Railways Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Edward Morello and Jerome Mayhew

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

The clause sets out the circumstances in which the passengers’ council must—that is “must”, not “may”—investigate matters relating to railway passenger services or station services. I could provide a long description of the clause, but I will leave that to the Minister, who I know will want to explain it to the Committee.

Essentially, the Bill largely lifts the current framework into the GBR model, so I can see why no amendment would be needed, although Ministers should clarify how the national and London watchdogs will co-ordinate on cross-boundary issues. I will be grateful for an explanation of how the Minister will undertake the balancing act between GBR and the London Transport Users Committee.

There is, however, a big issue with the current wording of the clause. It requires the council actively to

“investigate any matter relating to the provision of railway passenger services”

put to it by members of the public, as well as others. That sounds great, but from a practical perspective, there are 1.75 billion passenger journeys each year. The potential issues with the service that passengers receive will run into the tens of thousands every year, yet the drafting of the clause will impose a legal duty on the passengers’ council to investigate every single one of them, unless they are “frivolous or vexatious”.

“Frivolous” and “vexatious” are legal terms. To demonstrate that something is vexatious is a very high bar for the passengers’ council: it would typically have to provide evidence of multiple previous complaints on a similar subject that came to nothing. That is what “vexatious” means, and “frivolous” is not far off it. The Minister, perhaps unwittingly, is creating an enormous a legal duty and a vast workstream for the host organisation that is becoming the passengers’ council, which has fewer than 30 members of staff.

[Edward Morello]

I wonder whether the shadow Minister’s line of argument actually supports the Liberal Democrat amendment. The vast majority of those claims could be resolved by GBR via a repayment or penalty, without ever getting to the passengers’ council in the first place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister has described the function of clause 48, the lead measure in this group, but there is one notable exception from the list of bodies that can refer to the council for advice under clause 48(1)(a) as drafted. It includes mayoral combined authorities, Transport for London and Ministers—whether the Secretary of State, Welsh or Scottish Ministers—but there is no room for local transport authorities. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is not in her place, because she made the point powerfully in previous sittings of the Committee that some areas of the country do not have mayoral combined authorities and never will, because of their geographic or demographic set-up—that is particularly the case in the south-west. Those areas still have local transport needs, and a local transport authority, yet under the Bill as drafted, those authorities are excluded from asking the advice of the passenger body. We have heard that there are many areas that will never have an MCA but that still have rail-related concerns and issues. I seek advice from the Minister: what is the thinking of the Government, that they have deliberately excluded local transport authorities from the clause?

Clause 49 deals with “Consultation about railway passenger services and station services”. Again, I have left it to the Minister to explain what the clause does, but it sets out the policies and procedures that GBR should consider consulting the passengers’ council on. It gives GBR discretion to decide whether to do so based on its assessment of the impact on passengers. That is, again, quite important. The clause creates a duty on GBR to consult the passengers’ council, but only where GBR itself decides that a policy change will significantly affect passengers. The explanatory notes confirm that that judgment is entirely for GBR. GBR, the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers will all owe consultation duties to the council, but the Bill imposes a duty only on GBR, and even then only on GBR’s own assessment of significance. There is no parallel duty on Ministers, meaning that major ministerial decisions affecting passengers could fall entirely outside statutory consultation. The list in clause 49(2) once again seeks to sideline the passengers’ council by limiting its remit. The list does not cover the issues that

“significantly affect the interests of the public in relation to…passenger services or station services”,

as described in clause 49(1)(b); far from it.

Amendment 75 would require GBR to consult the passengers’ council when GBR is developing or changing its procedures, with reference to the passenger-focused KPIs outlined in proposed new clause 2:

“reliability, including punctuality…short-forming…key connections… safety and security…comfort and on-board experience”

and

“affordability and value for money”.

Those are issues at the heart of the passenger experience. Let the passengers’ council do a proper job.

Clause 50 gives the passengers’ council the power to publish information and advice for

“users or potential users of railway passenger services”.

The clause only allows the passengers’ council to publish information; it does not require it to publish information. That means the council can choose not to publish anything at all. The clause also gives no sense of what should be published, or how often. Perhaps the Minister could expand on the reasons he has not decided to require publication when it is about information and advice; that seems a bit odd.

