Paris Agreement on Climate Change

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hurd]

I thank my hon. Friend for that constructive and positive intervention. I am delighted that we are doing our bit to shift the tone of this debate, which is much needed. I will go on to address her point about how we intend to maintain our leadership and this international influence.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

The Minister is quite right to point to the two-stage process of ratification, and the question of how the UK will go about that process in conjunction with the EU. The fact is that that process is undertaken in the UK by laying an order to achieve the objectives of an EU treaty, by having it debated by both Houses and by it coming out the other end. That process has already been completed by France, and yet the UK is nowhere near even thinking about it. Is that the Minister’s understanding, or is such a process imminent in this House?

[Mr Hurd]

The hon. Gentleman has a long and distinguished record. We served together on environmental Committees a very long time ago. I thank him for his interest. He is right on one point. Yes, France has completed its domestic processes. He is entirely wrong on his second point, which was that the Government have not even begun to think about the process. We have, and we will be in a position to make our announcement on this at an appropriate point. I am sorry that it is not today, but we have made it clear, as the Prime Minister set out explicitly today, that we do intend to ratify as soon as possible.



On the important question of international influence, the challenge is not just how we meet our own commitments in the fairest and most cost-effective way, but how we maximise our influence to make sure that others play their full part. Those two aspects are linked, because it is easier for us to keep our people, businesses and private sector with us on this journey if they feel that other countries are fully engaged, and if they see that the global opportunity offered by the low-carbon economy, which I will come to, is real, substantial and growing, and that we must maximise our involvement in it.

I want to address the question of an international instrument, which the hon. Gentleman is rightly and understandably probing and which underlies the motion. UK diplomacy is widely recognised as having played an important role in shaping and securing the Paris agreement. The framework for the commitments to which countries have signed up has clearly been influenced by the structure that we have set up in the UK. That is enormously welcome. Our influence was built not on symbolism, but on substance.

We were the first to put our own house in order, putting world-leading targets into law and implementing the policies to meet them. We then established what is still the most extensive network of climate attachés in our embassies overseas. We gave other countries practical help in areas such as carbon pricing, energy planning, power sector reform, low-carbon urban development, green finance and climate legislation. Climate change researchers are now, apparently, working with the Chinese on the structure of their own emissions trading scheme. In many of these areas, UK expertise is world leading, and sharing it has strengthened our bilateral relationships and opened up commercial opportunities. I pay tribute to Sir David King for the work that he has done over many years with commitment and passion, which he maintains today.

We have also played a leading role in international climate finance. Ahead of Paris, we committed to providing at least £5.8 billion—that is serious money—of international climate finance over the next five years to support poorer countries in raising their level of ambition to reduce emissions and strengthening their resilience to growing climate insecurity. In the Department for International Development, I had responsibility for the climate finance brief. On regular trips to Africa, I saw the exposure, vulnerability and cost attached to lack of resilience to climate change, which made even clearer to me the importance of international climate finance. I am very proud of the lead that we have taken, and of the fact that we have been asked by the global community to take the lead in Marrakesh on setting out the road map for further progress.

We arrived in Paris well respected, with a strong set of relationships. On top of that, the UK negotiating team in the UN is recognised as one of the strongest in the world. It was rightly praised after Paris for playing a key role in bringing diverse countries into the agreement. Before I close on the past, it is appropriate to put on record my personal appreciation, and I am sure that of many colleagues, of the leadership role played by the then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, who is now Home Secretary.

I can reassure the House that all these elements of our influence remain strong. Our bilateral co-operation on climate and energy with key international partners remains as wide ranging and ambitious as ever. As I said, our climate finance over the next five years will be 50% greater than it was over the past five years. Our investment in clean energy research and development will double over the next five years, and we are a leading member of a group of 20 countries that have all made such a commitment. The Governor of the Bank of England is leading the way globally on green finance and the important issue of climate risk disclosure. The Bank of England co-chairs the G20’s working group on green finance with the People’s Bank of China. Our negotiating teams across Government remain active and influential, not only on the US process that will meet again soon in Marrakesh, but in critical negotiations on emissions from civil aviation and the maritime sector, and hydrofluorocarbons.

