Paris Agreement on Climate Change
Debate between Ed Miliband and Alan Whitehead(8 years, 2 months ago)
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Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
The hon. Member for Wells (James Heappey) described the hon. Member for Monmouth (David T. C. Davies) as an “oracle”. I cannot resist observing that the oracle at Delphi was a priestess known as the Pythia who raved incoherently under the influence of the noxious gases coming up from beneath the earth’s surface and whose comments were then translated by the priest for the delectation of the general public. I shall simply let that observation fall to the floor, for what it is worth.
Today’s debate is about not just the ratification of the Paris accords, but the consequences of their ratification for the UK, and the ability of the UK to ratify them in good faith and good order on the basis of what it recognises as the commitments it will undertake as a result of being a party to the accords. In that context, it is important not only to clarify one or two points about the ratification process, which we have already done to some extent today, but to review the process and how it relates to issues such as the existence or otherwise of a low-carbon programme that actually sets out what we are committed to. I would have thought that it would have been a particularly good idea—or should be particularly good idea—to make the low-carbon programme available at the same time as the consideration of the ratification process so that we could have the full raft of information in front of us, but I will return to that point in a moment.
It is clear that the ratification process has two stages, as we have discussed, and that the UK’s particular responsibility now is to put an order—the EU treaty converted into an order—in front of the House and to get our bit done, which, as I mentioned in an earlier intervention, France has managed to do. That is important not only to get the business done for our country, but to ensure that the EU ratification is made as speedily as possible by getting the full process undertaken, especially by the heavy-hitters such as the UK, at the earliest possible time.
It is also important to clarify what we are undertaking in our joint ratification with the rest of the EU. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) underlined earlier, we need to clarify our ratification position as the Brexit process is undertaken. As far as we are concerned, the INDCs that were put on the table in Paris form part of the European bloc for the international negotiations. We have a joint INDC with all other EU member states, and the commitments that come from that relate to ambitions not for 2050, but for 2030, given the 40% reduction in emissions between 1990 and 2030 that was jointly agreed among all participating EU states.
The INDCs will then be the subject of progress reports. The INDCs together represent a reduction in temperature of substantially less than the 2°/1.5°C ambition, coming in at 2.6° or 2.7° in the overall INDCs. Therefore, the conference of the parties progress reports on how the INDCs are going will not only consider whether countries have carried out their INDCs, but form part of a process of strengthening them over time to get further commitments and to move them down towards a reasonable target or ambition for global temperature stability.
In those circumstances, by my reading, we will be in the first review period just at the point when we will be undertaking Brexit, so the INDCs that we had negotiated jointly with the EU may no longer be seen as tenable for the UK. The question we may have to start to face in those international negotiations is: do we, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North said, seek to nail ourselves down in the EU discussions on the INDCs, or do we decide at some stage that we are somehow going to develop our own INDC, which will be recalibrated from whatever it is we think we have allowed ourselves to be put in line for within the EU? If we do that, does that recalibration indicate a lessening or an intensification of our commitment? Better still, is there simply an agreement that, whatever else Brexit may say, we are committed to that joint INDC on the basis of whatever is shared out by the EU as the process goes forward? I would value a thought from the Minister about what the intention on the INDCs might be, because that is important for clarifying our long-term commitment over the next period in reality.
Notwithstanding that, the ratification process will take place on the basis that we are committed to being part of the European basket of a 40% reduction by 2030 as our offer from Paris and beyond that. The question of the missing low-carbon programme therefore starts to loom large because, as a result of Paris, we need to know whether the UK is really able to deliver on that 40% reduction, be it separately or as part of that EU programme. The whole issue of ratification must have that as one of the questions within it—are we able to do what we said we would be doing at the time of the agreement?
