistance. In the past five years, western countries alone have invested more than $14 billion in the DRC. International aid is now equivalent to nearly half the DRC’s annual budget. As such, donors have considerable leverage over the DRC. Yet despite all that aid, nothing substantial ever seems to happen to stop the suffering of the people of the DRC.

The DRC will continue to receive billions in aid, including in humanitarian assistance, to help to relieve the suffering of the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the numerous ongoing conflicts, while the lack of efforts by the Congolese Government on good governance, on structural reforms in the security sector, the army and the justice and administration sectors and on decentralisation will thwart any positive developments in stabilisation.

Despite all the ongoing work and the amount of aid being given by the UK and the international community, the DRC will not meet any of its millennium development goals. However, if the UK Government continue with their current policy, which I sincerely hope they will, then by 2015 we will without doubt fulfil the targets for the DRC, set by the Department for International Development. Those targets include delivering more for poor people by promoting economic growth and wealth creation; helping to build peace, stability and democracy; and meeting various specific targets such as safer births, clean water for 6 million people, and protection from malaria for 15 million adults and children.

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Ind)]

I simply want to refer to the destabilisation effect. Does the hon. Lady agree that one of the problems is that the lack of movement on the reformation of the armed services creates enormous pressures on Rwanda and Uganda to act over their borders into eastern Congo?

[Pauline Latham]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He has a huge experience of this subject.

Finally, at a time of such economic hardship at home, there are those who question the purpose and the amount of aid going overseas, but this is an investment. I passionately believe that providing aid to people in such desperate conditions is morally right. It is also in our national interest to have a safer and more secure world and less suffering in such destitute conditions. It is time to move the world with us in embracing the 21st century.

Piracy (Somalia)

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Ind)]

I commend the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) on his excellent report. I am not a member of the Committee, and I will not detain the Chamber for long, but I was interested in the recommendation in paragraph 27 of the Government’s response:

“We conclude that the Government should not pay or assist in the payment of ransoms but”—

crucially—

“nor should it make it more difficult for companies to secure the safe release of their crew by criminalising the payment of ransoms.”

As the hon. Gentleman said, the Chamber of Shipping sent a strong briefing to hon. Members here and elsewhere. There are many acronyms, concepts and ideas involved in the debate about using armed guards, the payment of ransoms and so on, and there have been recent examples of people being taken captive for a ransom elsewhere in the world on land and at sea. It is self-evident that if someone demands a large amount of money for a loved one, and that they will be killed or executed if it is not paid, everyone would want to avoid that.

The taskforce’s general direction of travel on ransoms, announced on 31 May, was to reduce or constrain payment—although I may be wrong, and a Minister may correct me. It is most unlikely that anyone could convince foreign Governments not to pay, and not to assist or facilitate payment. Indeed, there are examples of foreign Governments—it is probably best not to say which ones—possibly making payments, and certainly of Governments facilitating payments. Even if the UK obtained agreement from some members of the taskforce, it is most unlikely that the payment of ransoms would stop. Pirates would still be attacking ships and taking people hostage. They would not be taking people hostage on the basis that their country was one that would facilitate a ransom payment. The risk is that we could end up with a two-tier situation, and some people would be released eventually. As the hon. Gentleman said, Judith Tebbutt was released after payment of a $1 million ransom, and it was reported that someone, perhaps even a news agency, helped to pay £500,000 for the Chandlers. A sad recent example was a Scotsman, Khalil Dale, who was kidnapped in Pakistan. There was evidently and clearly a financial imperative in the demands of the people who kidnapped him, and his employer, the International Committee of the Red Cross, said that its policy, as the Government suggested, was not to pay ransoms.

There is a distinction between a Government who make a political policy decision not to pay ransoms, and an employer. For many different reasons, and given the scale of their work, the Government’s exposure to risk is far greater than that of any employing organisation, and seafarers belong to the latter group. It therefore seems quite improper to constrain employers who may have seafarers at sea from paying ransoms in cases when they could get someone released.

People are held in Somalia, having been captured off the coast. For example, MV Iceberg 1 is still being held; two people are dead and others have been held for more than 800 days. We know that the longer it takes to get a ransom paid the longer people are held in captivity, and that when a ransom is paid, they are likely to be released. Few UK citizens have been affected.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman goes to the heart of the knotty moral problem of paying ransoms. Is not the problem that although paying a ransom may well save the life of an employee or a loved one, it encourages the taking of hostages and the risking of other people’s lives? Indeed, it pays for that to be facilitated. Surely we must encourage shipping companies, and others, to take a firm stand against the payment of ransoms.

