Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Russia

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Ind)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his refusal to give clearance to the report on Russia by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Christopher Pincher)]

As the first Member who has no particular hook on which to hang their congratulations to you, Mr Speaker, may I in any event, and rather gratuitously, welcome you to the Chair?

I would like to answer my right hon. and learned Friend’s question regarding publication of the ISC’s report on Russia. The ISC provides invaluable scrutiny and oversight of the work of the intelligence community to Parliament, so I am grateful to it for conducting this timely inquiry into our work on Russia. Russia’s reckless behaviour in Salisbury and Amesbury shows that, now more than ever, we cannot afford to be complacent about the Russian threat.

Because the ISC deals with matters of national security and intelligence, its reports always contain sensitive information, so it is entirely right that they go through an intensive security review before publication. This report is one of a number of ISC reports that the Government are currently considering. The current length of time that this report has been with the Government is not unusual, as this has averaged around six weeks for reports published in recent years, and three to four weeks for a response to be forthcoming from the Government.

For example, the details of the counter-terrorism review following the attacks and the 2017-18 annual report were sent together to No. 10 on 12 October 2018. We were asked to respond 10 days later on 26 October. We responded on 8 November, and then the checked, proofread report was published on 22 November. Similarly, the details of the detainees report were sent to No. 10 on 10 May 2018. Again, the ISC asked for a response within 10 working days on 24 May. We responded on 30 May, and then the checked, proofread report was published on 12 June. In both cases, the process took approximately six weeks, because by law it is imperative that the process is thorough.

In accordance with the Justice and Security Act 2013, the impact of releasing sensitive information must be carefully considered by the Prime Minister on the advice of civil servants. We cannot rush the process and risk undermining our national security. There is no set timeline within the memorandum of understanding with the Committee for the Government to clear such reports for publication, and under the same memorandum there is no set timeline for a response, nor is such a deadline set in the governing legislation.

I want to assure the House that the Committee is well informed of this process, which is continuing along standard parameters that apply before every publication. Once the process has been completed, we will continue to keep all relevant parties and the House informed.

[Mr Grieve]

Mr Speaker, may I once again warmly congratulate you on your election?

The Intelligence and Security Committee operates on a completely non-partisan basis to try to put information into the public domain in the national interest. This report was completed in March of this year after many months of work. There then began a process of correction and redaction needed to get it published, and that process, which involved the agencies and the Cabinet Office, was completed by early October, when the agencies and the national security secretariat indicated that they were happy that the published form would not damage any operational capabilities of the agencies. That is why, on 17 October, the report was sent to the Prime Minister for final confirmation.

It is a long-standing agreement that the Prime Minister will endeavour to respond within 10 days. The Minister has indicated that there have been instances where further delay has crept in, but my secretariat tells me that it is unprecedented that we should have had no response at all explaining why any further delay is required in this case. The report has to be laid before Parliament when it is sitting. If it is not laid before Parliament ceases to sit this evening, it will not be capable of being laid until the Committee is reformed. In 2017, that took nearly six months.

I ask the Minister, how is it that the Prime Minister has claimed, through the No. 10 spokesman, that there must be further delays for consultation about national security, when the agencies themselves indicated publicly this morning, in response to journalistic inquiries, that publication will not prejudice the discharge of their functions? So for what purpose is the Prime Minister still considering it? It certainly cannot be the risk to national security, as the agencies themselves have said that there is none.

Will the Minister confirm that the Prime Minister does not have carte blanche to alter our reports or remove material from them, and that, if he wishes to exercise a veto over publication, he must give the Committee a credible explanation as to why he is doing so? Will he also explain why No. 10 spokesmen insisted that no publication should take place because weeks of further interdepartmental consultations were needed, when, I have to say to the Minister, this explanation was plainly bogus? Finally, will he explain why No. 10 spokesmen suggested that parts of the report had been leaked by the Committee, when it is plainly obvious to anybody who looks at the journalistic speculations that they have not? Would he now like to take the opportunity of withdrawing that particular slur, which came from No. 10?

[Christopher Pincher]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his questions and for his tone. I simply reiterate the points I made in my statement. It is not unusual for the review of ISC reports to take some time. The average turnaround time is six weeks. The average response to the Committee is anywhere between three and four weeks. It is not as if the Prime Minister has not had one or two other things to do over the past several weeks, notably obtaining a good deal for Britain on withdrawing from the European Union. It is not unusual that the turnaround time is what it is.

The Prime Minister has very specific and particular responsibilities, under the Justice and Security Act 2013, to be sure that any information that ISC reports may contain is properly checked and, if appropriate, redacted. The Prime Minister takes that responsibility very seriously indeed, because the reports that issue from the ISC are important. They carry weight and therefore they must be properly looked at. That is what No. 10 is doing. That is what the Prime Minister is doing by referring to his officials for advice, which is his right and responsibility.

