Japan Free Trade Agreement

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Monday 14th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of her statement and congratulate her on reaching this agreement. It is a much-needed relief for all those UK companies that would have seen their trade with Japan revert to World Trade Organisation terms if the agreement had not been reached by the end of the year. It is also a welcome benefit at a time of great economic uncertainty for the UK’s digital and tech sectors, and for other key exporters, which will benefit from greater access, faster tariff reductions or stronger geographical indication protections under this agreement than they enjoyed under the previous EU-Japan agreement. In the absence of a treaty text and a full updated impact assessment, there is much about the UK-Japan agreement that we still do not know and will not know until those documents are published. Nevertheless, I hope that the Secretary of State can answer some initial questions today.

First and foremost, will the Secretary of State tell us, in billions of pounds and percentages of growth, what benefits this agreement will produce for UK trade and GDP over and above the forecast benefits of simply rolling over the existing EU-Japan deal? I was glad to hear her refer to consultation with the farming sector. Can she tell us what benefits the sector will derive from this deal if the EU reaches its tariff rate quota limit for agricultural products, and how that will compare with the benefits that the sector was forecast to derive from the EU-Japan deal? Will she also tell us what the impact of Friday’s agreement will be on the UK aerospace sector relative to the impact of the EU-Japan deal?

Let me turn to three specific issues. Given that there has been lots of discussion about Stilton, can the Secretary of State tell us exactly how the treatment of Stilton differs under the deal that she has agreed compared with its existing treatment under the EU-Japan deal? Given the current debate on state aid, can she confirm that the provisions on Government subsidies that she has agreed with Japan are more restrictive than the provisions in the EU-Canada deal, which No. 10 has said is the maximum it is prepared to accept in any UK trade deal with Brussels? On a similar subject, what provisions, if any, are included in the UK-Japan agreement relating to public procurement, and are they also consistent with the Government’s current negotiating position on an EU trade deal?

On the subject of Brexit, will the Secretary of State simply agree with me that, as welcome and necessary as this deal with Japan is, it is nothing like as important in terms of our global trade as reaching a deal to maintain free trade with the European Union? Our trade with Japan is worth 2.2% of our current global trade. That does not come anywhere near the 47% of trade that we have with Europe under the Government’s best-case scenario. The deal they signed on Friday will increase our trade with Japan by a little less than half in 15 years’ time. That is nothing compared with what we will lose in just four months if we do not get the deal with Europe that this Government have promised. That is why Nissan and every other Japanese company operating in Britain have told us that the deal that will determine the future of the investment and the jobs that they bring to our communities is not the one that we signed with Japan, but the one we sign with Europe.

I am glad that the Secretary of State has committed to a further debate on the agreement, given that there are many more questions to ask, but frankly there is no point in having that debate if Parliament does not have the right to vote. Will the Secretary of State guarantee today that once the treaty text and all the impact assessments have been published for proper scrutiny, she will bring the agreement back for a debate and vote, in Government time, just as will be done in the Japanese Parliament? It surely cannot be the case that this House will have less of a right to vote on a self-proclaimed historic deal agreed by the Secretary of State than will be enjoyed by our counterparts in Japan. May I ask her today to guarantee a vote, and to make it a precedent that will apply to all the other historic agreements she mentioned in her statement and that we hope are still to come?

[Elizabeth Truss]

After the right hon. Lady’s congratulations to me on securing this important deal, it is perhaps a bit churlish of me to point out that she did not vote for the original EU-Japan deal, so none of the original benefits she talked about would have come into existence had we followed the steer given by the Labour party at the time. The deal we have secured goes significantly beyond the EU-Japan deal in areas that are important to the United Kingdom. For example, the data and digital chapter in some cases goes beyond the CPTPP and sets new precedents for a high-quality deal. On business mobility, financial services, geographical indicators and rules of origin, there are advances in all parts of the negotiation that benefit all parts of the UK and all parts of business.

The right hon. Lady asked about the impact assessment. No doubt she has read the scoping study, which shows a £15 billion increase in trade under this deal, but of course we will conduct another impact assessment following the finalisation of the details of the deal, which we will indeed publish. It will also cover the deal’s environmental impact, social impact and impact on agriculture. [Interruption.] From a sedentary position, the hon. Member for Harrow West (Gareth Thomas) asks when we will publish it. The answer is that we will do so when we have completed the full legal scrub of the documents and signed the agreement.