[Eric Joyce]

The hon. Gentleman describes the point that we all regard as central to the question. Paying ransoms may encourage pirates, but my instinct is that pirates in Somalia are looking not at the policies of international Governments but at the fact that it is possible to get a ransom payment. I greatly doubt that Governments across the world will agree not to facilitate ransom payments. Indeed, I can list—we all can—the Governments who are highly likely to encourage the facilitation of ransom payments. Therefore, if we say that we will discourage such payments, British citizens will be affected but no one else. It is true that the UK has considerable influence because of its importance in the maritime industry and the presence in the UK of the International Maritime Organisation, but it is highly unlikely that other countries would agree not to pay ransoms.

If there was a billionaire whose daughter had been captured and was about to be shot, and there was a £2 million ransom, would they pay it or would they say, “No, I don’t think I will because it’s just going to encourage others.”? Of course they would pay it. If people are discouraged from taking up kidnap and ransom insurance, the risk is that we will end up with only rich people being able to secure their safety. We know of one or two cases, including that of Judith Tebbutt who luckily was able to secure a large amount of money—$1 million—to secure her freedom. If no kidnap and ransom insurance is paid, other employees will be at considerable risk of exposure.

The case of Khalil Dale in Pakistan is relevant, if perhaps only tangentially. The non-governmental organisation in question was described as “brave” for taking a decision that led inevitably to Khalil Dale’s death. I did not regard that as brave. I thought it was a businesslike decision that, in the worst case, saved the organisation money because kidnap and ransom insurance is expensive. Commercial companies can build insurance into their expenditure and planning assumptions, and it seems a bit too easy for employers to say, “Well, the Government say that this is the best thing to do.” If someone who works for an NGO is unfortunate enough to get captured and a ransom is not paid—imagine, for example, someone on land in Somalia—they are much more likely to be held for many months, or even killed. If they are lucky enough to be employed by an organisation that has paid kidnap and ransom insurance, there is a strong chance that they will be released. That is the realpolitik of the matter.

In conclusion, we should be cautious about assuming that just because we say, “This is a jolly good thing”, everybody else will agree. If we decide to discourage, or in the worst case, make it unlawful to pay kidnap and ransom insurance, employees—the people about whom organisations must be concerned—will be exposed to much greater risk. That is why in this dilemma I come down strongly on the side of paying kidnap and ransom insurance, and I think NGOs ought to do that as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Horwood]

I cannot predict the future, but the fact that Mogadishu is now an overwhelmingly secure city, which was far from true only a few years ago, and that the Foreign Secretary and International Development Secretary can visit cities such as Mogadishu with a degree of confidence about their personal security is a quite dramatic shift, as I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would acknowledge. I do not say that securing a military solution is the only path forward, but the fact that African Union troops and others have made enormous sacrifices, displayed great courage and secured a large amount of territory should not go unnoticed.

There is also progress in the sense that areas of the internationally recognised territory of Somalia—mainly, in practice, self-governing areas such as Somaliland and Puntland—have achieved a reasonable degree of peace and security. The Government have shown wisdom in promoting a flexible attitude to territories such as Somaliland. The creation of the Somaliland Development Corporation, which the Government supported earlier this year, is a positive development. Trying to exploit the economic potential of the relative peace of areas such as Somaliland is a practical contribution to the provision of an alternative economic model to the chaos and piracy prevalent in other parts of the Somali territory. It is exactly right that the Department for International Development is prioritising development on the ground and the provision of economic alternatives to people in Somalia.

The convening of the London conference earlier this year was an important step, not just in relation to tackling war and conflict in Somalia and getting a co-ordinated regional approach, which the Select Committee asked for, but in making concrete contributions to progress on anti-piracy initiatives, including some things that have been mentioned: the taskforces on ransoms and the wonderfully named—let me get it right—Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre. I am sure that Hansard will report that I got that fluently right. The substantial financial commitment that the Government have made to RAPPICC is welcome, and we have provided its first director, Garry Crone. That support is welcome and exactly the kind of lead in international co-ordination that the Select Committee asked for.