As to leaks, we see quite a few of those and we deplore them all. I certainly would not want anybody to believe that what is in a leak, particularly if it appears on the front pages of certain newspapers, is believable.

Oral Answers to Questions

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I feel for anyone in the Thomas Cook scenario—people stranded abroad or people who lost their jobs. I have set out why the Government do not systematically bail out or step in to prop up firms that are unsustainable. I am afraid that if the hon. Lady looks at the figures, she will see that that was not a sustainable route to follow. Of course, if she wants to write to me, we will look at any details she raises, but the bottom line is that the way we create a healthy economy and jobs is by making sure that we have the tax measures in place—by not raising taxes on businesses and by supporting the workers of this country. That is what we are doing.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Ind)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on being at the Dispatch Box as Deputy Prime Minister.

How is it that the Government are allowing special advisers at No. 10 Downing Street, speaking on behalf of the Government, to tell outright lies? My right hon. Friend should be familiar with the fact that on Saturday such a special adviser—whom I believe to be Mr Dominic Cummings—told The Mail on Sunday that a number of hon. Members were in receipt of foreign funding to draft what is known as the Benn Act, something which in itself is totally untrue. Moreover, he went on to say that that was going to be the subject of a Government investigation, which is also completely untrue because, mercifully, this country is not yet run as a police state by Mr Cummings.

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I was not quite sure what the question there was, but the position of the Government is that advisers advise and Ministers decide. It is right that the legislation that we have rightly dubbed the surrender Act gets the kind of scrutiny that a Government would get—whether it is from the Executive, parliamentary Select Committees in this House or, indeed, the declarations of interest that should come forward in the normal way.

Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I listened very carefully to what the right hon. Lady said and I would be grateful if she thought again about the words she used when she accused officials in our agencies—I think that I quote accurately—of being “involved in torture”. They were not involved in torture, so I really think the right hon. Lady may want to come back to the House and say that, actually, that is an inaccurate accusation.

These were very unique times. The twin towers had been blown up in the biggest terrorist attack we have seen. It went right to the heart of the United States psyche, and there was inevitably going to be a very strong and strict response. We are, of course, very close allies of the United States and work very closely with them on intelligence matters. What the response led to was a lot of officers being asked to do things that they had not been trained for and had never encountered before. It took time to understand that there were certain practices going on which required new rules. Perhaps, if there is a fault, it is the time it took for that appreciation to dawn. But once it did, I think it is of credit to this country and our intelligence agencies that they reviewed their practices, revised them and adjusted as best they could to the new world in which they were working.

The right hon. Lady says that I should listen to the ISC. I can say that I have done so, as I was on the Committee. Not only did I listen to it, but many of those interviewed also had to listen to me. The inquisition and witness sessions of the Committee, chaired by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), were very robust indeed. I also say to her that Adrian Fulford is part of a structured and formal apparatus. The fact that the Prime Minister has said that he should look at the consolidated guidance in the way that she has is, I think, addressing some of the outstanding issues, which, quite rightly, the House would like to see studied.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is not the role of the ISC to take a view on whether there should be a judge-led inquiry. That is a matter for the Government and for this House. What I think can and should be said about this matter, and which may be helpful for the Minister, are three points.

First, as the Minister will appreciate, when the report was published, the Committee was extremely disappointed that it was not able to access the witnesses from whom it wanted to hear. It is important to understand that this was not because it wished to pass judgment on those witnesses—far from it—but because it felt strongly that the witnesses would be able to help to fill out the information that was present on the documents in a way that would be helpful to the purposes of the Committee in explaining to the House and the public what had been going on.

The second point, which has been raised from time to time, is what is to happen to the Libyan cases. My right hon. Friend has not commented on that, but what I will say about the Libyan cases is that in view of the difficulties that the Committee has experienced, there can be absolutely no question of the Committee being willing to consider those cases in the light of the difficulties it has had.

Thirdly, if I may gently pick up with my right hon. Friend the length of time this report has taken, the reason why it has taken so long is that, for nearly 12 months of that period, there was no Committee sitting at all, which should be a matter of concern to the House, and there was a period of six months, which in my view was also much too long, in which we failed to get a response from the Government about our request to have those witnesses.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his comments. I quite understand what he is saying about the difficulty of a Committee working when it is not actually constituted, and I hear what he says about the Libyan cases. In the case of witnesses, I think it has been made clear in the House that he regrets that he was unable to see more of them, but the fundamental question here is: if things went wrong as it is thought they did, could such things ever happen again? The reassurance that we can offer the House, and indeed the wider world, is that agencies now have clear guidance, including the consolidated guidance, which covers all aspects of dealing with detainees and has training on operational management. Compliance with this guidance is mandatory and this is very much a part of agency culture. The consolidated guidance is coupled with a world-leading independent oversight regime, underpinned by the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which has just commenced, so these are extant—they are working. It has given enhanced powers to the Intelligence and Security Committee to oversee the activities of the security and intelligence agencies alongside the statutory role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Adrian Fulford, to whom I referred earlier.