The right hon. Lady asked me about agriculture. I am pleased to hear that she shares my strong interest in improving exports of Great British products around the world. The vast majority of agricultural products such as beef and pork are not subject to tariff rate quotas, and we have secured the full liberalisation of those products under this agreement, which is a tremendous boost for British farmers. There is a limited number of areas where there are tariff rate quotas, and that represents about £1 million worth of business versus just over £150 million for the remainder of agriculture, but in those areas we have fought hard to ensure that British exporters continue to get the benefit of exports into the Japanese market at lower tariff rates, including but not limited to Stilton. We have also secured an agreement on malt barley, and we are the second largest exporter of malt into Japan, so that is a significant benefit for British farmers. We have also succeeded in getting more liberal rules of origin on many food and drink products, which will mean that more producers are able to export into Japan tariff-free.

As the right hon. Lady knows, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Parliament can refuse to ratify trade deals. Parliament has the power that other Parliaments have. If there is not a majority in this House for this trade deal, which I do not think will be true because it sounds like she has changed her mind since she voted against the Japan deal last time, it will simply not be ratified.

The right hon. Lady asked me all kinds of questions about the details of the agreement. Obviously, as we, first of all, share it with the International Trade Committee and then with Parliament, she will be able to see the details, but I assure her that the subsidies chapter is the standard kind of chapter you get in an FTA. It is vastly different from what the EU is trying to do with us, which is essentially impose the EU state aid regime in Britain. As David Frost has made clear, that is simply not acceptable.

The right hon. Lady tries to compare and contrast the EU and Japan. We can have both deals—we are global Britain. We want to have deals with CPTPP, with the United States, with the EU and with Canada, and I believe that that is absolutely possible. I am afraid to say that the right hon. Lady still seems to want to relitigate the EU referendum. In 2016, the people of Britain decided. It is time for her to get behind it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Thursday 3rd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

We have engaged with SMEs directly, and we are also working through organisations such as the Federation of Small Businesses and the British Chambers of Commerce. What we are committed to is negotiating dedicated SME chapters in our trade agreements with the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan to give our fantastic small businesses greater access to those markets.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab) [V]]

I am sorry not to be able to be in the Chamber in person. I am pleased to hear that the Secretary of State is listening to British business, and I hope that she will listen to the millions of British workers and consumers who have an equal right to be heard when it comes to trade. With that in mind, may I ask her a simple, factual question: of the 162 individuals that she announced last week will be members of her new trade advisory groups, will she tell us how many of them represent trade unions, consumer groups or non-governmental organisations?

[Elizabeth Truss]

The right hon. Lady will be very pleased to hear that we will shortly be announcing new groups—the strategic trade advisory group, as well as groups consulting civil society and the trade unions—and that is the way that we will engage those organisations in our trade negotiations. I have already had meetings with environmental groups and with trade unions, and I am committed to continuing to do that.

[Emily Thornberry]

The question really is: why do those groups really not merit being part of the trade advisory group, because of the 162 advisers that she has appointed, there is not a single person from a union, a consumer group or an NGO. Perhaps more important than anything else is that also excluded from the Secretary of State’s new advisory groups is the CBI, which previously sat on a group advising Ministers on continuity of trade for UK firms post Brexit—a group that has met nine times in the past year alone. Will the Secretary of State tell us why the CBI has been totally excluded, and why has the advisory group on continuity after Brexit now been totally disbanded?

[Elizabeth Truss]

We are reformulating the new strategic advisory group, which will contain some large business representative organisations alongside civil society groups, and we will be announcing that in due course. None the less, there is a difference between the detailed consultation that we need to undergo on the specifics of trade negotiation—for example, rules of origin for specific industries—and then the broader strategic advice on our trade policy. It is right that we are consulting the trade unions, the environmental groups and organisations such as the CBI on that broader strategy as well, and we will be announcing that in due course. The hon. Lady will not have to wait much longer.

Trade Bill

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 20th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Gullis]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on the scrutiny point?

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

On the Michael Spicer point?

[Bill Esterson]

I do not know if Michael Spicer is talking to the hon. Gentleman or not; we will find out in a moment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bill Esterson]

Absolutely. We compare very badly with the scrutiny in the United States, some of which I have already described. My hon. Friend is right to make the comparison. Is it not ironic that we are in the middle of trade talks with the United States, where they have full scrutiny and we do not? While we are stuck with CRAG, in the United States debates and votes will take place in Congress, alongside the engagement with business and the unions that I described earlier.

Let us remind ourselves that CRAG was introduced as part of our scrutiny process while we were EU members, because trade agreements were an EU competence. The process included full scrutiny in the European Parliament —scrutiny that has not been replaced by an equivalent system. The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) reminded us of her experience performing exactly that role.

