Victims and Prisoners Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Champion]

I am content at this point with the movement that the Minister has offered. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14

Independent legal advice for victims of rape

“The Secretary of State must develop proposals for a scheme to give victims of rape access to free, independent legal advice.”—(Ellie Reeves.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

New clause 14 seeks to introduce independent legal advocates for rape victims. Although it is always awful to be a victim of any crime, seeking justice after a rape is particularly traumatic, not just because of the desperately low chance of the offender being charged—it is currently just 1.6%—or because rape cases take the longest of all crimes to get to court, but because rape and other sexual offences are the only criminal offences in which the victim’s credibility can become the focal point of the police investigation and the trial.

In no other crime would the complainant’s lifestyle, online presence or sexual history be considered relevant to a jury. Coupled with the fact that victims have no right to their own legal support, that can mean that they find themselves trying to navigate a complex and opaque system on their own. That is why one of the things that survivors tell me time and again is that they feel the criminal justice system is working against them, compounding the trauma they have already suffered.

Given the pressures, it is no wonder that nearly 70% of survivors who report a rape drop out of the justice system. I recognise that the Minister has outlined the fact that he is looking at independent legal advice for rape victims, specifically in relation to disclosure. Although I welcome that, the remit needs to be much wider. Too often, the interests of rape victims are not properly protected in the criminal justice process. When that happens, rape survivors need somewhere to turn to get expert legal help, and that is where legal advocates come in.

The alleged offender has a defence lawyer acting and advocating in their interests, but the rape victim has no such support, and that causes many survivors to drop their cases. An independent scheme of legal advocates would help to tackle that. This proposal would not give victim survivors party status in legal proceedings, and would not conflict with fair trial rights and the duty of the Crown to act in the public interest.

It is important to note that independent legal advice schemes for victims already exist in many other jurisdictions, including many European countries, Australia, Japan, California and Ireland. The UK is an outlier in that respect. As it stands, the only specialist independent legal advice for rape survivors in the UK comes from the groups Centre for Women’s Justice and Rights of Women. They do brilliant work, but can assist only a very limited number of survivors. They cannot deliver the full service that survivors often require, so there is a significant level of unmet need.

A pilot scheme of legal advocates was trialled in Northumbria between 2018 and 2020. The survivors who took part gave positive feedback, as did most of the police and prosecutors directly involved with the lawyers in the scheme. One survivor, Susan, said that

“100% in all of this the saving grace has been”

the lawyer,

“without a doubt, without a doubt my saving grace”.

Police and prosecutors were also clear that the accused’s right to a fair trial was not affected. Overall, the pilot found that the legal advocates substantially improved best practice in the police and CPS, and led to an improved victim experience.

Academic research by Dr Olivia Smith of Loughborough University shows that expanding the roll-out of the pilot to every police force in England and Wales would cost just over £4 million a year. The Home Office estimates that the emotional and wellbeing consequences alone of sexual offences, and the inadequate responses to those crimes, cost £9.8 billion. Given that, and the bulk of research showing that legal advocacy improves criminal justice satisfaction, health and employment outcomes, the cost of an independent legal advocate scheme is far from prohibitive, and would likely make huge savings elsewhere across the economy.

I turn to the remit of legal advocates. It is important to outline that, given the complexity and range of the legal issues that survivors encounter, legal advocates need to be trained lawyers, as opposed to independent sexual violence advocates. They need to be able to properly advise survivors on the issues they encounter, as well as conduct legal casework, such as reading police and CPS documents and preparing written representations. They have to be in an organisation entirely separate from any criminal justice bodies, to uphold their independence and, if necessary, liaise directly with the police and the CPS on the survivors’ behalf. However, we are not proposing that legal advocates assist victims at trial or represent them before the court. We are also not proposing that they play a role in the day-to-day communications between police and survivors. Rather, they would support the victim on specific issues that arise where legal expertise is required, from the moment they report their case to the police right through to trial. Importantly, they would be available free of charge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

In the latest progress update, we also recognised that there is more to do. I want to be very clear on the record that I am not unsupportive of what the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge seeks to achieve with her amendment. Indeed, to better understand whether independent legal advice and representation is required, and how it could work in practice alongside our wider reforms and in broader interactions with the system, we have asked the Law Commission to explore the merits of independent legal advice and representation, and how that would work in practice, recognising among other things the specific challenges in cases of rape and serious sexual offences, in terms of third-party material and similar. We also hope that the Law Commission will consider in the round why one particular set of cases should attract it while others would not, and whether that would be an equitable approach. There are very specific reasons in the case of RASSO cases, but we have asked the Law Commission to look at it carefully.