Government Policy on Russia

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 6th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very perceptive point about the way in which such attacks affect not only the UK but many of our NATO allies. If what happened in Salisbury turns out to be as many suspect, we will co-ordinate our response with our NATO allies.

The hon. Gentleman asks how we protect such individuals, which is obviously not something on which he would expect me to comment in the House of Commons. We do our best to give such individuals the protection we can.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement, which highlights the very real problems that we are now encountering in our relations with Russia. He will be aware that when the Intelligence and Security Committee was reformed, we immediately announced that one of our priorities is to carry out an inquiry into Russia’s covert activities and whether we have the appropriate responses to them. He may agree that that matter perhaps now requires a greater degree of urgency. I therefore ask him to do everything possible to facilitate that inquiry and ensure that it can get under way as soon as possible.

[Boris Johnson]

From his vantage point as Chair of the ISC, my right hon. and learned Friend has been following this very closely. I undertake to get back to him on that matter as soon as possible.

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry]

That is a serious point, and I hope that Members will consider it. The question is whether the House was deliberately misled. Chilcot concluded that, although the intelligence may have been flawed and the House misled, it was not deliberately misled. Therefore, in my opinion, if the House tried to make any findings of fact and act on them, it would move away from those previous times when the instrument of a contempt motion has been used. When it has been used previously, there has been a finding of fact upon which the House has been able to act, meaning that someone has either been found guilty or admitted an offence. There has been no admission of deliberately misleading the House, so if the House attempted to make a factual finding, it would become a kangaroo court, because the person accused would not be allowed to represent themselves or speak. In my view, such circumstances would fly in the face of this country’s established principles of justice. Opposition Members are particularly interested in the Human Rights Act, and in article 6, on the right to a fair trial.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The hon. Lady has pre-empted what I was about to say. It seems somewhat strange that some Members who rightly proclaim our need to adhere to the European convention on human rights should suggest a process that cannot meet article 6 requirements under any circumstances.

[Emily Thornberry]

I always get very worried when I agree so thoroughly with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I find it happening on many occasions. [Interruption.] I hear from a sedentary position, “You lawyers are all the same”, but we do agree on certain principles. Frankly, our concern is sometimes to ensure that our colleagues who are not lawyers understand these basic legal principles.

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[Emily Thornberry]

It is interesting to hear what the right hon. Gentleman says, but that issue is one of speculation. In my view it is not legal to intervene in a country to topple a regime, and morally we should not intervene in a country unless we have some form of strategy to ensure that the country we leave is in a better state than when we first arrived.

[Mr Grieve]

When I was in government I had some involvement in the Libyan intervention, and from memory I do not think that there was a blinding of oneself to potential problems as a result of that intervention. We must also bear it in mind that the trigger for the intervention was the fact that Colonel Gaddafi was about to kill tens of thousands of his own citizens. That prompted the Security Council resolution that provided the legal basis for the intervention. That highlights—I will come on to speak about this—some of the really difficult decisions in those areas, where even questions of legality do not come into it. I certainly would not be willing to characterise that intervention as having been wrong in the circumstances that prevailed at the time.

[Emily Thornberry]

I hear what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, but my point is that, again, information was available and could have informed the intervention. Once the initial intervention had been made, what happened thereafter? How were manifest and obvious dangers protected against? I do not think that those important points were considered, and again we learn a lesson from Chilcot and Iraq that is so much more important that any form of soap opera regarding Tony Blair or not Tony Blair.

The other important issue is post-war planning, some of which has been touched on—this is my final point, Mr Speaker, as everyone will be glad to hear. Perhaps most devastatingly, Chilcot highlights the total absence of adequate planning for what would happen after the war and the long-term strategy for Iraq. If ever a mistake should never be repeated, it is the idea that we enter into another military intervention with no idea of its consequences, no plan for the aftermath, and no long-term strategy. And yet, that is the exact hallmark of all the outgoing Prime Minister’s interventions.

Again, we see the evidence in Libya. In the words of President Obama, the Prime Minister became “distracted”, and once the Gaddafi regime had been overthrown, the lengthy, arduous task of post-war reconstruction was all but ignored. In the years since, Libya has been riven by factionalism and violence. Its experiment with democracy was brief, with power in the hands of rival militias, and the ungoverned space that that created was an invitation for Daesh to establish a strategic foothold on the Libyan coast. It is a stain on this Government that they began to pay real attention to the mess they had left in Libya only once that terrorist threat from Daesh became too urgent to ignore.