Clause 51, which is on the power to make exclusions, will be watched by many, as it is really important to rail enthusiasts. Committee members should be careful when commenting on it, because people are keenly interested in this power. Actually, on this occasion I think the Government have got it about right. The clause replicates similar provisions in the 1993 Act—specifically, sub-sections (7B) and (7C) in section 76.

Clause 51 enables the Secretary of State to exclude services from one or more of the duties imposed by clauses 37 to 43, 45 and 48 through regulations, or modify those duties for particular services. However, before making changes, the Secretary of State must consult the passengers’ council and the London Transport Users Committee.

There are currently two exemptions from the similar requirements in the 1993 Act in place, one of which excludes services without through-ticketing facilities and which are exempt from holding a licence. Charter and heritage railway operators fall under this exemption. The Government assert in the explanatory notes to the clause that,

“it would be burdensome and unnecessary for the Passengers’ Council to be required to investigate heritage railway operators,”

which only operate for tourism and recreational purposes, not for the mainline network. I agree that those potential exclusions are reasonable. The Government rightly point out that burdening heritage rail with unnecessary regulation when the hospitality and tourism sector is facing serious challenges—admittedly, because of this Government—would be disproportionate.

Very few constituencies do not boast a heritage railway, so I declare an interest, Mrs Hobhouse: the Bure Valley Railway and the start—or the finish, depending on which way a person is going—of the Wells and Walsingham Light Railway run in my constituency of Broadland and Fakenham.

[Edward Morello]

I have been on that.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am interested to hear that the hon. Gentleman has been on that railway. I would continue on that, but I have gone on long enough by saying, “and another thing—I remember”.

Rail charter services are a different matter that must also be considered. Those with children may have travelled on one of the many Christmas polar expresses that are chartered services. They are very important to tourism and to the financing of the railway, as they make an economic contribution to the running of it. They sit in a unique space of quasi-open access and are a useful component of the railway. Mainline heritage rail routes, such as the Cambrian express—although the Minister of State for Rail, Lord Hendy, still needs to do some work to restore steam, rather than diesel, locomotives to that heritage route—as well as services with the Flying Scotsman, or Sir Nigel Gresley, which is the last working version of the Mallard class, the A4s, are very important, and crowds of people gather to watch them steam past.

I applaud the Government for that sensible exemption. All I ask is that they continue to do what they can to facilitate and support heritage and chartered railways, and I would be grateful to hear the Government’s plans to do so, if there are any. I would propose no amendments to clause 51. Clause 52 is the interpretation chapter, and I am happy for that to continue without amendment.

That leaves me solely with the pleasure of discussing new clauses 68 and 70, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. New clause 68 would give the Secretary of State the power to direct GBR to co-operate with transport authorities to ensure the effective operation of transport networks and to reduce disruption. Network Rail is often cited as a poor neighbour, with no interest in co-operating with other transport modes, or frankly with adjacent landowners— I have had more than one letter of complaint from constituents on that—to minimise disruption not on the railway. The Opposition support the intentions behind the new clause. Culture change is needed in the successor to Network Rail, and a duty to co-operate would at least help. The Minister needs to recognise the existing problem of Network Rail’s culture being—I think it is fair to say—deeply suboptimal in relation to this, and set out his proposals for improvement.

New clause 70, also in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, sets out the requirements for GBR to ensure that any planned changes to passenger services are only made with due consideration of its objectives and are fully communicated with stakeholders. I read the new clause into the record, but I do not propose to press it to a Division when the time comes.

Railways Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Edward Morello and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

I think we have to decide what GBR is going to be. Is it going to be a stand-alone organisation that is trying to run itself efficiently, providing value for money for the taxpayer and hopefully, one day, a check on the Secretary of State? Or is it going to be a creature of the Department for Transport that is told what to do and having its decisions second-guessed? This is a big decision that the Government have to take.

The clause creates a huge risk of stasis, as GBR gets bossed around and becomes a passive recipient of instructions from the Department for Transport. I worry that it is a recipe for future disaster, so I have questions for the Minister. What factors will the Secretary of State take into account when deciding the general level and structure of fares? Why is the Secretary of State in a better position to take those decisions than GBR is, given the objects that she has set the organisation? What additional information will she use that is not available to GBR? I will be grateful for the Minister’s answer. At least it is clear that any future failure of the railways will be down to the Department for Transport and the Secretary of State, not to GBR, since the power to guide and then direct and then set fares lies expressly with the Secretary of State.