The Minister wrote to MPs last week. I think he read out quite a lot of his letter in his speech. He told us last week that legislation will be debated and scrutinised by Parliament in “the usual way”. The usual way? There is no “usual way”, because the usual process only worked alongside the scrutiny carried out for us in the European Parliament. Despite what the Minister says, CRAG on its own makes no sense unless the Government wish to avoid scrutiny.

Today’s amendments to the Bill are similar to those passed in March 2019. The Minister is fond of telling us how vital it is that the Bill passes, so why did the Government not accept the amended Bill last year? It could have saved a lot of trouble.

[Emily Thornberry]

And time.

[Bill Esterson]

And time. What possible reason can the Government have for wanting to avoid scrutiny, and why on such important areas? Perhaps there are some clues in the topics covered by the various amendments. The threat to our NHS is right at the top of the list. Investor-state dispute settlement was a scandal that came to prominence during the TTIP negotiations. Let us look at some examples of the threat posed by ISDS. The Portuguese Government were sued using ISDS when the Lisbon metro was returned to public ownership. ISDS clauses in bilateral investment treaties are being used now to prepare a series of cases against the UK Government for pausing construction contracts during the pandemic.

ISDS is not the only issue. Standstill clauses prevent Governments from returning privatised public services to the public sector. Ratchet clauses require further services to be privatised. Then there are negative lists, which require Governments to specify exactly which services are to be exempt from privatisation, with everything else up for grabs. The Prime Minister told us he favours a social insurance system in his Daily Telegraph article, so when Ministers tell us not to worry about the NHS, it simply will not wash.

Statements alone are worthless. It is very simple: the detailed text of all agreements must include cast-iron commitments, because it is not just the Prime Minister who wants to hand over our NHS to the healthcare corporations; it is his friend the US President, and it is in the US negotiating objectives, which refer to

“full market access for US products”.

They want access to NHS medicines and more, and they are not shy about saying so.

Scrutiny matters, nowhere more so than in the protection of our NHS in international trade agreements. That is why our new clause 17 is so important. Ministers say that they want export opportunities for our farmers in the United States and Australia. Export opportunities? Really? Ministers are missing the point. Farmers have to survive first. If food imports are allowed with lower production, welfare standards and costs, farmers will struggle to stay in business. They will be undercut. As trade representative Lighthizer warned us, on issues such as agriculture

“this administration is not going to compromise.”

There is no ambiguity in Mr Lighthizer’s commitment not to compromise, is there? The idea that farmers will make up for domestic sales by exporting more is a fantasy. The magical thinking of Ministers will not stand up to scrutiny—that is, of course, if scrutiny is ever allowed.

Sale of Arms: War in Yemen

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Monday 13th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab) (Urgent Question)]

To ask the Secretary of State for International Trade if she will make a statement on her decision to resume the sale of arms to the Saudi-led coalition for use in the war in Yemen.

[The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)]

The Secretary of State has retaken the licensing decisions, as required by the Court of Appeal. All existing and new applications for Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen will be assessed against the revised methodology, which considers whether there is a clear risk that the equipment might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

The revised methodology was developed to address the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It considers all allegations that are assessed as likely to have occurred and that have been caused by fixed-wing aircraft, reflecting the factual circumstances that the court proceedings concerned. It remains the case, however, that it can be extremely difficult to reach firm conclusions as to whether specific incidents violate the principles of international humanitarian law. Therefore, where an incident is assessed as a possible breach, it is regarded for the purposes of the relevant analysis as if there were breaches of IHL. I emphasise that that analysis is just one part of the assessment.

In retaking these decisions, the Secretary of State has considered the full range of information available to the Government. Some of that information is necessarily sensitive and confidential. I am therefore not able to go into detail about individual assessments. The crucial point is that we have assessed that there were a small number of incidents that have been treated, for the purposes of this analysis, as violations of international humanitarian law. However, these were isolated incidents and our analysis shows that Saudi Arabia has a genuine intent and the capacity to comply with international humanitarian law and the specific commitments it has made.

It is on that basis that the Secretary of State has assessed that there is not a clear risk that the export of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

[Emily Thornberry]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question, although I am sorry the Secretary of State cannot be dragged here to explain her own decisions. There is certainly much explaining to do. In my limited time, I have five questions for the Minister and one specific request.

First, we welcome the Secretary of State’s assessment of possible violations of international law in Yemen, but can the Minister explain why his brother Ministers have been telling the House for the last five years that such an assessment was impossible for Britain to make, and that it could be made only by Saudi Arabia itself? Were those Ministers simply wrong?