On ransoms, Her Majesty’s Government’s instinct is exactly right. Briefings from non-governmental organisations such as Saferworld, which has talked to civil society in Somalia, make it clear that the economic model of piracy brings, in some cases, the most effective wealth provision into the local economy. If we can disrupt that business model and suggest that a peaceful, normal economy and society would be a more profitable way to develop—as we would obviously hope—we will have some chance of defeating the root causes of piracy. If we continue to fuel the ransom economy and pay money, that will be a massive incentive for Somalis to continue with piracy and to allow it to spread. If, as the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) said, risk and reward are so imbalanced, why would piracy not spread down the coast of Africa? Why would not that model be emulated in other parts of the world?

[Eric Joyce]

Does the hon. Gentleman not think that the thing for a responsible employer to do, if two dozen employees are captured and a ransom is demanded—they may well be executed—is to pay it, as opposed to the view of NGOs, which appear on the whole to want to leave them to die?

[Martin Horwood]

No. I think that paying is profoundly irresponsible. There are even more extreme cases than that of an employer. It is difficult to tell someone whose loved one has been kidnapped—it would be difficult for me if one of my loved ones had been kidnapped—and other members of the family, “You should not pay.” That is a terribly difficult thing to say to someone, face to face. However, in the bigger picture, people are kidnapped because other people have paid ransoms, which paid for the boats and mother-ships and the lifestyle of the pirates that makes future ransoms, kidnaps and piracy much more likely. We must try to disrupt that business model. Trying to find a simple military solution is only half the answer. I am afraid that I think that the Government’s instinct is right.

Somalia

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison). I want to praise her for raising the issue of female genital mutilation, and not just in today’s debate. I am sure that all Members are aware of her considerable work on the issue, which is incredibly important and a credit to her.

The first principle of a stable state is the rule of law. Our most famous expression of that is arguably found in Magna Carta, which states:

“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful Judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.”

Without that foundation, there can be no sustainability and no democracy.

Somalia has spent two decades in the grip of a lawless malaise as its people have been borne on the violent ebbs and flows of competing warlords, yet there is a break in the cloud. The Foreign Secretary spoke of the window of opportunity which currently exists in the country, and that opportunity must be taken. Mogadishu has recently been forsaken by al-Shabaab; the strengthened African Union and transitional federal Government forces have been acting to force out the remaining guerrilla operatives, and are even poised to tackle al-Shabaab in its crucial port stronghold of Kismayo, from which it runs the kidnap, drugs and piracy operations which are its lifeblood and which sustain it in control of swathes of central Somalia.

While those struggles for control rage, the Somali people suffer unbearable degradations. Lamentations at the decline of law and the collapse of civil structures and infrastructure are easily forgotten when supplanted by a daily struggle for simple survival. The bald statistics of the famine suffered in that part of the world have already been spoken about, and I shall not repeat them.

It is clear, then, that the prevailing conditions in Somalia are not conducive to the establishment of a viable nation state. However, the challenge to the forthcoming London conference is at least to show that there is a pathway to a stable Somalia, secure in the rule of law and representative of its people, who are reconciled to the systems of regional and federal government that are put in place. An end to famine, the rule of law and democracy are the ultimate objectives. The prerequisite for the achievement of those objectives is security, and in that respect Britain is again in the lead.

The Royal Navy leads the joint European Union enterprise Operation Atalanta, is in overall control of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, and supports the separate US-led Combined Maritime Forces. Away from the “pointy end” of the Royal Navy is Maritime Trade Operations, a capacity-building organisation that trains merchant seamen. The Royal Navy has been at the forefront of the development of counter-piracy operations, including most recently increasing the speed of access to plans of merchant ships that have fallen foul of pirates. It has also played a great role in advising companies on how to keep their crews safe. It was as part of the NATO operation that the Royal Navy, operating from Royal Fleet Auxiliary Fort Victoria, captured 13 Somali pirates last month.

It is, of course, all to the good that apprehended pirates are no longer at large. However, in the absence of a legal structure making it possible to prosecute them in Somalia, neighbouring countries have had to take on those cases, with the Royal Navy tasked with providing much of the damning evidence.

My hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) and for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) have already spoken about the difficulties the Royal Marines face with rules of engagement and the requirement to have a legal officer on board. This is not just some bureaucratic problem; it is leading to people being hurt and killed. When the Royal Marines or the Royal Navy come across a pirate vessel or an act of piracy, there is a time delay affecting their ability to act, which means that hostages are often taken out on deck and tortured. As a result, it is often not possible to undertake an assault.

I have often rehearsed in this Chamber the point that the work of the naval service—the Royal Navy and Royal Marines—is not well understood by parliamentarians. At last year’s Trafalgar event, one of our colleagues approached a member of the Royal Marines and asked him why he was there, as he was not aware that the Army had a role in Trafalgar. I am happy to say that he walked away from that exchange with no limbs broken. We expect the Navy to be there when the Falklands must be defended or Libyan tyrants contained, almost as though Her Majesty’s ships are moored in Portsmouth—or indeed Plymouth—waiting for the call. The fact is that the Navy is constantly working, constantly advancing and protecting British interests. Day and night—while we go about our daily business and while we sleep—the men and women of the Senior Service are at work, keeping the fuel flowing and the shelves stocked, tightening the grip on terrorist activities and undertaking counter-piracy operations to help keep trade routes open.

If the Navy is to fulfil these tasks it must be properly resourced, so I rejoiced when I heard the Prime Minister speak enthusiastically of the Royal Navy yesterday. The new Type 26 frigates—the global combat ships—will be a vital tool in the protection of British interests around the world. The 13 that will enter service will be the workhorses of the fleet and will complement the six Type 45 destroyers currently doing such a good job in demonstrating Britain’s instinct for resolute defence. The qualities of the Type 26 will be directly applicable to the Somalia operations. It is ideal for service in the Indian ocean to tackle piracy and illegal trade, keeping our trade routes open, cutting off the supplies of terrorists, and protecting British citizens home and abroad.

The Royal Navy’s contribution to Somalia is considerable, and I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport: the Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel involved in those operations really do qualify for a medal. They are often in harm’s way.

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent speech and is rightly praising the role of the Royal Navy. Does she agree that former members of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines play an important role in private sector companies in protecting shipping? Many of the companies are members of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry, which plays a really important role—perhaps the greatest role—in world shipping.

[Penny Mordaunt]

I agree absolutely with the hon. Gentleman. The former head of the Royal Marines said on this subject that it is a big ocean and we will have to work much more with private companies and navies in order to protect those trade routes. It is positive that many of the people working in the private sector know how the Royal Navy and Royal Marines work.

The Foreign Secretary has articulated Britain’s will to bring Somalia within the comity of nations, and in so doing we will not only be doing the people of Somalia a service but advancing our own interests. It is to the Prime Minister’s and the Foreign Secretary’s credit that the forthcoming conference will be held in London, at which we hope some light can be shone on the shadowy path leading to the clear objectives of stability, rule of law and democracy. I hope that the participants in the conference, and the British contingent especially, will bear it in mind that these ends cannot simply be willed; they must be brought about by the investment of time, resources and effort. The Royal Navy is ready to supply all three, and I trust that its critical role will provide yet further evidence of the need for a strong, well-resourced, and large Royal Navy.

Human Rights (Colombia)

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd November 2011 Westminster Hall

[Kerry McCarthy]

I agree that past attempts to put pressure on Colombian Governments have not been effective. Impunity, at 98% or thereabouts, is a shocking statistic. It is important, and I will ask the Minister about this in a moment, that we use any leverage we have, anything within our power, to try to push that agenda along to ensure that it is not just warm words about human rights but that action is taken on the ground to protect them. President Santos was prepared to meet the non-governmental organisations today. I was not aware yesterday that trade unions would be involved in that meeting, and it is very important that they were. Anything the Minister can do to ensure better dialogue between the people from the trade union movement who have visited Colombia and the Colombian regime is an important step forward.

Anyone who has met human rights campaigners from Colombia cannot fail to be moved by their stories. A week or two ago I met some women who were talking about the shocking rise in gender-based violence and the use of rape in the conflict. President Santos was not able to explain why there has been such a dramatic increase over the past year or two, and the assessments that have been made seem to indicate that the violence is being carried out by the guerrilla movement, paramilitaries in particular, and the security forces, and that women are being targeted across the board. I hope that issue is very much on the Minister’s radar.