At the time, it was welcome news that the Government went ahead and agreed to the fifth carbon budget, and that they did so without any suggestions that there might be caveats attached, unlike what happened with the fourth carbon budget. That sent a clear signal about what our overall ambitions should be. A question then arises about the fourth and fifth carbon budgets moving forward, and whether we can fit what we have agreed regarding the INDCs into the process of agreeing those carbon budgets and their consequences. That is where we start to have a problem. I am increasingly concerned about whether we have the policy instruments in place and the wherewithal to reach a position where we can say, hand on heart, “Yes, we are in this seriously.” Indeed, that concerns not only me but, more importantly, the Committee on Climate Change. Its recent progress report to Parliament on carbon budgets made the important point that although, as the Minister mentioned, our progress on tackling overall emissions has historically been looking pretty good over the recent period, with emissions falling by an average of 4.5% a year since 2012, that has been almost entirely due to progress in the power sector, not progress in the rest of the economy.
The Committee on Climate Change says that, in the rest of the economy, emissions have fallen by less than 1% a year on a temperature-adjusted basis. It specifically says that that is because of a slow uptake of low-carbon technologies and the behaviour of the building sector—low rates of insulation improvement and low take-up of low-carbon heat—as well as because improved vehicle efficiency has been offset by increased demand for travel. It also says that there is minimal evidence of progress in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The Committee is beginning to sound alarm bells about the extent to which we will be able to make the progress that is needed if we are to carry out those INDCs properly.
The Committee on Climate Change points out that, even as far as the energy sector is concerned, some areas have seen progress. It says that funding for offshore wind has been extended to 2026, which I very much welcome as an important step towards attaching the next stage of the levy control framework to offshore wind. However, the Committee says that there are backward steps in other areas, and Members will not be surprised to hear what they are: the cancellation of the commercialised programme for carbon capture and storage; the reduction in funding for energy efficiency; and the cancellation of the zero-carbon homes standard.
The Committee on Climate Change also says that other priorities have not moved forward. There have been no further auctions for the cheapest low-carbon generation, no action plan for low-carbon heat or energy efficiency, and no vehicle efficiency standards beyond 2020. It also says that progress on improving the energy efficiency of buildings has stalled since 2012. Annual rates of cavity wall and loft insulation in 2013 to 2015 were down 60% and 90% respectively from annual rates between 2008 and 2012. I cite these points from the Committee given its status as an expert body.
The carbon budget and carbon programmes have substantial ramifications for endeavours, aspirations and targets way beyond the size of what appears to be the policy put in place at a particular moment. I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister in his task of putting the new low-carbon programme together over the next period. He inherits a number of issues that have percolated down to short-term policy decisions, which have substantial ramifications on climate change targets over the longer period. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North, I would like to big up the Minister’s new post. It is a good idea to have a Minister for climate change who is completely onside as far as climate change is concerned. Not only is he onside, but he has a long record of being onside. His commitment to this cause is absolutely unquestionable.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed, yes. That is now two stabs to the heart of the Minister’s career.
In his responsibilities and those of his Secretary of State, the Minister has a problem arising from the flurry of policies over the past year on the long-term considerations relating to climate change effects. If his new Department lets those policy changes lie, or runs further with them, the problem will be exacerbated, and his problem of writing a low carbon programme will be magnified.
The new Department benefits from particularly good appointments in the form of Ministers who completely understand and are at ease with the question of what we need to do, where we need to do it, how we need to do it and what the effects will be. We need to identify where those effects may continue to be felt outside the new Department. We can point the finger at what happened with some of those changes under the previous Department of Energy and Climate Change, and we can point the finger in the direction of the Treasury. During the latter stages of the previous Government and in the first period of the present Government, we had the Treasury’s energy and climate change policy and the Department’s energy and climate change policy, and the two rarely coincided. Let us guess who came out on top in terms of policy direction.
My first plea, coupled with kindly advice to the Minister, is to get on top of the Treasury straight away. If Treasury domination of energy and climate change policy is allowed to continue, regardless of the long-term climate consequences, the writing of a new carbon policy will end in tears. To illustrate that, we can look at the previous carbon plan, which came out in December 2011. That plan not only contained some bright ideas, but set out where we were, where we wanted to be in 2050 and how the transition would be undertaken in each of a series of sectors, and that was analysed thoroughly for those sectors.