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[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). There is no doubt that they have two very clear advantages over me in this debate, in that both of them opposed the motion in the House in 2003, which initiated our military action in Iraq. I, on the other hand, supported it—something that I have come very much to regret. I supported it at the time because I was persuaded by the arguments eloquently put forward by the Prime Minister, Mr Blair. He said that, in his view, Saddam Hussein was a real and present danger in the immediate context and that that justified taking military action against him, even without going back for a further resolution of the United Nations Security Council, but relying on the previous resolutions, which, as considerable evidence showed, had been serially breached by Saddam Hussein, certainly in his non co-operation. On that basis, I voted for the motion, as did many others who are still Members and present in this House today.

Sir John Chilcot’s report highlights how the decision-making processes of government can become distorted under pressure of events. I should like to think that I am always a bit wary of that. The distortions highlighted in the report are so considerable that it highlights a dysfunctionality at the heart of Mr Blair’s Government that I hope may have been exceptional to him. For all that, there are plenty of cautionary tales for us in this House today that we can look at in the current context just as much as they would have been considered at the time.

This point seems to have been rather well made already that, and I will not repeat it, because Mr Blair had formed in his view a very strong resolution that we should support the United States, including in removing Saddam Hussein and effecting regime change, the entirety of the processes of government and of Whitehall were then skewed in order to achieve that aim and had the mischief of disregarding all the evidence that might be available to contradict the belief that that was the right course of action to take—whether it was intelligence information or the thorny problem of legality, both of which I wish to touch on briefly this afternoon.

On the question of the intelligence, those of us who have been in government, or who have served on the National Security Council as I have—indeed it is also true of my current role as Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee—know perfectly well that intelligence, often obtained at great risk and which is with difficulty, can only be what it is, a tool in decision making. The intelligence may be mistaken. One cannot prevent that in a human society, and one cannot guarantee that its interpretation will be correct. My impression during my time in government was that the intelligence agencies and the Joint Intelligence Committee now go to very considerable lengths to point out the limits of the use to which intelligence can properly be put—a lesson which, I suspect, they derived from this experience.

Reading Sir John Chilcot’s report, one can only conclude that the way in which intelligence was handled during the run-up to the Iraq war is, in some cases, truly breathtaking. It makes very troublesome reading. I hope very much—I am not going to say anything more about this—that those within the agencies who now do the work will read and reread Sir John’s report in order to remind themselves of how perfectly reasonable intelligence was skewed and, I have to say, misused for the purposes of justifying a theory, and then, I am afraid, misused by Mr Blair when he came to address this House in the defining moment before the war was sanctioned by this Parliament.

The certainties that were engendered were never present. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley) made a very good intervention about this last week when he said that if we had taken the time and trouble to read some of the background information available, we might have doubted some of the certainties that were being expressed. I think he was absolutely right about that, and that is another burden that Members of this House who participated in that debate will have to bear.

So much for the intelligence. What about the process of legal advice? I was at the heart of trying to provide legal advice to Government when I was a Law Officer. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General is on the Front Bench and he, too, has been involved in those processes. As Law Officers know, legal advice is often advice which cannot in any way be certain. Legal advice is exactly what it says it is. In some cases, particularly when one is dealing with international law, the question whether one is on the right side or the wrong side of international law is an intensely grey area, precisely because there is no ultimate tribunal to determine those issues. Yet at the heart of the British Government’s doctrine and ethics is the principle that we have to act lawfully at all times. It is for the Law Officers to try to steer that course.

What shines through to me, reading the Chilcot inquiry report, is not, as some critics have said, that Lord Goldsmith as Attorney General abandoned legal objectivity. Now that I have read the Chilcot inquiry report and looked at these passages very carefully, it seems to me that he fulfilled those criteria as best he possibly could, but that he was drawn into a process which in itself was utterly flawed, because it cherry-picked whatever bit of the advice that he provided suited those who wanted to present it, and then sold it in that way both to the Cabinet, who never properly inquired or scrutinised it at all, and ultimately to the public.

[Mr David Davis]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend really think that the Attorney General met all his duties? The report refers to the final question to Tony Blair, which it says was answered perfunctorily, about whether the conditions had been met. Surely he should have been a little more pressing, rather than accepting a perfunctory reply before changing his view.