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we tend to conflate the issues of drugs and human rights in Colombia but that human rights problems existed long before the country was effectively the centre of the world as far as cocaine production was concerned? Any solution, therefore, must not simply involve killing the likes of Alfonso Cano but have social justice at its core.

[Kerry McCarthy]

I agree. It is a complex situation, involving drug wars, the political situation, the role of FARC, the land grab and commercial interests. I am not suggesting that there is one solution. It is an incredibly complex situation to unravel, but President Santos’s rhetoric is very welcome. Recently, there has been significant progress in tackling some of the violence that has plagued the country over the past 50 years. FARC’s activities have been curtailed, but there is genuine concern that a more fragmented organisation is less likely to come to the negotiating table.

Does the Minister see a particular role for the UK? It has been flagged up a number of times that given our history of negotiating with groups, particularly in Northern Ireland, and given the recent decision by ETA, there might be lessons to be learnt that could help the Colombian Government in their discussions with FARC. President Santos has indicated that he is very willing to pursue such negotiations.

President Santos’s announcement in the past month about disbanding DAS, the administrative department of security, is a very welcome step given the allegations of collusion with paramilitaries, illegal surveillance, corruption and harassment of judges, journalists and politicians. The president has said:

“The country knows why we have decided to take this step,”

and that is, I think, both a tacit admission that the allegations against DAS were well founded, and an important signal that the President wants to restore the integrity of his country’s intelligence services.

Nevertheless, there are understandably still concerns about the human rights situation. In the first year of the Santos Administration 54 human rights defenders were killed, there has been a significant increase in gender-based violence, and there are concerns about the future of indigenous peoples—campesinos and Afro-Colombians—who have been displaced from their land to make way for drug and palm oil plantations and cattle ranching, which the United Nations has described as ethnic cleansing. It is not up there with the human rights abuses involving killings, but displacement is important, as is the question whether the new land and victims law will provide reparation and restitution for those people. What role does the Minister feel Britain has to play, particularly when British commercial interests are involved in such land grabs? How does he think that we can resolve the issue and return land to people?

I know that the Minister has visited Colombia twice and that he met President Santos in Peru as well as this week. He has had a lot of time to get a feel for the new regime. Does he feel that the agenda is moving forward and that we are making progress in pushing Colombia on human rights abuses? In particular, what has he learned from this week’s visit?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Browne]

The point I am making is that that was an example of a politician trying to make a broader point about the consumption and legal status of drugs in Britain. I suspect that the way that the politician was attacked in that election provided a disincentive for others to take the same approach.

[Eric Joyce]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Browne]

I will not, because many points have been made.

There have been improvements in Colombia. Cocaine production has decreased significantly, murder and kidnap rates have declined and Colombia is safer as a result, but more still needs to be done. As Members have said, many candidates were murdered during last month’s local elections, and attacks on human rights defenders increased in 2011. The situation is serious. President Santos has set an ambitious reform and modernisation agenda, including a policy of zero tolerance of human rights abuses. In my meetings with him and other Ministers, he emphasised that powerfully.

The passage of the victims and land restitution law is one of the President’s most important achievements to date and has been commended by the UN. It aims to return land to huge numbers of displaced people and to compensate victims, and we attach great importance to it. The Santos Government have made it clear that civic society has a key role to play in addressing human rights concerns in Colombia. The British Government share that view. To respond to the hon. Member for Shannon, our ambassadors and others are here today, and I will ask our ambassador to raise our concerns directly.

Oral Answers to Questions

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

John Cryer: not here.

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab)]

3. What recent assessment he has made of the threat to UK shipping from piracy off the horn of Africa.

[Laura Sandys (South Thanet) (Con)]

7. What recent progress his Department has made on its work to counter piracy off the horn of Africa.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Henry Bellingham)]

Thanks to international navies and the self-defence measures used by large sectors of the shipping industry, there have been no hijacks in the critical gulf of Aden trade artery since November 2010. However, piracy continues to pose a significant risk to shipping and seafarers in the Indian ocean, with 18 successful hijacks having taken place this year, so we are not complacent. Britain is playing a leading role in the counter-piracy operations at sea, and we are leading the international work with regional countries to help put in place penal and judicial facilities to deal with this evil.

[Eric Joyce]

The Minister is no doubt aware of the role of many British service personnel, and indeed ex-service personnel, in protecting shipping off Somalia in particular. Does he agree that in the end, only when Somalia has a high degree of law and order, which it does not at the moment, will the problems be properly solved?