Secondly, the Secretary of State has concluded that where international law was broken in Yemen these were “isolated incidents”. Can the Minister tell us how many such incidents were identified, so that we can understand how they define the word “isolated”?

Thirdly, the Government say they have found no patterns of civilian infrastructure being targeted. Can the Minister therefore explain why, for 17 months at the start of the war, Saudi planes systematically destroyed Yemen’s means of food production, bombing farmland, markets, milk plants and fishing boats? If that is not a pattern, what is?

Fourthly, as well as deliberate targeting, the Minister will know that the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas is in itself a war crime, but the Government say the Saudis could not have meant to break international law because their violations

“occurred at different times, in different circumstances and for different reasons.”—[Official Report, 7 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 339WS.]

Does the Minister not agree that that sounds like the very definition of the word “indiscriminate”?

Fifthly, the Government have concluded that Saudi Arabia has both the intent and capacity to comply with international law, but if that is the case, will the Minister explain the cause of the occasions on which it has failed to do that?

Finally, it would help all of us to understand the Government’s decision if they would agree to publish the full assessment that underpinned it, including the analysis of each so-called isolated incident. If the Minister believes this decision is not just moral and lawful but correct, then surely he has nothing to fear from publishing that assessment and letting us all decide for ourselves.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her questions, and start by saying that we absolutely share her concern about the humanitarian tragedy in Yemen, which is why the UK is actively engaged in seeking further diplomatic solutions. Let me try to deal with her questions, as far as I am able, as some of the matters are within the competence of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Ministers have of course not been wrong in their assessment; if they had been wrong, they would have come to the Dispatch Box. The consolidated criteria have been used in all the assessments of the licences. The number of incidents is an operational question; the role of the Department for International Trade is in assessing the consolidated criteria.

The right hon. Lady talked about a number of incidents over different times and in different ways. The assessment was that there is no pattern in the behaviour of Saudi Arabia, and that these were isolated incidents over some considerable time and also at different times.

The right hon. Lady mentioned the intention and capacity to comply and publish the full assessment of the various incidents and asked for a full analysis of each incident. It is worth saying—as you, Mr Speaker, will certainly understand—that assessments of the different incidents that took place in Yemen will often be informed by confidential information that comes to the Government not necessarily from Saudi Arabia; it would not be appropriate for us to publish those assessments. What we have published, however, are the consolidated criteria and the quarterly lists of each licence that has been granted.

Oral Answers to Questions

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Thursday 18th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Greg Hands]

It is worth pointing out that nothing in any trade agreement would prevent the UK from reaching its targets under the Paris agreement and to go net zero by 2050—we are the first Government to commit to doing that, and no trade agreement will prevent us from doing that. We remain on the front foot in our advocacy, making sure that the international response remains extremely strong, including through multilateral agreements and the UK contribution to the global climate fund.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

Last year, Brazil lost an area of rainforest the size of Yorkshire, and the new land reforms proposed by the Bolsonaro Administration will make the scale of deforestation and commercial exploitation in the Amazon even worse. In the light of that, can the Minister tell us what environmental conditions are attached to his Department’s £20 million trade facilitation programme with Brazil? Will he promise to suspend that programme if the Bolsonaro Administration persist with their proposed land reform laws?

[Greg Hands]

This question is about trade agreements, and it is worth pointing out that we are not currently in negotiation with Brazil on a trade agreement. The European Union is, by the way. When it comes to trade agreements, the right hon. Lady needs to get her own house in order. Yesterday at this very Dispatch Box, she praised EU trade agreements with Pacific rim countries in the CPTPP. The only problem for her is that those on the Labour Front Bench voted against CETA and did not support the EU-Japan agreement. Worst of all, she led her troops to vote against the Trade Bill—

[Emily Thornberry]

indicated dissent.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)]

First, I praise the long-standing work that my hon. Friend has done in local government leadership over many years. Local government and councils will play a key role. This week, I have spoken to civic leaders, including Andy Burnham in Manchester and candidate Shaun Bailey in London, and impressed on them the importance of trade and investment decisions in our biggest cities. Trade and investment is a whole-of-the-UK effort involving all four nations, and all regions and cities, including councils and local government. I praise my hon. Friend for his work.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

On Monday in Yemen, 13 civilians travelling by road, including four children, were killed in an alleged Saudi airstrike—the latest innocent victims of this barbaric war. A year ago this week, the Court of Appeal ruled that it is unlawful for the Government to license any more exports of arms to Saudi Arabia for use in the war in Yemen, and ordered the Government to review all extant licences in the light of that judgment. A full year later, can the Secretary of State tell us whether that review of extant licences is complete and, if not, why not?