My amendment 45 would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions and set guidance as to the general level and structure of railway fares, thereby preventing ministerial intervention in how fares are set and making that decision separate from political influence. When considering amendment 45, Rail Forum said:

“We support this as it should be for GBR, as an arm’s length body and the directing mind, to determine fares not the Secretary of State.”

Amendment 148 in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage would remove the power to give binding directions over fares—another version of our approach.

The clause as drafted is overreach by the Department for Transport and exactly the kind of micromanagement that the Minister claims will not happen. Why do we need these powers?

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mrs Barker.

As the shadow Minister outlined, amendment 148 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage is not overly dissimilar to Conservative amendment 45 in what it tries to achieve, but I will come at it from a slightly different angle. Clause 33, as drafted, gives the Secretary of State the power to issue binding directions to Great British Railways on the level and structure of fares. We have said many times that the Bill already grants the Secretary of State extensive influence over GBR. Allowing binding directions on fares risks tipping that influence into outright micro-management. It opens the door to the imposition of short-term political decisions, rather than long-term, evidence-based decisions about fares being made by those responsible for actually running the railways. It is a tool that can be misused, particularly in times of fiscal or political pressure.

Even if the current Government assure us that they would not misuse the power, the problem is that once it exists, it exists for all future Governments. I hope the Government will recognise the inherent risk in that and support amendment 148, thereby preventing not only themselves but all future Secretaries of State from being able to abuse the power.

Railways Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Edward Morello and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

I wish to speak briefly to new clause 26, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. In simple terms, the new clause would ensure that Great British Railways’ funding is reviewed, published and scrutinised by Parliament halfway through each funding cycle, so that there is transparency and accountability on public money and it is spent effectively.

Any long-term rail strategy, particularly one that involves large sums of public money, must be open to proper scrutiny, regularly reviewed and accountable to Parliament. This is especially important as the Bill in its current form gives the Secretary of State a significant concentration of power over the future, shape, funding and direction of the railways. If Parliament is to be asked to confer that level of authority, accountability should increase alongside it. New clause 26 provides a sensible and proportionate mechanism to do exactly that without dragging Ministers or officials into day-to-day micromanagement.

As currently proposed, Great British Railways risks becoming the rail equivalent of NHS England—a fear raised previously in Committee—a large, centralised body distant from accountability and with blurred lines between ministerial direction and operational responsibility. Transparency is the safeguard to protect against ending up with another unaccountable arm’s length body.

The new clause would require a statutory funding review halfway through each five-year settlement. That review would set out, in clear figures, exactly how much funding GBR had been allocated, how much revenue had been raised from fares, and how much Government subsidy had been received. Crucially, it would also be sent directly to the Transport Committee, thereby ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny. That matters because taxpayers are funding the railway twice: once through general taxation and again through ticket prices. Passengers and taxpayers alike deserve to know where their money is going, how it is balanced between subsidies and fares, and whether it is being spent evenly and effectively across the funding cycle, not just all at the start or at the end.

A mid-point review would also allow us to see what is working and what is not, particularly given that GBR will be a new organisation. It would give time to correct course when things are failing, and to continue or scale up when results are delivered. Above all, it is about hardwiring trust into the railway system, with clear information, published transparently and scrutinised by Parliament, with a focus on passengers. We believe new clause 26 would strengthen the Bill and hope the Government will give it due consideration.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Thank you, Mr Western, for allowing me a second bite at the cherry. I misdirected myself in dealing just with clause 12 in itself, rather than the new clauses in the group.

A forward view of funding certainty is key to stopping the stop-start approach to infrastructure funding. The Committee has received plenty of evidence from the industry—both in written evidence and in the oral evidence we heard on Tuesday last week—that this is a major concern. The date in schedule 2(1)(d) is therefore important, and needs to be a minimum of two years prior to the start of the next five-year funding period. That is because, given that we currently have five-year control periods, funding certainty decreases in the run-up to the end of one control period and the beginning of the other and, as a result, the amount of work undertaken and committed to by Network Rail decreases proportionately. We therefore get a wind-down of activity, with specialist staff being laid off by the supply industry, before it all grinds up a gear at the beginning of the next control period. We end up with a bell curve of activity.

We have heard strong evidence—I will read some out in a moment—about how that uncertainty disrupts the ability of the supply sector to service Network Rail and its infrastructure development plans efficiently. It does two pretty terrible things: first, it drives up costs for Network Rail and therefore for the taxpayer, and secondly, it means that less work gets done per pound. It is expensive and it takes longer.