The Law Commission’s consultation on the use of evidence in sexual prosecutions was published on 23 May and will run until the end of September. I suspect that it will cover this matter and a wide range of other matters that we have discussed. I look forward to closely reviewing the Law Commission’s findings and, through gathering that additional evidence, arriving at a well-informed position on this important issue, and how it might be practical to deliver on such a commitment, subject to what the Law Commission says, and to decisions by the Lord Chancellor. To continue our improvements to third-party material requests through the Bill, we are also introducing duties on policing, which we debated when considering new clause 4. In addition, the victims code will introduce an entitlement for adult victims of rape and serious sexual offences to be offered a meeting with the prosecution team once they have been notified that the case is proceeding to trial. That will give victims the opportunity to discuss what happens next and to ask any questions that they have about the process.

On supporting victims to access the right to review process, the CPS notifies victims by letter of decisions not to charge or to stop a case, and offers eligible victims the right to request a review and gives details on how to do that. I will suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General that she and the Director of Public Prosecutions undertake an exercise akin to the one that the hon. Member for Rotherham and I did to look at how—often standard—letters are worded and framed, to ensure that they are sensitive and communicate clearly. That would be a matter for the Attorney General’s office.

In our view, it is slightly premature at this stage to propose a specific approach to free legal advice without taking into account the findings, and the expert advice, of the Law Commission’s important work on these issues. In the light of that work, we will probably return to these questions when it reports.

[Ellie Reeves]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I take some comfort from him saying that he is unable to support the new clause “at this stage” and that it is premature rather than something that is not being looked at. It is an incredibly important issue. I note that the Law Commission is looking at it. I would not want to see the issue kicked into the long grass.

[Edward Argar]

May I offer to meet the hon. Lady to discuss this in advance of the Law Commission work, so that the two of us can discuss it further, as Minister and shadow Minister?

[Ellie Reeves]

I would very much welcome that, and I am grateful for the offer. I will not press the new clause to a vote in the light of what the Minister has said. He acknowledges on the rape review that came out yesterday that there is more to do. I gently suggest that this is one of the key things that could be done so that we start to see some real progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 20

Data-sharing for immigration purposes: exemption for victims

“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements to ensure that personal data of a victim, as defined by section 1 of this Act, that is processed for the purpose of that person requesting or receiving support or assistance under the Victims Code is not used for the maintenance of immigration control.

(2) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 shall not apply to the personal data to which subsection (1) applies.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the Secretary of State must issue guidance to—

(a) persons providing relevant victim support services, as defined by section 12 of this Act;

(b) persons exercising any function of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality; and

(c) persons exercising any function conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer.

(4) In this section “immigration control” means United Kingdom immigration control and includes any United Kingdom immigration control operated in a prescribed control zone outside the United Kingdom.”—(Sarah Champion.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Sarah Champion]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I wonder if it will help to start by saying that the Deputy Speaker has said that the debate in the Chamber will go all the way to 5 pm—I will preface my quite long speech with that, but I will keep it moving.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Champion]

The situation that we are in pains me, and it pains me that the Minister is unable to move forward on this. It is not enough to inform those vulnerable victims; I need to see the police being informed of what they ought, and ought not, to be doing. I will withdraw the new clause, but I assure the Minister that it will come back. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 21

Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

“(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—

‘2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person (“A”) is convicted of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of another person (“B”); and

(b) A and B had parental responsibility for the same child (“C”) at the time at which the offence was committed.