[Elizabeth Truss]

As the right hon. Lady knows from the written ministerial statement I made earlier this year, we have been reviewing our processes and making sure all the work we do is compliant with the consolidated criteria.

[Emily Thornberry]

I thank the Secretary of State for that answer, but the fact is that, a year on from the Court of Appeal ruling, British firms are still exporting arms for use in Yemen, and that is unacceptable.

On a related issue, the Government refuse point black to tell us whether British-made tear gas and other riot equipment have been used in the United States over the past month. I ask the Secretary of State a very simple but important question that goes alongside that: does she condemn the tear gassing and beating of unarmed, peaceful protesters and journalists, and will she make it clear that riot equipment should never be used in that way?

[Elizabeth Truss]

Of course we are all extremely concerned about what has happened in the US—in particular, the killing of George Floyd. We are very, very concerned about that. However, we have one of the strictest arms licensing regimes in the world and we are absolutely clear—I have made this clear to the team—that we always comply with the consolidated criteria.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (Accession)

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of her statement and for always keeping the House up to date on the progress of her trade negotiations. On my count, in those six weeks, the Secretary of State has formally launched new trade negotiations with four different countries—the US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand—on top of the 16 negotiations that she is already leading to roll over our EU third country agreements, all of which, according to her own timetable, she wants signed and sealed within the next six months. In addition, we now have today’s statement committing the Government to begin negotiations on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP—I am going to pronounce it “C-tip” for short.

As the Secretary of State said, CPTPP currently comprises 11 members, accounting for 13% of global GDP, making it the third-largest free trade area in the world. So in theory, the UK becoming a member sounds like it deserves the fanfare that the Secretary of State has given it today. However, let us now look at those 11 countries. With seven of them, we already have free trade agreements, courtesy of our membership of the EU—that is Japan, Canada, Singapore, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Vietnam. With two of those—Chile and Peru—roll-over deals are in place to continue free trade beyond December. With the other five, bilateral negotiations are still ongoing to get roll-over deals agreed. That is seven out of the 11 taken care of.

Then, just this morning, the Secretary of State formally launched free trade negotiations with another two CPTPP members, Australia and New Zealand. Just to be clear, according to the Secretary of State’s plans, by the time we join CPTPP, we should already have bilateral free trade deals in place with nine of its 11 Members, accounting for 95% of the UK’s current trade with the CPTPP area. In fact, the only new free trade agreements that we stand to gain from membership of CPTPP are with the kingdoms of Malaysia and Brunei, which, between them, accounted for just 0.37% of the UK’s total world trade last year.

I ask the Secretary of State: what are the benefits of joining CPTPP for UK trade, growth and jobs, over and above the benefits that she has already forecast from trade deals with Japan, Australia and the seven other CPTPP countries with whom bilateral negotiations are already complete or still in train? Could she then tell us how these potential benefits stack up against some of the potential risks of CPTPP membership? First, will the UK be subject to the provisions in CPTPP for investor state dispute settlement, with all the risks that that poses to our ability to protect public services, consumers and the environment from corporate profiteers? Secondly, will membership of CPTPP demand the sharing of our citizens’ data, including health records? If so, how will that data be protected? If other CPTPP members are not compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation, how will that affect the ability of UK service companies to access EU citizens’ data?

Thirdly, will CPTPP membership oblige us to accept a “list it or lose it” approach to private competition in the public sector? If so, can the Government guarantee a blanket exception for our NHS and other essential public services? Fourthly, will we be obliged to accept the regulatory standards on animal welfare and food production established under CPTPP and, if so, are they compatible with other existing standards?

Finally, will the Government negotiate the terms of our CPTPP membership to benefit key British trade sectors, or will we have to accept the existing terms of an agreement shaped in the interests of others? I raise those questions not from confirmed opposition to CPTPP but simply because we need to know whether the risks are worth taking if the only distinct benefit is the prospect of free trade with Malaysia and Brunei. That debate has not yet been won, and I urge the Secretary of State to reopen it for consultation with industry, unions and other stakeholders who did not have the time to study the proposals properly during the busy Brexit negotiations in autumn 2018.

In closing, we cannot divorce this debate from that around the still busy Brexit negotiations. The businesses I speak to around the country simply cannot understand why the Government are spending so much time and effort trying to negotiate international trade deals of relatively low value when they have yet to secure our continued trade with Europe. I am all for expanding the 0.3% of global trade that we share with Malaysia and Brunei, which is all the statement ultimately amounts to, but as the 47% of our trade that depends on Europe is hanging in the balance that is where the Government’s priorities should lie.