In written evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Forum states:

“The Bill states in Schedule 2 Part 1 that the SoS can ‘vary the financial assistance’ previously agreed as part of the GBR five-yearly settlement during the five-year term. This flies in the face of providing the stability that the Transport Committee was seeking to address through the ‘Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust’ inquiry earlier this year. Re-opening of the settlement should only be allowed in very exceptional circumstances that should be explicit in the legislation.”

Why has the Minister moved away from the position that was previously articulated? Why is the sanctity of the funding settlement within a five-year control period—which has been, albeit imperfect, so valuable for the industry—actively removed by schedule 2? To put it another way, why is the Secretary of State being granted new powers to vary the financial settlement without notice?

The Rail Industry Association, which represents the supply sector for the railways, states:

“The railway, and rail supply businesses, need stable funding to be able to plan effectively and be efficient. Changes to the Control Period style five-year infrastructure funding settlement (Schedule 2) undermine this and amplify the uncertainty already faced by suppliers.

RIA and our members are very concerned the current Bill drafting allows the Secretary of State for Transport to remove railway funding mid-period, at no notice and with very limited transparency over the impact, for example, on safety, performance or efficiency.

We disagree with the principle that the Secretary of State should be able to remove funding mid-period. Stable multi-year funding settlements are a longstanding principle for infrastructure networks because short-notice funding changes reduce the efficiency of spending and make it harder for suppliers to plan ahead with any confidence.

Supply chain confidence in the UK rail market is already historically low with 64% believing the rail market will contract in 2026 and 62% freezing recruitment or reducing headcount (over one in three business leaders plan to lay off staff in 2026), according to a RIA-commissioned Savanta survey of rail business leaders.

There is…currently already a lack of full work visibility to the end of the current Control Period, which completes in March 2029, and companies are now repositioning themselves away from rail to target other industrial sectors in the UK and overseas rail markets—the ability for the Secretary of State to remove funding would clearly exacerbate this situation…Concerningly, even on its own terms Schedule 2 does not require transparency over the impacts on efficiency, performance and safety if there are changes within a funding period and longer-term.”

Mr Western, you cannot tell me you agree that that is a very troubling statement from the industry, but I am sure you do agree, or are likely to. The difficulties with the current system are only going to be exacerbated by the proposed changes under schedule 2.

The statement of funds will indicate what the Secretary of State

“reasonably considers may be…available”.

That gives no certainty of funding, which is a key concern of the sector. It would be a backward step from the status quo. Paragraph 4(3)(c) of schedule 2 contains no focus on minimising the cost for the taxpayer, but merely refers to

“how Great British Railways proposes to meet those costs.”

Paragraph 4(5)(b) refers only to “good value for money” and not to good value for money for the taxpayer.

Under paragraph 4(7)(a), regarding the business plan, Great British Railways could retain a huge amount of information from potential open access operators, thereby preventing a level playing field.

Finally, paragraph 7(3) removes the whole point of funding periods, which is to provide funding certainty for five years. On its own, that provision removes that funding certainty—which is obviously a backward step. The RIA has stated:

“The railway has benefited from 5-year funding settlements for infrastructure for over 30 years, but the legislation proposes that the Transport Secretary will be able to reopen these at any time without consultation. Any deviation from 5-year funding stability risks increased future costs for taxpayers and a deteriorating experience for passengers.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Amendments 120 to 123 aim to strengthen GBR’s value for money and wider performance duties. As drafted, paragraph 2(2) in schedule 2 only gives the Secretary of State the option of tying performance objectives to granting public funds. The performance objectives should be at the core of the granting of funds, so amendments 120 and 121 seek to change the wording of the current drafting by replacing “may” with “must”. In other words, they would make it clear that it is not an option but core to the application of the process, and should therefore be mandatory.

Amendment 122 would make it clear that Great British Railways should aim to increase passenger services. I do not know why this has become such a hot topic; I would have thought it would be obvious—I was about to use unparliamentary language for a moment there. Increasing passenger services should obviously form part of the functions and aspirations of GBR, and that should be included on the face of the Bill. It should be clear that GBR aims to increase passenger services, not just freight. In addition, the list of objectives in the schedule is missing a specific objective on productivities or efficiency, which amendment 123 would add.

This series of simple amendments seek to perfect the currently imperfect drafting, to put performance at the heart of the Bill and to recognise that the pursuit of increased passenger numbers should be a key objective of GBR, in addition to its focus on growing rail freight, which we all agree with.