(2) Subject to the exceptions in subsection (3), A ceases to have parental responsibility for C while A is serving a custodial sentence in a prison or other place of detention in respect of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of B.

(3) The exceptions are where a conviction for manslaughter was made—

(a) as a result of the partial defences provided for in section 54 (partial defence to murder: loss of control) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, or

(b) on the grounds of diminished responsibility

in circumstances in which, on the balance of probability, A was a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour by B at the time of the killing or at a time reasonably proximate to it.’

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision that is consequential on this section.

(3) The power to make regulations under subsection (2) may (among other things) be exercised by modifying any provision made by or under an enactment.

(4) Regulations under this section—

(a) may make transitional and saving provision;

(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Ellie Reeves.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ellie Reeves]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Under the law, if a father is found guilty of killing his children’s mother, he retains parental responsibility over the children. That means that after ending their mother’s life and destroying the children’s lives, such killers still have power over their children—power to be involved in decisions affecting their lives and power to continue controlling and abusive behaviour over the family of their victim. The new clause would end that dreadful situation.

The new clause would reverse the situation in which the onus is on the victim’s family to prove, often through protracted legal proceedings, why the perpetrator’s parental responsibility should be revoked. Instead, the killer’s parental responsibility would be automatically removed for the period they were in prison, and the onus placed on them to go through the legal hoops to prove that they deserve that responsibility. That would apply to all those found guilty of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the other parent.

The loss of a parent to violence creates deep trauma. We have no official figures for how many children lose their mothers in that way, but we know that two women are killed by their partner or former partner each week. One trauma specialist I spoke with, who has worked with hundreds of children whose mothers were killed by their fathers, estimates that about 50 mothers are killed by the father per year. In those cases, the children are dealing not just with grief, but with the loss of their parent—the mother is almost always the victim in such cases—and with the feelings of anger, shame and confusion that accompany having a father who has committed such an abhorrent act.

Retaining parental responsibility, however, allows those men to continue to exercise control over the children and surviving family from their prison cells. That results in an indefensible situation—his permission must be sought for things such as schooling or medical treatment, or before the children can be taken abroad. That forces the children’s carers, who are often the only stability the children have left, to engage with the killer and his wishes. That can be hugely distressing and, in turn, can potentially destabilise the children’s recovery.

Some abusive fathers even try to block maternal family members from gaining custody of the children they love, leaving the children to grow up in the care system instead. That has left some families unable to see their loved nieces, nephews or grandchildren—for months on end, as legal battles go through the courts—at the exact time when they are needed most to support the children.

The fact that a convicted killer’s parental responsibility cannot be suspended without protracted legal battles is a huge injustice. What greater dereliction of duty towards a child can there be than to rob them of their mother and burden them with a lifetime of trauma? Many are raised knowing that the perpetrator retains intimate knowledge of and access to their lives, which undermines their recovery. For some, that results in fear—they might themselves be in danger—and for others, in decisions made not in their best interest but rather to deprive them of opportunities out of sheer spite.

Children Heard and Seen, a charity that supports children impacted by parental imprisonment, reports that the retention of the father’s rights is a significant traumatising factor in those children’s lives. Children need stability, and their guardians having to fight in the family courts runs counter to that. As I have outlined, our new clause would end that.

I now turn to the case that helped shape the new clause: that of Jade Ward. Jade was 27. She had recently left her former partner when she was murdered by him in her home. Her four young sons were all in the house at the time. Jade’s killer was given a life sentence last year, with the judge calling the attack “merciless”. However, Jade’s family were horrified to find that their daughter’s killer retained rights over the children.

Jade’s parents said that her killer started to cause ripples not long after being sentenced, asking to see the boys’ school reports and attendance notes. They were then informed by social workers that, if they wanted to take the children on holiday, he would have to be consulted, and that he still had the power to take decisions on medical treatment. Jade’s mother said:

“He had lost control of Jade so he did what he did, and now he has still got control because he is controlling the boys and controlling us and it is horrific…He is in prison, but his presence is still looming. Any rights should have been taken away from him the moment he took away their mother…You cannot put into words the added worry and the stress because of him. It means we still can’t move on.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if we were to walk up to anybody in the street and ask them whether a murderous father could decide whether his children could go on holiday, they would think we were mad? Yet that is so clearly the case.