[Mr Bellingham]

That is exactly why Her Majesty’s Government are putting so much effort into leading the international initiatives to help rebuild that failed state. Indeed, the Department for International Development has a four-year, £250 million programme for Somalia, which will focus on building regional judicial and penal structures, strengthening the police, strengthening regional coastguards and trying to help coastal communities find alternative livelihoods. As the hon. Gentleman says, the problem will be solved only on land.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Eric Joyce Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will be very brief and make just one or two points. I can either speak very quickly or stick to the quality.

I want to speak about social media and the issues that have arisen in the past couple of days. Yesterday, the Attorney-General general said in answer to a question from my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Justice that he would create a Committee. I presume that that would be a Committee of both Houses involving cross-party membership, but I am not yet sure how it is going to be put together. So far, the debate has had two primary variables at its heart. On the one hand, there has been the legal side, with much discussion among the usual lawyers. In fact, as far as I can see, there are only three or four lawyers in England, because they keep appearing on Channel 4 News, Newsnight and every other news programme. I will not name them, because that is not in vogue at the moment. I do not dispute that the law is a very important dimension. The other dimension is privacy, which people feel variously about. I know that some of my right hon. and hon. Friends are concerned about issues relating to a certain newspaper empire. To be honest, I have lesser, or different, concerns.

Both aspects are important, but what has not been aired is the issue of technology. At the moment, the court and legal system—and, indeed, Parliament—is finding itself in a tricky position over privacy, injunctions and so forth because of the way technology is racing ahead through social media applications such as Twitter, Facebook and many other platforms; I will not run through an advertisement for all the rivals. The fact is that they exist and that there is the potential for information to circulate with astonishing speed. As the Attorney-General and my right hon. Friend the shadow Justice Secretary said yesterday, it would be wrong for us in this place to say, “That’s the law, it can’t be enforced, so we just ignore it.”

Lord Neuberger’s report, which seemed a pretty reasonable effort, revealed some of the difficulties. Post that report, in the past couple of days, the Lord Chief Justice has tried to create some balance and reflected on the fact that some of the stuff that is said on the social media is taken pretty lightly. People gossip on the high street and at work, and that can sometimes have implications. Although I am not a lawyer, I understand that such gossip can have a legal status so that someone who took part could technically be taken to the civil courts for slander or, if they wrote it down, for libel. Social media merely—I say “merely”, but I know that there are significant implications—transfer that to the internet. One thing that the Lord Chief Justice said—I like to call him Judge Judge, because it is a great name, like the one in “Catch-22”—was that it is a simple fact that people do not give as much weight to information that they see on Twitter or wherever, because often it is wrong. It is patently obvious from recent cases in the media that some of the names that have come out have been wrong.

We might be tempted to say that one just has to accept that this is gossip on the internet, that that is life, and that there is nothing that the law can do about it. However, as the Attorney-General said yesterday, we cannot do that. There are many instances in which we could say that one should just accept that because we cannot implement a particular law in every case, it is not worth having. However, that is not a general position that we accept. We know that we cannot prosecute everyone who ever commits a crime. Nevertheless, it is important that the principle is there.

The argument about emerging technologies and what will come next is terribly important. I sat on the Standing Committee that considered the Communications Act 2003, which was the original Ofcom legislation. More recently, I took part in the debate in the House on the Digital Economy Act 2010. It is clear that it is difficult to legislate for new and emerging technologies, because one does not have the foggiest idea what will come next. Twitter is only two or three years old. We have no idea what there will be two or three years down the line. It is difficult to legislate for, or to take into account in the current debate, what will happen two or three years down the line. I want to emphasise that point, I hope it will be taken up by the Joint Committee when it comes into being and considers its position.

When I and other people say that we have to reflect on what is possible, we are not negating the actuality that there have to be laws under which people can be pursued if there is a particularly bad breach of an injunction, or whatever. The fact is that it is enormously difficult to close the stable door once the horse has bolted. That is not a statement of hopelessness. We have to think not just about Twitter, although that is what most of the debate has been about, but about the emerging technologies just down the road—there are many and I could bang on about them at great length, but I will not because my time is almost up—and they will inevitably impact on the deliberations of the Joint Committee and on the further discussions that will no doubt take place in this House.