[Edward Morello]

I wish to speak briefly to amendment 206, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. The amendment goes to the heart of what we Liberal Democrats believe the Bill should be about: putting passengers first. It would expand the objectives that the Secretary of State sets for the rail funding settlement to include customer experience and satisfaction explicitly. In other words, it would ensure that when decisions are made about money, priorities and trade-offs, the people who actually use the railways are not an afterthought.

Making customer satisfaction central to GBR would help to rebuild trust in the railways, which many people currently feel have stopped working for them. If we are serious about encouraging people to shift away from the convenience of cars and toward more sustainable public transport, customer experience has to be central. People will not make the switch because they are told to; they will do so because trains are easier, more comfortable and more reliable.

The creation of customer satisfaction targets and objectives that are tied to rail funding settlements will create the incentives for change. It will make it more likely that investment decisions will focus on what actually improves journeys for passengers, rather than just on what is cheapest in the short term. It will find the balance between what is affordable and what is best for users.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

From the Government’s perspective, yes, it would be, but we have recent experience—this is a slight tangent, but I hope the Committee will bear with me—of Governments passing key objectives to achieve long out in the distance. I am thinking of the Climate Change Act 2008 and its objective of achieving net zero by 2050. That all sounds good in 2008, but in my view it does not achieve the objective of balancing democratic accountability with a long-term direction. Look, we are slightly arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Both parties agree that we want a long-term strategy, but should it be 15 years or 30 years? In a sense it does not really matter, but it needs to be significantly beyond the current five-year control period.

Amendment 137, also in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would require the strategy to set out a long-term strategy for supporting rural communities in accessing rail travel and co-operating with transport authorities to integrate travel options. It is a worthy objective, although we would want to go further if extending clause 15(1) beyond the railway network and railway services—the catch-all descriptors. The amendment is slightly a halfway house, but it nevertheless points in the right direction, and in so far as it makes progress, we are happy to support it.

Amendment 207, again in the name of the Liberal Democrat spokesman, would introduce a requirement for the rail strategy to consider the rail network as a whole, and the relationship between integrated timetables and infrastructure enhancement to enable such integration. There is perhaps a better solution tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), who is engaged somewhere else as we speak—there may be a better way to achieve that outcome.

Amendment 224, which I tabled, would add paragraph (c) to clause 15(1). As drafted, the provision requires the Secretary of State to

“prepare and publish a document that sets out”

her

“long term strategy for…(a) the development and use of the railway network in Great Britain, and…(b) the railway services that the Secretary of State wishes to see provided in Great Britain.”

This important amendment would add a focus on “rail freight network usage”. Rail freight does, in a sense, come under “railway services”, but we need to give it particular focus, and the amendment offers a good opportunity to do so.

Amendment 25, which is also in my name, would require the rail strategy to remain in place

“for a minimum of three control periods”,

which would be 15 years. We have already debated whether it should be 15 or 30 years, but the provision would provide the industry with a genuine long-term strategy and mean that that strategy is less likely to be used as a political football when Governments come and go. The period of 15 years is short enough to have political weight, but long enough to give the certainty that the industry also seeks.

I will briefly mention amendment 260, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. I know that the subject is close to my hon. Friend’s heart because he has told me so, multiple times.

[Edward Morello]

Repeatedly.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Yes, repeatedly, which is great, because my hon. Friend is absolutely fighting for his constituency and his constituents. He has told me of a repeated trouble that communities experience when a level crossing closes very frequently and for long periods with no regard to the economic impact of that on the town in which it is based. That can cause long periods of tailbacks, but there is no consideration of that when the usage of the piece of line is set, and the Bill, as drafted, makes no provision for GBR even to take that problem into account. Amendment 260 would insert clause 15(2A), which states that the

“rail strategy must include a strategy for level crossings (“the level crossings strategy”)”,

and clause 15(2B), which states:

“The level crossing strategy must set out an assessment of the impact of level crossings on the economy and community of the area in which the level crossing is situated, for the purpose of reducing disruption caused by level crossings.”

That is actually a very sensible point, because it recognises that the railway does not impact just trains. If a level crossing temporarily closes arterial routes, there is an impact on other modes of transport, so it would be sensible for a strategy to take into account the full impact of the changes that the Secretary of State has in mind.