[Ellie Reeves]

I have spoken to countless people about this situation and frankly, when I say that a dad can retain from his prison cell parental responsibility when he has killed the kids’ mum, they look aghast. They cannot make sense of it; it does not make sense. That is why this new clause is so important.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

I understand the general point that the hon. Lady is making. Surely there are powers in social services and in the courts to completely remove the parental responsibility in question here. Is that not something that should be exercised? Can the hon. Lady not imagine also that there could be a case where a mother who had been brutalised over a period lost control or perhaps just defended herself so vigorously that it became a manslaughter? In circumstances such as those, we could imagine that the mother’s parents might be looking after the child and she might want to see school reports.

[Ellie Reeves]

In relation to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s first point, yes, families can go through the family court to get a special guardianship order. I will say a bit more about that later. However, it puts the onus on the victims’ families to go through protracted, costly and often opaque family law processes for that to happen. That can take years.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Or social services.

[Ellie Reeves]

But parental responsibility remains, so while that goes on, the dad still has a say.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Well, it is an urgent case.

[Ellie Reeves]

But they are not heard urgently; it takes years, as in the case of Jade Ward and other survivors and families I have spoken to.

In relation to the second point, I will go on to speak about how those people are specifically protected. Under the new clause, those convicted of manslaughter with a defence of loss of control or diminished responsibility and who at the time of the offence were subjected to coercive or controlling behaviour by the person they killed would not be caught, as there is specific carve-out. I will talk a little more about that as I go on, but I want to end what I was saying about Jade Ward by paying tribute to her family in highlighting the situation and trying to stop other families from facing the suffering they have faced.

I now want to talk about Mumtahina Jannat, known as Ruma, as her case also outlines the injustice that is occurring. Ruma was murdered by her violent ex-husband. On hearing the news, Ruma’s niece, the renowned children’s author Onjali Raúf, went straight to the house to find the children, but they had already been taken straight from school into foster care. She was not allowed to know where the children were or to make contact with them, while from his jail cell the killer was given the phone number of the foster parent and allowed to make contact with them, sending them letters. That is despite the fact that Ruma turned to Onjali and her mother for help when she fled with her children to a refuge five years earlier. Onjali said:

“We saw those kids every other day…Our home was a refuge for them. We would watch films with them and take them on holiday. They were part of our family…We didn’t see the children for over a year. After we were finally reunited with them, they asked us questions that gave us hints about the lies they were being told in those letters. Lies that tried to justify his murder of their mother…That youthful confidence was sucked out of them. And of course they had trouble trusting us again—why would they?”

Commenting on the current situation, Onjali said:

“Until it happens to you, you don’t know how broken the system is…You don’t know it’s geared towards this violent person, who has all the protections and all the rights…There’s no justice. ‘Justice’ isn’t the right name for this system.”

For Onjali’s family, new clause 21, which would change the law on parental responsibility, would be a step towards justice.

There is a school of thought that says that children always benefit from contact with their parent, but that is contrary to the available evidence. I met with Diane Clarke, whose mother was killed in 1978 when Diane was just 10 years old. Her father was charged with murder, which he denied, although he admitted manslaughter. He was sentenced at Birmingham Crown court to just three years in prison.

When her father was released, Diane was sent to live with him. She told me that at the time she felt that that was what she wanted, yearning for a normal family set-up, but as a child she did not recognise the domestic abuse she had witnessed for what it was or that she had been groomed by her dad to disrespect her mum. Only now, as an adult, does she realise the further harm inflicted on her by this living arrangement. She says that she realised she lived in fear that she would anger him and he would kill her too. Let us be clear: this was not an irrational fear, given that he had already killed someone he claimed to love.