I agree that ratifying the Paris agreement early is important symbolically. That is why we will ratify as soon as we can, but it is not credible to suggest that our international influence hangs on this one symbol when it is so firmly rooted in substance. We in this Government are proud of the leadership that the UK has shown and we have no intention of surrendering it.

Our influence overseas will always rest on our action at home. Few countries can lay greater claim to leadership in decarbonisation than the UK. Through the Climate Change Act, we were the first country to set a legally binding 2050 target to reduce our emissions by at least 80% compared with 1990. That target is in line with the Paris agreement’s goal of keeping the temperature rise to well below 2º C. We have not just set targets; we have acted. At home, just as abroad, we focus not on symbolism, but on substance. We reduced UK emissions by 36% in 2014 compared with 1990. Between 2010 and 2015 alone, we reduced emissions by 17%, which was the biggest reduction in a single Parliament.

On this journey, we have proved something that was in doubt when we started debating the issue in 2005 and 2006: whether cutting emissions comes at the expense of economic growth. We have proved in the UK that it does not. UK emissions have steadily decreased since 1990 while GDP has increased. By 2014, emissions had fallen by 36%, while GDP has increased by 61% since 1990. We have proved that green growth is a reality.

We have invested in clean energy, with 99% of our solar power being installed since 2010. Renewables now provide a greater share of our electricity generation than coal. I am confident that that impressive progress will continue. During this Parliament, our investment in clean energy generation is set to double, and we are on track for 35% of our electricity to come from renewables by 2020.

I will respond to the provocation from the hon. Member for Brent North. As we develop our emissions reduction plan, which is one of the Department’s top priorities, we will set a course towards deeper emission reductions in both heating and transport. The hon. Gentleman asked me about the emission reductions plan and, I think, manufactured a suggestion of gossip from the Secretary of State. The hon. Gentleman totally distorts what I said last night. He needs to check his sources.

The emissions reduction plan matters enormously. Any suggestion from the hon. Gentleman that this Government are not taking it seriously, are sliding away from it or do not understand its importance is misleading and misrepresents our position. It is important for the reasons that he states: to underpin the credibility of our progress towards challenging decarbonisation targets, and because, as he stated, if it is done well, it will send signals to market for investment and for the mobilisation of private capital and the private sector that is fundamental for success. It is essential that we get our carbon reduction plan right.

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[David T. C. Davies (Monmouth) (Con)]

I begin by welcoming the new Ministers and indeed the new Department. I am very pleased at the fact that industrial strategy is going to be a huge part of what is going on. I think it is impossible to separate industrial strategy from climate change and energy.

With the greatest respect to Ministers, experienced though they are, I suggest that when their teams of advisers and experts tell them that the temperature is rising directly as a result of carbon dioxide, they should merely deploy the scepticism and intelligence that I know they have and ask a few pertinent questions. They should at least try to get some rational answers before embarking on decisions that will have a huge impact on industry, particularly energy-using industries such as the steel industry, which is an important one for me.

I do not intend to speak for too long today, but every time I speak on this issue, I deliberately and repeatedly make the point that I accept climate change. I have never tried to deny climate change; in fact, I have never met a scientist who does. The climate has always changed, and the ice age is testament to that. Those changes have gone on over the course of millions of years, and over the last 2 million years, we have seen ice ages usually lasting about 100,000 or so years, followed by interglacials, which are usually about 10,000 to 12,000 years. We are possibly coming towards the end of an interglacial at the moment, so we might want to turn our thoughts to what will happen when the earth inevitably starts to get cooler, as it will.

Of course I do not deny that the climate will continue to change; no sensible scientist has ever done so. The point I always make is that the climate change we have seen over the past 250 years is not particularly exceptional. Although it is of course true that carbon dioxide is a global warming gas—there is no doubt about that either—and that if we have begun to emit more carbon dioxide, it follows logically that it must have had some effect on the climate, that does not mean that it is responsible for the relatively small increase in temperature seen over the past 250 years.