Amendment 261, which my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge also tabled, would insert an alternative subsection (2A) in clause 15, stating:

“The rail strategy must include an assessment”

of

“the ability of passengers to change between…main line rail services”

and from rail services to

“other modes of public transport.”

The amendment would also provide that the

“assessment under subsection (2A) must consider how to reduce delays and disruption to end-to-end journeys involving a change between rail services, or between rail services and other modes of public transport.”

This is, again, my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge standing up for his constituents and the particular issues that they face with the co-ordination of services. Having heard the experience of Mayor Burnham with the Bee Network in Greater Manchester, the Committee could argue that the increased integration of all modes of transport should properly be a focus of GBR, and the amendment would apply that integration to areas that are not mayoral combined authorities. Later in Committee, we will consider an amendment that seeks to extend the same courtesies to local transport authorities as the Bill extends to mayoral combined authorities, and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon will be keen to speak to that.

Liberal Democrat amendment 135, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would require the Secretary of State to make an international rail strategy part of the Government’s long-term rail strategy. That would specifically look to support new routes and operators, and increase channel tunnel and London St Pancras high-speed rail capacity.

Railways Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Edward Morello and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Morello]

Thank you, Sir Alec, for the clarification, and I thank the hon. Member for his question. I understand the premise of the point: whichever number we put in, there is a risk that someone could come up with such an example. I think the point is that, for journeys over 30 minutes, for older passengers, for example, the guarantee of a seat may be an issue of whether they want to travel or not, so we must find a line to draw in the sand; I hope that able-bodied Members would stand up for the elderly, but it is not always the case. I would like us to move to a system where we do not have to stand on trains and where there is an expectation of seating—not least so that the drinks trolley can get through and get a cup of tea to me when I need one.

The charter would also set targets for reliability and a clear timetable for improving passenger accommodation, including seat design, reliable wi-fi and mobile signals, power outlets—I honestly cannot believe we are still questioning whether or not we should have power outlets on trains—luggage and bicycle storage, clean and accessible toilets, and onboard catering for journeys of more than two hours. We must focus much of our innovation on the passenger experience and not just the journey time, whether that is wi-fi for commuting workers or accessible toilets for everyone. Crucially, it would also extend delay repay principles to cover failures in onboard amenities and move towards automatic digital compensation that does not place the burden on passengers to fight for refunds—hopefully that speaks to the teeth that the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston mentioned.

Those are not luxuries. Almost every rail user has stood despite booking a seat, lost their signal mid-journey, missed a connection because of a delay, struggled to find a clean toilet—or a working one—or found nowhere to store a bag, yet too often there is no meaningful redress for those inconveniences. That undermines confidence in the railway.

The data is stark. Only 32% of passengers believe that the rail network meets their needs, and just 59% are satisfied with value for money or onboard internet. Last year, there were more than 62,000 complaints about punctuality, nearly 40,000 about overcrowding, and more than 24,000 about onboard facilities. All those things act as a drag. They are why people do not want to travel on the trains and why they are choosing car journeys instead. If we want people to choose rail for economic, environmental and social reasons, we have to deal with these frustrations as well. New clause 8 puts passengers back at the heart of the system, where they belong.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am very supportive of the intent behind this new clause. Where the Government have taken the political decision to put all their eggs in the nationalisation basket, it becomes even more important that we add as many clauses to the Bill as possible to force them to focus on the passenger experience.

Nationalisation has been tried before, not just in the railways but in a number of other organisations, and not a single one of them is a byword for individual customer choice, so if experience is anything to go by—and if we are, as seems likely, going to be forced to have a nationalised approach to the railways—the legislation needs to bend over backwards to keep reinforcing the point that the passenger experience is the central element that the organisation should be aiming for.

At the moment, the Government are woefully unambitious in their definition of railway services. If you look at clause 18(3)—which I am sure you have already, Sir Alec—you will see that the definition for railway service performance

“includes, in particular, performance in securing each of the following in relation to railway services”.

I was expecting a long list of all the good things that customers travelling on the railway should expect, but what do we get? We get “reliability, (including punctuality),” and

“the avoidance…of passenger overcrowding”,

and that is it. What poverty of aspiration. It really is very striking.

It may be that the wording of new clause 8 could be improved—I am sure that the Government have the drafting firepower to do exactly that—but what is listed in subsection (2)(c)(i) to (vi) is a good starting point, and certainly much better than what the Government managed to come up with in clause 18. I support it.

