Assisted Suicide

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

The hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) spoke with great emotion. Like his father, my mother died at the age of 87; it is very difficult for us to speak about these very personal matters. I know that my mother, like many elderly people, wrongly felt that she was a burden. Of course she was never a burden, but I think that many people feel like that; there might be absolutely no pressure on them, but they feel that they would make it easier for everybody if they were to ease their path out of life. We must never allow old people in this country to feel that they are a burden. That is where I come from.

My views have progressed on this matter over the time I have been in Parliament. I freely confess that when I first came here I believed that the state had the right to take life and I voted, like many of my colleagues, in 1983 to restore capital punishment. I now think I was wrong and I have come to the conclusion that the only logical and right course of action is always to proclaim life. As it happens, at the moment I am reading a history of Stalin’s Russia, and one cannot understand the attitude of a society in which life is held so cheaply. I know that we are a million miles from that but in my view the end never justifies the means. That is why I personally voted against all the recent wars—or certainly did not vote for them. I believe that life must come first and that we must proclaim life.

That does not come from my religious views; it is a matter of absolute certainty and belief and is incredibly important for society if we are to create a society of light and hope and not one in which people ultimately feel they are a burden. That is why I have consistently voted, opposed, spoken against and moved amendments on abortion and I would vote against capital punishment. I am totally opposed to euthanasia in any shape or form. Some people will say, “That’s all very well for you. At the moment you are reasonably healthy. What if you are faced with the appalling difficulties and problems that we have been talking about today?”, and my answer is that I do not know. All I know is that we must proclaim this truth, and the House of Commons should proclaim it—that anybody, however young, unborn, crippled, hopeless, diseased or idiotic, has as much right to life as anybody else, and all life is precious because the external human body is simply a mirror of the soul. If we renege on that moral certainty and if we start on a journey, it is a very dangerous journey indeed.

[Mr Winnick]

I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman. Every life is of value and the idea that because someone may be disabled or elderly and so on their life is less valuable than other people’s is totally alien to me, as it is to him. But I gave as an example Dr Anne Turner, who was so terrified of facing a death like her husband’s, where all physical movement would have ended. Does he recognise that she had the right to decide, and she took that right, though she could not do so in Britain?

[Mr Leigh]

I recognise that point of view and that is why, although I have expressed myself so far, some would say, with too much moral certainty, I realise that we are in a moral maze here. It is not for us to lecture people on what they may or may not do at the end. That is why the guidelines are a fair compromise. I do not think anybody wants to prosecute and send to jail somebody who acts out of the depth of love and compassion when they are faced with a close relative who is suffering. Nobody wants such a person to be sent to prison if they assist their loved one out of this life.

We have a compromise, but it is not legalised euthanasia. I tabled an amendment, which was not selected. Why should it have been? I wanted to express the point of view that the House of Commons must firmly and unequivocally state, as it has done up to now, that for the absolute avoidance of doubt, it is opposed to voluntary euthanasia. There is a world of difference between the desperate situation in which a relative helps somebody out of this world, and a situation where a doctor, as part of the legal process, kills somebody. That is what so many of us on this side of the argument believe so passionately. It might be a cliché to talk in terms of slippery slopes, but it is there in Holland and in Oregon—in only about six jurisdictions throughout the world. We do not want this country to embark on this road.

I was with my best friend, a former Member of this House, Piers Merchant, as he lay dying. He was riddled with cancer, in great pain, and I was with him as he was dying. He was filled with morphine. I could see the morphine going through his body all the time. He was no doubt killed by the morphine, not by the cancer, and I respected that judgment. He was in a wonderful, caring hospice. Everybody was looking after him and everybody was loving him. At the end of the day his doctors, I suppose, killed him because the pain would have been unendurable, but that is not legalised euthanasia. That is allowing doctors to take an informed decision on the basis of what they know to be right.

[Naomi Long]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a subtle but important distinction between treatment that is administered by a doctor in order to ease pain which, as a side effect, may hasten death, and a doctor setting out to hasten death?

[Mr Leigh]

That is the point that I am trying to make, and that is the absolute principle that I hope this debate will proclaim. We want the law to recognise the appalling moral difficulties that people face. None of us in the Chamber speaking in this debate has yet embarked on that journey. We all will. That is the only thing we know with absolute certainty. There will come a moment when we are dying, in pain, and those around us have to make appallingly difficult decisions.

I want to live in a country where there is a moral assumption that although, at the end of the day, my passage into the next world might have to be eased, and the easing might be the killing of me, that decision will be taken in the final analysis by doctors who are simply trying to relieve pain, who have recognised that I am dying and who do not accept the principle that the state, the law, doctors or even relations have a right to come to an individual and say before their time is up, “Yes, you are a burden on society. Yes, you must go.” That is a moral principle, that is what the debate is about, and that is what we must abide by.

Voting by Prisoners

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I rise to support the motion in the names of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab), other hon. Members and myself. I should perhaps explain that the hon. Member for Esher and Walton underwent an operation yesterday and is hoping to be present later today, such is his interest and, as a former Foreign Office lawyer, his expertise in this issue. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North East Derbyshire (Natascha Engel) and the Backbench Business Committee for choosing our motion for today’s debate.