I believe that the hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Callum McCaig) said that the temperature had increased by about 1°, and in common with many other commentators, he has linked that directly to increases in carbon dioxide emissions. In fact, the temperature increase that is generally agreed on—it is, of course, open to question—is 0.8°, but even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recognises that a significant amount of that is not due to man-made carbon dioxide emissions. The first question that I would put if I were ever to become a Minister in the Department—which I accept is probably an unlikely proposition—is, “What percentage of that 0.8° has come about as a result of man-made carbon dioxide emissions, and what percentage is due to the natural forcings that we know are there?”.

I have mentioned the ice ages and the interglacials, but over the last 2,000 years there has been a well-documented series of climate changes that have had nothing to do with carbon dioxide emissions. We know, for example, that 2,000 years ago, when the Romans ruled Britain, there was what was called a Roman optimum, a warmer period. That was followed by the dark ages, when things were cooler. There was then a medieval warming period during the Renaissance, which was followed by what was commonly referred to, and scientifically recognised, as a “little ice age”. That came to an end in about 1800, which, coincidentally, is when we started to industrialise.

Another important question that I would love to put to experts—in fact, I have put it to experts on many occasions, but have never received a rational answer—is, “How much of that 0.8° increase in temperature is due to the fact that the temperature was warming anyway because we were coming out of a particularly cool period, when the Thames”—just outside the House—“used regularly to freeze over so solidly that ice fairs could be held on it?” Some of that warming is clearly natural.

If people are still not convinced, we can look at the correlation, or rather the lack thereof, between carbon dioxide emissions and the temperature increases that have taken place since industrialisation. If it is the case—as some of the more alarmist commentators would have it—that this 0.8° increase has occurred directly as a result of carbon dioxide emissions, it would logically follow that one could correlate a line between carbon dioxide emissions that have taken place since, say, 1800 and temperature increases, but obviously, if we look at the graph, we find that there is no such correlation. We see that over the last 250 years there have been periods, once again, of warming and cooling, regardless of carbon dioxide emissions. In the first part of the 20th century, for example, there was a significant warming. From 1940 until about 1970, or probably a bit later, there was a significant cooling, which led to people beginning to suggest—

[Dr Whitehead]

indicated dissent.

[David T. C. Davies]

The hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but that is a fact. There was a cooling from the 1940s onwards. That is why, when I was growing up in the 1970s, people were worried that the next ice age was coming.

From the mid-1970s until about 1998 there was a significant amount of warming, but from 1998 until now there has been no statistically recognisable warming. People keep referring to the third hottest year on record, or whatever it is, but the reality is that when we look at the actual temperature increases, we see that they are absolutely minute. They are almost impossible to detect. Scientists who are asked about it will also have to admit that the margin for error within those increases is much greater than the increases themselves. Given the level of increase that we are seeing, it is perfectly possible to explain it away, because we are not comparing like with like. We are using slightly different temperature gauges, the areas in which we are using them have moved, some of the areas that they are in have changed over the years, and they can be subject to something called the urban heat island effect or to other natural factors. So there has not really been an increase since 1998.

Members may shake their heads, but I have raised this with the Met Office, and also with Professor Jim Skea. Scientists refer to it as the Pause, and they have come up with numerous explanations for it. I have heard about volcanoes, for instance, and the heat going into the ocean. At a meeting in this building, Professor Skea suggested that a pause over 16 or 17 years was statistically insignificant, which prompts an obvious question: if 17 years of temperatures not rising are insignificant, why are 30 or 35 years of temperatures increasing slightly so significant that we have to make radical changes to our economy and our industry to try and tackle that?

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[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for Wells (James Heappey) described the hon. Member for Monmouth (David T. C. Davies) as an “oracle”. I cannot resist observing that the oracle at Delphi was a priestess known as the Pythia who raved incoherently under the influence of the noxious gases coming up from beneath the earth’s surface and whose comments were then translated by the priest for the delectation of the general public. I shall simply let that observation fall to the floor, for what it is worth.