New clause 21 would deliver protections for cases such as Diane’s, as it contains provisions for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter to have their parental responsibility suspended. That is necessary, as so many cases of domestic homicide result in a manslaughter rather than a murder conviction. This is often despite long histories of domestic abuse featuring in these cases.

Take, for example, the case of Joanna Simpson. She was killed by her estranged husband, Robert Brown, in 2010. The attack began when Brown was returning their two children, aged nine and 10, after a half term visit. Brown used a hammer he had packed in the children’s bag and bludgeoned Joanna repeatedly. He then put her body in the car with the children in it and took her to the site of a pre-dug grave, where he buried her. Joanna’s friends and family all describe the killing as taking place in the context of long-term abuse, but Brown was convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. It is vital that killers such as Robert Brown are prevented from causing more harm to their children, regardless of what the conviction for killing ends up being. New clause 21 would ensure that.

All the cases I have referred to involve men who have killed women. However, it is right to acknowledge that there are some women in prison for manslaughter having killed their partner after suffering years of domestic abuse—a point made by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire. We recognise the very specific nature of those crimes and that, in such circumstances, the risk to the children presented by the killer is not the same. Therefore, in new clause 21 we have included an exemption where a manslaughter conviction is made on the grounds of loss of control or diminished responsibility and the prisoner had, on the balance of probabilities, been a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour by the person killed at or near the time of the killing. In these rare cases, I do not consider that the mother should automatically lose their parental responsibility. That is why new clause 21 contains the exemption.

I turn to the current system. I appreciate that new guardians can already seek a special guardianship order over the children, meaning that their parental responsibility would trump the perpetrator’s, although they would still need to consult him on some things and would not be able to do certain important things without his consent. However, that still places an extra burden on the family in terms of legal proceedings. Given the abysmal court delays, that is another hurdle for a family that has already been through legal proceedings in the criminal court.

I also understand that the family can seek an adoption order, but that can feel uncomfortable for families as it legally alters the relationship between the children if they are with the family. For example, if they are adopted by their grandmother, she legally becomes their mother and their birth mother legally becomes their deceased sister. But that is beside the point. As Onjali says,

“Why do we even think murderers should have parental responsibility? They forfeited that ‘responsibility’ when they killed their children’s mother. It’s beyond logic.”

New clause 21 would remove the burden of lengthy, stressful proceedings in the family court and give children the security they so desperately need: that their new guardians have responsibility for them and that they are safe.

To conclude, the research is clear that adverse childhood experiences have a huge impact on how children grow and develop. New clause 21 is about doing what is best for the children left behind: safeguarding their rights, protecting them from abusers and trying to give them the best possible means to thrive. It is about valuing the rights of children over those of abusers.

One year on from the petition for Jade’s law, it is indefensible that men who kill their partners, often after long periods of abuse, are still able to exercise control over the surviving children and their guardians from their prison cell. I note the Justice Minister’s comments today outlining his support after months of campaigning from Labour. I also note his comment that he is looking to find a quicker way to cut off parental rights for killers. Today is that opportunity with new clause 21. By voting for it, we can end an indefensible situation and truly make this a Bill for victims. Failing to do so is a vote for more delay, leaving vulnerable children unprotected and victims’ families having to fight through the backlogged courts. I hope that Government Members will vote to support Jade’s law today.

[Edward Argar]

I thank the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge for her new clause, which seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in the tragic circumstances where one parent of a child has been convicted of murdering or committing voluntary manslaughter of the other for the term of their imprisonment for such an offence. I do of course have the deepest sympathy for families dealing with such a tragic event—including the family of Jade Ward, who have campaigned bravely and tenaciously for the change to be made.

The hon. Lady and I debated the issue in November last year in Westminster Hall, following which the right hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside introduced me to Jade’s parents, who were there to listen to that debate. I suspect that this view will be shared by the shadow Minister: I think everyone in that room was struck by their quiet dignity in the face of everything they have had to put up with and endure while campaigning.