[Elizabeth Truss]

I am not surprised that the right hon. Lady is trying to do down our efforts to secure trade agreements with the vast majority of the world and join some of the most exciting free-trade areas in existence, because the Opposition refused even to support trade deals with Canada and Japan when we were members of the EU. She talked about a continuity agreement, but she did not even support signing it in the first place. Only the Labour party could call low value a trade area where the UK has £100 billion-worth of trade. I do not know what mathematics or economics that relates to, but it is certainly none with which I am familiar.

Let me be clear with the right hon. Lady. The deal of which we would be part with CPTPP goes much further than the existing roll-over agreements that countries such as Canada have with the EU. For example, CPTPP has an advanced digital and data chapter. The UK is a data and digital superpower. We are third in the world for the number of billion-dollar tech companies, after the US and China. CPTPP has an advanced digital and data chapter to which the EU would not sign up. That chapter gives us access to that in Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile across the agreement.

This agreement removes 95% of tariffs—again, going further than many of the roll-over agreements. We are talking about joining one of the most advanced trade agreement areas in the world. The measure goes far beyond what the EU was willing or able to agree, which is a huge opportunity for the UK. It is completely wrong to suggest that this is about Malaysia and Brunei, although I do not deprecate Malaysia, which is a fast-growing market and a good trade opportunity for the UK.

To say that CPTPP is simply equivalent to the deals that the EU is negotiating with those nations betrays a lack of understanding of the text of these trade agreements. I am very happy to share with the right hon. Lady the additional chapters in question.

The right hon. Lady suggested that I will close all these trade deals in the next six months, and I am very flattered by her belief in my superhuman power to do so. I have not said that we are going to close all the trade deals we are negotiating in the next six months. For example, we have set no timetable on a United States trade deal, so it is simply not true to say that we have a target of closing all of them in the next six months.

We will do deals that are good for Britain, and we will be prepared to walk away if we do not get what the UK wants. For example, the national health service is not on the table and the price we pay for drugs is not on the table. [Interruption.] The right hon. Lady has asked me a series of questions, and she might listen to the answers, rather than chatting to her colleague on the Front Bench, the hon. Member for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson).

I am very clear that we will not lower our food import standards. We have an excellent independent agency, the Food Standards Agency. As part of the withdrawal agreement, all of our import standards, including those on chlorinated chicken and hormone-injected beef, will be on the UK statute book, and it would take a vote in Parliament to overturn them. We are not negotiating that as part of any of these trade agreements. It is simply scaremongering from the right hon. Lady.

We have a huge opportunity here to forge a new future for global Britain, and we are not going to listen to the scaremongering and negativity from the Labour party. We are going to take those opportunities, and we are going to move forward.

Trade Bill

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th May 2020 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House recognises that upon leaving the European Union, the UK will need effective legislation to implement agreements with partner countries corresponding to international trade agreements of the European Union in place before the UK’s exit, to implement procurement obligations arising from the UK becoming a member of the Government Procurement Agreement in its own right, to set out the basis of a Trade Remedies Authority to deliver the new UK trade remedies framework, and to establish the powers for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to collect and disclose data on goods and services exporters; but declines to give a Second Reading to the Trade Bill because it fails to set out proper procedures for Parliamentary consultation, scrutiny, debate and approval of future international trade agreements, fails to protect the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty in respect of the implementation of international trade agreements previously negotiated by the European Union and in respect of changes to existing government procurement regulations arising from the UK’s or other countries’ accession to the Government Procurement Agreement, fails to establish sufficient scrutiny procedures to replace those that have pertained while the UK has been a member of the European Union, fails to guarantee that the UK’s current high standards and rights will be protected in future trade agreements, and fails to render the Trade Remedies Authority answerable to Parliament or representative of the full range of stakeholders who should be included in its membership.

In moving this amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, I am conscious that, for many of us, there will be a strong sense of déjà vu: the personnel may have changed, but we have all been here before, with the same Bill, the same amendment, and the same arguments. For once, the Government are correct when they say that nothing has changed. The inescapable truth remains that this Trade Bill, as it currently stands, is a massive missed opportunity for the Government, for this Parliament and for our country.