Today’s debate is about not just the ratification of the Paris accords, but the consequences of their ratification for the UK, and the ability of the UK to ratify them in good faith and good order on the basis of what it recognises as the commitments it will undertake as a result of being a party to the accords. In that context, it is important not only to clarify one or two points about the ratification process, which we have already done to some extent today, but to review the process and how it relates to issues such as the existence or otherwise of a low-carbon programme that actually sets out what we are committed to. I would have thought that it would have been a particularly good idea—or should be particularly good idea—to make the low-carbon programme available at the same time as the consideration of the ratification process so that we could have the full raft of information in front of us, but I will return to that point in a moment.

It is clear that the ratification process has two stages, as we have discussed, and that the UK’s particular responsibility now is to put an order—the EU treaty converted into an order—in front of the House and to get our bit done, which, as I mentioned in an earlier intervention, France has managed to do. That is important not only to get the business done for our country, but to ensure that the EU ratification is made as speedily as possible by getting the full process undertaken, especially by the heavy-hitters such as the UK, at the earliest possible time.

It is also important to clarify what we are undertaking in our joint ratification with the rest of the EU. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) underlined earlier, we need to clarify our ratification position as the Brexit process is undertaken. As far as we are concerned, the INDCs that were put on the table in Paris form part of the European bloc for the international negotiations. We have a joint INDC with all other EU member states, and the commitments that come from that relate to ambitions not for 2050, but for 2030, given the 40% reduction in emissions between 1990 and 2030 that was jointly agreed among all participating EU states.

The INDCs will then be the subject of progress reports. The INDCs together represent a reduction in temperature of substantially less than the 2°/1.5°C ambition, coming in at 2.6° or 2.7° in the overall INDCs. Therefore, the conference of the parties progress reports on how the INDCs are going will not only consider whether countries have carried out their INDCs, but form part of a process of strengthening them over time to get further commitments and to move them down towards a reasonable target or ambition for global temperature stability.

In those circumstances, by my reading, we will be in the first review period just at the point when we will be undertaking Brexit, so the INDCs that we had negotiated jointly with the EU may no longer be seen as tenable for the UK. The question we may have to start to face in those international negotiations is: do we, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North said, seek to nail ourselves down in the EU discussions on the INDCs, or do we decide at some stage that we are somehow going to develop our own INDC, which will be recalibrated from whatever it is we think we have allowed ourselves to be put in line for within the EU? If we do that, does that recalibration indicate a lessening or an intensification of our commitment? Better still, is there simply an agreement that, whatever else Brexit may say, we are committed to that joint INDC on the basis of whatever is shared out by the EU as the process goes forward? I would value a thought from the Minister about what the intention on the INDCs might be, because that is important for clarifying our long-term commitment over the next period in reality.

Notwithstanding that, the ratification process will take place on the basis that we are committed to being part of the European basket of a 40% reduction by 2030 as our offer from Paris and beyond that. The question of the missing low-carbon programme therefore starts to loom large because, as a result of Paris, we need to know whether the UK is really able to deliver on that 40% reduction, be it separately or as part of that EU programme. The whole issue of ratification must have that as one of the questions within it—are we able to do what we said we would be doing at the time of the agreement?

At the time, it was welcome news that the Government went ahead and agreed to the fifth carbon budget, and that they did so without any suggestions that there might be caveats attached, unlike what happened with the fourth carbon budget. That sent a clear signal about what our overall ambitions should be. A question then arises about the fourth and fifth carbon budgets moving forward, and whether we can fit what we have agreed regarding the INDCs into the process of agreeing those carbon budgets and their consequences. That is where we start to have a problem. I am increasingly concerned about whether we have the policy instruments in place and the wherewithal to reach a position where we can say, hand on heart, “Yes, we are in this seriously.” Indeed, that concerns not only me but, more importantly, the Committee on Climate Change. Its recent progress report to Parliament on carbon budgets made the important point that although, as the Minister mentioned, our progress on tackling overall emissions has historically been looking pretty good over the recent period, with emissions falling by an average of 4.5% a year since 2012, that has been almost entirely due to progress in the power sector, not progress in the rest of the economy.