In the context of the 40% emissions cut that we are now looking at in the European INDCs, the assumptions underlying a low carbon plan are important. How effectively do they cover where we are now, where we are going to be in 2050, how we make that transition and how that transition works in 2030, which is the period that we are now considering? The carbon plan 2011 is clear about carbon saving, the green deal and ECO. It envisages that all practical cavity walls and lofts will be insulated by 2020 and up to 1.5 million solid walls will be insulated. We know that that has gone. There is no longer even a remote chance of such an achievement, particularly with respect to solid walls and probably also with respect to other forms of insulation, because the green deal has gone and ECO has morphed into a pretty restricted version of the original ECO. Yet, the Committee on Climate Change, in its preamble to the fourth carbon budget, suggested, as an assumption in that carbon budget, that by the early 2020s over 2 million treatments of solid-wall properties would have to be undertaken as a central contribution to carbon reduction. So that has gone.
The 2011 programme says carbon capture and storage will
“make a significant contribution by 2030”.
In the scenarios modelled, it is estimated that CCS will contribute as much as 10 GW. Well, that has gone. The Treasury managed to bundle CCS into a cupboard very neatly just a little while ago. Personally, I thought that was one of the biggest enviro-crimes committed by the Treasury, in terms of its policies of cutting off the fundamental route to decarbonisation of remaining baseload power over the period and apparently not worrying about the consequences.
The 2011 carbon plan says:
“From 2030 onwards, a major role for gas as a baseload source of electricity is only realistic with large numbers of gas CCS plants.”
We have committed ourselves to close down coal by 2025, although we have yet to see the consultation on that, but that is to be undertaken, it is stated in the relevant consultation, only if the progress on building new gas plants is sufficient to allow that to happen—that is, the commitment is to phase out coal, but to replace it with a new dash for gas. Yet, the carbon plan and, indeed, the Committee on Climate Change indicate very clearly that gas itself can be maintained as a baseload only if it has a substantial amount of CCS attached to it. We are apparently going ahead with the dash for gas over the next period without any thought that in the reasonable future CCS may come in as far as gas itself is concerned. That has a substantial impact on our ability to meet the fourth and fifth carbon budgets over the next period.
The low carbon plan says:
“Looking to the future, between 21% and 45% of heat supply to our buildings will need to be low carbon by 2030”,
but the then Secretary of State warned last year that we are failing badly on our 2020 heat targets and there is no chance at present of getting to our 2030 target, so that contribution has also gone.
Finally, let me just pick out some of a larger number changes from the 2011 report. The report said
“all new homes from 2016”
will “be zero carbon”, which would make a considerable contribution to the fourth and fifth carbon budgets. Well, of course, those homes will not be zero carbon, because the zero-carbon homes plan has also been pulled.
Energy Bill [Lords]
Debate between Ed Miliband and Alan Whitehead
Dr Whitehead
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Indeed, a carbon capture strategy that sets out a longer-term route for our carbon capture and storage would play an important part in ensuring that investment for CCS was available. He also makes the point that the cancellation of those pilot projects has cast quite a pall over the future investability of carbon capture and storage projects, despite the fact that many such projects are now getting under way across the world.
It is important to reflect on how we will import the relevant technology under a new CCS strategy and how we might keep as much as possible of the rest of the supply chain and other CCS arrangements in the UK, particularly the substantial developments and intellectual property gained from the White Rose and Peterhead projects, which must be retained in the UK for use in future CCS developments. All of that should be part of a strategy, but we simply do not have one at the moment. Having a strategy in place would enable us at least to recover substantially from the immense setback caused by the cancellation of those pilot projects. The new clause calls for such a strategy to be articulated at an early stage and for us to be clear about exactly how and why we will keep CCS on track for the future.
We have heard about targets today, but new clause 8 does not set a new target. It relates to the undertakings in part 1 of the Energy Act 2013 relating to setting a target for the decarbonisation of the energy sector by 2030. Part 1 makes it clear that the Secretary of State has a duty to ensure that the carbon intensity of electricity generation in the United Kingdom is no greater than the maximum permitted level of the decarbonisation target range. There is a clear undertaking in the Act to set a decarbonisation target range and a requirement for the Secretary of State to take related actions.
