Public Order Bill

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Commons Chamber

If we look further back into history, we find examples of peaceful lock-on protests and of the police making good use of the powers available to them when they needed to. At Greenham Common peace camp, for example, the police did intervene when they needed to, and they arrested and charged people. We could ask the Prime Minister, because she was there. Only last week, the Home Secretary, before tweeting that the police needed extra powers on protest, congratulated the police on making over 300 arrests. The flaw in the argument is gaping.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

If new clause 11 is agreed to, will the Labour party vote against Third Reading?

--- Later in debate ---

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy]

I thank my right hon. Friend, and he is absolutely right. Far too often, families like the Kaba family have to spend months, even years, seeking answers and justice for their loved ones. I hope that in the years to come, the Independent Office for Police Conduct quickly begins to look at measures to speed up the investigations that give family members answers about why they have died. We have to remember that around the time Chris Kaba died, not to mention him too much, he was one of two men who had been killed following contact with police, and one of over 1,000 who have died in police custody or following contact with police since 1990. Since that time, only one police officer has ever been prosecuted. That absolutely needs to change.

In conclusion, the Public Order Bill is a continuation of the Government’s assault on the right to protest, further criminalising people who call for the change we need and ramping up police powers to restrict demonstrations. It could also have a very negative impact on black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. It is authoritarian and disadvantages the poorest and most marginalised communities. Unless it is fundamentally amended, I believe it must be opposed.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I am surprised we are debating this again. It was only in 2018 when the Home Office concluded there was no need to introduce so-called buffer zones. I am referring here to new clause 11. Buffer zones are disproportionate in the restrictions they impose on freedom of expression, and unnecessary in that there remains a lack of evidence that they are needed. The Government have recently affirmed this position, and rightly so given that existing laws enable the police and local authorities to deal with protests that are harmful. Before we rush to create new laws, it is only right that the Government expect the police and local authorities to use their current powers appropriately and where necessary.

The 2018 review showed that

“it would not be proportionate to introduce a blanket ban”

as the evidence found that protests occurred at less than 10% of abortion clinics. That is a very small number. Of course—we emphasise this point—any kind of harassment is absolutely wrong. It should be dealt with by the law and can be dealt with by existing laws. We have heard much in the debate about how we should turn to existing laws, rather than create new ones. Any remedy must be proportionate to the problem. The review—not my review, but an objective Government review—concluded that most of the activities during these protests were passive in nature. My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), in a very powerful speech, described just how passive they can be. They can be standing there and praying silently, not even holding up a banner of any nature or saying anything. It could include praying or handing out leaflets. The review found that disruptive or aggressive behaviour was the exception, not the norm. Crucially, it also confirmed that the police have the necessary powers already to take action and protect the public when protests become harmful or disruptive. A blanket ban of the kind proposed in new clause 11 would be disproportionate in the face of those facts. The law must be proportionate.

To be clear, the people this amendment targets are peaceful protestors, often elderly grandmothers, frankly, who are entirely peaceful. They politely pray and hand out leaflets. The contrast could not be greater between those protestors and those of the likes of Just Stop Oil, who glue themselves to roads and create human blockades that are disruptive and obstructionist. If any so-called protesters at abortion clinics did anything like that, they would be immediately arrested. While the police have the powers to take action so that ordinary people can go about their daily lives, they will not stop Just Stop Oil protests.

Are we in this House really going to criminalise people who are peacefully trying to raise awareness about support available? This is the point.

[Stella Creasy]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

No, I have been told not to speak for long and I want to get on with it.

Public Order Bill

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Stella Creasy]

It is an irony to me that Members of the party that once claimed to be the party of law and order are trying to argue against the law and order that a PSPO establishes.

For the avoidance of doubt, let me be clear that I am not arguing for the criminalisation of silence. My argument is about the location. The right hon. Gentleman is being disingenuous if he does not recognise the effect of somebody who disagrees so passionately with a woman’s right to privacy in making that choice standing there while she does it. He talked about some of the literary greats, so let us talk about Margaret Atwood and “Under His Eye.” That is what these people praying represent by being there at that most tender moment for a woman making that choice. It is their physical presence, not their praying, that is the issue.

If we respect people having different opinions on abortion when it comes to free speech, we also have respect that when someone has made that choice, they should not be repeatedly challenged for it. The Members who want to challenge those women by praying outside and supporting others who do so have no idea why those women are attending the clinics; they have no idea of the histories and stories. They can only listen to the countless testimonies that the women attending the clinics do find this harassing. That is why so many have called for the PSPOs. They do find it intimidating. That is not the right time and place.