The Committee on Climate Change says that, in the rest of the economy, emissions have fallen by less than 1% a year on a temperature-adjusted basis. It specifically says that that is because of a slow uptake of low-carbon technologies and the behaviour of the building sector—low rates of insulation improvement and low take-up of low-carbon heat—as well as because improved vehicle efficiency has been offset by increased demand for travel. It also says that there is minimal evidence of progress in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The Committee is beginning to sound alarm bells about the extent to which we will be able to make the progress that is needed if we are to carry out those INDCs properly.

The Committee on Climate Change points out that, even as far as the energy sector is concerned, some areas have seen progress. It says that funding for offshore wind has been extended to 2026, which I very much welcome as an important step towards attaching the next stage of the levy control framework to offshore wind. However, the Committee says that there are backward steps in other areas, and Members will not be surprised to hear what they are: the cancellation of the commercialised programme for carbon capture and storage; the reduction in funding for energy efficiency; and the cancellation of the zero-carbon homes standard.

The Committee on Climate Change also says that other priorities have not moved forward. There have been no further auctions for the cheapest low-carbon generation, no action plan for low-carbon heat or energy efficiency, and no vehicle efficiency standards beyond 2020. It also says that progress on improving the energy efficiency of buildings has stalled since 2012. Annual rates of cavity wall and loft insulation in 2013 to 2015 were down 60% and 90% respectively from annual rates between 2008 and 2012. I cite these points from the Committee given its status as an expert body.

The carbon budget and carbon programmes have substantial ramifications for endeavours, aspirations and targets way beyond the size of what appears to be the policy put in place at a particular moment. I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister in his task of putting the new low-carbon programme together over the next period. He inherits a number of issues that have percolated down to short-term policy decisions, which have substantial ramifications on climate change targets over the longer period. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North, I would like to big up the Minister’s new post. It is a good idea to have a Minister for climate change who is completely onside as far as climate change is concerned. Not only is he onside, but he has a long record of being onside. His commitment to this cause is absolutely unquestionable.

[Edward Miliband]

We have finished him off now.

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed, yes. That is now two stabs to the heart of the Minister’s career.

In his responsibilities and those of his Secretary of State, the Minister has a problem arising from the flurry of policies over the past year on the long-term considerations relating to climate change effects. If his new Department lets those policy changes lie, or runs further with them, the problem will be exacerbated, and his problem of writing a low carbon programme will be magnified.

The new Department benefits from particularly good appointments in the form of Ministers who completely understand and are at ease with the question of what we need to do, where we need to do it, how we need to do it and what the effects will be. We need to identify where those effects may continue to be felt outside the new Department. We can point the finger at what happened with some of those changes under the previous Department of Energy and Climate Change, and we can point the finger in the direction of the Treasury. During the latter stages of the previous Government and in the first period of the present Government, we had the Treasury’s energy and climate change policy and the Department’s energy and climate change policy, and the two rarely coincided. Let us guess who came out on top in terms of policy direction.

My first plea, coupled with kindly advice to the Minister, is to get on top of the Treasury straight away. If Treasury domination of energy and climate change policy is allowed to continue, regardless of the long-term climate consequences, the writing of a new carbon policy will end in tears. To illustrate that, we can look at the previous carbon plan, which came out in December 2011. That plan not only contained some bright ideas, but set out where we were, where we wanted to be in 2050 and how the transition would be undertaken in each of a series of sectors, and that was analysed thoroughly for those sectors.