Strengthening measures to ensure the safety of children and vulnerable parents continues to be a top priority for the Government and something we remain deeply committed to. I agree that in such tragic circumstances family members who are stepping in to care for the child or children should be better supported, and that, fundamentally, an abusive parent who has committed such a terrible offence should not be able to use family court proceedings as a further way of exerting control or tormenting a tragically bereaved family. As the Lord Chancellor stated in The Sun today,

“It should be presumed that when one parent murders another, denying their child of a loving parent, they should not have the right to make decisions on that child’s life.”

I agree with the Lord Chancellor. He was clearly setting out the view of His Majesty’s Government. It is now a matter of how that intent is achieved.

As the Lord Chancellor has stated, there will of course be exceptions, as the hon. Lady’s amendment recognises, such as victims of domestic violence and domestic abuse who lash out after years of abuse, for whom automatic restriction would not be appropriate. But restricting the right should be the norm. It is right that time is taken to properly look at the options, however, to ensure that exceptions are captured—I will come on to the legal reasons in the light of a recent case in a minute—and we are looking for the quickest way and most appropriate vehicle. The shadow Minister would say we have one in front of us as we sit in this room today, and that might prove to be the case. However, we do not believe this new clause is the right route to remedy this situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister, but I will go on to explain why I believe the drafting is not necessarily appropriate. I assure her that there are no plans to prorogue or dissolve Parliament in the immediate future that I am aware of.

I would also like to make clear that the courts do have the power to seriously restrict the exercise of parental responsibility when it is in the child’s best interests. I heard the points made by the shadow Minister in respect of that process. I draw hon. Members’ attention to the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Re A, regarding parental responsibility. In that judgment, the President of the Family Division confirmed that Parliament has already given the court the power to empty a father’s parental responsibility of all content and prevent them from making any future applications to the court, regardless of the marital status of the parent or how parental responsibility was acquired. Courts can and do make use of that power when it is appropriate to do so, but crucially, they are able to do so considering all the unique circumstances of the individual case, with the child’s best interests at the heart of their decision. The new clause potentially would remove that ability. However, I take the shadow Minister’s underlying point about how retraumatising and traumatic going through the family court in that context can be.

As I said earlier, I have huge sympathy for the aims of the amendment, particularly in respect of the processes and procedures that bereaved families have to go through in order to achieve the result they desire. We are committed to taking action to address this issue, as the Lord Chancellor has unequivocally set out. In response to the Ward family’s calls for reform, we have asked the Family Procedure Rule Committee in the interim to make the court process less time-consuming and more straightforward for families applying for special guardianship orders and other orders to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in these or similar circumstances. The committee is actively considering what changes can be made to deliver that. Also, as of 1 May, the Government have extended the scope of legal aid for making special guardianship orders. That means that in private family proceedings where an individual wishes to become a special guardian, they can receive legally aided advice and representation to help them do that, subject to a means test.

I agree that there is more that can and should be done. That is why we are actively working on what changes could be made to the law on parental to rectify the position that the Ward family have highlighted through their campaign, while avoiding unintended or perverse consequences from those changes. We need to fully consider the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Re A case as part of that.

I am very concerned about the risk that an automatic suspension of parental responsibility could be deemed to breach the child’s rights under articles 6 and 8 of the European convention on human rights, potentially leading to legal action or undermining what we are all trying to resolve here with minimal legal challenge. It is better that we take the intervening months to carefully consider what is the right approach in the light of that judgment, and return—hopefully swiftly—with a fully drafted and carefully considered proposal that guarantees the core principle of the Children Act that the family court should always have the best interests of the child at heart, but that also seeks to address the underlying point, the underlying intention, of the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge.

This new clause has, as I hope everyone can agree, an entirely noble and uncontroversial aim. We all have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them. I am happy to work with the hon. Lady on this if she so wishes. I will repeat the words of the Lord Chancellor, which set out the Government’s position:

“It should be presumed that when one parent murders another, denying their child…a loving parent, they should not have the right to make decisions on that child’s life.”

I have to say in response to the final point made by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge, with whom I tend to agree—not all the time, but a lot of the time—that on this, I disagree with her. Voting against the new clause is not a vote for doing nothing or a vote to reject a solution that works. It will be a vote for taking the time to get it right.