In tabling the amendment, the hon. Member for Northampton South is attempting to complicate something that is very simple. I pay tribute to Baroness Sugg for tidying up our original amendment and clarifying where the 150-metre zone will be. In a very small zone around an abortion clinic, that is not the right time and place. People can pray—of course they can. Although I might disagree with the hon. Gentleman on whether that is still intimidating, I will defend to the hilt people’s right to pray. What I will not do is place that ahead of a woman’s right to privacy and say that a woman who has made the decision to have an abortion must continue to face these people, because somehow it is about their freedom of speech unencumbered.

We need to be honest and recognise that there will never be a point at which the people praying agree with the choice that a woman has made, so there is never going to be a point at which their prayers are welcome. There is never going to be a point at which those prayers are not designed to intimidate or to destabilise a very difficult decision. Look at the widespread evidence that shows that the people conducting these prayer marathons outside our abortion clinics are not acting simply to help women, and that they are not well intentioned. I think we can all make our own decision on what is well intentioned. The hon. Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger) says it is not offensive, but I disagree. I think that when a woman has made a choice, to have someone try continually to undermine that choice is offensive. We both have a right in this place to make our argument. Where we do not have a right to make that argument is right outside an abortion clinic with a woman who just needs her right to privacy to be upheld.

The hon. Member for Northampton South talked about consensual contact, but that is very unclear. What if a protester walks up to a woman and asks her the time, and she tells them? Does that mean she has engaged in conversation with them, which will allow them to start talking to her about their views on abortion? What if they ask for directions? Will that undermine the provision? The people protesting outside clinics, especially the “40 Days for Life” people, boast about how their presence reduces the number of women having abortions. They say it makes the no-show rate for abortion appointments as high as 75%. This is not benign behaviour. They also claim that those of us who support a woman’s right to choose are “demonic”, and increasingly they suggest we are “satanic” in our support for a woman’s right to privacy. Let us be clear: amendment (a) would not make an abortion clinic buffer zone clearer; it would sabotage a buffer zone by introducing uncertainty about behaviour and about the simple concept of there being a right time and place.

I am conscious of the time available, so I just want to put on the record my gratitude not only to Baroness Sugg, but to my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) for all her work, the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex, and organisations like Sister Supporter. They have stood up for the silent majority—the people who think it is not right to hassle a woman when she is making these choices. That is ultimately what we are here to say. When the vast majority of the public support buffer zones, and when those of us who will be in this position cannot speak freely, as a Scottish colleague raised, then we have a challenge in this place. Freedom of speech is not freedom of speech if 50% are living in fear of what might happen next. Margaret Atwood taught us that. She said that men are worried that women will laugh at them, and women are worried that men might kill them. Do not kill a woman’s right to her freedom. Do not kill a woman’s right to privacy. Let us not sabotage at the last minute abortion buffer zones by supporting amendment (a). We should support Lords amendment 5 and let everybody else move on with their life.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

It is worth looking at what amendment (a) states. It states:

“No offence is committed under subsection (1) by a person engaged in consensual communication or in silent prayer”.

For the avoidance of doubt, amendment (a) goes on to say that nothing in it should allow people to be harassed or their decision to be changed, such as kneeling down and praying right in front of somebody’s face, or blocking the pavement, or indulging in any kind of harassing.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I am not going to give way to my hon. Friend, who has intervened many times already. I have been asked to speak very briefly.

It is worth looking at what this amendment is, and it is worth considering the question put by the police officer to the lady. The police officer asked her, “Are you praying?” In other words, there was nothing she was obviously doing that was harassment or in any way objectionable. The police officer had to actually go into her mind—she was just standing there; I do not think it is even clear that she was kneeling—and that is surely what is dangerous about the measure.

In speaking to this Chamber, I am going far beyond what that lady was doing. Of course I am not indulging in any objectionable behaviour by expressing my thoughts. I am not harassing anybody, but everybody in this Chamber in a sense is being forced to listen to me, and I have spent 39 years no doubt irritating people and even boring them. They cannot shut their ears, but this lady was not actually saying anything, and the policeman had to go up to her and ask what she was doing. If we are going to have a law—a criminal law—it has to be capable of being effective.