As I have mentioned, that target already exists. It has done so since the Energy Act 2013 was passed. The outstanding issue at the time was not whether there should be a target but what the target range should be. Under the legislation, it is up to Ministers to clear up that matter through secondary legislation. It is not a particularly small matter: it is in the gift of Ministers to decide whether the target for decarbonisation is strong or not. During the passage of that legislation, it became clear that Members across the Committee envisaged the target being strong and in line with the aim that carbon reductions should make a proper contribution.
Unfortunately, during the passage of this Bill in another place, we heard about a letter to the Opposition from the Minister in the other place. In Committee, I quoted the Minister stating in that letter that
“a power was taken within the Energy Act 2013 which gives the Secretary of State the ability to set a ‘decarbonisation target range’ for the electricity sector, for a year ‘not before’ 2030. This allows a target to be set on the same date or after setting the Fifth Carbon Budget which must be set before end of June 2016 (measured in emissions intensity in grams of CO2 per kWh)…it is the intention of this Government not to exercise this power. This position is consistent with our manifesto pledge not to support additional distorting and expensive power sector targets.”––[Official Report, Energy Public Bill Committee, 4 February 2016; c. 206.]
Clause 8 does not propose an additional distorting target. It is a target that was included in the Energy Act 2013, and it is incumbent on the Government to take action on the decarbonisation target range through secondary legislation. It is extremely disappointing that the Minister in the other place indicated that the Government were not going to exercise this power. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to set a decarbonisation target and discharge section 1 of the Energy Act 2013. I am sure that, in the light of our discussions this afternoon, Members would agree that it is extremely important that such targets should be placed as waystations on our way to 2050. That is what the new clause seeks to achieve.
New clause 9 addresses an aspect of that decarbonised structure for energy in looking at the perverse results of the first two capacity auctions in not procuring any long-term new large generating plant; instead, almost the only long-term outcome was the procurement of diesel sets as generators. More than 1 GW of generators was procured, and they are more polluting than coal, which the Secretary of State has pledged to take off the system by 2025. The new clause adds to the 2013 Act’s requirements relating to fossil fuel-generating plant that is granted a 15-year capacity contract. That plant must adhere to certain conditions if the contract is to be granted. One of those conditions is the emissions performance standard. Section 57 of the Act contains a target or formula that, under subsequent secondary legislation, has led to a performance standard of 450 grams per kWh being established.
The new clause clearly does not seek to capture gas, because new plant for gas comes in at about 370 grams per kWh and is below the emissions performance standard. It refers to diesel coming into the provision of electricity, particularly in the context of what has happened in the two previous capacity auctions. Those diesel engines escaped the provisions of the 2013 Act because they were individually below the size at which plants were caught by the legislation. However, in terms of their individual emissions, they are among the dirtiest of the energy generation devices.
Diesel is exempt from present EPS levels because of the individual size of the reciprocating sets, and it has therefore cumulatively obtained a substantial proportion of long-term capacity payments coming into the system. Diesel sets have been able to get into the capacity auctions not because they are particularly cheap to run but because until recently they were already receiving a substantial underwriting from the Treasury through the enterprise investment scheme payments for the establishment of such plants. It appears that the payments were originally introduced to encourage the plants to be established for standby purposes, but they have of course been used for other purposes in the capacity auction. Although that route has been changed in the autumn statement, the most polluting generating plants have managed to get two lots of subsidies for generating and have got in through the capacity auction process as well. That is not only bad climate policy but bad public policy in general.
The question of diesel sets was discussed in Committee, and in a recent ministerial statement on changes to the capacity auctions, the Government undertook to look again at the matter. They suggested that this might happen through proposals to change the air quality regulations under the large plants directive, which might include diesel sets. However, they said that those changes might not occur until 2019 at the earliest, which would be too late for the next series of capacity auctions. The new clause seeks the most straightforward route to ensuring that diesel is not the perverse beneficiary of auctions as of now.
New clause 10 looks further forward, to the fifth carbon budget, but perhaps not quite so much further forward, in that we will have to decide on the fifth carbon budget by the summer. The new clause seeks to strengthen the Government’s intention to use their powers to ensure that we keep on track by outlawing the use of private trading sector credits at and after the fifth carbon budget. The hon. Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) made some valuable points about that.