[Ellie Reeves]

I have listened to what the Minister has had to say, but the Government have had ample time to bring forward proposals on this matter. A new clause could have been presented by the Government in relation to this Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the issue has been being raised since as far back as 2016. We had the debate last November. Therefore the Government have had more than enough time to bring forward proposals. There is a proposal on the table today to end this situation once and for all. That is why I will press new clause 21 to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Janet Daby]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In discussing new clause 25, I will focus on the Government’s own equality statement on the Bill. Hon. Members will recognise the problem of disproportionalities in criminal justice. Too often, minority groups face unfairness in how they are treated in the justice system. More action is required to identify those inequalities, and where they are identified, they must be tackled.

The new clause requires the Government to lay before Parliament an annual report covering how the Secretary of State has exercised his powers regarding release decisions for top-tier offenders. The report would include how a case is referred, the decision from that referral, and information about the appeal mechanism after referral. All the information will be broken down by protected characteristics.

I wish to make three brief points. First, black and Asian prisoners and those aged 18 to 20 fall into the top-tier category at a higher rate than other parole-eligible prisoners; they are over-represented. That is why the new clause is required: to record such concerns. For some protected characteristics, such as marital status or pregnancy, it would be difficult to identify the impact of clauses 35 to 39, and the equality statement recognises that. However, the new clause requires reporting on all protected characteristics to catch disproportionalities that are not currently identified, but may arise in future. It is also a tool to address wider concerns of disproportionality. Between Committee and Report stages, I hope the Minister will include that point in his consideration of whether to revise the clauses.

Secondly, following recommendations made in the Lammy review, the Ministry of Justice committed to publishing

“more and better data on ethnicity where possible”.

Let us please follow that principle. If a new power is given, information on how the power will affect ethnic minority groups should be published. In response to the Secretary of State’s new referral powers, therefore, I hope he will publish that kind of data. Unfortunately, new powers are often introduced before Ministers are required to publish regular information on the impact of the powers. I hope the Minister will not make this another such example. It is in the Minister’s interest to produce an annual report and to allow parliamentarians to scrutinise the issue, so that he and his colleagues in the Ministry of Justice have more information and can be proactive in tackling inequalities.

That brings me to my third and final point, on victims and public protection. The equality statement highlights the Government’s belief that confidence in the system must be balanced against the case for rehabilitation—I refer Members to page 30 of the equality statement. Unfortunately, I am not yet convinced by that analysis. Building confidence in the parole process is inherently linked to the rehabilitation of offenders. If it is not—as the Government’s equality statement seems to indicate—it will fail to reassure victims and it will undermine the Government’s aim of prioritising public protection.

The impact assessment for the Bill shows that, in recent years, about a third of those who would be classified as top-tier offenders have been released. Even after the Bill gains Royal Assent, top-tier offenders are expected to be released at a similar rate. That is why rehabilitation is essential for victims and for public protection. We must make best use of: rehabilitation opportunities; key work; the use of open conditions where appropriate; and release on licence to facilitate reintegration back into the community. I accept that that will not always be possible, but I expect that the Minister in his reply will agree that a range of options should be available when making a release decision. Perhaps he could reflect on how creating a top tier of offences might better interact with rehabilitation opportunities. That will reassure victims and protect the wider public.

I hope that the new clause encourages the Minister to acknowledge the issues highlighted in the equality assessment, and to consider how we can resolve them as the Bill passes through Parliament.

[Ellie Reeves]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East for moving new clause 25. As I outlined earlier, there is concern across the political spectrum about the impact of clauses 35 and 36. I also share my hon. Friend’s concerns about racial disproportionality in our criminal justice system. The equality impact assessment for the Bill finds that the provision it makes for the creation of a top tier of prisoners will disproportionately impact black and Asian prisoners and young adults. As the Prison Reform Trust’s evidence points out, the Government have made

“no provision to mitigate or prevent that discriminatory impact.”

It therefore seems sensible that the Secretary of State should report annually on the use of the powers on release decisions. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.