[Mr Grieve]

I simply quote from paragraph 810 of the executive summary:

“It is an essential part of the legal basis for military action”—

this was written by an official in the Attorney General’s Department—

“without a further resolution of the Security Council that there is strong evidence that Iraq has failed to comply with and co-operate fully in the implementation of resolution 1441 and has thus failed to take the final opportunity offered by the Security Council in that resolution. The Attorney General understands that it is unequivocally the Prime Minister’s view that Iraq has committed further material breaches as specified in [operative] paragraph 4 of resolution 1441, but as this is a judgment for the Prime Minister, the Attorney would be grateful for confirmation that this is the case.”

It is important to understand one of the big changes that has probably taken place between 2003 and today in the way in which a Law Officer’s advice is secured. My impression from reading Chilcot—I hope I have got this right—is that, in practice, the Attorney General was provided with only sketched backgrounds of the factual analysis on which his legal opinion was being sought. The big difference now, and I can tell the House this without giving away state secrets, is that if Law Officers are asked to advise on a factual basis that involves a serious or complex problem of international law, they will receive briefing that is as good as, and—if they demand it—potentially better than, that which would be provided to the Prime Minister himself as to the intelligence and factual base that justifies it, so they have to make their own independent assessment. However, it is quite clear that, in 2003, and, I suspect, even before then—I do not think this was peculiar to 2003—that was not the practice that was adopted; it was not how Government worked. In practice, the Law Officer, Lord Goldsmith, was placed in a position where he had, reasonably, to take on trust the factual assessments made by others, and particularly the Prime Minister.

I want to make it clear that I cannot make a judgment on whether Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March was right or not, but he set out—correctly, in my view—the alternative interpretations available for resolution 1441. I simply make the point, as I did in my intervention, that there are areas of international law that raise massive difficulties of interpretation. If, for example, we stuck, as some jurists would argue, to the principle that no military intervention can take place without UN Security Council authorisation, the well-established United Kingdom doctrine of intervening on the basis of humanitarian necessity, which is what led us to be able to take action in Kosovo, would never have come about. I simply chuck that into the pool of the debate the House has had in trying to understand some of the complexities.

Of course, none of that gets away from the fact that the debate would likely have been very different in Cabinet if Lord Goldsmith’s advice in its original form had been properly presented, circulated and discussed. As any of us who have been in government know, the process by which we moderate each other’s opinions is by challenging them. If we do not have a process of challenge, we should not be surprised that, at the end of the day, people simply end up rubber-stamping decisions because it appears convenient to do so. One of the interesting features, I might add, of being in coalition was that one quickly realised that because some members of, for example, the National Security Council or the Cabinet were not beholden to the Prime Minister, the level of challenge was raised in a manner that one might not necessarily have found in a single-party Government, which is an interesting reflection on some of the problems that flow from it. Of course, when one has a Prime Minister who is utterly dominant after four or five years in government and receiving a triumphant second mandate, these things become even harder.

Those, then, are my thoughts on those two principal issues. There are lots of other issues in the report, which is one of the most compelling reads I have had. I am not sure I am going to be able to get through the whole lot, but I will certainly try to read much more of it.

Let me just make two final points. First, the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) expressed the desire that accountability should lead to somebody being held at least in contempt of this House if Mr Blair did act improperly. I simply say to him that, just as some people were talking about impeachment, which was last used in 1806, contempt proceedings in Parliament—unless they are based on findings made in an external tribunal that meets article 6 compliance —will, in practice, be very difficult. I would strongly argue that, tempting as such a route might suggest itself to be, the practical difficulties are likely to make it impossible to follow. I say that in all sincerity.

[Joanna Cherry]

I would like to explore this with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I am not quite clear in what way he considers that the former Prime Minister’s civil rights and obligations would be determined in a contempt motion. As I understand it, as a novice in parliamentary procedure, it is a breach of privilege. It is not a determination of the former PM’s civil rights or obligations, and it is clearly not a criminal charge—a contempt of court. Could the right hon. and learned Gentleman elucidate on what basis he thinks that article 6 would be engaged?

[Mr Grieve]

It depends, I suppose, on what sanction this House wishes to follow. However, there is a second issue. We may have examples where somebody says one thing to this House and, in front of a tribunal or court of record, when giving evidence on oath, says something different. The House can then look at those two things juxtaposed and conclude, for example, that the House was misled in evidence that it was given. That might well give rise to a finding of breach of privilege for contempt, although that still leaves unanswered the question of sanctions.

I do understand the hon. and learned Lady’s point. However, I am not, in this case, making some definitive statement; I am simply describing what, to my mind, appear to be the difficulties that are likely to come from trying to pursue this particular course of action. As, on the whole, I would like the reputation of this House to stand enhanced by the way in which we approach the Chilcot inquiry report and its aftermath, I am always wary of suggesting, counselling or recommending a course of action that might lead to the very opposite of what is intended.