Airport Drop-off Charges

Debate between Edward Morello and Jerome Mayhew

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Ms Vaz. I congratulate the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden (Yasmin Qureshi) on securing this important debate.

What should be a simple act of kindness—giving someone a lift to an airport, as we have all done—is increasingly being met with extortionate airport charges. This is neither fair nor reasonable, and it is why we believe the Government must now look seriously at regulating the fees. For constituents like mine in West Dorset, who live in a hugely rural area with limited public transport, where many villages do not even have a reliable local bus service, let alone a direct rail link to a major airport, it is increasingly painful. For my constituents to get to Exeter, Bristol or Bournemouth airports, let alone Heathrow or Gatwick, means driving, booking a costly taxi or, more often than not, asking a family member or neighbour to help.

If we want to drop someone off, we have to use the airport system and pay its charges. At Bristol, that now means £8.50 for 10 minutes, or £30 for an hour. Bournemouth airport promotes what it calls a passenger pick-up offer of up to 90 minutes to meet and greet friends, for the small fee of £6. For many people, that £6 will be spent on merely five minutes’ activity. For families who are already paying inflated air fares, baggage fees and taxes, it is just another hidden cost added to the journey.

The charges have risen rapidly across the country, far beyond inflation. Gatwick now charges £10 for just 10 minutes—double what it charged in 2021. What began in 2007 as a £1 security-driven charge at Birmingham airport has become a nationwide revenue stream. Airports often justify the increases by citing environmental goals or the need to encourage public transport use, but unless the charges are accompanied by serious, accessible and affordable public transport investment, they do not change behaviour; they simply extract more money from those who have no alternative.

The charges hit some groups particularly hard, including disabled passengers, people with reduced mobility, parents travelling with young children, and those from rural areas who are least able to use public transport and most dependent on car access. Although airports have duties under the Equality Act 2010 to make reasonable adjustments, statutory provisions for blue badge holders do not apply in private car parks, and many people fall through the cracks.

The Competition and Markets Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority previously concluded that there was insufficient evidence of harm in surface access charging. That assessment is now out of date. Since 2016, charges have risen sharply. Free drop-off zones have all but been removed, and on-site payment options have been closed in favour of online or phone systems that are confusing for most.

As people try to avoid the charges, police have reported increased dangerous behaviour, with cars stopping on motorway hard shoulders to pick up passengers. That is unsafe for drivers, passengers and emergency services and is a direct result of an unfair pricing system. It is also worth remembering, as has been highlighted, that these charges are not normal across Europe. Passengers at Paris-Charles de Gaulle, Amsterdam Schiphol, Frankfurt and Madrid do not pay to drop off loved ones. If it can be done there, it can be done here.

Airports argue that they face financial pressures, particularly from business rates, which were recalculated after the pandemic. We Liberal Democrats sympathise, and passing the bill directly to passengers through drop-off fees may be the easiest lever to pull, but it is not the fairest or most effective one. The Department for Transport has previously said that it has no plans to monitor or limit parking fees at airports, and I believe that position is no longer acceptable.

The Liberal Democrats have been clear that we want to reduce the environmental impact of flying, but it has to be done in a way that is fair and effective. We support investment in zero-carbon flights, reforming aviation taxation so that frequent flyers pay more, taxing private jets, improving rail alternatives and banning short domestic flights where fast rail options exist. What we do not support is offloading the cost of climate policies on to families, friends, disabled people and rural transport.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

I rarely intervene on another spokesperson’s speech, but this raises a question: if the Liberal Democrats want these expensive policies and say that consumers should not pay, who should pay?

[Edward Morello]

I thank the hon. Member for the opportunity to clarify my point. It is not about whether the consumer pays; it is about whether the airports are using the revenue they claim they are generating to support climate policies for that purpose, or whether it is simply another revenue stream for them. Airports and providers must use the money correctly, rather than just levying another tax on passengers.

Regulation could take several forms. There could be a cap on drop-off charges linked to inflation. There could be a requirement for a free short-stay grace period. There could be mandatory exemptions for disabled passengers and carers. There could be greater transparency on how revenues are used and whether they genuinely fund sustainable transport.

What we cannot do is to continue to allow airports to exploit their control over access to extract ever higher fees from consumers who have no meaningful choice. It is time we recognised that airport drop-off charges have become unfair, unregulated and disconnected from their original purpose. I hope the Government will act.