In the context of the 40% emissions cut that we are now looking at in the European INDCs, the assumptions underlying a low carbon plan are important. How effectively do they cover where we are now, where we are going to be in 2050, how we make that transition and how that transition works in 2030, which is the period that we are now considering? The carbon plan 2011 is clear about carbon saving, the green deal and ECO. It envisages that all practical cavity walls and lofts will be insulated by 2020 and up to 1.5 million solid walls will be insulated. We know that that has gone. There is no longer even a remote chance of such an achievement, particularly with respect to solid walls and probably also with respect to other forms of insulation, because the green deal has gone and ECO has morphed into a pretty restricted version of the original ECO. Yet, the Committee on Climate Change, in its preamble to the fourth carbon budget, suggested, as an assumption in that carbon budget, that by the early 2020s over 2 million treatments of solid-wall properties would have to be undertaken as a central contribution to carbon reduction. So that has gone.

The 2011 programme says carbon capture and storage will

“make a significant contribution by 2030”.

In the scenarios modelled, it is estimated that CCS will contribute as much as 10 GW. Well, that has gone. The Treasury managed to bundle CCS into a cupboard very neatly just a little while ago. Personally, I thought that was one of the biggest enviro-crimes committed by the Treasury, in terms of its policies of cutting off the fundamental route to decarbonisation of remaining baseload power over the period and apparently not worrying about the consequences.

The 2011 carbon plan says:

“From 2030 onwards, a major role for gas as a baseload source of electricity is only realistic with large numbers of gas CCS plants.”

We have committed ourselves to close down coal by 2025, although we have yet to see the consultation on that, but that is to be undertaken, it is stated in the relevant consultation, only if the progress on building new gas plants is sufficient to allow that to happen—that is, the commitment is to phase out coal, but to replace it with a new dash for gas. Yet, the carbon plan and, indeed, the Committee on Climate Change indicate very clearly that gas itself can be maintained as a baseload only if it has a substantial amount of CCS attached to it. We are apparently going ahead with the dash for gas over the next period without any thought that in the reasonable future CCS may come in as far as gas itself is concerned. That has a substantial impact on our ability to meet the fourth and fifth carbon budgets over the next period.

The low carbon plan says:

“Looking to the future, between 21% and 45% of heat supply to our buildings will need to be low carbon by 2030”,

but the then Secretary of State warned last year that we are failing badly on our 2020 heat targets and there is no chance at present of getting to our 2030 target, so that contribution has also gone.

Finally, let me just pick out some of a larger number changes from the 2011 report. The report said

“all new homes from 2016”

will “be zero carbon”, which would make a considerable contribution to the fourth and fifth carbon budgets. Well, of course, those homes will not be zero carbon, because the zero-carbon homes plan has also been pulled.

[Barry Gardiner]

My hon. Friend always speaks with such authority on these matters. In relation to CCS, is he as concerned as I am that the cross-Yorkshire and Humber pipeline has just had its planning deadline extended by the Secretary of State? It looks as if, yet again, these projects are being put into cold storage.

[Dr Whitehead]

There is perhaps an irony in the words “put into storage”, because the whole purpose of the exercise in the first place is storage. However, my hon. Friend is absolutely right that the whole question of what will happen with not only CCS pilot projects but the infrastructure and the prospects for CCS as a whole appears to have been put into the long grass, and that is a profound problem as far as our future climate change commitments are concerned.

It is going to be hard to write a convincing new low carbon programme in the light of just some of these things unless the Department gets to work very rapidly and unpicks the damage to the long-term low carbon prospects that have been underlined by the savage changes of the past year. I know that the new Minister is committed personally to making sure that the consequences are right, so that is perhaps an early task on his desk. Let us turn this round so that we can put into the low carbon programme positive consequences for the future rather than the negative consequences that there are at the moment.

These two issues go very closely together. We have to get on, very soon, with doing our bit on ratification. I am encouraged to hear from the Minister that if the documentation is not imminent, perhaps it is pretty imminent.