[Joanna Cherry]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I hold his legal expertise in the highest regard. He says that it is important that the reputation of this House is enhanced by the way in which it deals with the outcome of this report. Surely the reputation of this House will not be enhanced if there is no attempt to hold the former Prime Minister to account.

[Mr Grieve]

I have listened to the hon. and learned Lady, and this matter can be debated or discussed at greater length, but, as I say, I counsel caution. The truth is that the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, has been examined at the court of public opinion and, I suspect, of history, and I think it is likely that that judgment is going to be pretty unkind to the way in which this process was carried out. Whether the House feels that it wants to do more immediately is a matter that we can debate another time.

The point has been made that the outcome of this process in the middle east has been, on the evidence, lamentable. Of course, the middle east is a place of massive dysfunctionality. It may be that even if we had not intervened in 2003, we would find that another pattern of war and bloody conflict would have occurred, based on a whole series of disintegrations of the social fabric of that area that has been going on for some time, and that we can see manifested in the current conflicts in Iraq and Syria. That is not, I think, entirely due to our intervention in 2003, but has elements inherent within those societies themselves. I worry very much—indeed, this has coloured my view as a politician ever since—that this has also had a terrible effect on public trust in us and our institutions in this country that carries itself all the way into the Brexit referendum and its aftermath. On that, I rather agreed, for once, with an article in the New Statesman.

We have much to learn from this very sorry episode. The nugget I derive from it is that we must have open debate and that we must avoid simply treating politics as presentational gimmicks. That has become a habit in modern western society because of the development of social media, the press and the way in which we communicate ideas, but if we continue to do it we will ruthlessly undermine sensible decision making and the ability to come to the right conclusions by debate, which is absolutely the heart of what this House should be about.

Europe, Human Rights and Keeping People Safe at Home and Abroad

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

We do not know by any means that the ECJ always finds in favour of the Community. Indeed, we have done rather well when challenged in the ECJ. For example, when the European Central Bank disgracefully tried to prevent euro-denominated financial instruments from being cleared in the City of London, we went to the ECJ and won the case, with a clear declaration that the ECB’s proposal was illegal. So I simply do not accept the premise of my Friend’s question.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Further to that point, is not the very essence of the Prime Minister’s deal in Brussels, to which I suggest too little attention has been paid, that it provides a firm guarantee that the UK’s position outside the eurozone will not be used to jeopardise its position within the single market? Is that not a very important safeguard and one that, in the context of the ECJ and any arbitration it has to carry out, will have to be taken into account and has binding force in international law?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. Those on the other side of the argument spent a lot of time trying to argue that the agreement did not have binding force in international law, only—eventually—to have to concede that it did. He is absolutely right. The deal that the Prime Minister negotiated is substantive, and if we vote to remain in the EU on 23 June, we will move ahead with the implementation of those measures, which will give Britain not only the advantages, which we already have, that come with membership of a 500-million consumer-strong marketplace but all the additional advantages and assurances that the deal brings.

I know from my meetings with colleagues from across the EU that, whatever people in the House or the country think, our colleagues in Europe cannot believe the deal that we have negotiated. They cannot believe we managed to negotiate the best of both worlds—being in the EU but able to opt out of all the measures we find do not suit our political purposes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to be able to participate in this debate on the Gracious Speech. If I may say so, it was an immense pleasure to hear my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary so clearly present and articulate Conservative principles of international engagement, particularly our adherence to rules-based international systems. We have a long tradition in that area, and it is perhaps one of our greatest offerings to the world. I want to return to that in a few moments, but the way he expounded it seemed to me to put it with absolutely crystal clarity that the United Kingdom sees itself as belonging to a rules-based system that helps to maintain values and to further freedom, democracy and the rule of law.

I have no doubt that, as we meet, we face really serious challenges in promoting those values, whether from Russia, which appears in some respects to be descending into a gangster state given its gross violations of international law, or from the anarchy in the middle east. It is quite clear that on our doorstep—very close to us, and capable of affecting us—there is a whole series of processes that, quite frankly, appear on any analysis to be retrograde. That must inform the entire way in which we look at how we pursue our own policies.

I am delighted that the Government have made progress in Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill. I recognise that it is absolutely essential to have the tools to protect ourselves properly against those who seek to do us harm. I understand that the Bill is shortly to return to the House on Report, and I very much hope that we will be able to make further progress to ensure that the Government’s completely legitimate aim of protecting us all in this country can be reconciled with some of the concerns that people have about personal liberty. I am pretty convinced that they can be reconciled, and I look forward to playing a part in that process when the Bill returns to the House, no doubt along with other members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I have the privilege of chairing.