For the past five decades, our trade policies have been set at European level. Indeed, there is not a single Member of this House who was in Parliament the last time the UK set its own trade policies, so, like it or not, this Bill carries an historic significance, and that is what I want to address today. Is this Bill, in its current form, fit to rise to its historic challenge? After five decades, in which we have seen tremendous upheaval in our global economy, does the Bill provide the legislative framework and the bold and far-reaching vision that we need to underpin Britain’s trade policies for several years to come? After five decades, does the Bill ensure that issues such as climate change and human rights, which were barely a consideration the last time the UK set its own trade policies, are now at the heart of our decision-making and central to our relationships overseas? And after five decades, does the Bill give a proper voice to the devolved Administrations, who did not even exist back then, and to all other private, public and civic-sector bodies whose ideas and insights constantly improve our policy-making and remind us that Whitehall does not know best? Finally, after five decades, does this Bill restore full sovereignty to Parliament over Britain’s trade policies, especially when it comes to the formulation, scrutiny and approval of new trade agreements? Those are the questions I asked myself. As I will explain, the answer that came back, on every front, was a resounding no—even worse, a warning cry that far from restoring the powers of Parliament when it comes to trade policy, this Bill erodes them to nothing.

Let me begin with the first question, namely whether this Bill gives us a legislative framework and a bold new vision for decades of trade policy to come. Here we find ourselves in the strange position of having Ministers themselves tell us that the answer is no. They say that there is nothing of significance in this legislation, and that it is simply a continuity Bill that is designed to maintain the status quo beyond 31 December. I will come back to whether that is right, especially in respect of new trade agreements, but one thing is for sure: there is no bold, long-term vision in this Bill. There is no great legislative framework for the future, and when it comes to the UK shaping its own trade policy after five long decades, this Bill certainly was not worth the wait.

That brings us to the second question, namely to what extent the Bill reflects the necessary and welcome widening of Britain’s trade policy objectives over five decades, and the extent to which it puts at the heart of our future trade agreements the issues of climate change, environmental protection, human rights, workers’ rights, sustainable development and gender equality. Again, we should all be ashamed to say that the answer is: not at all.

I will take just one of those issues, namely human rights. It is disappointing enough that the Government are failing to make it a key priority in negotiating new trade agreements, but what is truly damaging is the Government’s willingness to omit from their rolled-over trade agreements the human rights clauses that are now mandatory in all deals with the EU. If the Government want to refute that, the Minister of State has a simple task when he closes the debate later. He should guarantee that the rolled-over trade agreements that the Government are still trying to negotiate before 31 December with Cameroon and Egypt will both contain clauses enabling the UK to terminate the agreements if those countries continue their horrendous abuse of human rights. Will he ensure that the same policy applies to Turkey, Singapore, South Sudan and every other country with whom we are in negotiation?

The third question was whether the Bill marks a decisive break with the “Whitehall knows best” attitudes that dominated policy making five decades ago, and instead paves the way for Britain’s new trade policies to be formed in a transparent and inclusive way, for example by consulting the elected representatives of our regions and devolved Administrations, benefiting from the expertise of our development and environmental non-governmental organisations, or listening to the concerns of British businesses and their employees. Again, the answer, sadly, is no.

We see that most starkly when it comes to the Bill’s proposals for the membership of the trade remedies authority. That will be a vital body with a vital task, but it will have no guaranteed representation from the UK’s industry bodies and trade unions—the representatives of the people most affected by the unfair practices that the TRA is supposed to prevent. No wonder there are such concerns and suspicions that the Government’s true agenda for the TRA is not to defend Britain against underpriced imports, but somehow to balance the damage they do to domestic producers against the perceived benefits for domestic consumers. That is not the job of the trade remedies authority. That is why we instead need there to be proper representation on the board for the businesses and workers that it has been set up to defend, and why we need the TRA to be accountable to Parliament rather than Government.

That brings me to the final question, which is of the greatest immediate significance: whether, after five decades, this Bill succeeds in restoring parliamentary sovereignty over our country’s trade policies or whether, in fact, the opposite is true, as Members here and in the other place—all formidably led by my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner)—have consistently said over the past two and a half years.

Let us take an example. The Secretary of State is a fan, it would seem, of the Government procurement agreement. As my colleagues have pointed out in the past, no matter how much we agree with the GPA, it is still incredible that the UK can accede to the GPA and MPs have no practical means to stop it; that the UK’s coverage schedules can be sent to the WTO and MPs have no opportunity to approve them; and that changes can be made in the future to the UK’s commitment under the GPA, and MPs will have less chance to scrutinise them than we did when Brussels was in charge and the European Scrutiny Committee was in place. So in an area such as Government procurement, the Bill does not advance parliamentary sovereignty—it does not even leave us standing still. The Bill takes us backwards.