At the heart of this debate is a conflict of principles, which sometimes have to be faced in politics and by Governments. On the one hand, there is the issue of whether convicted prisoners should be allowed to vote while serving their sentence. On the other, there is the question of how we meet out treaty obligations in respect of the Council of Europe, the European convention on human rights and the Court in Strasbourg. I will deal with those points in turn.

A ban on convicted prisoners voting while in jail has existed in this country at least since 1970. Post-war, the question has been considered under a Labour Administration in 1968, a Conservative Administration in 1983 and a Labour Administration in 1999-2000. On each occasion, the position was confirmed by an overwhelming cross-party consensus. On each occasion, amendments could easily have been moved in the House by those who supported an end to the ban, and voted on. On none of those occasions, and on no other occasion that I can recall, has this ever been a matter of active pursuit for Members of any party in this House. Significantly, and to echo the point made by the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), neither I nor my staff can recall one letter, among the hundreds of complaints from prisoners with which I have dealt in my 32 years in this House, calling for the right to vote from prison.

I turn to the European convention on human rights and the Strasbourg Court’s decisions. The convention was drafted principally by distinguished British jurists, including David Maxwell Fyfe, who was later Home Secretary and Lord Chancellor in Conservative Administrations. The convention is a fine statement of what we all understand to be fundamental human rights. As an instrument, it has stood the test of time, and I strongly support it. One key problem for many years after the convention was agreed in 1951 was that, in contrast to most signatory states, it was not incorporated into our domestic law. That meant that the United Kingdom was much less likely to be given the latitude offered to other countries—the so-called margin of appreciation—by the Strasbourg Court, because our courts were not able to adjudicate on the convention’s articles.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

With respect to the right hon. Gentleman, is the problem not that his Government got us into this mess by incorporating the convention into our law? There is no way out now for this Government. There is a queue a mile long of people on no win, no fee cases, waiting to sue the Government. What is he going to do about it?

[Mr Straw]

I spelled that out in The Times this morning, and I was just about to come on to that point. I am grateful for the cue from the hon. Gentleman.

The Human Rights Act 1998 is part of the solution to the problem; it was never part of the problem. I shall explain why. We have not been able to enjoy the margin of appreciation and our courts have not been able to adjudicate on the convention’s articles. The first attempt to deal with that issue in the House was made in 1987 by the then Conservative Member of Parliament, the late Sir Edward Gardner, QC. His private Member’s Bill failed after receiving considerable Back-Bench support from all parts of the House, but scepticism from those on the Government and Opposition Front Benches. Ten years later, I was privileged to do what Ted Gardner had begun with what became the Human Rights Act 1998. In the end, it gained all-party support, as proceedings on Third Reading show.

Importantly for this debate, and to answer the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh), the White Paper preceding the Human Rights Act was entitled “Rights Brought Home”. It was about repatriating British rights in the convention that we had provided for other countries in Europe, but that were not available to our own citizens.

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[Mr Streeter]

I completely agree and I intend to address that point in a moment.

We decided in this country centuries ago that convicted criminals should not have the right to vote, and I support that decision. After all, the punitive element of incarceration is the denial for the time being of certain rights and privileges that our citizens enjoy. We decided long ago that in addition to surrendering their liberty, convicted criminals while in prison would also give up their right to vote. That was the case in 1953 when the treaty on human rights was signed, and it remains the case.

What has changed since 1953? The answer is simply this: the European Court of Human Rights decided in 1978 that it could interpret the convention as a living document and effectively create law rather than purely reflect the provisions of the original convention.

[Mr Leigh]

There appears to be some sloppy thinking here. I oppose incorporation into our law, but the Supreme Court will always uphold prisoners’ appeals because we cannot pick and choose between the judgments we like and those we dislike. I am afraid that that is the law.

[Mr Streeter]

If my hon. Friend exercises a little patience, I will give him the solution before my five minutes are up. I can assure him that there is no sloppy thinking down this end of the Chamber.

The rights taken to itself by the ECHR is the clearest case of mission creep that we will ever see. It is the ECHR’s decision to award itself more power—much more power than the authors of the convention ever intended—that we must challenge today. That decision has led to a steady trickle of judgments and pronouncements over the past 30 years that have frequently left the British public baffled and extremely angry.

That is the real problem with the ECHR conducting itself in that way. Yet again, it has undermined the authority of this House, which leaves us wringing our hands hopelessly on the sidelines, and widens the gap between the electorate and their Parliament. If we, the people whom they send here on their behalf, cannot change things, what is the point of us being here, and therefore, what is the point of them voting?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Leigh]

It seems that everyone who has spoken so far is trying to have their cake and eat it. They all say that they want this incorporated into our law, but they do not like this particular judgment. They think that a debate will solve the problem. If the vote goes against us this afternoon, will the Attorney-General do the right thing and withdraw us from our incorporation in the convention?

[The Attorney-General]

My hon. Friend takes a very absolutist stance, although I have heard him utter such a view before. That is not Government policy, however.