I will also take a great interest in the extremism Bill. I must say to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary that I have some considerable concerns about how this legislation can be framed in practice to reconcile it with the right of freedom of expression, which applies even when the matters expressed are ones with which we heartily disagree. We have to be very careful. There is a tendency within democracy—perhaps for understandable reasons of electoral advantage—to stay silent in the face of comments with which we may disagree where we nevertheless would like at least to encourage people to consider giving us their support. The problem with legislation of this kind is that it might both antagonise people who express points of view that in practice are incompatible with the furtherance and survival of democracy but at the same time subtly free us, as parliamentarians, from the duty of challenging those people. We need to look to what we do as parliamentarians just as much as to any legislation that we seek to enact.

That brings me to my two key points about rules-based international systems. Such systems are indeed the United Kingdom’s principal gift to the world. I once asked the Foreign Office how many treaties we had signed up to; although it was reluctant to go back beyond 1834, it accepted that since then we had signed up to more than 13,000 that were still extant. More than 700 contain arbitral mechanisms for resolving disputes, whereby the United Kingdom undertakes to accept the binding judgment of a tribunal or arbitrator in respect of the treaty. The EU treaties—or for that matter the European convention on human rights—are no different from any of the others when it comes to the UK’s intentions in having signed up to them.

What are we to make of some of my colleagues here in Parliament, who, for example, say that not only do they want the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union but that when we have had a vote in support of that we should not take the lawful route of invoking article 50 of the Lisbon treaty, but instead should merely legislate in Parliament to delete those aspects of the treaty that appear onerous or incompatible with our own views? What they are advocating is no different from President Putin’s saying that it is legitimate to annex Crimea because the Russian Duma has said that it is an acceptable thing to do. But that is the reality of some—I emphasise “some”—of the very strange utterances that we are hearing in the course of the debate on the EU referendum. Not only are there policy differences on the future, but there is a willingness to articulate suggestions that the United Kingdom should adopt an anarchic approach to our international obligations.

That brings me to my principal point, namely that in the Gracious Speech there is a further reference to enacting a Bill of Rights. I will make it clear that there may be arguments as to why the United Kingdom might profitably seek to have a Bill of Rights. As time goes by, I begin to think that the widespread constitutional changes as a result of devolution are of such a character that providing a constitutional framework in which devolution can operate might be of merit. I recognise that that is an enormous task to take on, and do not in any way criticise my right hon. Friends in the Government for being reluctant to embark upon it, but within that context I can see that a Bill of Rights might play some key role; indeed, the idea that we might have a Bill of Rights was discussed back in the early 1990s, before we decided to enact the Human Rights Act.

I confess that it is quite clear that that is not what my colleagues in the Government have in mind. What they have in mind is very unclear—indeed, that is part of the problem—but it is certainly not that. It appears to range from some minor cosmetic changes to the Human Rights Act—on that, I would simply echo the view of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that if that is really what is intended, what on earth is the point?—to the suggestion that some radical change to the Human Rights Act and to the text of the convention could be effected, a change that, as far as I can see, would then almost automatically place us in breach of our obligations under the European convention.

The European convention is not a perfect document, and I have no doubt that its interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights has at times also been imperfect. To put it bluntly, however, in my view it constitutes without the slightest doubt the single most important lever that has ever been devised on this planet for improving human rights, not only in Europe but worldwide. The United Kingdom’s ambivalent position on the convention is doing us immense reputational damage, and it is also damaging the effectiveness of that convention. The United Kingdom’s position is invoked by Mr Putin to justify Russian intransigence in implementing judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, and in the past it has been invoked by the President of Kenya when justifying a failure to co-operate with the International Criminal Court, which is at the centre of the Foreign Secretary’s efforts to promote human rights worldwide. There are also other examples, including by signatory states such as Ukraine.

As we debate this matter, and as the Government consider what to do about a Bill of Rights, we must bear it in mind that this is not an internal conversation; it is one that goes to the very heart of the principles that the Foreign Secretary so clearly set out. This debate should be conducted in a way that reflects that, and that also reflects the immense changes that have been taking place at the European Court of Human Rights, thanks—he was very modest about it—to the efforts of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe and the Brighton Declaration. We must consider how the convention is operating today and how it is applied in this country through the Human Rights Act, and not just how it was applied 10 years ago. If we keep that in mind, we may come up with some sensible conclusions, although I urge my Front-Bench colleagues to ensure that any consultation period is long enough to enable us all to consider and participate in it fully.

With that in mind, I was pleased to hear the way that the Government articulated their adherence to an international rules-based system this afternoon. That is one of the things that brought me into the Conservative party, although our adherence to and belief in such a system is not exclusive to us, and is probably shared widely across the House. In those circumstances, we must uphold it, and if we do that we will come up with the right conclusions on the legislation proposed by the Government this Session.

European Union Referendum Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 9th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Let me complete my remarks on this section, and then I will come back to my hon. Friend’s point. I hope that I will clarify the matter for him.