Hon. Members will recall that when the Bill arrived in the House from another place, clause 80 sought to simplify the accounting of the UK’s carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act 2008. That clause was removed during the passage of the Bill in Committee. This new clause seeks a slightly different route to the goal of more effective carbon accounting in the fifth carbon budget and beyond. It seeks to make the Government directly accountable for emissions in the sectors covered by the EU emission trading system when determining whether the UK is staying within its national carbon budgets. The EU ETS covers emissions in the electricity sector and heavy industry, and the carbon accounting regulations currently allow the Government to ignore emissions from those sectors when determining whether the carbon budgets have been met. For that reason, the UK’s carbon budgets, as currently designed, fail to provide a framework that offers investor confidence in the UK power sector. In particular, it provides no assurance that the Government will put in place the necessary measures to ensure that the power sector is largely decarbonised by 2030 despite the fact that the Committee on Climate Change has repeatedly indicated that the power sector must reduce emissions to below 100 grams per kWh by 2030 in order to maintain a cost-effective trajectory to our 2050 climate target.
If the accounting rules are changed, the Committee on Climate Change has indicated that it will provide new advice on the appropriate level for the fifth carbon budget, and the committee will for the first time be able to recommend a budget that reflects a cost-effective pathway for UK emissions across the economy. The new clause differs from the original clause 80 in a key respect: while clause 80 prevents any carbon units in the EU ETS from affecting the UK carbon account, the new clause specifically prevents the carbon trading behaviour of private firms from affecting the national accounts, which is what allows the Government to ignore emissions from the ETS sectors. Under the new clause, the Government would retain the option of purchasing and cancelling ETS carbon allowances to offset UK emissions at state level, an environmentally preferable form of carbon-offsetting compared with the many types of international offset credits available to the Government. If exercised, the offsetting option would also strengthen the EU ETS.
Finally, amendment 47 reminds us of the first part of the Bill and the wide consensus for change regarding North sea oil. It seeks to give the Oil and Gas Authority new powers and oversight to ensure that decommissioning is used to best advantage in the North sea. Decommissioning should not operate in the short-term interests of those involved in it but in the longer-term interests of the co-operative use of infrastructure, which hon. Members have touched on, and for the benefit of not only the production of future, more marginal fields over the next period, but the future possible use of the North sea as one of the world’s finest repositories when carbon capture and storage gets under way. The amendment would add an important tool to the Oil and Gas Authority’s arsenal and I hope that the Minister will accept it.
Edward Miliband (Doncaster North) (Lab)
I rise to speak to new clause 11, which was tabled in my name, that of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and those of Members from five other parties across the House. I thank the hon. Members for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron), for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart), for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter), for Belfast South (Dr McDonnell) and for Arfon (Hywel Williams) for their support. I also thank my Front-Bench team and Baroness Worthington in the other place for her support and advice.
The new clause would insert the commitment to zero emissions in the Paris climate change agreement into our domestic law, with the Committee on Climate Change advising on when it should be achieved. It is the right thing to do and the science is clear: the world needs to get to zero emissions early in the second half of this century, and it is worth reminding the House of the debate’s context.
We know from recent scientific analysis that 2015 was the hottest year on record. The record for global temperatures has been broken in each of the past five months, with February’s record broken in shocking fashion. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are now higher—this is hard to get your head around—than they have been for at least a million years. That is what the scientists tell us and it highlights the necessary urgency, which is shared by Members on both sides of the House.
My proposal makes economic, moral and political sense. It makes economic sense because we have to get to zero emissions eventually. It will be tough, so we need to start planning now. We are already aware of some of the tools we will need, but not all of them. We need clean energy supplies, a revolution in the household sector and reforestation. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Callum McCaig), who speaks for the SNP, said, we need carbon capture and storage to trap emissions. We will also need other technologies that are in the early stages of development. Crucially, we need to start the work now so that we can get to zero emissions at least cost. The economic case is proven by the support from the business community, and I thank Aviva, GSK, Unilever, Kingspan, Kingfisher and the broader “We Mean Business” coalition for their backing. The proposal also makes moral sense. Achieving zero emissions is necessary, so it would be irresponsible to pretend otherwise. Future generations will look badly on a generation that stuck its head in the sand and refused to plan ahead.