Let us look at a more contentious area: new trade agreements. The Government have tried to convince us that, because the Bill only seeks to provide the basis to roll over existing agreements, we do not have to worry about the almost complete absence of accompanying parliamentary scrutiny or approval. But the reality is that in many cases there are or will be major differences between the UK’s third country agreement and the EU equivalent it is opposed to replicate.

Let us look at some of the examples we have seen. We have agreements with five countries in a trade bloc where the UK only covers three. We have EU agreements with mandatory clauses on human rights that the UK has agreed to drop. We have an EU agreement with Turkey based on a customs union, which the UK has explicitly rejected. We have an EU agreement with Japan, which both the Secretary of State and her Japanese counterpart have said our bilateral deal should go beyond, and that will doubtless be true of the Canada deal as well.

In short, we will end up with several major new trade deals all significantly different from their EU equivalents, but all subject to the same minimal amount of parliamentary scrutiny and approval, as proposed in the Trade Bill. That is not a restoration of parliamentary sovereignty. That is not anywhere near the gold standard of parliamentary consultation, scrutiny and approval of trade deals that we see in Australia or the United States. That is not therefore what I would call taking back control.

In conclusion, I believe that this Trade Bill offers a historic opportunity, but that opportunity has so far been missed. Instead of a bold, strategic vision for the future of our trade policy, we have a stopgap piece of legislation that even Ministers are trying to talk down. Instead of issues such as climate change and human rights being put at the heart of our trade policy, they have been ignored or consciously dropped. Instead of opening our trade policy to the expertise of others, the Government are denying them even a seat at the table. And instead of restoring Parliament’s sovereignty over trade policy, this Bill leaves MPs even more powerless than before. That is why I urge colleagues on both sides of the House to support the Opposition’s amendment. After five decades, let us spend the time and effort we need to get this historic Bill right.

Oral Answers to Questions

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Tuesday 12th May 2020 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

A free trade deal with the United States is set to benefit every nation and region in the UK, including Wales. We will strike a hard bargain, and seek a deal that is fair for our producers. For example, we want to make sure that we gain access for British lamb and Welsh lamb in the United States market. It is the second biggest importer of lamb in the world, and it represents a massive opportunity for our farming sector and for the nation of Wales.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for the warm welcome that she has given me in this new role and for the co-operative discussions that we have enjoyed so far in relation to both coronavirus and US trade. On the latter subject, she will be aware that the Trump Administration and the US Congress see the US-Mexico-Canada agreement on trade as a template for every other free trade agreement that they are looking to sign around the world. Can the Secretary of State make it clear to them today that she will not agree to any version of article 32.10 of the USMCA that would constrain the UK’s ability to negotiate our own trade agreement with China and therefore represent an unacceptable breach of the sovereignty of this Parliament?

[Elizabeth Truss]

First, I welcome the right hon. Lady to her seat. It is great to see her in the flesh, even though we have had a number of calls over the last few weeks. I am committed to working with the Opposition to ensure that we get the best possible deal for all parts of the UK in the US trade deal. I can assure her that when we negotiate with the United States we will negotiate in the UK’s interest, ensuring that we have full freedom of manoeuvre and making our own sovereign decisions as a country. Of course, we are looking at a number of precursor agreements for the text we use in those trade negotiations, but my No. 1 priority is to ensure that we have our own sovereign capability to trade with the rest of the world as we see fit. One important benefit of a US trade deal and the trade deal we are looking to strike with Japan is that we need to be setting standards with fellow free market democracies and ensuring that we have proper transparency in our operations and proper setting of standards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

It would be remiss of me not to welcome the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) to her new role.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. May I also thank my colleagues for asking such vital questions about shortages of PPE and other essential medical supplies?

One area where we have, thankfully, not seen shortages to date is the supply of prescription medicines, thanks to the so-called Brexit buffer of supplies built up in preparation for a no-deal Brexit. But given that this buffer only provides somewhere between three to six months of supplies, will the Minister tell us how the Government are getting on with replenishing these stocks from imports, so that we do not experience any shortages once the Brexit buffer starts to run out?

[Greg Hands]

I join the Secretary of the State in welcoming the right hon. Lady to her position. After four years of the hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner), we always look forward to seeing somebody new at the Dispatch Box.

Again, we are active in all available forums to ensure that the UK’s supply of prescription and non-prescription medicines continues. For example, following the restrictions that India put in place on 3 March, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has been very active with the Indian Trade Minister to get almost all those restrictions removed. We will continue to be active with all our trade partners to ensure that products continue to flow to our NHS at this time.