The reason George Orwell’s novel “1984” resonates so much with all of us is that the state was trying to regulate not just people’s actions but what goes on in their minds. That is why, ever since that novel was written, people have felt that probably the most advanced form of totalitarianism is one where the state is trying to regulate not simply people’s behaviour, but their minds. What the debate is about is that those who oppose my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South (Andrew Lewer) are determined to stop anybody indulging in any kind of protest, if it could be deemed to be some sort of protest, even if it is entirely silent.

The whole point of the Public Order Bill, as I understand it—this is why I support it—is that it does not outlaw peaceful protest. What the Government are addressing is people making that protest who are deliberately trying to obstruct the rights of other citizens by blocking roads or whatever. That is the point of the Bill. It has now been hijacked by people who want to stop completely silent peaceful protest.

The case of Livia Tossici-Bolt has not yet been mentioned. In the past few days she was told by council officers in Bournemouth that she would be fined simply for holding up a sign saying, “Here to talk if you want” inside a buffer zone. She was not holding up a sign with any graphic images, and she was not trying to intimidate anybody; she was simply saying, “Please, if you want to talk, I am here if you want any advice. This is a very difficult day for you.” For that she was stopped by the police. In other words, that lady was told that she could not offer other women who might, in some circumstances, be coerced into attending an abortion clinic, or who felt that they lacked the resources to complete a pregnancy, the opportunity to talk if they wanted to do so.

We must not criminalise such peaceful activity. Where are we going? Where will this stop? I believe—this is how I will conclude; I think that this is the shortest speech—that this is an entirely worthwhile, harmless, moderate amendment, and I hope that Members will support it.

[Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I remain of the view that the Bill is draconian and anti-democratic, and represents a frightening lurch towards authoritarianism. Whether or not Members agree with me, most of us will accept that the concept of what constitutes serious disruption is central to the sweeping liberty-curtailing powers and offences that it contains.

The matter of protest banning orders rests on that definition, and the peaceful and often innocent conduct that the police would seemingly be able to criminalise as a result is breath-taking in its range. The Bill says that those orders can apply to people without a conviction—the Minister explained the Government amendment earlier—if someone has carried out activities or contributed to the carrying-out of activities by any other person related to a protest

“that resulted in, or were likely to result in, serious disruption”,

among a range of other scenarios, on two or more occasions. Justice has stated:

“Given the extent of the powers contained within the Bill, it is essential that any definition should be placed at such a threshold as to minimise the possibility for abuse.”

I agree. The term “serious disruption” should be defined. Despite requests even from senior police officers for clarity in the Bill’s early stages, the Government had to be dragged to this point today. Looking at the Government’s vast and vague amendment on this issue, the reasons for not defining the term in the first place are clear. It would appear that their intention was always to set the bar at a frighteningly low level—and the bar could not be lower.

Serious disruption is “more than a minor” hindrance. That is a paradox if ever there was one. Apart from being dangerously vague, “more than a minor” hindrance is not serious disruption by any stretch of the imagination. More than a minor hindrance, as suggested by the Government, is having to cross to the other side of the road because someone is protesting on the pavement. It is a Deliveroo takeaway arriving 15 minutes later than someone would like. Those things might be annoying, but they are not serious disruption and they certainly do not warrant arrest.

I want to set this in context, as the Lords have attempted to do. The comparison in English common law is the definition of civil nuisance, which involves “substantial interference”. That is a very high bar, which has been defined by decades of case law on the matter. It is a world away from the low threshold that the Government propose in this measure.

I should make it clear that on the issue of blocking emergency vehicles—the Minister might try to cite that as a reason for the Government’s vague and dangerous amendment—of course that should be an offence, but it already is. The Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act 2006 contains two offences. First, the Act makes it an offence to obstruct or hinder certain emergency workers who are responding to emergency circumstances. Secondly, it makes it an offence to hinder or obstruct those who are assisting emergency workers responding to emergency circumstances. The Lords amendment provides a much more sensible definition of serious disruption. It states that serious disruption

“means causing significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community, in particular, where…it may result in significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product…or…it may result in a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential services”.

That complements “significant delay” in the delivery of goods and “prolonged disruption” of access to services, as set out in the Public Order Act 1986, as well as measures in the Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act.

On stop and search, which colleagues have already mentioned, of course the police must have the ability, sometimes, to stop and search when people are reasonably suspected of various crimes. However, the danger of abuse lies in the threshold of “reasonable suspicion” being low or, worse, as in the case of this Bill, non-existent.