[Mr Hurd]

indicated assent.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister is sort of nodding his head, so that is good. At the earliest opportunity, we need to have a good look at the new low carbon programme to see whether what we are committing ourselves to do can really be carried out, and, if it cannot, what we must do next to make sure that we can meet those commitments. That is part and parcel of the documentation, and the sooner it can come forward, the better. I hope that by putting the two issues together, we can get a real grip on what we have committed ourselves to and how well we can do it for the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jesse Norman]

I am enjoying the sedentary contributions from the Opposition spokesman, but he has had his moment. Let us focus on the two themes that came through, loud and clear, across all the speeches and interventions today. The first is that the issue of climate change is now in the absolute mainstream of our political debate. Whatever people’s specific views, climate change is recognised across all parties, in all the nations and regions of this country, as a central issue of public concern. The second point follows from that, and it is that we cannot and we must not view this country’s commitments in relation to climate change in a narrowly partisan or party political way. The Paris agreement has been welcomed by Members from across the House, as has the concerted action taken this week by China and the USA.

As the Prime Minister underlined only a few hours ago, this country has long exercised global leadership in this area. It has balanced great ambition with a sober recognition of the costs involved—costs that can hit not merely industry but often, directly and indirectly, the poorest people in our society. There is so much more to do, but what the UK has done is cause for celebration, not regret.

We can all agree that climate change is one of the most serious threats facing the world, and that has been brought home to us again today by the excellent examples highlighted in the contributions of the hon. Member for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady), my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble (Seema Kennedy) and the hon. Members for Wirral West, for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) and for Wakefield, as well as by my brilliant colleague the Minister of State. We agree that climate change is one of the most serious threats facing the world. We agree that the UK has played, and will continue to play, a unique and important role in global action to tackle the changing climate. We agree that that action is an opportunity for growth, for new jobs and for improvements to health, to cities and to our daily lives.

That consensus is the prerequisite. It is the essential long-term basis for concerted action in this area by all Governments, at any time. It will be especially helpful to us as we look forward to the COP22 meeting in Marrakesh in November, which will help to set many of the rules relating to the Paris agreement and so will mark a shift from aspiration to implementation. That consensus, and the need to maintain it, is fundamentally why I still hope that the hon. Member for Brent North will not press this needlessly divisive motion to a vote.

The Government have made it very clear that they welcome the push by the US, by China and by other countries towards the early ratification of the Paris agreement. We remain firmly committed to that agreement and to ratifying it as soon as possible. The convention, however, is that all European Union member states ratify the agreement together, collectively. We hope that that will happen, as has been said, as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, it is not true, as was stated by the hon. Member for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson), that France has ratified the agreement. The Commons Library briefing of 6 September says:

“As set out on the UK French Embassy website it will not do so until all Member states and the EU are ready to do so, and will focus”—

in the meantime, on—

“encouraging other Member States to make progress”.

France was reported in the press as having ratified the agreement, but it has not in fact done so.

I appreciate that we have heard some perfectly proper concerns about the Paris agreement coming into force before the EU has ratified it. However, there is widespread international understanding that in the event that the agreement enters into force early, countries that have not yet completed their domestic processes to allow ratification to take place—very important processes of consensual ratification—should not and will not be prejudiced. Not to do so would mean that as many as 140 countries, including some of the very poorest and most climate-afflicted nations in the world, would be denied a full seat at the table. COP22 in Marrakesh in November will, I hope, take a formal decision to that effect.

Turning to recent history, few countries have been more active in decarbonisation than this one. We were the first country to set, through the Climate Change Act, a legally binding 2050 target to drop our emissions by at least 80% on 1990 levels. Far from not having a strategy, we have just signed off our fifth carbon budget, which sets the terms for the overall picture. The UK has made great progress in reducing its emissions, which had fallen by 36% by 2014 on 1990 levels. During the past five years, between 2010 and 2015, our domestic greenhouse gas emissions have fallen by 17%, which is the biggest reduction in a single Parliament. We already have domestic obligations that keep the UK well below the 2° rise in temperature goal mandated by the Paris agreement.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister mentions the signing off of the fifth carbon budget and my pleasure about that, but perhaps he missed the point I made earlier, which is that the Government are nowhere near in any possible way meeting the terms of the fifth carbon budget, as a result of the policies they have recently put in place. That is presumably of some concern to him.