Clearly, it will be for the yes and the no campaigns to lead the debate in the weeks preceding the poll. The campaigns will be designated by the Electoral Commission, and will receive a number of benefits, including a public grant and eligibility to make a referendum broadcast and to send a free mailshot to voters. I can assure the House that the Government have no intention of undermining those campaigns, and they do not propose to spend large sums of public money during the purdah period prescribed by section 125 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000. A vibrant, robust debate in the best traditions of British democracy is in all our interests. If my hon. Friend’s concern is that the Government are thinking of spending public money to deliver doorstep mailshots in the last four weeks of the campaign, I can assure him that the Government have no such intention. The Government will exercise proper restraint to ensure a balanced debate during the campaign.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I remember that one of the arguments that I made on my party’s behalf during debates on the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 was that the purdah period should be extended, not restricted. While I understand the points that my right hon. Friend makes, and while I expect that I shall argue for a yes vote in the referendum—although I shall wait on the Prime Minister’s renegotiation —we have to be careful to provide a level playing field and make it clear that the Government will not abuse their position. For that reason, I hope that the Government will focus on this issue. The change that is being introduced to legislation that we previously said was deficient in this respect could convey an impression that the Government will come in and try to load the dice, and that must be avoided.

[Mr Hammond]

I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend’s sentiments. I hope that he recognises that I have sought to reassure colleagues who have such concerns, and that the Government will continue to seek to reassure colleagues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Salmond]

I know that many people in the Labour party find the argument about the difference between a country and a county or city very difficult. I advise the hon. Gentleman that there are many routes to revival for the Labour party in Scotland, but suggesting that Scotland is not a nation, or is equivalent to a city or a county, is not one of the best avenues. All the four component nations of the United Kingdom should be treated with equal respect.

The subject of respect comes to the issue of whether the referendum might be held on the same day as the Scottish, Welsh and, possibly, the Northern Irish elections. I am sure that Ministers on the Treasury Bench will have heard the huge opposition to such a proposal from all those nations, but that does not come only from representatives of those countries or even of London. It also comes from the Electoral Commission, which—last December—not only said that was a bad idea, but gave clear advice to the Government. It said:

“Any government introducing legislation for future referendums, not only in Scotland but also those held across or in other parts of the UK, should also publish at the same time its assessment of the implications of holding other polls on the same day. This will enable legislatures (including the Scottish Parliament and the UK Parliament) to consider the relative benefits and risks of the proposal as they scrutinise the referendum Bill.”

So the Electoral Commission recommended that should be done “at the same time”. We are now discussing the Bill on the Referendum. I ask the Minister for Europe where the assessment is that the Electoral Commission called for in such unambiguous language.

[Mr Grieve]

May I take the right hon. Gentleman back a moment to his arguments about the franchise? Is he arguing that prisoners should be empowered to vote in the referendum? If they should be in the parliamentary franchise, which arguably—under the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights—they should, that might be an argument for their inclusion, but I noticed that, when he was First Minister in Scotland and the matter was being debated here, the silence of his Administration on the subject was deafening.

[Alex Salmond]

The silence was action. The Government that I led defended in court—I am surprised the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not follow the proceedings of the Scottish courts on the matter—an attempt to enfranchise prisoners in the Scottish referendum, and we were right to refuse that. I merely pointed out that ex-prisoners in the House of Lords will be enfranchised by the Government’s proposals while fine, upstanding European citizens who have never done a thing wrong in their lives, such as Christian Allard MSP, are to be denied a vote. I am truly surprised that someone with such a liberal reputation—the right hon. and learned Gentleman may be the last liberal in the House—should make such a point. Perhaps he is campaigning for some Select Committee and trying to garner support from the Tory Benches.

Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman attempted to distract me, I was making an important point about the clear injunction—to use an English term—from the Electoral Commission that if a Bill for a referendum left open the possibility of holding elections on the same day, an assessment should be published at the same time. That was what the Electoral Commission said last December. Ministers have said that they are considering that, so where is the assessment that the Electoral Commission required to be published? Where is the Government’s assessment of the pros and cons of holding an election on the same day? It would be unacceptable to the people of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to have the European referendum held on the same day as our national elections.

The Bill is badly based on nonsense and a contradiction. The Prime Minister, who is introducing the Bill—although he is not here with us today—does not actually want to withdraw from the European Union. Major constitutional referendums should be held on a proposition honestly held, whether for independence, devolution or proportional representation, and backed up by those proposing it. The Prime Minister proposes to hold the referendum as a political tactic, and that is the contradiction at the heart of the Bill. That is why there is so much suspicion already, not only among opponents of Europe but among proponents of Europe, and that is why the Bill should not be given a Second Reading later today.